Shanu Kumar (Adopted Son) vs The Nagar Ayukt Municipal (Commissioner)

4. The contention put forth by learned counsel for petitioner is that the petitioner is an adopted son of deceased employee, who was working in the Municipal Corporation, Lucknow, which is an undisputed fact. He further submits that the adoption is done while executing registered deed and, therefore, unless the adoption deed is cancelled or nullified, the status of the petitioner would be as an adopted son of the deceased employee. He submitted that the adoption deed can not be cancelled or otherwise interpreted or presumed by any authority, except apart the court of civil competence. He added that clause-7 of the rejection order dated 02.09.2023 discloses the reasons that as per the date of birth, the age of the petitioner would be 18 years at the time of adoption i.e. 06.09.2012, which is impermissible under the Act of 1956. He submits that it is not open for the Municipal Commissioner, who under the administrative capacity entered into the issue of validity of adoption deed. Concluding his arguments he submits that since the claim of petitioner regarding the appointment on compassionate ground, has been rejected, on wrong premises, therefore, the same do not stand in the eyes of law, therefore, the impugned order may be quashed.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents have opposed the aforesaid contentions to some extent but he could not refute the contention that the Municipal Commissioner has no authority to test 3 WRIA No. 493 of 2024 the validity of the registered adoption deed, by virtue of which, the petitioner has been given the status of an 'Adopted Son'.

6. Upon considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is apparent that the petitioner is an adopted son of deceased employee, namely Ramesh, who died in harness. After his death, the petitioner raised his claim for appointment on compassionate ground, under the provisions of Rules, 1974, which has been declined by the competent authority, on the ground that if the age of the petitioner is counted as is mentioned in the age certificate, to the date of adoption, i.e., September 6, 2012, his age would be 18 years at the time of adoption, which is impermissible, and therefore, the adoption deed is not genuine.

7. The question cropped up for consideration is, whether the administrative authority, while considering the claim of legal heir of a deceased employee for appointment, can test the validity of a registered deed, i.e., adoption deed. When this Court examines the above-said legal question, it is apparent that the adoption deed is admittedly registered, which gives status to the petitioner as an adopted son, under the provisions of the Act, 1956.

8. The consequence/effect of adoption has been prescribed under Section 12 of the Act, 1956, which reads as under: "12. Effects of adoption. An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family: Provided that (a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth, (b) any property which wested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in 4 WRIA No. 493 of 2024 the family of his or her birth; (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption. "

9. The above-said provision provides that an adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his/her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption. It is not out of place to mention that the words 'All Purpose" given in the Act 1956 shall also cover, such adopted son to be considered as 'son', who is entitled for the claim of the appointment on compassionate ground, under Rules

10. Further, the presumption regarding the registered document relating the adoption has been provided under Section 16 of the Act 1956, which reads as under:- "16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption.-Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved."

11. The above-said provision prescribes that as soon as any document registered under any law for the time being in force, is produced before any court regarding adoption, that shall be presumed in compliance with the provisions of the Act of 1956, unless and until it is disproved.

12. It is settled law that after registration of any document, the competent authority for it's disproving or cancellation, is the civil court alone. If any registered document is brought before any administrative authority, the domain of such authority is to examine its genuineness that whether it is actually registered or not, but, whether the contents of the registered deed are such which, in fact, ultimately, took it for cancellation, the same cannot be declined on this ground unless it is cancelled by a court of civil competence. In fact, the very 5 WRIA No. 493 of 2024 genesis of this principle is that if this would be open for the administrative authority to decline its validity on certain disputed facts mentioned therein, the purpose of registration of such a document would be frustrated. The recourse open before such authority is to challenge the validity of such a document before the civil court. Further, even the power of an administrative authority, undertaking the procedure of appointment, on compassionate ground, under the Rules of 1974, is not quasi-judicial, but administrative in nature.

13. In fact, the legislature, in its wisdom and intent, has particularly prescribed the provision under section 16 of the Act of 1956, while giving protection to the rights of the adopted son. Perhaps it was in the mind of the legislature that, if someone disproves the adoption deed on the administrative side, the child who has been adopted and has lost his all rights and interest in the property of his natural family (father and mother), would jeopardize, if the protection is not granted. In this background, this Court finds that the administrative authority has no right to dwell into the question of a registered adoption deed being unlawful, unless it is disproved, while adopting the lawful recourse.

14. This Court further finds that the ground for rejection of the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment does not stand on its own legs and, therefore, the same is also covered with the ratio as the case of Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405.

15. In view of the aforementioned submissions and discussions, the order impugned is unsustainable. Consequently, the order dated September 2, 2023, is hereby quashed.

16. The Municipal Corporation, Lucknow, is directed to reconsider and decide the matter for the appointment of the petitioner, under the Rules 1974, as well as the observations made, herein above, afresh, within a period of two months, from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him. 6 WRIA No. 493 of 2024

17. The present petition stands allowed accordingly. November 24, 2025 Ram Murti (Shree Prakash Singh,J.) RAM MURTI YADAV High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

4. The contention put forth by learned counsel for petitioner is that the petitioner is an adopted son of deceased employee, who was working in the Municipal Corporation, Lucknow, which is an undisputed fact. He further submits that the adoption is done while executing registered deed and, therefore, unless the adoption deed is cancelled or nullified, the status of the petitioner would be as an adopted son of the deceased employee. He submitted that the adoption deed can not be cancelled or otherwise interpreted or presumed by any authority, except apart the court of civil competence. He added that clause-7 of the rejection order dated 02.09.2023 discloses the reasons that as per the date of birth, the age of the petitioner would be 18 years at the time of adoption i.e. 06.09.2012, which is impermissible under the Act of 1956. He submits that it is not open for the Municipal Commissioner, who under the administrative capacity entered into the issue of validity of adoption deed. Concluding his arguments he submits that since the claim of petitioner regarding the appointment on compassionate ground, has been rejected, on wrong premises, therefore, the same do not stand in the eyes of law, therefore, the impugned order may be quashed.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents have opposed the aforesaid contentions to some extent but he could not refute the contention that the Municipal Commissioner has no authority to test 3 WRIA No. 493 of 2024 the validity of the registered adoption deed, by virtue of which, the petitioner has been given the status of an 'Adopted Son'.

6. Upon considering the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it is apparent that the petitioner is an adopted son of deceased employee, namely Ramesh, who died in harness. After his death, the petitioner raised his claim for appointment on compassionate ground, under the provisions of Rules, 1974, which has been declined by the competent authority, on the ground that if the age of the petitioner is counted as is mentioned in the age certificate, to the date of adoption, i.e., September 6, 2012, his age would be 18 years at the time of adoption, which is impermissible, and therefore, the adoption deed is not genuine.

7. The question cropped up for consideration is, whether the administrative authority, while considering the claim of legal heir of a deceased employee for appointment, can test the validity of a registered deed, i.e., adoption deed. When this Court examines the above-said legal question, it is apparent that the adoption deed is admittedly registered, which gives status to the petitioner as an adopted son, under the provisions of the Act, 1956.

8. The consequence/effect of adoption has been prescribed under Section 12 of the Act, 1956, which reads as under: "12. Effects of adoption. An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family: Provided that (a) the child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or she had continued in the family of his or her birth, (b) any property which wested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to vest in such person subject to the obligations, if any, attaching to the ownership of such property, including the obligation to maintain relatives in 4 WRIA No. 493 of 2024 the family of his or her birth; (c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption. "

9. The above-said provision provides that an adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his/her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of adoption. It is not out of place to mention that the words 'All Purpose" given in the Act 1956 shall also cover, such adopted son to be considered as 'son', who is entitled for the claim of the appointment on compassionate ground, under Rules

10. Further, the presumption regarding the registered document relating the adoption has been provided under Section 16 of the Act 1956, which reads as under:- "16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption.-Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved."

11. The above-said provision prescribes that as soon as any document registered under any law for the time being in force, is produced before any court regarding adoption, that shall be presumed in compliance with the provisions of the Act of 1956, unless and until it is disproved.

12. It is settled law that after registration of any document, the competent authority for it's disproving or cancellation, is the civil court alone. If any registered document is brought before any administrative authority, the domain of such authority is to examine its genuineness that whether it is actually registered or not, but, whether the contents of the registered deed are such which, in fact, ultimately, took it for cancellation, the same cannot be declined on this ground unless it is cancelled by a court of civil competence. In fact, the very 5 WRIA No. 493 of 2024 genesis of this principle is that if this would be open for the administrative authority to decline its validity on certain disputed facts mentioned therein, the purpose of registration of such a document would be frustrated. The recourse open before such authority is to challenge the validity of such a document before the civil court. Further, even the power of an administrative authority, undertaking the procedure of appointment, on compassionate ground, under the Rules of 1974, is not quasi-judicial, but administrative in nature.

13. In fact, the legislature, in its wisdom and intent, has particularly prescribed the provision under section 16 of the Act of 1956, while giving protection to the rights of the adopted son. Perhaps it was in the mind of the legislature that, if someone disproves the adoption deed on the administrative side, the child who has been adopted and has lost his all rights and interest in the property of his natural family (father and mother), would jeopardize, if the protection is not granted. In this background, this Court finds that the administrative authority has no right to dwell into the question of a registered adoption deed being unlawful, unless it is disproved, while adopting the lawful recourse.

14. This Court further finds that the ground for rejection of the claim of the petitioner for compassionate appointment does not stand on its own legs and, therefore, the same is also covered with the ratio as the case of Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405.

15. In view of the aforementioned submissions and discussions, the order impugned is unsustainable. Consequently, the order dated September 2, 2023, is hereby quashed.

16. The Municipal Corporation, Lucknow, is directed to reconsider and decide the matter for the appointment of the petitioner, under the Rules 1974, as well as the observations made, herein above, afresh, within a period of two months, from the date of production of a certified copy of this order before him. 6 WRIA No. 493 of 2024

17. The present petition stands allowed accordingly. November 24, 2025 Ram Murti (Shree Prakash Singh,J.) RAM MURTI YADAV High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench