Rajan Saroj v. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, as well as its

One Sri Raja Ram Sharma was the Conductor. While the respondent was driving the bus and reached Qaiserbagh Bus Station, he did not halt the bus for the necessary time and departed earlier than its scheduled departure. Upon reaching Barabanki, the respondent stopped the bus at an unauthorized stop outside a hotel, started consuming alcohol along with an unknown person and permitted the unknown person to drive the bus. Upon passengers raising an objection, the respondent himself started driving the bus despite being under the influence of alcohol, and upon reaching Faizabad, the respondent told the Conductor that there was some fault in the bus and asked the Conductor to transfer the passengers to another bus. The bus was examined by a Junior Foreman, who informed that there was no fault in the bus.

4. It is contended that a complaint dated 30.07.1995 was made by the passengers and the Conductor to the in-charge at the Bus Depot, Faizabad. At the time of making the complaint, the respondent absconded from the spot and left the bus at the Bus Station itself, with the result that the bus fare was refunded to the passengers. The Conductor lodged a complaint at the Kotwali Police Station, Faizabad. Apart from the aforesaid, the respondent was also found to be misappropriating large quantities of diesel from the Corporation. The respondent was placed under suspension on 09.08.1995. A charge sheet dated

30.09.1995, a copy of which is annexure-6 to the petition, was served, in which two charges were levelled against the respondent. In support of the first charge, which pertained to the misconduct of driving the bus under the influence of alcohol, four reports were sought to be read against the respondent.

5. With regard to the second charge, which was of misappropriation of diesel, certain documents were sought to be read against the respondent.

6. It is contended that despite repeated dates being fixed in the inquiry, the respondent failed to participate, with the result that an ex-parte inquiry report was drawn up and was served along with a show cause notice dated 17.07.1996, a copy of which is annexure- 10 to the petition. Despite the respondent having sought time to submit a reply, he failed to do so. Thereafter, the services of the respondent were terminated vide order dated 23.11.1996, a copy of which is annexure-11 to the petition. The respondent filed a belated appeal, which was rejected on

25.07.1998, a copy of which is annexure-12 to the petition.

7. In the meanwhile, the dispute between the Corporation and the respondent was referred to the learned Industrial Tribunal by the Deputy Labour Commissioner and the question of reference was "Whether the termination of the services of Sri Rajan Saroj, son of Late Prasaid Lal, driver, vide order dated

23.11.1996 is inappropriate and illegal? If yes, then what benefits is the concerned workman entitled to and with what other details."

8. The learned Labour Court thereafter examined the issue and by means of the impugned award dated

16.02.2021, as published on 02.04.2021, set aside the termination order with all consequential benefit. However, only 40% of the back-wages have been awarded.

9. Being aggrieved, the instant petition has been filed by the Corporation.

10. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned Labour Court, in its award, has specifically indicated that the disciplinary proceedings as held against the respondent had been set aside by the learned Labour Court vide its order dated 01.04.2008, and it gave an opportunity to the Corporation to prove the charges against the respondent. However, while passing the impugned award, it has again placed reliance on the same inquiry report and has held that the charges are not proved against the respondent and has set aside the termination order.

11. His further argument is that once the learned Labour Court had already set aside the disciplinary proceeding as conducted against the respondent, consequently, it should have held an inquiry itself into the matter and without holding an inquiry, it could not have set aside the termination order of the respondent on the basis of the inquiry report that had itself been set aside vide its order dated 01.04.2008.

12. His next submission is a preliminary objection that as subsequent to the termination order of the respondent dated 23.11.1996, the appeal filed by him had also been dismissed vide order dated 25.07.1998, as such, the doctrine of merger applies and the termination order was no longer in existence so as to entail the learned Labour Court to have set aside the same.

13. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2009) 11 SCC 683 as well as the Constitution Bench judgment of S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582.

14. His further submission is that no prejudice had been caused to the Workman, as ample opportunity had been granted to him during the inquiry proceedings for putting forth his defence, which he failed to do.

15. No other ground has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

16. On the other hand, Sri Arvind Kumar Jauhari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has argued that no doubt the learned Labour Court, vide its order dated 01.04.2008, had set aside the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent; yet, the learned Labour Court itself gave an opportunity to the Corporation/Employer to prove the charges against the respondent. The learned Labour Court has thereafter concluded in its award that the documents produced by the Workman in support of his defence, namely, documents No. 3(1) to 3(4), have not been disputed by the Corporation, nor has the Corporation taken cognizance of the said documents; consequently, the termination of the respondent cannot be said to be valid in the eyes of law.

17. It is further contended that although the learned Labour Court has also taken cognizance of the inquiry report against the respondent, this would obviously be so once the learned Labour Court had gone into the veracity of the challenge itself after granting an opportunity to the petitioner/Corporation to prove the charges against the respondent. Since the Corporation failed to prove the charges against the respondent/Workman, as clearly observed by the learned Labour Court in its award, it cannot be said that the termination order against the respondent is valid in the eyes of law.

18. As regards the preliminary objection, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Regional Manager U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and another vs. Prabhu Dayal and another in Writ-C No. 22299 of 2021, decided on 28.10.2021, to contend that the aspect of merger has been considered by this Court, wherein it has been held that the Labour Court can only decide the reference referred to it and cannot travel beyond it. Thus, once it came to the conclusion that the domestic inquiry was not fairly conducted, or even in the inquiry before the learned Labour Court, the Corporation could not prove the charges against the respondent, the doctrine of merger would not be applicable even if the appeal had been decided.

19. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

20. At the outset, the Court may consider the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners pertaining to the doctrine of merger and the appellate order not having been challenged by the respondent herein.

21. SufÏce to state that the learned Labour Court was only required to decide the reference as was referred before it, which reference only pertained to the legality of the termination order i.e. 23.11.1996. Once the reference was already there and even if the respondent had preferred an appeal, the Corporation was conscious of the reference and as such it should have restrained itself from deciding the appeal. Merely because the Corporation took upon itself to decide the appeal even when the reference was pending, no premium can be put on their action in deciding the appeal and then to indicate that the doctrine of merger would be applicable.

22. Even otherwise, a perusal of the reference order would indicate, although no clear date can be seen in the said order, yet the reference number is LRCP 258 of 1997 and the matter has been fixed before the learned Labour Court on 20.10.1998 which indicates that at the time the appeal of the respondent was decided on

25.07.1998, the reference was already pending and thus the petitioners should not have proceeded to decide the appeal.

23. Moreover, it is a settled position of law that where the edifice goes the super-structure collapses. Once the termination order has itself been set aside by the learned Labour Court, obviously any consequential action that may have been taken by the Corporation, even by deciding the appeal, would not and cannot save the termination order (see Central Bank of India vs. C. Bernard reported in 1991 (1) SCC 319).

24. Thus, the preliminary objection is rejected.

25. Considering the aforesaid discussion, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Rathore (supra) and Sharda Singh (supra) would have no applicability in the facts of the instant case.

26. On merits, a perusal of the records would indicate that even though an inquiry was conducted against the respondent by the Corporation, yet the said inquiry was found to be vitiated in the eyes of law, and the learned Labour Court itself, vide its order dated 01.04.2008, declared the disciplinary proceedings held against the respondent as void. Incidentally, there is no averment in the petition filed by the petitioners that the order dated

01.04.2008, as had been passed by the learned Labour Court, was ever challenged; thereby, the said order has attained finality and thus, for all practical purposes, the disciplinary proceedings that were held against the respondent are void even as per the conduct of the petitioners themselves, having acquiesced to the order of the learned Labour Court dated 01.04.2008.

27. The learned Labour Court also granted an opportunity to the Corporation to prove the charges against the Workman/respondent, which is apparent from a perusal of the award itself, and to which there is no dispute.

28. The award of the learned Labour Court would indicate that certain documents were produced by the Workman, namely, documents No. 3(1) to 3(4), the production of which were not denied by the Corporation, and in this view of the matter, the learned Labour Court has held that once the said documents have neither been denied nor any cognizance has been taken by them by the Corporation, consequently, it cannot be said that the charges were proved against the Workman. Nowhere in the entire petition has any averment been made by the petitioner to the effect that the aforesaid documents, as have been referred to by the learned Labour Court, were never produced by the Workman, and in absence thereof, obviously the award of the learned Labour Court pertaining to certain documents having been produced by the Workman and not denied by the Corporation has to be taken as correct. Further, merely because the learned Labour Court has also referred to the disciplinary proceedings, the same can only be considered a passing observation, more particularly when the learned Labour Court, as per the award itself, has held an inquiry and given opportunity to the Corporation to prove the charges against the Workman, which the Corporation miserably failed to do.

29. In this regard, it would also be apt to refer to a judgment of this Court in the case of Prabhu Dayal (supra) wherein this Court in similar circumstances wherein appeal was decided during pendency of the reference and the plea of merger was raised, held as under :- "28. In view of the above discussions, the reference is not hit by "doctrine of merger", or by "res judicata". The reference was rightly referred to Labour Court. The Labour Court considered the inquiry report and came to the conclusion that domestic enquiry was faulty/irregular. The most crucial and relevant evidence of Mr. Roshan Lal, who conducted inspection of the bus was neither recorded during domestic enquiry nor before the Labour Court (due to his death). There was no other evidence with the petitioner-UPSRTC, which could prove the inspection of the bus and thus the termination order of the Respondent No. 1 was bad on facts as well as on law. No other point was argued by the petitioner. Therefore, there is no illegality in the impugned Award, on law as well as on facts."

30. The judgment of Prabhu Dayal (supra) has been afÏrmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with the dismissal of Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.1946 of 2022 on 06.01.2023.

31. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, no case for interference is made out. The writ petition is dismissed. Order Date :- 21.8.2025 cks/- [Abdul Moin, J.] CHANDRA KANT SINGH CHANDRA KANT SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench

One Sri Raja Ram Sharma was the Conductor. While the respondent was driving the bus and reached Qaiserbagh Bus Station, he did not halt the bus for the necessary time and departed earlier than its scheduled departure. Upon reaching Barabanki, the respondent stopped the bus at an unauthorized stop outside a hotel, started consuming alcohol along with an unknown person and permitted the unknown person to drive the bus. Upon passengers raising an objection, the respondent himself started driving the bus despite being under the influence of alcohol, and upon reaching Faizabad, the respondent told the Conductor that there was some fault in the bus and asked the Conductor to transfer the passengers to another bus. The bus was examined by a Junior Foreman, who informed that there was no fault in the bus.

4. It is contended that a complaint dated 30.07.1995 was made by the passengers and the Conductor to the in-charge at the Bus Depot, Faizabad. At the time of making the complaint, the respondent absconded from the spot and left the bus at the Bus Station itself, with the result that the bus fare was refunded to the passengers. The Conductor lodged a complaint at the Kotwali Police Station, Faizabad. Apart from the aforesaid, the respondent was also found to be misappropriating large quantities of diesel from the Corporation. The respondent was placed under suspension on 09.08.1995. A charge sheet dated

30.09.1995, a copy of which is annexure-6 to the petition, was served, in which two charges were levelled against the respondent. In support of the first charge, which pertained to the misconduct of driving the bus under the influence of alcohol, four reports were sought to be read against the respondent.

5. With regard to the second charge, which was of misappropriation of diesel, certain documents were sought to be read against the respondent.

6. It is contended that despite repeated dates being fixed in the inquiry, the respondent failed to participate, with the result that an ex-parte inquiry report was drawn up and was served along with a show cause notice dated 17.07.1996, a copy of which is annexure- 10 to the petition. Despite the respondent having sought time to submit a reply, he failed to do so. Thereafter, the services of the respondent were terminated vide order dated 23.11.1996, a copy of which is annexure-11 to the petition. The respondent filed a belated appeal, which was rejected on

25.07.1998, a copy of which is annexure-12 to the petition.

7. In the meanwhile, the dispute between the Corporation and the respondent was referred to the learned Industrial Tribunal by the Deputy Labour Commissioner and the question of reference was "Whether the termination of the services of Sri Rajan Saroj, son of Late Prasaid Lal, driver, vide order dated

23.11.1996 is inappropriate and illegal? If yes, then what benefits is the concerned workman entitled to and with what other details."

8. The learned Labour Court thereafter examined the issue and by means of the impugned award dated

16.02.2021, as published on 02.04.2021, set aside the termination order with all consequential benefit. However, only 40% of the back-wages have been awarded.

9. Being aggrieved, the instant petition has been filed by the Corporation.

10. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned Labour Court, in its award, has specifically indicated that the disciplinary proceedings as held against the respondent had been set aside by the learned Labour Court vide its order dated 01.04.2008, and it gave an opportunity to the Corporation to prove the charges against the respondent. However, while passing the impugned award, it has again placed reliance on the same inquiry report and has held that the charges are not proved against the respondent and has set aside the termination order.

11. His further argument is that once the learned Labour Court had already set aside the disciplinary proceeding as conducted against the respondent, consequently, it should have held an inquiry itself into the matter and without holding an inquiry, it could not have set aside the termination order of the respondent on the basis of the inquiry report that had itself been set aside vide its order dated 01.04.2008.

12. His next submission is a preliminary objection that as subsequent to the termination order of the respondent dated 23.11.1996, the appeal filed by him had also been dismissed vide order dated 25.07.1998, as such, the doctrine of merger applies and the termination order was no longer in existence so as to entail the learned Labour Court to have set aside the same.

13. In this regard, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sharda Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (2009) 11 SCC 683 as well as the Constitution Bench judgment of S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582.

14. His further submission is that no prejudice had been caused to the Workman, as ample opportunity had been granted to him during the inquiry proceedings for putting forth his defence, which he failed to do.

15. No other ground has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

16. On the other hand, Sri Arvind Kumar Jauhari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has argued that no doubt the learned Labour Court, vide its order dated 01.04.2008, had set aside the disciplinary proceedings against the respondent; yet, the learned Labour Court itself gave an opportunity to the Corporation/Employer to prove the charges against the respondent. The learned Labour Court has thereafter concluded in its award that the documents produced by the Workman in support of his defence, namely, documents No. 3(1) to 3(4), have not been disputed by the Corporation, nor has the Corporation taken cognizance of the said documents; consequently, the termination of the respondent cannot be said to be valid in the eyes of law.

17. It is further contended that although the learned Labour Court has also taken cognizance of the inquiry report against the respondent, this would obviously be so once the learned Labour Court had gone into the veracity of the challenge itself after granting an opportunity to the petitioner/Corporation to prove the charges against the respondent. Since the Corporation failed to prove the charges against the respondent/Workman, as clearly observed by the learned Labour Court in its award, it cannot be said that the termination order against the respondent is valid in the eyes of law.

18. As regards the preliminary objection, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court passed in the case of Regional Manager U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and another vs. Prabhu Dayal and another in Writ-C No. 22299 of 2021, decided on 28.10.2021, to contend that the aspect of merger has been considered by this Court, wherein it has been held that the Labour Court can only decide the reference referred to it and cannot travel beyond it. Thus, once it came to the conclusion that the domestic inquiry was not fairly conducted, or even in the inquiry before the learned Labour Court, the Corporation could not prove the charges against the respondent, the doctrine of merger would not be applicable even if the appeal had been decided.

19. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

20. At the outset, the Court may consider the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners pertaining to the doctrine of merger and the appellate order not having been challenged by the respondent herein.

21. SufÏce to state that the learned Labour Court was only required to decide the reference as was referred before it, which reference only pertained to the legality of the termination order i.e. 23.11.1996. Once the reference was already there and even if the respondent had preferred an appeal, the Corporation was conscious of the reference and as such it should have restrained itself from deciding the appeal. Merely because the Corporation took upon itself to decide the appeal even when the reference was pending, no premium can be put on their action in deciding the appeal and then to indicate that the doctrine of merger would be applicable.

22. Even otherwise, a perusal of the reference order would indicate, although no clear date can be seen in the said order, yet the reference number is LRCP 258 of 1997 and the matter has been fixed before the learned Labour Court on 20.10.1998 which indicates that at the time the appeal of the respondent was decided on

25.07.1998, the reference was already pending and thus the petitioners should not have proceeded to decide the appeal.

23. Moreover, it is a settled position of law that where the edifice goes the super-structure collapses. Once the termination order has itself been set aside by the learned Labour Court, obviously any consequential action that may have been taken by the Corporation, even by deciding the appeal, would not and cannot save the termination order (see Central Bank of India vs. C. Bernard reported in 1991 (1) SCC 319).

24. Thus, the preliminary objection is rejected.

25. Considering the aforesaid discussion, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.S. Rathore (supra) and Sharda Singh (supra) would have no applicability in the facts of the instant case.

26. On merits, a perusal of the records would indicate that even though an inquiry was conducted against the respondent by the Corporation, yet the said inquiry was found to be vitiated in the eyes of law, and the learned Labour Court itself, vide its order dated 01.04.2008, declared the disciplinary proceedings held against the respondent as void. Incidentally, there is no averment in the petition filed by the petitioners that the order dated

01.04.2008, as had been passed by the learned Labour Court, was ever challenged; thereby, the said order has attained finality and thus, for all practical purposes, the disciplinary proceedings that were held against the respondent are void even as per the conduct of the petitioners themselves, having acquiesced to the order of the learned Labour Court dated 01.04.2008.

27. The learned Labour Court also granted an opportunity to the Corporation to prove the charges against the Workman/respondent, which is apparent from a perusal of the award itself, and to which there is no dispute.

28. The award of the learned Labour Court would indicate that certain documents were produced by the Workman, namely, documents No. 3(1) to 3(4), the production of which were not denied by the Corporation, and in this view of the matter, the learned Labour Court has held that once the said documents have neither been denied nor any cognizance has been taken by them by the Corporation, consequently, it cannot be said that the charges were proved against the Workman. Nowhere in the entire petition has any averment been made by the petitioner to the effect that the aforesaid documents, as have been referred to by the learned Labour Court, were never produced by the Workman, and in absence thereof, obviously the award of the learned Labour Court pertaining to certain documents having been produced by the Workman and not denied by the Corporation has to be taken as correct. Further, merely because the learned Labour Court has also referred to the disciplinary proceedings, the same can only be considered a passing observation, more particularly when the learned Labour Court, as per the award itself, has held an inquiry and given opportunity to the Corporation to prove the charges against the Workman, which the Corporation miserably failed to do.

29. In this regard, it would also be apt to refer to a judgment of this Court in the case of Prabhu Dayal (supra) wherein this Court in similar circumstances wherein appeal was decided during pendency of the reference and the plea of merger was raised, held as under :- "28. In view of the above discussions, the reference is not hit by "doctrine of merger", or by "res judicata". The reference was rightly referred to Labour Court. The Labour Court considered the inquiry report and came to the conclusion that domestic enquiry was faulty/irregular. The most crucial and relevant evidence of Mr. Roshan Lal, who conducted inspection of the bus was neither recorded during domestic enquiry nor before the Labour Court (due to his death). There was no other evidence with the petitioner-UPSRTC, which could prove the inspection of the bus and thus the termination order of the Respondent No. 1 was bad on facts as well as on law. No other point was argued by the petitioner. Therefore, there is no illegality in the impugned Award, on law as well as on facts."

30. The judgment of Prabhu Dayal (supra) has been afÏrmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with the dismissal of Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.1946 of 2022 on 06.01.2023.

31. Keeping in view the aforesaid discussion, no case for interference is made out. The writ petition is dismissed. Order Date :- 21.8.2025 cks/- [Abdul Moin, J.] CHANDRA KANT SINGH CHANDRA KANT SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Lucknow Bench