State of U. P v. Gufran, pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Safipur, District

"To quash the impugned Charge Sheet No. 208/2024 dated 31-8-2024, Criminal Case No. 1263/2024, arising out of Case Crime No. 116/2024 under Section 3/25 Arms Act, 1959, Police Station-Fatehpur Chaurasi, District-Unnao as well as cognizance order dated 28-11-2024, State of U. P. versus Gufran, pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Safipur, District- Unnao."

3. Charge-sheet dated 31.08.2024 has been challenged only on the ground that on recovery memo there is no independent witness.

4. The High Court has inherent powers in criminal matters not by virtue of Section 482 Cr.P.C. but because the powers inherent in High Court, as a superior Court of record by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution of India and as it is a protector of fundamental rights of citizens. Section 482 Cr.P.C. merely makes explicit what is otherwise inherent in the High Court. Nevertheless, when we see the provision contained in Section 482 Cr.P.C. it says, "nothing in this Court shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Court, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice". Thus, the said provision merely clarifies that the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code shall not in any way limit or effect the inherent powers of the High Court.

5. Inherent powers of the High Court can be exercised to- (i) make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

6. The scope of inherent powers, the circumstances and manner in which they are to be exercised is no longer res-integera as it has been dealt with in a catena of decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as also this Court. In a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India Ahmed Ali Quraishi Versus State of U.P. And Others reported in AIR 2020 SCC 788 the law in this regard has been discussed and explained at length. Relevant paragraph nos. 10 to 16 of this report are as under:- "10. Before we enter into facts of the present case and submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to look into the scope and ambit of inherent jurisdiction which is exercised by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. This Court had the occasion to consider the scope and jurisdiction of Section 482 CrPC. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal[State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], had elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC/Article 226 of the Constitution in the context of quashing the criminal proceedings. In para 102, this Court enumerated seven categories of cases where power can be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 CrPC by the High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings. Para 102 is as follows:- "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

11. This Court in Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P. [Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P., (2017) 13 SCC 369 : (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 633] , had considered the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. In the above case also, the Additional Civil Judicial Magistrate had summoned the accused for offences under Sections 452, 376 and 323 IPC and the criminal revision against the said order was dismissed by the District Judge.

12. This Court time and again has examined the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy[State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404] , held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the following has been stated: (SCC p. 703) "7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."

13. A three-Judge Bench in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , had the occasion to consider the ambit of Section 482 CrPC. By analysing the scope of Section 482 CrPC, this Court laid down that authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It further held that court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. The following was laid down in para 6: (SCC p. 94) "6. ... All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."

7. Upon due consideration of the principle settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court on the scope of exercising inherent power provided under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Section 528 of BNSS indicated above, as also the allegations levelled against the applicant in the FIR, according to which on being pointed out by the Police informer, the applicant was apprehended and from his possession country made pistol (Tamancha 315 bore) and two live cartridges were recovered, this Court finds that in the instant matter no interference is required. Accordingly, the application being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed. Order Date :- 10.3.2025 Jyoti/- JYOTI RAJWANI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

"To quash the impugned Charge Sheet No. 208/2024 dated 31-8-2024, Criminal Case No. 1263/2024, arising out of Case Crime No. 116/2024 under Section 3/25 Arms Act, 1959, Police Station-Fatehpur Chaurasi, District-Unnao as well as cognizance order dated 28-11-2024, State of U. P. versus Gufran, pending before the Judicial Magistrate, Safipur, District- Unnao."

3. Charge-sheet dated 31.08.2024 has been challenged only on the ground that on recovery memo there is no independent witness.

4. The High Court has inherent powers in criminal matters not by virtue of Section 482 Cr.P.C. but because the powers inherent in High Court, as a superior Court of record by virtue of Article 215 of the Constitution of India and as it is a protector of fundamental rights of citizens. Section 482 Cr.P.C. merely makes explicit what is otherwise inherent in the High Court. Nevertheless, when we see the provision contained in Section 482 Cr.P.C. it says, "nothing in this Court shall be deemed to limit or effect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Court, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice". Thus, the said provision merely clarifies that the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code shall not in any way limit or effect the inherent powers of the High Court.

5. Inherent powers of the High Court can be exercised to- (i) make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court (iii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

6. The scope of inherent powers, the circumstances and manner in which they are to be exercised is no longer res-integera as it has been dealt with in a catena of decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India as also this Court. In a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India Ahmed Ali Quraishi Versus State of U.P. And Others reported in AIR 2020 SCC 788 the law in this regard has been discussed and explained at length. Relevant paragraph nos. 10 to 16 of this report are as under:- "10. Before we enter into facts of the present case and submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it is necessary to look into the scope and ambit of inherent jurisdiction which is exercised by the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. This Court had the occasion to consider the scope and jurisdiction of Section 482 CrPC. This Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal[State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], had elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC/Article 226 of the Constitution in the context of quashing the criminal proceedings. In para 102, this Court enumerated seven categories of cases where power can be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution/Section 482 CrPC by the High Court for quashing the criminal proceedings. Para 102 is as follows:- "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

11. This Court in Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P. [Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P., (2017) 13 SCC 369 : (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 633] , had considered the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. In the above case also, the Additional Civil Judicial Magistrate had summoned the accused for offences under Sections 452, 376 and 323 IPC and the criminal revision against the said order was dismissed by the District Judge.

12. This Court time and again has examined the scope of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and laid down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy[State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404] , held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7 of the judgment, the following has been stated: (SCC p. 703) "7. ... In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."

13. A three-Judge Bench in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa [State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 539] , had the occasion to consider the ambit of Section 482 CrPC. By analysing the scope of Section 482 CrPC, this Court laid down that authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It further held that court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. The following was laid down in para 6: (SCC p. 94) "6. ... All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."

7. Upon due consideration of the principle settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court on the scope of exercising inherent power provided under Section 482 Cr.P.C./Section 528 of BNSS indicated above, as also the allegations levelled against the applicant in the FIR, according to which on being pointed out by the Police informer, the applicant was apprehended and from his possession country made pistol (Tamancha 315 bore) and two live cartridges were recovered, this Court finds that in the instant matter no interference is required. Accordingly, the application being devoid of merits is hereby dismissed. Order Date :- 10.3.2025 Jyoti/- JYOTI RAJWANI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench