Jawahar Lal Prajapati And Another vs Counsel for Appellant(s)

VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is 30 days as prescribed vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. Before filing of the appeal, as informed by learned counsel for the respondents, the impugned judgment had been complied with. We have perused the affidavit filed in support of application for 2 SPLAD No. 127 of 2012 condonation of delay and we do not find it to be satisfactory. When tested on the anvil of the recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025, the impugned judgment herein-above having been passed on 26.08.2011, the appellants should have thrown some light as to when they were informed by their counsel in the High Court about the passing of the judgment and order dated 26.08.2011, as it was passed in open court and was not a reserved judgment. Instead their affidavit states that a copy of the judgment was received along with a representation of the respondent/ petitioner on

12.09.2011 without giving any explanation for the intervening period. On 13.09.2011 the District Magistrate, Balrampur directed the Additional District Magistrate, Balrampur to look into the matter and submit a report, in response to which the concerned Census Clerk submitted the report to the Additional District Magistrate, Balrampur on 22.09.2011, who in turn submitted his report to the District Magistrate, Balrampur on 18.10.2011, that is a good more than a month after the direction of the District Magistrate, Balrampur. The matter was then sent to the D.G.C. (Civil), Balrampur for his legal opinion which was provided on 17.11.2011, which again is almost a month after the aforesaid report. On

17.11.2011 District Magistrate, Balrampur wrote to the State Government seeking permission to file the appeal and on 27.12.2011 the permission was granted, yet again more than a month after request from the District Magistrate, Balrampur.

5. Paragraph 8 of the affidavit speaks of the Pairokar of the appellants contacting the office of the Chief Standing Counsel for taking necessary steps to file the special appeal but does not disclose the date, mischievously. Paragraph 9 speaks of handing over the records to the Standing Counsel on 31.01.2012, that is more than a 3 SPLAD No. 127 of 2012 month after grant of permission by the Law Department. Thereafter the affidavit neither discloses any dates nor any documents in support of the pleadings contained therein. Infact it does not offer any other explanation. Although the appeal itself came to be filed only on 14.03.2012, there is absolutely no explanation for the intervening period, that is from 01.02.2012 to 14.03.2012. The explanation offered for the preceding period is also neither sufficient nor satisfactory. It discloses a casual and negligent approach on the behalf of the appellants as also lack of diligence, sincerity and promptness in filing the appeal.

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein- 4 SPLAD No. 127 of 2012 above.

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the 5 SPLAD No. 127 of 2012 merits of the matter at this stage.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by 6 SPLAD No. 127 of 2012 the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

9. In view of the above discussion, as, not only the delay is inordinate, but the same has not been satisfactorily explained, we see no reason to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is rejected.

10. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 15, 2025 Arnima (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ARNIMA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 is 30 days as prescribed vide Chapter IX Rule 10 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 read with Article 117 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963.

4. Before filing of the appeal, as informed by learned counsel for the respondents, the impugned judgment had been complied with. We have perused the affidavit filed in support of application for 2 SPLAD No. 127 of 2012 condonation of delay and we do not find it to be satisfactory. When tested on the anvil of the recent judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRS vs. Karnatka Housing Board and another reported in 2025 SCC OnLine 1969 decided on 12.09.2025, the impugned judgment herein-above having been passed on 26.08.2011, the appellants should have thrown some light as to when they were informed by their counsel in the High Court about the passing of the judgment and order dated 26.08.2011, as it was passed in open court and was not a reserved judgment. Instead their affidavit states that a copy of the judgment was received along with a representation of the respondent/ petitioner on

12.09.2011 without giving any explanation for the intervening period. On 13.09.2011 the District Magistrate, Balrampur directed the Additional District Magistrate, Balrampur to look into the matter and submit a report, in response to which the concerned Census Clerk submitted the report to the Additional District Magistrate, Balrampur on 22.09.2011, who in turn submitted his report to the District Magistrate, Balrampur on 18.10.2011, that is a good more than a month after the direction of the District Magistrate, Balrampur. The matter was then sent to the D.G.C. (Civil), Balrampur for his legal opinion which was provided on 17.11.2011, which again is almost a month after the aforesaid report. On

17.11.2011 District Magistrate, Balrampur wrote to the State Government seeking permission to file the appeal and on 27.12.2011 the permission was granted, yet again more than a month after request from the District Magistrate, Balrampur.

5. Paragraph 8 of the affidavit speaks of the Pairokar of the appellants contacting the office of the Chief Standing Counsel for taking necessary steps to file the special appeal but does not disclose the date, mischievously. Paragraph 9 speaks of handing over the records to the Standing Counsel on 31.01.2012, that is more than a 3 SPLAD No. 127 of 2012 month after grant of permission by the Law Department. Thereafter the affidavit neither discloses any dates nor any documents in support of the pleadings contained therein. Infact it does not offer any other explanation. Although the appeal itself came to be filed only on 14.03.2012, there is absolutely no explanation for the intervening period, that is from 01.02.2012 to 14.03.2012. The explanation offered for the preceding period is also neither sufficient nor satisfactory. It discloses a casual and negligent approach on the behalf of the appellants as also lack of diligence, sincerity and promptness in filing the appeal.

6. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held in the case of Shivamma (Dead) (supra) that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilize the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused. The appellants have not acted with reasonable diligence nor is the explanation offered by them plausible and consistent with ordinary human conduct. There is negligence, want of good faith and casual approach on their part for the reasons already noticed herein- 4 SPLAD No. 127 of 2012 above.

7. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether ‘sufficient cause’ has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. Test of ‘sufficient cause’ cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. Yet another practical reason has been given by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as to why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation that is it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is substantively heard. By glancing into merits prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. Therefore, we cannot consider the 5 SPLAD No. 127 of 2012 merits of the matter at this stage.

8. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has also considered as to whether there was any room for largesse for State lethargy and leisure under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. After considering various earlier decisions on the subject, ultimately, it opined that prior to the decision of 'Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd.' reported in (2012) 3 SCC 563, the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. At the same time, there also existed contrary views such as 'State of W.B. vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality' reported in (1972) 1 SCC 366 and 'Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by LRS vs. State of A.P. and ors.' reported in (2011) 4 SCC 363 which held that, irrespective of whether the litigant is a Government entity or a private individual, the provisions of limitation would apply uniformly, and any leeway shown by the courts would also remain the same. The law as it presently stands post the decision of Postmaster General (supra) as unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bonafide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has further observed that on a combined reading of 'State of Rajasthan & Anr. vs. Bal Kishan Mathur (Dead) through Legal Representative' reported in (2014) 1 SCC 592 and 'Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India' reported in (2023) 10 SCC 531 it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by 6 SPLAD No. 127 of 2012 the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would compromise the sanctity of limitation. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural bottlenecks, or administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of delay cannot always, invariably accepted as a ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. We have perused other parts of the said judgment including para 214 and onwards.

9. In view of the above discussion, as, not only the delay is inordinate, but the same has not been satisfactorily explained, we see no reason to condone the delay. The application for condonation of delay is rejected.

10. Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed. December 15, 2025 Arnima (Rajeev Bharti,J.) (Rajan Roy,J.) ARNIMA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench