Mohanlalganj, Lucknow Thru. Its Commandant vs State Of U.P. Thru. Addl. District Magistrate (Land

In Re : First Appeal Defective No. 18 of 2024: 4Th Battalion Sashastra Seema Bal, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow Thru. its Commandant Versus State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Dist. Magistrate (Land Acquistion), Lko and another 2. IA/1/2024 In Re : First Appeal Defective No. 26 of 2024: 4Th Battalion, Sashastra Seema Bal, Having Mohanlalganj, Lucknow Thru. its Commandant its Office at Versus State of U.P. Thru. Addl. District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Lucknow and 6 others Court No. - 19 HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

1. The aforesaid applications along with affidavit have been filed for condonation of delay in filing of the aforesaid first appeals.

2. Heard Shri Ankit Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant, learned Standing Counsel for the State, Shri Vijay Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the private respondents and perused the record. Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties.

3. Shri Ankit Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is delay of 41 days in filing the aforesaid appeals. 2 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024

4. He further submits that the reason for such delay is a process in the department, which took reasonable period of time for filing the aforesaid appeals. In view of these circumstances, there is sufficient cause for not filing the appeals on time, therefore, the delay may be condoned.

5. Per contra, Shri Vijay Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the private respondents vehemently opposes the applications for condonation of delay and submits that the land of the private respondents has been acquired.

6. Learned counsel for the private respondent submits that as per Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 2013'), an appeal has to be filed within 60 days from the date of award.

7. Learned counsel for the private respondents submits that the above mentioned appeals have been filed beyond the period of limitation and no sufficient cause has been explained in the delay condonation application. Moreover, the day to day delay has also not been properly explained. These appeals suffer from delay and are accordingly liable to be dismissed.

8. After the compensation was awarded and the land owner moved application for enhancement of the compensation and the Reference Court had allowed the said enhancement, which has been assailed by means of the instant appeals.

9. He further submits that in spite of the order of enhancement of compensation by the Reference Court, the appellant has filed the appeal, which suffer from delay and laches.

10. The matters are pending since 2024 and no interim order is operating in favour of the appellants. Still the appellant has written a letter to the Presiding Officer, Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority, Lucknow, U.P. (herein-after referred to as 'Presiding Officer'), requesting not to disburse enhanced compensation money to the private respondents. 3 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024

11. Mere filing of an appeal would not render stay of the judgement passed by the Reference Court. The appellant ought not to have written the said letter. Even the appellant has written letter to the Presiding Officer, who is bound to pay the compensation amount. He cannot hold back the compensation on the mere letter written by the appellant.

12. It is further informed by learned counsel for the respondents that the enhanced amount of compensation has still not been paid by the appellant and the entire endeavour of filing of the instant appeals is just to hold the entire enhanced compensation and the filing of the instant appeals are nothing but a method not to pay the due amount to the land owners. Analysis and conclusions:

13. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

14. The delay in filing the aforesaid appeals is as follows: First Appeal Defective Number Sl. No. Delay in Preferring the Appeals (in Days)

1. First Appeal Defective No. 17 of 2024

2. First Appeal Defective No. 18 of 2024

3. First Appeal Defective No. 26 of 2024 41 41 41

15. This Court has to see the provision of Section 74 of the Act, 2013. The extract of the provision is as follows: "74. Appeal to High Court.–(1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of Award: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. (2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be 4 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 made to dispose of such appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the High Court. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the land acquired or proposed to be acquired is situated."

16. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of CCE & Customs v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791 : (2009) 315 ITR 449 : (2010) 2 GSTR 305 : (2009) 24 VST 298 : 2009 SCC OnLine SC 647 at page 802 has stated that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent. The relevant extract of the judgement is quoted herein-below: "36. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 35- H(1) to make a reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendable by a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well-settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act." (emphasis added)

17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Subrata Borah Chowlek, (2010) 14 SCC 419 has held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants. The court is duty bound to take a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach in such cases. If there is a gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State, necessarily the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should not be extended to them.

18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living. Media India Limited; (2012) 3 SCC 563 has held as follows: "29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. 5 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, had held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. It is the duty of the court to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [...] ***

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible." (Emphasis added)

21. This Court has to see the provision of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The extract of the same is reproduced as under: 6 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section”

22. The legislature confers the power to condone the delay enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the court to do substantial justice. The expression should be put to be a meaningful purpose and to serve ends of justice. Every day of delay must be explained. This is only to ensure that where there were reasons for not filing the appeal, the delay should be condoned. When each day delay is not explained, the benefit of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 should not be extended to the parties.

23. Further this Court has to see the sufficient 'explanation' for condonation of delay and not the 'excuses' for condoning the delay as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and Another; (2023) 10 SCC 531. The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:- "31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. for something. It helps clarify the cause

32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of 7 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication." (emphasis added)

24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Another V. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(D) Through His Lr; Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 21096 of 2019); 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 has held as under :- "27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. ***

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case." (emphasis added)

25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board; MANU/SC/1262/2025, categorically stated that the State or its instrumentality cannot claim special treatment or preferrential handling in litigation. The State must be treated equally with private litigants and follow the same rules and regulations. The delay by the State must not be condoned unless justified, promoting accountability and diligence in public litigation. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 8 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 "189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities, inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held that the pragmatic and justice-oriented approach of the courts should be confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State. ***

210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation. ***

249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration." (emphasis added)

26. The appellant being a department is equipped with a dedicated legal set-up, trained law officers, and panel advocates who are fully conversant with statutory requirements, procedural steps and limitation periods applicable to such claim petitions. Such an entity is expected to act with due diligence and within law. Internal administrative procedures, movement of files, or departmental processing cannot constitute "sufficient cause" for delay. time prescribed by

27. Institutional inefficiency, red-tapism, or routine procedural delays are 9 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 not valid grounds for condonation of delay. Accordingly, when any department fails to act within limitation despite having adequate infrastructure and professional legal assistance, the plea of departmental delay does not justify condonation. The burden lies heavily on such institutional or departmental litigants to show bonafide and unavoidable circumstances otherwise delay cannot be condoned.

28. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgements passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the delay can only be condoned if sufficient ground is shown for condonation of delay. However, the appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of such a long delay. The appellant being the department has proper machinery to deal with court cases, therefore, the grounds shown by the appellant are nothing but seems to be a concocted story, only to get the delay condoned in the matter of such claims.

29. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra) has categorically held that initially the court used to very lenient on delay on the bureaucratic complexities, however, the time changed, Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically laid down that the public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation. It has been further held that in case the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant by granting lenient approach on the departmental instrumentalities would dilute the legal of limitation statute. The State should not get and walk over on the private parties.

30. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold.

31. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.

32. In the instant appeals the delay seems to be because of gross negligence and deliberate inaction and hence no liberal concession can be 10 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 extended to the appellant. The reasons given for delay are purely bureaucratic methodology. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds both the State and the private parties on the same level.

33. In these appeals, there is a delay in filing the appeals. The day to day delay is also not condoned moreover as per ratio laid down in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra), the State should not get edges other private litigation and the Court should not allow the appellants to misuse the process of law in not approaching the Court in time.

34. Accordingly, the reasons for filing appeal after expiry of the period of limitation is not sufficient and therefore, the aforesaid applications for condonation of delay are rejected and consequently, these appeals are also dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. December 3, 2025 Anupam S/- (Prashant Kumar,J.) ANUPAM SINGH PATEL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

In Re : First Appeal Defective No. 18 of 2024: 4Th Battalion Sashastra Seema Bal, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow Thru. its Commandant Versus State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Dist. Magistrate (Land Acquistion), Lko and another 2. IA/1/2024 In Re : First Appeal Defective No. 26 of 2024: 4Th Battalion, Sashastra Seema Bal, Having Mohanlalganj, Lucknow Thru. its Commandant its Office at Versus State of U.P. Thru. Addl. District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Lucknow and 6 others Court No. - 19 HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

1. The aforesaid applications along with affidavit have been filed for condonation of delay in filing of the aforesaid first appeals.

2. Heard Shri Ankit Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant, learned Standing Counsel for the State, Shri Vijay Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the private respondents and perused the record. Arguments of the learned counsel for the parties.

3. Shri Ankit Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant submits that there is delay of 41 days in filing the aforesaid appeals. 2 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024

4. He further submits that the reason for such delay is a process in the department, which took reasonable period of time for filing the aforesaid appeals. In view of these circumstances, there is sufficient cause for not filing the appeals on time, therefore, the delay may be condoned.

5. Per contra, Shri Vijay Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the private respondents vehemently opposes the applications for condonation of delay and submits that the land of the private respondents has been acquired.

6. Learned counsel for the private respondent submits that as per Section 74 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 2013'), an appeal has to be filed within 60 days from the date of award.

7. Learned counsel for the private respondents submits that the above mentioned appeals have been filed beyond the period of limitation and no sufficient cause has been explained in the delay condonation application. Moreover, the day to day delay has also not been properly explained. These appeals suffer from delay and are accordingly liable to be dismissed.

8. After the compensation was awarded and the land owner moved application for enhancement of the compensation and the Reference Court had allowed the said enhancement, which has been assailed by means of the instant appeals.

9. He further submits that in spite of the order of enhancement of compensation by the Reference Court, the appellant has filed the appeal, which suffer from delay and laches.

10. The matters are pending since 2024 and no interim order is operating in favour of the appellants. Still the appellant has written a letter to the Presiding Officer, Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority, Lucknow, U.P. (herein-after referred to as 'Presiding Officer'), requesting not to disburse enhanced compensation money to the private respondents. 3 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024

11. Mere filing of an appeal would not render stay of the judgement passed by the Reference Court. The appellant ought not to have written the said letter. Even the appellant has written letter to the Presiding Officer, who is bound to pay the compensation amount. He cannot hold back the compensation on the mere letter written by the appellant.

12. It is further informed by learned counsel for the respondents that the enhanced amount of compensation has still not been paid by the appellant and the entire endeavour of filing of the instant appeals is just to hold the entire enhanced compensation and the filing of the instant appeals are nothing but a method not to pay the due amount to the land owners. Analysis and conclusions:

13. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

14. The delay in filing the aforesaid appeals is as follows: First Appeal Defective Number Sl. No. Delay in Preferring the Appeals (in Days)

1. First Appeal Defective No. 17 of 2024

2. First Appeal Defective No. 18 of 2024

3. First Appeal Defective No. 26 of 2024 41 41 41

15. This Court has to see the provision of Section 74 of the Act, 2013. The extract of the provision is as follows: "74. Appeal to High Court.–(1) The Requiring Body or any person aggrieved by the Award passed by an Authority under section 69 may file an appeal to the High Court within sixty days from the date of Award: Provided that the High Court may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the said period, allow it to be filed within a further period not exceeding sixty days. (2) Every appeal referred to under sub-section (1) shall be heard as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be 4 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 made to dispose of such appeal within six months from the date on which the appeal is presented to the High Court. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, "High Court" means the High Court within the jurisdiction of which the land acquired or proposed to be acquired is situated."

16. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of CCE & Customs v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791 : (2009) 315 ITR 449 : (2010) 2 GSTR 305 : (2009) 24 VST 298 : 2009 SCC OnLine SC 647 at page 802 has stated that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent. The relevant extract of the judgement is quoted herein-below: "36. The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 supports the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 35- H(1) to make a reference to the High Court is absolute and unextendable by a court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well-settled law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act." (emphasis added)

17. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Subrata Borah Chowlek, (2010) 14 SCC 419 has held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants. The court is duty bound to take a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach in such cases. If there is a gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State, necessarily the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should not be extended to them.

18. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General and others v. Living. Media India Limited; (2012) 3 SCC 563 has held as follows: "29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. 5 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few."

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108, had held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. It is the duty of the court to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.

20. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bherulal, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654, wherein the appellant-State was seeking a condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court sternly noted that it will not let the courts to be forums wherein the Government can walk-in, when it desires, entirely ignoring the period of limitation, and buttress reliance on cases wherein it allowed condonation, employing its discretionary powers, on merits or modalities of peculiarities of those cases. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: "3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [...] ***

7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible." (Emphasis added)

21. This Court has to see the provision of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963. The extract of the same is reproduced as under: 6 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.—Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section”

22. The legislature confers the power to condone the delay enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the court to do substantial justice. The expression should be put to be a meaningful purpose and to serve ends of justice. Every day of delay must be explained. This is only to ensure that where there were reasons for not filing the appeal, the delay should be condoned. When each day delay is not explained, the benefit of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 should not be extended to the parties.

23. Further this Court has to see the sufficient 'explanation' for condonation of delay and not the 'excuses' for condoning the delay as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sheo Raj Singh & Others Vs. Union of India and Another; (2023) 10 SCC 531. The relevant paragraphs 31 and 32 are extracted here-in-below:- "31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an "explanation" and an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an "explanation" from an "excuse". Although people tend to see "explanation" and "excuse" as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. for something. It helps clarify the cause

32. An "excuse" is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of 7 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 a defensive action. Calling something as just an "excuse" would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication." (emphasis added)

24. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Union of India and Another V. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy(D) Through His Lr; Civil Appeal No. of 2024 (arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 21096 of 2019); 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 has held as under :- "27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. ***

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case." (emphasis added)

25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board; MANU/SC/1262/2025, categorically stated that the State or its instrumentality cannot claim special treatment or preferrential handling in litigation. The State must be treated equally with private litigants and follow the same rules and regulations. The delay by the State must not be condoned unless justified, promoting accountability and diligence in public litigation. Relevant paragraphs are extracted below: 8 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 "189. This was followed by Indian Oil Corpn (supra) wherein this Court sowed the seeds for the shift in approach of the courts in matters where condonation of delay was sought by the State or its instrumentalities, inasmuch as it held that the Government and its various functionaries cannot be placed on a pedestal higher than any ordinary litigants, and held that the pragmatic and justice-oriented approach of the courts should be confined only to cases where there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction on part of the State. ***

210. What may be discerned from the aforesaid is that the jurisprudence on condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly where the State or any of its instrumentality is involved, has witnessed a significant shift. From a regime that once accorded preferential indulgence to the State, premised on its bureaucratic complexities and institutional inertia, the law has now evolved to insist upon parity between the government and private litigants. The rationale is that public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation. ***

249. Once the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant. To permit the State to evade the consequences of delay on the ostensible plea that the fault lay with individual officers would amount to diluting the rigour of limitation statutes and undermining their very object. Such an approach would not only privilege the State unjustly over private parties but would also perpetuate a culture of indifference and irresponsibility within the administration." (emphasis added)

26. The appellant being a department is equipped with a dedicated legal set-up, trained law officers, and panel advocates who are fully conversant with statutory requirements, procedural steps and limitation periods applicable to such claim petitions. Such an entity is expected to act with due diligence and within law. Internal administrative procedures, movement of files, or departmental processing cannot constitute "sufficient cause" for delay. time prescribed by

27. Institutional inefficiency, red-tapism, or routine procedural delays are 9 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 not valid grounds for condonation of delay. Accordingly, when any department fails to act within limitation despite having adequate infrastructure and professional legal assistance, the plea of departmental delay does not justify condonation. The burden lies heavily on such institutional or departmental litigants to show bonafide and unavoidable circumstances otherwise delay cannot be condoned.

28. Considering the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgements passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court, the delay can only be condoned if sufficient ground is shown for condonation of delay. However, the appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for condonation of such a long delay. The appellant being the department has proper machinery to deal with court cases, therefore, the grounds shown by the appellant are nothing but seems to be a concocted story, only to get the delay condoned in the matter of such claims.

29. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra) has categorically held that initially the court used to very lenient on delay on the bureaucratic complexities, however, the time changed, Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically laid down that the public interest is better served not by excusing governmental inefficiency, but by fostering accountability, diligence, and responsibility in the conduct of public litigation. It has been further held that in case the State chooses to litigate, it must shoulder the same responsibilities and abide by the same limitations that bind every litigant by granting lenient approach on the departmental instrumentalities would dilute the legal of limitation statute. The State should not get and walk over on the private parties.

30. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold.

31. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law.

32. In the instant appeals the delay seems to be because of gross negligence and deliberate inaction and hence no liberal concession can be 10 FAPLD No. 17 of 2024 extended to the appellant. The reasons given for delay are purely bureaucratic methodology. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds both the State and the private parties on the same level.

33. In these appeals, there is a delay in filing the appeals. The day to day delay is also not condoned moreover as per ratio laid down in Shivamma (Dead) by LRs (supra), the State should not get edges other private litigation and the Court should not allow the appellants to misuse the process of law in not approaching the Court in time.

34. Accordingly, the reasons for filing appeal after expiry of the period of limitation is not sufficient and therefore, the aforesaid applications for condonation of delay are rejected and consequently, these appeals are also dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. December 3, 2025 Anupam S/- (Prashant Kumar,J.) ANUPAM SINGH PATEL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench