High Court · 2025

first point, it was held that the relationship of landlord and tenant was accepted. The point with regard to sending of notice was decided against the plaintiff. Point No. 3 with regard to establishing bonafide need was decided against the plaintiff mainly on the ground that even in the application, no facts with regard to the actual need were stated by the landlord and ultimately, the suit in question came to be dismissed on 17.09.2018.

7. Aggrieved against the same, the plaintiff filed an appeal under Section 22 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. In the appeal, it was stated that the appellant was the owner of the premises, in which the petitioner was the tenant. It was also stated that need of the landlord was bonafide. The age of the landlord was also pleaded to impress the appellate Court. It was also stated that the list of the properties mentioned were not in the possession of the landlord and were involved in various litigation with the various tenants. The petitioner herein relied upon the defence taken in the release application.

8. The appellate Court has noticed that no written objections were filed to the ground taken in the appeal. The appellate Court framed two points of determination. The appellate Court recorded that on the basis of pleadings contained in the record of the trial Court, specific pleading with regard to bonafide need was made. It was also noticed that the landlord in his application i.e. C-14 has taken a ground that his family has become big and the change circumstances should be seen for determining the bonafide need. It was also noticed that the plaintiff had stated that the premises in question was a residential premises, which fact is admitted by the petitioner herein to be used for commercial purposes. It also recorded that the trial Court had noticed that the list with regard to number of family member was not disclosed and on the said ground, need of the plaintiff was not found to be established. The appellate Court also noticed that various proceedings have been initiated by the landlord against the other tenants, which were pending. The Court also noticed the age of the landlord and also the fact that during the pendency of the proceedings no efforts were made by the petitioner herein for searching an alternate premises.

9. Thereafter, the appellate Court considered the arguments of the petitioner to the effect that the landlord was a rich person having various properties, which was repelled on the ground that merely because there was various properties available, nothing stops the landlord for moving a release application for residential purposes. The Court also noticed that this fact has not disputed or rebutted by the petitioner. The Court also noticed that the petitioner was in occupation for almost 46 years till that time the landlord had attained the age 67 years. The Court accepting the contention of the landlord that the other properties were under tenancy and subject matter of litigation. The Court also stated that when, the premises were given on rent, the age of the petitioner was 20-25 years and subsequently he was married and his family has increased. The Appellate Court also noticed the finding recorded by the prescribed authority. Specifically, the pleadings in the application that the landlord was staying in the premises along with his family, where the petitioner was running a commercial shop restaurant (Dhaba), thus based upon the said observations coupled with the fact that the petitioner did not make any effort to search any alternative premises proceeded to establish that the need set up by the landlord was bonafide and had increased with the passage of time during the pendency of the appeal. Based upon the said, the order of the trial Court was set aside and the release application was allowed.

10. In the present writ petition, the counsel for the petitioner strenuously argues that the bonafide need was not set up in the application filed under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. It is further argued that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not served. It is further argued that in the absence of there being pleadings with regard to bonafide need, the release application was rightly rejected by the prescribed authority. It is further argued that the appellate Court has not upset the findings based upon consideration of any evidence and has decided the appeal on surmises and conjectures holding that the need must have swelled with passage of time. It is further argued that the premises is in occupation of the petitioner and is being run as a Restaurant or Dhaba, which is the only source of livelihood of the petitioner and in case the impugned order is sustained, it would cause a irreparable hardship to the petitioner.

11. My attention is also drawn to the specific pleading contained in paragraph nos. 31 & 32 of the petition, wherein it has been stated that the plaintiff has huge and more than 20 accommodations available at Lucknow including the house in which the premises in question is situated, which was given through a will-deed dated 24.05.2010 and the plaintiff has two residential flats lying vacant. It was also stated that a portion of "U.P. Film Chambers of Commerce" on the ground floor of the building is lying vacant to the plaintiff, as such, the plaintiff has no need, much less bonafide need. In the light of the said, it is argued that the impugned order cannot be sustained and needs to be quashed.

12. Two things that emerge and are importance are firstly that no counter afÏdavit has been filed in the present writ petition and secondly that the petitioner has not filed any defence in the appeal as is recorded in the appellate Court and not controverted through any pleading in the writ petition. The fact remains that in the application and replication there were pleading of bonafide need by the plaintiff, however, the same was not accepted by the prescribed authority. The appellate Court rightly considered that by the passage of time, the family must have increased. It is not necessary that bonafide need has to be established by arithmetic precision. The Appellate Court noticed that the pleadings in the release application and replication (to which no reply was filed) and also the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W.2 and P.W. 3 on record which substantiated the pleadings in the application and replication in respect of bonafide need. The fact also remains that during the whole 46 years of tenancy, the petitioner never make any effort to search alternative accommodation, which is one of the criteria for determination while deciding the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Even in paragraph nos. 31 & 32 of the writ petition, although it has been stated that additional premises is available to the plaintiff, it is fairly well established that a landlord cannot be dictated to stay in a premises of the liking of the tenant. The landlord is entitled to seek release of the shop in which he wants to stay and the tenant has no right to dictate.

13. In view thereof, no good grounds for interference are made out. The writ petition is dismissed, the appellate order is upheld.

14. After arguing, the counsel for the petitioner seeks to vacate the premises in question. In view thereof, the petitioner is granted one year's time to vacate the premises in question i.e. up to

30.07.2026 subject to the petitioner filing an undertaking in the form of an afÏdavit within three weeks i.e. up to 31.07.2025 before the Court concerned undertaking to vacate the premises on or before 30.07.2026 and to handover the vacant and actual physical possession to the landlord and to no one else. The arrears of rent shall also be deposited within a period of three months, if due. It is also essential to notice that the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 has been repealed by a new U.P. Tenancy Act, 2021, thus the rigors that were applicable in the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 have lost its efÏcacy by passage of time. The rent as is being paid in the interim order of this Court shall be paid till the date of actual vacation of the premises in question. Order Date :- 11.7.2025 Arun ARUN KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

first point, it was held that the relationship of landlord and tenant was accepted. The point with regard to sending of notice was decided against the plaintiff. Point No. 3 with regard to establishing bonafide need was decided against the plaintiff mainly on the ground that even in the application, no facts with regard to the actual need were stated by the landlord and ultimately, the suit in question came to be dismissed on 17.09.2018.

7. Aggrieved against the same, the plaintiff filed an appeal under Section 22 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. In the appeal, it was stated that the appellant was the owner of the premises, in which the petitioner was the tenant. It was also stated that need of the landlord was bonafide. The age of the landlord was also pleaded to impress the appellate Court. It was also stated that the list of the properties mentioned were not in the possession of the landlord and were involved in various litigation with the various tenants. The petitioner herein relied upon the defence taken in the release application.

8. The appellate Court has noticed that no written objections were filed to the ground taken in the appeal. The appellate Court framed two points of determination. The appellate Court recorded that on the basis of pleadings contained in the record of the trial Court, specific pleading with regard to bonafide need was made. It was also noticed that the landlord in his application i.e. C-14 has taken a ground that his family has become big and the change circumstances should be seen for determining the bonafide need. It was also noticed that the plaintiff had stated that the premises in question was a residential premises, which fact is admitted by the petitioner herein to be used for commercial purposes. It also recorded that the trial Court had noticed that the list with regard to number of family member was not disclosed and on the said ground, need of the plaintiff was not found to be established. The appellate Court also noticed that various proceedings have been initiated by the landlord against the other tenants, which were pending. The Court also noticed the age of the landlord and also the fact that during the pendency of the proceedings no efforts were made by the petitioner herein for searching an alternate premises.

9. Thereafter, the appellate Court considered the arguments of the petitioner to the effect that the landlord was a rich person having various properties, which was repelled on the ground that merely because there was various properties available, nothing stops the landlord for moving a release application for residential purposes. The Court also noticed that this fact has not disputed or rebutted by the petitioner. The Court also noticed that the petitioner was in occupation for almost 46 years till that time the landlord had attained the age 67 years. The Court accepting the contention of the landlord that the other properties were under tenancy and subject matter of litigation. The Court also stated that when, the premises were given on rent, the age of the petitioner was 20-25 years and subsequently he was married and his family has increased. The Appellate Court also noticed the finding recorded by the prescribed authority. Specifically, the pleadings in the application that the landlord was staying in the premises along with his family, where the petitioner was running a commercial shop restaurant (Dhaba), thus based upon the said observations coupled with the fact that the petitioner did not make any effort to search any alternative premises proceeded to establish that the need set up by the landlord was bonafide and had increased with the passage of time during the pendency of the appeal. Based upon the said, the order of the trial Court was set aside and the release application was allowed.

10. In the present writ petition, the counsel for the petitioner strenuously argues that the bonafide need was not set up in the application filed under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. It is further argued that notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not served. It is further argued that in the absence of there being pleadings with regard to bonafide need, the release application was rightly rejected by the prescribed authority. It is further argued that the appellate Court has not upset the findings based upon consideration of any evidence and has decided the appeal on surmises and conjectures holding that the need must have swelled with passage of time. It is further argued that the premises is in occupation of the petitioner and is being run as a Restaurant or Dhaba, which is the only source of livelihood of the petitioner and in case the impugned order is sustained, it would cause a irreparable hardship to the petitioner.

11. My attention is also drawn to the specific pleading contained in paragraph nos. 31 & 32 of the petition, wherein it has been stated that the plaintiff has huge and more than 20 accommodations available at Lucknow including the house in which the premises in question is situated, which was given through a will-deed dated 24.05.2010 and the plaintiff has two residential flats lying vacant. It was also stated that a portion of "U.P. Film Chambers of Commerce" on the ground floor of the building is lying vacant to the plaintiff, as such, the plaintiff has no need, much less bonafide need. In the light of the said, it is argued that the impugned order cannot be sustained and needs to be quashed.

12. Two things that emerge and are importance are firstly that no counter afÏdavit has been filed in the present writ petition and secondly that the petitioner has not filed any defence in the appeal as is recorded in the appellate Court and not controverted through any pleading in the writ petition. The fact remains that in the application and replication there were pleading of bonafide need by the plaintiff, however, the same was not accepted by the prescribed authority. The appellate Court rightly considered that by the passage of time, the family must have increased. It is not necessary that bonafide need has to be established by arithmetic precision. The Appellate Court noticed that the pleadings in the release application and replication (to which no reply was filed) and also the evidence of P.W. 1, P.W.2 and P.W. 3 on record which substantiated the pleadings in the application and replication in respect of bonafide need. The fact also remains that during the whole 46 years of tenancy, the petitioner never make any effort to search alternative accommodation, which is one of the criteria for determination while deciding the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. Even in paragraph nos. 31 & 32 of the writ petition, although it has been stated that additional premises is available to the plaintiff, it is fairly well established that a landlord cannot be dictated to stay in a premises of the liking of the tenant. The landlord is entitled to seek release of the shop in which he wants to stay and the tenant has no right to dictate.

13. In view thereof, no good grounds for interference are made out. The writ petition is dismissed, the appellate order is upheld.

14. After arguing, the counsel for the petitioner seeks to vacate the premises in question. In view thereof, the petitioner is granted one year's time to vacate the premises in question i.e. up to

30.07.2026 subject to the petitioner filing an undertaking in the form of an afÏdavit within three weeks i.e. up to 31.07.2025 before the Court concerned undertaking to vacate the premises on or before 30.07.2026 and to handover the vacant and actual physical possession to the landlord and to no one else. The arrears of rent shall also be deposited within a period of three months, if due. It is also essential to notice that the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 has been repealed by a new U.P. Tenancy Act, 2021, thus the rigors that were applicable in the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 have lost its efÏcacy by passage of time. The rent as is being paid in the interim order of this Court shall be paid till the date of actual vacation of the premises in question. Order Date :- 11.7.2025 Arun ARUN KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench