High Court · 2025

Judgment

1. The appeal survives only on behalf of appellant no.2- Ram Roop as the appeal with regard to appellant no.1- Ram Bilas stood abated by this Court vide order dated 14.05.2025, which is reproduced hereinunder:- “In deference to the previous order passed by this Court, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lakhimpur Kheri had sent a report dated 15.04.2025 indicating therein that the appellant-Ram Bilas son of Shripal has died. The report has been sent annexing therewith the statements recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned and the death certificate issued by the Gram Panchayat. In regard to the appellant no. 2, it has been intimated that his wife has informed that he has gone to Dehradun for work. In view of above, this appeal stands abated on behalf of the appellant no.1- Ram Bilas son of Shripal. Now, this appeal survives only on behalf of the appellant no. 2-Ram Roop. None is present on behalf of the appellant no. 2. In the interest of justice, the case is adjourned. List in the third week of July, 2025.”

2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant no.2, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.

3. The instant Criminal Appeal under Section 374 (2), Cr.P.C. has been filed by the accused/appellants, namely, Ram Bilas and Ram Roop, challenging the judgment and order 19.11.2009 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court No.2) Lakhimpur Kheri in S.T. No.490 of 2004, arising Page No.2 of 23 out of Case Crime No.379 of 2003, P.S. Nighasan, District- Kheri, convicting and sentencing the appellants to undergo four years rigorous imprisonment under Section 304/34 I.P.C. with a fine of Rs.1000/- and in case of default of payment of fine to further undergo three months simple imprisonment.

4. Prosecution story, in brief, is that the informant – Lalli Devi w/o Gaya Prasad is a resident of Village- Madhaiya Mauza Bailha, Police Station- Nighasan, District Kheri and her husband’s sister and brother-in-law had passed away and their son Ram Narayan was living in her house. On 09.12.2003 her husband’s cousin brother-in-law Prabhu’s sons, namely, Ram Vilas and Ram Roop came to her house and in her presence told her husband -Gaya Prasad (deceased) that they would sell the field of Ram Narayan and would usurp the money, and thereafter they moved from her house along with Ram Narayan and when her husband opposed the same, both the accused threw her husband on the road in front of her house at about 6:00 P.M. and assaulted him with fists and kicks and went to their house. In the alleged incident her husband sustained internal injuries and one and a half hour of the incident her husband succumbed to his injuries sustained.

On written complaint of the informant/Lalli Devi an FIR bearing Case Crime No.379 of 2003 was lodged at Police Station- Nighasan, District- Kheri, under Section 304 I.P.C. against the accused/appellants.

6. The Investigating Officer, after completing the investigation, submitted the charge sheet against the accused/appellants.

7. After submission of charge sheet, learned Magistrate took cognizance and thereafter the said case was committed to the Court of Sessions where it was registered as S.T. No.490 of 2004 and charges were framed against the accused/appellants Page No.3 of 23 under Section 304/34 I.P.C. The charges were denied by the accused/appellants and they claimed trial.

8. In order to substantiate its case, prosecution examined as many as six witnesses, namely, Vinod Kumar s/o informant (P.W.1), Lalli Devi/informant (P.W.2), Ram Narayan (P.W.3), S.I. Jawahar Lal Yadav (P.W.4), Dr. S.K. Shukla (P.W.5) and Constable Atahar Hussain (P.W.6).

9. That after closing of the evidence, statements of accused/ appellants was recorded by the trial court in terms of Section 313 Cr.P.C., after explaining the entire evidence and other circumstances, in which the appellants denied the prosecution story and the entire prosecution story was said to be wrong and concocted.

10. Thereafter, the learned trial court after hearing learned counsel for both the parties and appreciating the entire evidence, oral as well as documentary, found the accused/appellants guilty and convicted them, as above.

11. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of conviction, the appellants have preferred the present appeal.

12. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the accused- appellants have not been convicted previously for any offence and they are the first time offender. The learned counsel at the outset submits that he is not challenging the impugned judgment and order of conviction and is confining submission in the appeal only with respect to the order of conviction and sentence for the reason that after taking note of the prosecution story, proved by the witnesses of fact, the trial court ought to have convicted the appellants for the offence under Section 304 Part-II I.P.C. as from the same it is apparent that the incident took place on spur of moment without pre-meditation of mind in heat of passion. Page No.4 of 23

13. Learned counsel for accused-appellants submits that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, including the fact that the accused-appellants have not been convicted previously for any offence, the trial court ought to have invoked the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1958') after convicting the accused/appellants for the offence under Section 304 Part-II I.P.C., which may be done by this Court.

14. The Trial Court did neither invoke the provisions of the Act, 1958 nor the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. while sentencing the accused-appellants. The Trial Court has not given any special reason in the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence for not giving the benefit of provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or the provisions of Act, 1958.

15. Learned counsel for the accused-appellants submits that to that extent, the impugned judgment and order suffers from serious illegality being violative of provisions of section 361 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, it cannot be sustained.

16. Section 361 of the Code is required to be applied with or without the beneficial provisions i.e. Section 360 of the Code or provisions of the Act, 1958. If the Court chooses not to apply either of these provisions, it is required to give special reasons for not applying the beneficial provision in case the accused offender otherwise is eligible for provisions of Section 360 of the Code or Section 3 or 4 of the Act, 1958.

17. The accused-appellants have statutory right for claiming the benefit of beneficial legislation i.e. the provisions of the Act, 1958 and the learned Trial Court was under a duty to consider the applicability of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or Sections 3 or 4 of the Act, 1958 as mandated under Section 361 Cr.P.C. If the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or provisions of the Act, 1958 Page No.5 of 23 were not applied, then the learned Trial Court should have recorded reasons for the same.

18. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the State of Uttar Pradesh has its own local law of probation i.e. Uttar Pradesh First Offenders Probation Act, 1938. He further submitted that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (Central Act) is also applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh as held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of U.P.; (2017) 2 SCC 198. Thus, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that it is upon the discretion of the Court to grant benefits in either of the Acts.

19. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that he does not want to press the appeal on merits. He has submitted that the incident took place 26 years ago and there is no further criminal antecedent of the appellants no.1 to 3. The delay in trial deprives the right of the appellants of speedy trial and they may be given benefit of first offender and they may be extended the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred as the ‘Act of 1958’). He further submitted that appellants no.1 to 3 are first time offender and are not previously convicted in any case. He further submitted that it is the Court which may consider the benefit of Section 4 of the Act of 1958 to the accused-appellants.

20. Learned A.G.A., on the other hand, opposed the appeal and has submitted that there is no material irregularity or illegality committed by the court below and keeping in view the evidence on record, accused-appellants have been rightly convicted.

21. Learned A.G.A. appearing for the State does not dispute the fact that accused-appellants are the first time offender and was not previously convicted in any other case. He also submits that in view of the expressed provisions of Section 361 Cr.P.C., considering the facts and circumstances, nature of the offence, Page No.6 of 23 the character of the accused-appellants and particularly, the time period which has lapsed since the date of incident, the benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1958 can be granted in this case.

22. Learned A.G.A. further states that the benefit of Section 4 of the Act of 1958 could be extended to the accused-appellants on certain stipulations as specified in Section 4 of the Act of 1958.

23. After considering the arguments advanced by the parties and after perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that except apart the merits of the case, so far as the prayer of learned counsel for the appellants for providing benefits of Section 4 of the Act of 1958 is concerned, it is essential to discuss the legal position and law propounded in this regard.

24. Sections 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 are extracted hereunder: "3. Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition.- "Where any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 379 or Section 380 or Section 381 or Section 404 or Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal code, or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under section 4 release him after due admonition. Explanation.-For the purposes of this Section, previous conviction against a person shall include any previous order made against him under this Section or Section 4.

4. Power of Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.- (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the Page No.7 of 23 offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that the Court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the Court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond."

25. That Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ratan Lal vs State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444, while discussing the purpose and object of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, has observed in para no. 4, as follows:- "4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years, absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the condition laid down in the appropriate provision of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act."

26. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ved Prakash

On written complaint of the informant/Lalli Devi an FIR bearing Case Crime No.379 of 2003 was lodged at Police Station- Nighasan, District- Kheri, under Section 304 I.P.C. against the accused/appellants.

6. The Investigating Officer, after completing the investigation, submitted the charge sheet against the accused/appellants.

7. After submission of charge sheet, learned Magistrate took cognizance and thereafter the said case was committed to the Court of Sessions where it was registered as S.T. No.490 of 2004 and charges were framed against the accused/appellants Page No.3 of 23 under Section 304/34 I.P.C. The charges were denied by the accused/appellants and they claimed trial.

8. In order to substantiate its case, prosecution examined as many as six witnesses, namely, Vinod Kumar s/o informant (P.W.1), Lalli Devi/informant (P.W.2), Ram Narayan (P.W.3), S.I. Jawahar Lal Yadav (P.W.4), Dr. S.K. Shukla (P.W.5) and Constable Atahar Hussain (P.W.6).

9. That after closing of the evidence, statements of accused/ appellants was recorded by the trial court in terms of Section 313 Cr.P.C., after explaining the entire evidence and other circumstances, in which the appellants denied the prosecution story and the entire prosecution story was said to be wrong and concocted.

10. Thereafter, the learned trial court after hearing learned counsel for both the parties and appreciating the entire evidence, oral as well as documentary, found the accused/appellants guilty and convicted them, as above.

11. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of conviction, the appellants have preferred the present appeal.

12. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the accused- appellants have not been convicted previously for any offence and they are the first time offender. The learned counsel at the outset submits that he is not challenging the impugned judgment and order of conviction and is confining submission in the appeal only with respect to the order of conviction and sentence for the reason that after taking note of the prosecution story, proved by the witnesses of fact, the trial court ought to have convicted the appellants for the offence under Section 304 Part-II I.P.C. as from the same it is apparent that the incident took place on spur of moment without pre-meditation of mind in heat of passion. Page No.4 of 23

13. Learned counsel for accused-appellants submits that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, including the fact that the accused-appellants have not been convicted previously for any offence, the trial court ought to have invoked the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1958') after convicting the accused/appellants for the offence under Section 304 Part-II I.P.C., which may be done by this Court.

14. The Trial Court did neither invoke the provisions of the Act, 1958 nor the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. while sentencing the accused-appellants. The Trial Court has not given any special reason in the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence for not giving the benefit of provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or the provisions of Act, 1958.

15. Learned counsel for the accused-appellants submits that to that extent, the impugned judgment and order suffers from serious illegality being violative of provisions of section 361 Cr.P.C. and, therefore, it cannot be sustained.

16. Section 361 of the Code is required to be applied with or without the beneficial provisions i.e. Section 360 of the Code or provisions of the Act, 1958. If the Court chooses not to apply either of these provisions, it is required to give special reasons for not applying the beneficial provision in case the accused offender otherwise is eligible for provisions of Section 360 of the Code or Section 3 or 4 of the Act, 1958.

17. The accused-appellants have statutory right for claiming the benefit of beneficial legislation i.e. the provisions of the Act, 1958 and the learned Trial Court was under a duty to consider the applicability of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or Sections 3 or 4 of the Act, 1958 as mandated under Section 361 Cr.P.C. If the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. or provisions of the Act, 1958 Page No.5 of 23 were not applied, then the learned Trial Court should have recorded reasons for the same.

18. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the State of Uttar Pradesh has its own local law of probation i.e. Uttar Pradesh First Offenders Probation Act, 1938. He further submitted that the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (Central Act) is also applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh as held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of U.P.; (2017) 2 SCC 198. Thus, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that it is upon the discretion of the Court to grant benefits in either of the Acts.

19. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that he does not want to press the appeal on merits. He has submitted that the incident took place 26 years ago and there is no further criminal antecedent of the appellants no.1 to 3. The delay in trial deprives the right of the appellants of speedy trial and they may be given benefit of first offender and they may be extended the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred as the ‘Act of 1958’). He further submitted that appellants no.1 to 3 are first time offender and are not previously convicted in any case. He further submitted that it is the Court which may consider the benefit of Section 4 of the Act of 1958 to the accused-appellants.

20. Learned A.G.A., on the other hand, opposed the appeal and has submitted that there is no material irregularity or illegality committed by the court below and keeping in view the evidence on record, accused-appellants have been rightly convicted.

21. Learned A.G.A. appearing for the State does not dispute the fact that accused-appellants are the first time offender and was not previously convicted in any other case. He also submits that in view of the expressed provisions of Section 361 Cr.P.C., considering the facts and circumstances, nature of the offence, Page No.6 of 23 the character of the accused-appellants and particularly, the time period which has lapsed since the date of incident, the benefit of Section 4 of the Act, 1958 can be granted in this case.

22. Learned A.G.A. further states that the benefit of Section 4 of the Act of 1958 could be extended to the accused-appellants on certain stipulations as specified in Section 4 of the Act of 1958.

23. After considering the arguments advanced by the parties and after perusal of the material available on record, this Court finds that except apart the merits of the case, so far as the prayer of learned counsel for the appellants for providing benefits of Section 4 of the Act of 1958 is concerned, it is essential to discuss the legal position and law propounded in this regard.

24. Sections 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 are extracted hereunder: "3. Power of court to release certain offenders after admonition.- "Where any person is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable under Section 379 or Section 380 or Section 381 or Section 404 or Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860) or any offence punishable with imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with both, under the Indian Penal code, or any other law, and no previous conviction is proved against him and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or releasing him on probation of good conduct under section 4 release him after due admonition. Explanation.-For the purposes of this Section, previous conviction against a person shall include any previous order made against him under this Section or Section 4.

4. Power of Court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.- (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the Page No.7 of 23 offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that the Court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the Court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond."

25. That Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ratan Lal vs State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 444, while discussing the purpose and object of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, has observed in para no. 4, as follows:- "4. The Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the field of penology. It is the result of the recognition of the doctrine that the object of criminal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish him. Broadly stated the Act distinguishes offenders below 21 years of age and those above that age, and offenders who are guilty of having committed an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life and those who are guilty of a lesser offence. While in the case of offenders who are above the age of 21 years, absolute discretion is given to the court to release them after admonition or on probation of good conduct, subject to the condition laid down in the appropriate provision of the Act, in the case of offenders below the age of 21 years an injunction is issued to the court not to sentence them to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the nature of the offence and the character of the offenders, it is not desirable to deal with them under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Act."

26. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ved Prakash