Writ Petition No. 18 of 1977 · Allahabad High Court · 2025

confirmation of order dated 30.6.1976. The said writ petition was allowed and the appellate order dated 17.9.1977 as well as order of the prescribed authority dated 30.6.1976 were set aside in toto and the matter was remanded back to the prescribed authority to decide the matter afresh on all aspects.

9. Again the order passed by the prescribed authority was passed, wherein neither the observations and directions of appellate order nor the order of this Court was considered and 68-8-3 land including the lands sold prior to cut off date 24.1.1971 were clubbed and declared as surplus. Appeal was once again preferred by Rani Shanti Devi being Appeal No.469- Barabanki against the order dated 30.10.1987, which was allowed by the Commissioner, Faizabad Division and the order of the prescribed 3 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 authority was set aside holding it to be suffering from serious legal defects and the matter was remanded back to the prescribed authority for deciding afresh in the light of the observations of the order dated

19.9.1989 as well as the direction of this Court dated 25.10.1979.

10. Upon remand, the impugned order dated 27.4.1998 as contained in Annexure-2 was passed by the prescribed authority and once again not only discarding the direction of this Court but also violating the observations and directions of the appellate court dated 19.9.1989, an order was passed and even the sale deeds executed prior to the cut off date i.e. 24.1.1971 were ignored and the land held by the petitioners in their independent rights as tenure holders were clubbed with the land of Rani Shanti Devi and declared surplus.

11. All the petitioners appeared before the prescribed authority and even filed their objections before it alongwith the copy of the sale deeds as relevant revenue records and even the erstwhile tenure holder also categorically asserted the transfers made by her prior to 24.1.1971 and also stated having no concern with the lands so transferred. The registered sale deeds executed in favour of the petitioners are as under :- i. Raghunath Singh (father of the petitioner No.1). Sale deed dated

18.5.1970. ii. Jag Prasad Singh. Sale deed dated 10.6.1970. iii. Rati Ram. Sale deed dated 15.12.1970. iv. Bindra Singh. Sale deed dated 24/30.7.1970. v. Trishool Singh (predecessor in interest of petitioner Nos.6 and 7). Sale deed dated 16.12.1970.

12. Appeal under Section 13 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act was filed by the petitioners against the order dated

27.4.1998 in the court of Commissioner, Faizabad Division which was registered as Appeal No.104-Barabanki. Another appeal was filed by Rani Shanti Devi and both the appeals were heard and decided together. 4 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999

13. Vide order dated 18.1.1999, which is impugned in the writ petition as Annexure-1, both the appeals filed by the petitioners as well as erstwhile tenure holder Smt. Shanti Devi were rejected.

14. Assailing the impugned orders, submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the prescribed authority as well as appellate authority failed to consider the provisions of Section 5(6) and going beyond their jurisdiction without any authority of law, considered the genuineness and validity of the sale deeds duly protected and kept out of the purview of scrutiny of the ceiling authorities, under the provisions of Section 5(6) and rendering the very cut off date of 24.1.1971 as otiose making both the judgments impugned illegal, arbitrary and non-sustainable in law.

15. Next submission is that both the authorities prescribed as well as appellate authority have not considered the adequate consideration at the relevant point of time and proceeded to pass the impugned order. It is submitted that Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand) in the year 1970 was sufficient amount to execute a sale deed in favour of the petitioners, therefore, the finding returned otherwise is per se illegal and non- sustainable.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the following judgments :- (i) Vithaldas Jagannath Khatri Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2020) 16 SCC 1]. Relevant paragraphs 5, 9 to 11, 16, 19 and 31 are being quoted below :- "5. Section 2(11-A) defines “family unit” as follows: “2. (11-A) “family unit” means a family unit as explained in Section 4;”

9. Section 11 states as follows: “11. Restriction on partition.—Where any land held by a family is partitioned after the 26th day of September, 1970, the partition so made shall be deemed (unless the contrary is proved) to have been made in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the object of the amending Act, 1972, and shall accordingly be ignored, and any land covered by 5 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 such partition shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the land held by the family; and the extent of share of each person in the land held by the family shall be taken into consideration for calculating the ceiling area in accordance with the provisions of Section 3. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “partition” means any division of land by act of parties made inter vivos, and includes also partition made by a decree or order of a court, tribunal or authority.”

10. Section 12 deals with the submission of returns by a person or a family unit. Section 13 is important and states as follows: “13. Failure to submit return.—(1) Where a person or member of a family unit required by Section 12 to furnish a return,— (a) fails without reasonable cause so to do, within the time specified in that section, or (b) furnishes a return which he knows, or has reason to believe, to be false, he shall be liable to pay a penalty which may extend in the former case to one hundred rupees, and in the latter case to five hundred rupees. (2) Where the Collector has reason to believe that a person or a member of a family unit required by Section 12 to furnish a return has, without reasonable cause, failed so to do, or has submitted a return which he knows or has reason to believe to be false, the Collector shall issue a notice calling upon such person or member to show cause within fifteen days of the service thereof, why the penalty provided by sub-section (1) should not be imposed upon him. If the Collector, on considering the reply or other cause shown, is satisfied that the person or member has without reasonable cause failed to submit the return within time, or has submitted a return which he knew or had reason to believe to be false, he may impose the penalty provided in the last preceding sub-section and require him to submit a true and correct return complete in all particulars, within a period of fifteen days from the date of the order. (3) If the person or member fails to comply with the order within the time so granted by the Collector, then as a penalty for failure to furnish a 6 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 return, or a true and correct return complete in all particulars, the right, title and interest in the land held by him or as the case may be, by the family unit in excess of the ceiling area shall, subject to the provision of this Chapter, be forfeited to the State Government and shall thereupon vest without further assurance in that Government.”

11. Section 14(1) states as follows: “14. Power of Collector to hold enquiry.—(1) As soon as may be after the expiry of the period referred to in Section 12, or the further period referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 13, the Collector shall, either suo motu whether or not a return had been filed or on the basis of the returns submitted to him under either of those sections, and such record as he may consider it necessary to refer to, hold an enquiry in respect of every person or family unit holding land in excess of the ceiling area, and shall, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, determine the surplus land held by such person or family unit.”

16. Section 44-B excludes pleaders from appearance as follows: “44-B. Pleaders, etc. excluded from appearance.—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any law for the time being in force, no pleader shall be entitled to appear on behalf of any party in any proceedings under this Act before the authorised officer, the Tribunal, the Collector, the Commissioner, the State Government or the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal: Provided that, where a party is a minor or lunatic, his guardian may appear, and in the case of any other person under disability, his authorised agent may appear. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression “pleader” includes an advocate, attorney, vakil or any other legal practitioner.”

19. On 19-11-1976, 60 ac and 27 guntas of land of Vithaldas was declared surplus. An appeal preferred against this order was dismissed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 16-2-1977. On 2-3-1982, a learned Single Judge of Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court 7 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 remitted the matter to the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal for fresh enquiry. On remand, a fresh order was passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 7-5-1984, where land admeasuring 59 ac 35 guntas was deemed to be surplus. An appeal was filed against the aforesaid order by Vithaldas, his wife, his son and the third daughter, Bela Devi under Section 33 of the 1961 Act. The two other minor daughters did not file any appeal, as they were satisfied with the view adopted by the Sub-Divisional Officer, by which no part of the property that devolved on them by means of the partition deed was declared surplus. The State filed cross- objections in the appeal filed by Vithaldas, challenging the exclusion of the land, inter alia, of the two elder daughters. However, the State did not take care to implead them. The appeal filed by Vithaldas et al. was dismissed by the appellate authority, who allowed the cross-objections of the State by its order dated 3-12-1984. The appellate authority found that the partition deed dated 31-1-1970, though before the cut-off date, was against the principles of Hindu Law, to the extent that it gave a share to minor daughters in ancestral land. On this basis, the partition deed was declared to be of no effect in law. As a matter of fact, if the appeal provision i.e. Section 33 of the 1961 Act is to be seen, it is clear that appeals are provided to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal against a declaration or part thereof made under Section 21 of the 1961 Act. The persons who would be aggrieved by such declarations can only be the person or family unit whose ceiling area is determined or the landlord to whom possession of land is to be restored or the right, title and interest of the person or family unit whose land is to be forfeited to the State Government. If at all a cross-objection can be taken by a respondent under Section 33(1-A), it can only be a person or family unit or landlord spoken of in Section 21(1) of the 1961 Act. The State Government may perhaps file a cross-objection where it contends that land has wrongly not been forfeited to it. But such is not the case on the facts of this appeal. Thus, the State taking a cross-objection on the facts of this case would itself be outside Section 33(1-A). If at all the State can be said to be aggrieved by a declaration made under Section 21, a suo motu power of revision is given to the State Government under Section 45, which on the facts of a particular case may well be exercised." 8 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 (ii) Ramadhar Singh Vs. Prescribed Authority [1994 Supp (3) SCC 702]. Relevant paragraph 2 is being quoted below :- "2. It has to be seen under what provision of the Act can the validity of the sale executed prior to January 24, 1971, the appointed day, be gone into? Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the said Act says that in determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenureholder, any transfer of land made after the 24th day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared as surplus land under the Act shall be ignored and not taken into account. The proviso (b) thereto, inter alia, provides that a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and an irrevocable instrument, not being of benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit for the tenureholder or other members of the family, is outside the scope of the aforesaid sub-section. Thereafter Explanation II provides that the burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit. Apparently, it is under this provision of law that the validity of the sale deed dated April 22, 1969 was put to test. The authorities under the Act took the view that the sale deed was not genuine because no consideration appears to have passed before the Sub- Registrar and that it was a transfer between father and son raising a dust of suspicion. Otherwise it was not disputed on fact that the sale had been effected by means of a registered deed in which the passing of consideration was mentioned as a recital. The existence of the sale deed being not disputed and it having taken place, as said before, on February 24, 1969, prior to the appointed day that is January 24, 1971, the inquiry regarding the validity of the sale deed under sub-section (6) of Section 5 was totally misplaced. Thereunder, as it appears to us, the appropriate authority had no jurisdiction to be put the validity of the sale deed to test since his jurisdiction arose only when the deed of transfer had been effected on or after the appointed day. Not only the first and the appellate authority under the Act persisted in that view, but the High Court too proceeded on that basis. The effort of the appellant to have it declared that the authorities had no jurisdiction to invalidate the sale under sub- section (6) of Section 5 when read with Explanation II to sub-section (1) of Section 5 also was a futile attempt because the High Court followed the 9 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 path, as did the authorities under the Act, and rejected the writ petition. We are of the view that this was a wholly erroneous approach. Sub- section (6) of Section 5 did not confer jurisdiction on the authorities to determine the validity of the sale and if that is so any finding of theirs as to the contents of the sale is of no assistance. In the result the appeal must succeed. Accordingly, allowing the same we set aside all the orders of the authorities below as also that of the High Court. No costs." (iii) Narendra Pal Singh Gahlot Vs. Upper Commissioner (Judicial) [2008 SCC OnLine All 1027]. Relevant paragraphs 6, 7 and 12 to 14 are being quoted below :- "6. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Ramadhar Singh v. Prescribed Authority reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 702. Taking support of aforesaid Judgment, learned counsel for petitioner submits that sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act says that in determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure holder, any transfer of land made after the 24th day of January 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared as surplus land under the Act shall be ignored and not taken into account. It does not confer jurisdiction on the authorities to determine the validity of a sale deed executed prior to 24th January, 1971. Reliance has been placed upon para 2 of the said judgment. The same are being reproduced below:- “2. It has to be seen under what provision of the Act can the validity of the sale executed prior to January 24, 1971, the appointed day, be gone into? Sub section (6) of Section 5 of the said Act says that in determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure holder, any transfer of land made after the 24th day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared as surplus land under the Act shall be ignored and not taken into account. The proviso (b) thereto, inter alia, provides that a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and an irrevocable instrument, not being of benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit for the tenure holder or other members of the family, is outside the scope of the aforesaid sub-section. Thereafter Explanation II provides that the burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall 10 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 rest with the party claiming its benefit. Apparently, it is under this provision of law that the validity of the sale deed dated April 22, 1969 was put to test. The authorities under the Act took the view that the sale deed was not genuine because no consideration appears to have passed before the Sub-Registrar and that it was a transfer between father and son raising a dust of suspicion. Otherwise it was not disputed on fact that the sale had been effected by means of a registered deed in which the passing of consideration was mentioned as a recital. The existence of the sale deed being not disputed and it having taken place, as said before, on February 24, 1969, prior to the appointed day that is January 24, 1971, the inquiry regarding the validity of the sale deed under sub-section (6) of Section 5 was totally misplaced. Thereunder, as it appears to us, the appropriate authority had no jurisdiction to be put the validity of the sale deed to test since his jurisdiction arose only when the deed of transfer had been effected on or after the appointed day. Not only the first and the appellate authority under the Act persisted in that view, but the High Court too proceeded on that basis. The effort of the appellant to have it declared that the authorities had no jurisdiction to invalidate the sale under sub-section (6) of Section 5 when read with Explanation II to sub- section (1) of Section 5 also was a futile attempt because the High Court followed the path, as did the authorities under the Act, and rejected the writ petition. We are of the view that this was a wholly erroneous approach. Sub-section (6) of Section 5 did not confer jurisdiction on the authorities to determine the validity of the sale and if that is so any finding of theirs as to the contents of the sale is of no assistance. In the result the appeal must succeed. Accordingly, allowing the same we set aside all the orders of the authorities below as also that of the High Court. No costs.”

7. Further reliance has been placed upon a judgment in Indrapal Singh v. Prescribed Authority, Meerut reported in 2007 (6) ADJ, 205 and reliance has been placed upon paras 5, 8, 9 of the said judgment. The same are being reproduced below:- “5. The learned Counsel the petitioners submitted genuineness of the sale-deed dated 9-9-1970 cannot be taken into consideration by the authorities under the Ceiling Act and the land 11 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 transferred by the sale-deed was liable to be excluded from the total holding of the petitioners. Further, the sale-deed executed in favour of Vimla Devi, even though it was executed after 24-1-1971, nonetheless, the sale-deed was bona fidely executed and that Vimla Devi was in cultivatory possession and her name was also mutated in the revenue records, as such, the Prescribed Authority committed an error in ignoring the sale-deed merely on the basis that it was executed after 24-1-1971. Further, the authorities have committed a manifest error in holding that no evidence was filed to show that some of the plots were grove land. The appellate authority committed an error in holding that since less number of trees per bigha were existing on the plot in question, the land could not be treated as a grove land.

8. The Supreme Court in Ram Adhar Singh v. Prescribed Authority, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 702 has held that no inquiry regarding the validity of the sale-deed under Section 5(6) of the Act could be made with regard to the genuineness of the sale-deed executed prior to 24-1-1971. The Supreme Court further held that appellate authority had no jurisdiction to put the validity of the sale-deed to test since its jurisdiction arose only when the deed of transfer had been effected on or after the appointed day, i.e. 24-1-

1971. Consequently, this Court holds that the Prescribed Authority could not consider the genuineness of the sale deed dated 9-1-1970 and the land transferred vide sale-deed is liable to be excluded from the holding of the petitioner.

9. With regard to the sale-deed dated 28-8-1971, no doubt the sale-deed was executed after 24-1-1971 and the same could be ignored under Section 5(6) subject to the provision of proviso (b) to sub-section (6) of Section 5, which contemplates that the tenure holder can prove to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority that the transfer was made in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument and that it was not a benami transaction. The Prescribed Authority cannot ignore the sale-deed on the sole ground that it was executed after 24-1-1977. The Prescribed Authority was liable to consider the effect of the mutation in favour of Vimla Devi pursuant to the sale- deed and consider the genuineness of the transaction as to whether adequate consideration was paid and whether she was put in cultivatory 12 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 possession. This aspect has not been considered. Consequently, the order of the Prescribed Authority ignoring the sale-deed of 25-8-1971 in favour of Vimla Devi cannot be sustained.”

12. From the record it is clear that in the objection filed by petitioner, petitioner has filed various documents showing therein that a sale deed has already been executed by father of petitioner in the year 1959 but authorities below has not taken into consideration the aforesaid fact. From the provision of Ceiling Act it is clear that if sale deed has been executed prior to 24-1-1971, ceiling authority has got no jurisdiction to hold that tenure holder is not entitled for benefit. Petitioner has filed a registered sale deed as well as revenue record showing therein that sale deed has been executed in 1959 by father of petitioner. Name of purchaser has been mutated and he was possession in the land in dispute. As regards finding recorded by court below that during period of execution of sale deed, there was consolidation in village, as such, without permission of settlement officer (Consolidation), sale deed cannot be executed, as such, petitioner is not entitled for benefit of aforesaid land mentioned in sale deed. The state-respondent has not filed any document therein showing that during that period when sale deed was executed by father of petitioner, village in question was under consolidation, though petitioner has submitted a document showing therein that after execution of sale deed, village in question was notified under Section 4 of Consolidation of Holdings Act and plot number has been changed but authorities below has not taken into consideration the said fact. Further authorities have committed a manifest error in holding that no evidence was filed to show that some of the plots were grove. Prescribed Authority has not recorded a finding to this effect.

13. The Supreme Court in Ram Adhar's case (supra) has held that no inquiry regarding validity of the sale deed under Section 5(6) of the Act could be made with regard to the genuineness of sale deed executed prior to 24-1-1971. The Supreme Court has further held that court below had no jurisdiction to put the validity of the sale deed to test since its jurisdiction arose only when the deed of transfer had been effected on or after the appointed day i.e. 24-1-1971. 13 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999

14. In such situation, Court holds that authorities below cannot consider the genuineness of sale deed executed in the year 1959, as such, land transferred vide sale deed by father of petitioner is liable to be excluded from holding of petitioner." (iv) Chimman Lal Shah Vs. State of U.P. [1979 SCC OnLine All 308]. Relevant paragraphs 1 and 4 are being quoted below :- "1. The only controversy that arose for consideration was whether the authorities constituted under the provisions of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act were justified in rejecting the partition decree dated 2-4-1970. It is stated that this decree was given effect to in revenue records prior to 24-1-1971. Both, the prescribed authority and the District Judge, have rejected petitioner's claim only because it was a decree between petitioner and his sons and there was nothing to show that the sons were co-tenants. Whether the view taken by the District Judge or the prescribed authority is correct or not needs no comment as the effectiveness of the decree for determining ceiling area has to be examined in the light of provisions containd in Section 5 and its sub- sections. Sub-Section (7) deals with partition decrees passed after 24-1-

1971. As the partition decree was passed prior to this date the sub-section did not apply. Nor did the provisos apply as the suit for partition or proceeding was not pending on 24-1-1971. The learned State counsel argued that petitioners case was covered by Explanation I and II to sub- section (1) of the Act. It may be so but those explanations apply on certain facts. For instance for applicability of Expl. 1 there has to be evidence that the land was held by the petitioner in his own right.

4. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The order passed by the District Judge is quashed. He is directed to decide the appeal afresh on the question whether partition decree was liable to be ignored. The petitioner shall be entitled to its costs."

17. On the basis of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, he tried to submit that cut off date fixed as 24.1.1971 was not taken into consideration while deciding the issue in regard to execution of sale deed. 14 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999

18. On the other hand, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits that the order passed by the prescribed authority and appellate court do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality and are just and valid orders. He further submits that the prescribed authority and appellate authority have recorded reasons to disbelieve the execution of sale deed in favour of the petitioners. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon a judgment rendered in the case of Sant Singh Vs. The Additional District Judge, Jhansi & others [1996 (3) SCC 400. Relevant paragraphs D and E are being quoted below :- "The proviso provides that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to “a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a ‘Benami’ transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of the family”. The question is: whether the sale deed is executed in good faith and for adequate consideration and is not a ‘Benami’ transaction for the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of the family. ‘Family’ has been defined under the Act to include wife and minor children in relation to himself or herself and his wife or her husband, as the case may be (other than a judicially separated wife or husband), minor sons and minor daughters (other than married daughters). It is seen that the District Judge had recorded the finding, as a fact, that she was a minor and the sale deed was executed by the father making the wife the guardian of the minor daughter."

19. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel further placed reliance upon a judgment rendered in Writ-C No.55503 of 2002 (Vyas Prasad Vs. Additional Commissioner & others). Relevant paragraphs-18 and 21 are being quoted as under :- "18. The judgment in the case of Ramadhar Singh (supra) was held to be per incurium and in Sant Singh v. ADJ, Jhansi.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sant Singh (supra) has held that in view of the specific language used in section 5(6) of the Rural Ceiling Act. The Prescribed Authority in determining the ceiling applicable to tenure-holder shall ignore any transfer of land made after the 24.1.1971, which, but for the transfer 15 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 would have been declared as surplus land under the Act. However, the proviso further says thus “provided that nothing in the sub-section shall apply to (a) transfer in favour of any person (including the Government) referred to in sub-section (2)(b) transfer proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument, not being benami transaction, or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder, or other members of the family, is outside the scope of the aforesaid subsection. Thereafter, Explanation II provides that the burden of proving that case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit.

21. The Supreme Court observed that sale deed executed even prior to

24.1.1971 could be looked into and the question would be whether the sale-deed is executed in good faith and for adequate consideration and is not benami transaction for the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of the family."

20. After having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I perused the material on record as well as the law reports cited by both the parties.

21. The law is settled and it is provided under Section 5(6) of the Ceiling Act, only transfers made on or after 24.01.1971 can be examined to check if they are in good faith, for adequate consideration, etc. Transfers made before 24.01.1971 cannot be challenged by ceiling authorities merely on suspicion regarding consideration, possession, relationship, or genuineness. The Supreme Court in Ramadhar Singh (Supra) has clearly held that the authority has no jurisdiction to test the genuineness of a registered sale deed executed before the appointed day. It has to be seen under what provision of the Act can the validity of the sale executed prior to January 24, 1971, the appointed day, be gone into? Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the said Act says that in determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenureholder, any transfer of land made after the 24th day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared as surplus land under the Act shall be ignored and not taken into account. The proviso (b) thereto, inter alia, provides that a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for 16 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 adequate consideration and an irrevocable instrument, not being of benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit for the tenureholder or other members of the family, is outside the scope of the aforesaid sub-section. Thereafter Explanation II provides that the burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit.

22. Narendra Pal Singh Gahlot (Supra). This decision reiterates that pre ‑appointed‑day transfers must be excluded from ceiling calculations. The Court held that the authority cannot question the genuineness of such transfers except where clear evidence of fraud, benami or sham transaction exists. The judgment also supports the principle that mutation and possession records strengthen pre‑cut‑off transfers.

23. Indrapal Singh (Supra). The Court held that the Prescribed Authority cannot reject a registered pre-1971 sale deed merely because consolidation proceedings existed or because the authority suspected inadequate consideration. Again, the principle is that the existence of a registered deed and mutation/possession is sufficient unless there is strong proof of fraud.

24. Chimman Lal Shah (Supra). The Court held that partition decrees or transfers prior to 24.01.1971 must be considered valid for ceiling computation. Authorities cannot ignore such documents merely on presumptions.

25. Sant Singh (Supra). The State cited this case to argue that authorities may examine whether a transfer is benami or for the benefit of the family. However, that case involved specific proof that the transfer was for the benefit of a minor daughter and was not a genuine sale. The factual matrix in Sant Singh (Supra) is distinguishable because in the present case no such evidence has been produced.

26. After considering the above judgments and the material on record, it is evident that in the present case all sale deeds relied upon by the petitioners were registered and executed before 24.01.1971. Revenue 17 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 records and possession entries also supported these transfers. Despite several remand directions, the Prescribed Authority repeatedly ignored these sale deeds and treated them as invalid. There is no material on record showing that these deeds were benami, sham, forged, or executed for the continued benefit of the tenure‑holder. In view of the above, there is no hesitation to hold that the authorities below exceeded their jurisdiction by examining and rejecting pre‑cut‑off sale deeds.

27. On overall consideration of facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned orders being per se illegal and are not sustainable in law, thus, they are liable to be set aside by this Court. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 18.1.1999, passed by opposite party no.1 and the order dated 27.4.1998, passed by opposite party no. 2, as contained in annexures no.1 and 2 respectively are hereby set aside. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed.

28. No order as to costs. November 13, 2025 Gautam (Irshad Ali,J.) GAUTAM TECKCHANDANI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench

confirmation of order dated 30.6.1976. The said writ petition was allowed and the appellate order dated 17.9.1977 as well as order of the prescribed authority dated 30.6.1976 were set aside in toto and the matter was remanded back to the prescribed authority to decide the matter afresh on all aspects.

9. Again the order passed by the prescribed authority was passed, wherein neither the observations and directions of appellate order nor the order of this Court was considered and 68-8-3 land including the lands sold prior to cut off date 24.1.1971 were clubbed and declared as surplus. Appeal was once again preferred by Rani Shanti Devi being Appeal No.469- Barabanki against the order dated 30.10.1987, which was allowed by the Commissioner, Faizabad Division and the order of the prescribed 3 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 authority was set aside holding it to be suffering from serious legal defects and the matter was remanded back to the prescribed authority for deciding afresh in the light of the observations of the order dated

19.9.1989 as well as the direction of this Court dated 25.10.1979.

10. Upon remand, the impugned order dated 27.4.1998 as contained in Annexure-2 was passed by the prescribed authority and once again not only discarding the direction of this Court but also violating the observations and directions of the appellate court dated 19.9.1989, an order was passed and even the sale deeds executed prior to the cut off date i.e. 24.1.1971 were ignored and the land held by the petitioners in their independent rights as tenure holders were clubbed with the land of Rani Shanti Devi and declared surplus.

11. All the petitioners appeared before the prescribed authority and even filed their objections before it alongwith the copy of the sale deeds as relevant revenue records and even the erstwhile tenure holder also categorically asserted the transfers made by her prior to 24.1.1971 and also stated having no concern with the lands so transferred. The registered sale deeds executed in favour of the petitioners are as under :- i. Raghunath Singh (father of the petitioner No.1). Sale deed dated

18.5.1970. ii. Jag Prasad Singh. Sale deed dated 10.6.1970. iii. Rati Ram. Sale deed dated 15.12.1970. iv. Bindra Singh. Sale deed dated 24/30.7.1970. v. Trishool Singh (predecessor in interest of petitioner Nos.6 and 7). Sale deed dated 16.12.1970.

12. Appeal under Section 13 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act was filed by the petitioners against the order dated

27.4.1998 in the court of Commissioner, Faizabad Division which was registered as Appeal No.104-Barabanki. Another appeal was filed by Rani Shanti Devi and both the appeals were heard and decided together. 4 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999

13. Vide order dated 18.1.1999, which is impugned in the writ petition as Annexure-1, both the appeals filed by the petitioners as well as erstwhile tenure holder Smt. Shanti Devi were rejected.

14. Assailing the impugned orders, submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the prescribed authority as well as appellate authority failed to consider the provisions of Section 5(6) and going beyond their jurisdiction without any authority of law, considered the genuineness and validity of the sale deeds duly protected and kept out of the purview of scrutiny of the ceiling authorities, under the provisions of Section 5(6) and rendering the very cut off date of 24.1.1971 as otiose making both the judgments impugned illegal, arbitrary and non-sustainable in law.

15. Next submission is that both the authorities prescribed as well as appellate authority have not considered the adequate consideration at the relevant point of time and proceeded to pass the impugned order. It is submitted that Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand) in the year 1970 was sufficient amount to execute a sale deed in favour of the petitioners, therefore, the finding returned otherwise is per se illegal and non- sustainable.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the following judgments :- (i) Vithaldas Jagannath Khatri Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2020) 16 SCC 1]. Relevant paragraphs 5, 9 to 11, 16, 19 and 31 are being quoted below :- "5. Section 2(11-A) defines “family unit” as follows: “2. (11-A) “family unit” means a family unit as explained in Section 4;”

9. Section 11 states as follows: “11. Restriction on partition.—Where any land held by a family is partitioned after the 26th day of September, 1970, the partition so made shall be deemed (unless the contrary is proved) to have been made in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the object of the amending Act, 1972, and shall accordingly be ignored, and any land covered by 5 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 such partition shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the land held by the family; and the extent of share of each person in the land held by the family shall be taken into consideration for calculating the ceiling area in accordance with the provisions of Section 3. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “partition” means any division of land by act of parties made inter vivos, and includes also partition made by a decree or order of a court, tribunal or authority.”

10. Section 12 deals with the submission of returns by a person or a family unit. Section 13 is important and states as follows: “13. Failure to submit return.—(1) Where a person or member of a family unit required by Section 12 to furnish a return,— (a) fails without reasonable cause so to do, within the time specified in that section, or (b) furnishes a return which he knows, or has reason to believe, to be false, he shall be liable to pay a penalty which may extend in the former case to one hundred rupees, and in the latter case to five hundred rupees. (2) Where the Collector has reason to believe that a person or a member of a family unit required by Section 12 to furnish a return has, without reasonable cause, failed so to do, or has submitted a return which he knows or has reason to believe to be false, the Collector shall issue a notice calling upon such person or member to show cause within fifteen days of the service thereof, why the penalty provided by sub-section (1) should not be imposed upon him. If the Collector, on considering the reply or other cause shown, is satisfied that the person or member has without reasonable cause failed to submit the return within time, or has submitted a return which he knew or had reason to believe to be false, he may impose the penalty provided in the last preceding sub-section and require him to submit a true and correct return complete in all particulars, within a period of fifteen days from the date of the order. (3) If the person or member fails to comply with the order within the time so granted by the Collector, then as a penalty for failure to furnish a 6 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 return, or a true and correct return complete in all particulars, the right, title and interest in the land held by him or as the case may be, by the family unit in excess of the ceiling area shall, subject to the provision of this Chapter, be forfeited to the State Government and shall thereupon vest without further assurance in that Government.”

11. Section 14(1) states as follows: “14. Power of Collector to hold enquiry.—(1) As soon as may be after the expiry of the period referred to in Section 12, or the further period referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 13, the Collector shall, either suo motu whether or not a return had been filed or on the basis of the returns submitted to him under either of those sections, and such record as he may consider it necessary to refer to, hold an enquiry in respect of every person or family unit holding land in excess of the ceiling area, and shall, subject to the provisions of this Chapter, determine the surplus land held by such person or family unit.”

16. Section 44-B excludes pleaders from appearance as follows: “44-B. Pleaders, etc. excluded from appearance.—Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any law for the time being in force, no pleader shall be entitled to appear on behalf of any party in any proceedings under this Act before the authorised officer, the Tribunal, the Collector, the Commissioner, the State Government or the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal: Provided that, where a party is a minor or lunatic, his guardian may appear, and in the case of any other person under disability, his authorised agent may appear. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the expression “pleader” includes an advocate, attorney, vakil or any other legal practitioner.”

19. On 19-11-1976, 60 ac and 27 guntas of land of Vithaldas was declared surplus. An appeal preferred against this order was dismissed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on 16-2-1977. On 2-3-1982, a learned Single Judge of Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court 7 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 remitted the matter to the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal for fresh enquiry. On remand, a fresh order was passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer on 7-5-1984, where land admeasuring 59 ac 35 guntas was deemed to be surplus. An appeal was filed against the aforesaid order by Vithaldas, his wife, his son and the third daughter, Bela Devi under Section 33 of the 1961 Act. The two other minor daughters did not file any appeal, as they were satisfied with the view adopted by the Sub-Divisional Officer, by which no part of the property that devolved on them by means of the partition deed was declared surplus. The State filed cross- objections in the appeal filed by Vithaldas, challenging the exclusion of the land, inter alia, of the two elder daughters. However, the State did not take care to implead them. The appeal filed by Vithaldas et al. was dismissed by the appellate authority, who allowed the cross-objections of the State by its order dated 3-12-1984. The appellate authority found that the partition deed dated 31-1-1970, though before the cut-off date, was against the principles of Hindu Law, to the extent that it gave a share to minor daughters in ancestral land. On this basis, the partition deed was declared to be of no effect in law. As a matter of fact, if the appeal provision i.e. Section 33 of the 1961 Act is to be seen, it is clear that appeals are provided to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal against a declaration or part thereof made under Section 21 of the 1961 Act. The persons who would be aggrieved by such declarations can only be the person or family unit whose ceiling area is determined or the landlord to whom possession of land is to be restored or the right, title and interest of the person or family unit whose land is to be forfeited to the State Government. If at all a cross-objection can be taken by a respondent under Section 33(1-A), it can only be a person or family unit or landlord spoken of in Section 21(1) of the 1961 Act. The State Government may perhaps file a cross-objection where it contends that land has wrongly not been forfeited to it. But such is not the case on the facts of this appeal. Thus, the State taking a cross-objection on the facts of this case would itself be outside Section 33(1-A). If at all the State can be said to be aggrieved by a declaration made under Section 21, a suo motu power of revision is given to the State Government under Section 45, which on the facts of a particular case may well be exercised." 8 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 (ii) Ramadhar Singh Vs. Prescribed Authority [1994 Supp (3) SCC 702]. Relevant paragraph 2 is being quoted below :- "2. It has to be seen under what provision of the Act can the validity of the sale executed prior to January 24, 1971, the appointed day, be gone into? Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the said Act says that in determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenureholder, any transfer of land made after the 24th day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared as surplus land under the Act shall be ignored and not taken into account. The proviso (b) thereto, inter alia, provides that a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and an irrevocable instrument, not being of benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit for the tenureholder or other members of the family, is outside the scope of the aforesaid sub-section. Thereafter Explanation II provides that the burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit. Apparently, it is under this provision of law that the validity of the sale deed dated April 22, 1969 was put to test. The authorities under the Act took the view that the sale deed was not genuine because no consideration appears to have passed before the Sub- Registrar and that it was a transfer between father and son raising a dust of suspicion. Otherwise it was not disputed on fact that the sale had been effected by means of a registered deed in which the passing of consideration was mentioned as a recital. The existence of the sale deed being not disputed and it having taken place, as said before, on February 24, 1969, prior to the appointed day that is January 24, 1971, the inquiry regarding the validity of the sale deed under sub-section (6) of Section 5 was totally misplaced. Thereunder, as it appears to us, the appropriate authority had no jurisdiction to be put the validity of the sale deed to test since his jurisdiction arose only when the deed of transfer had been effected on or after the appointed day. Not only the first and the appellate authority under the Act persisted in that view, but the High Court too proceeded on that basis. The effort of the appellant to have it declared that the authorities had no jurisdiction to invalidate the sale under sub- section (6) of Section 5 when read with Explanation II to sub-section (1) of Section 5 also was a futile attempt because the High Court followed the 9 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 path, as did the authorities under the Act, and rejected the writ petition. We are of the view that this was a wholly erroneous approach. Sub- section (6) of Section 5 did not confer jurisdiction on the authorities to determine the validity of the sale and if that is so any finding of theirs as to the contents of the sale is of no assistance. In the result the appeal must succeed. Accordingly, allowing the same we set aside all the orders of the authorities below as also that of the High Court. No costs." (iii) Narendra Pal Singh Gahlot Vs. Upper Commissioner (Judicial) [2008 SCC OnLine All 1027]. Relevant paragraphs 6, 7 and 12 to 14 are being quoted below :- "6. Learned counsel for petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Ramadhar Singh v. Prescribed Authority reported in 1994 Supp (3) SCC 702. Taking support of aforesaid Judgment, learned counsel for petitioner submits that sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Act says that in determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure holder, any transfer of land made after the 24th day of January 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared as surplus land under the Act shall be ignored and not taken into account. It does not confer jurisdiction on the authorities to determine the validity of a sale deed executed prior to 24th January, 1971. Reliance has been placed upon para 2 of the said judgment. The same are being reproduced below:- “2. It has to be seen under what provision of the Act can the validity of the sale executed prior to January 24, 1971, the appointed day, be gone into? Sub section (6) of Section 5 of the said Act says that in determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure holder, any transfer of land made after the 24th day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared as surplus land under the Act shall be ignored and not taken into account. The proviso (b) thereto, inter alia, provides that a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and an irrevocable instrument, not being of benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit for the tenure holder or other members of the family, is outside the scope of the aforesaid sub-section. Thereafter Explanation II provides that the burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall 10 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 rest with the party claiming its benefit. Apparently, it is under this provision of law that the validity of the sale deed dated April 22, 1969 was put to test. The authorities under the Act took the view that the sale deed was not genuine because no consideration appears to have passed before the Sub-Registrar and that it was a transfer between father and son raising a dust of suspicion. Otherwise it was not disputed on fact that the sale had been effected by means of a registered deed in which the passing of consideration was mentioned as a recital. The existence of the sale deed being not disputed and it having taken place, as said before, on February 24, 1969, prior to the appointed day that is January 24, 1971, the inquiry regarding the validity of the sale deed under sub-section (6) of Section 5 was totally misplaced. Thereunder, as it appears to us, the appropriate authority had no jurisdiction to be put the validity of the sale deed to test since his jurisdiction arose only when the deed of transfer had been effected on or after the appointed day. Not only the first and the appellate authority under the Act persisted in that view, but the High Court too proceeded on that basis. The effort of the appellant to have it declared that the authorities had no jurisdiction to invalidate the sale under sub-section (6) of Section 5 when read with Explanation II to sub- section (1) of Section 5 also was a futile attempt because the High Court followed the path, as did the authorities under the Act, and rejected the writ petition. We are of the view that this was a wholly erroneous approach. Sub-section (6) of Section 5 did not confer jurisdiction on the authorities to determine the validity of the sale and if that is so any finding of theirs as to the contents of the sale is of no assistance. In the result the appeal must succeed. Accordingly, allowing the same we set aside all the orders of the authorities below as also that of the High Court. No costs.”

7. Further reliance has been placed upon a judgment in Indrapal Singh v. Prescribed Authority, Meerut reported in 2007 (6) ADJ, 205 and reliance has been placed upon paras 5, 8, 9 of the said judgment. The same are being reproduced below:- “5. The learned Counsel the petitioners submitted genuineness of the sale-deed dated 9-9-1970 cannot be taken into consideration by the authorities under the Ceiling Act and the land 11 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 transferred by the sale-deed was liable to be excluded from the total holding of the petitioners. Further, the sale-deed executed in favour of Vimla Devi, even though it was executed after 24-1-1971, nonetheless, the sale-deed was bona fidely executed and that Vimla Devi was in cultivatory possession and her name was also mutated in the revenue records, as such, the Prescribed Authority committed an error in ignoring the sale-deed merely on the basis that it was executed after 24-1-1971. Further, the authorities have committed a manifest error in holding that no evidence was filed to show that some of the plots were grove land. The appellate authority committed an error in holding that since less number of trees per bigha were existing on the plot in question, the land could not be treated as a grove land.

8. The Supreme Court in Ram Adhar Singh v. Prescribed Authority, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 702 has held that no inquiry regarding the validity of the sale-deed under Section 5(6) of the Act could be made with regard to the genuineness of the sale-deed executed prior to 24-1-1971. The Supreme Court further held that appellate authority had no jurisdiction to put the validity of the sale-deed to test since its jurisdiction arose only when the deed of transfer had been effected on or after the appointed day, i.e. 24-1-

1971. Consequently, this Court holds that the Prescribed Authority could not consider the genuineness of the sale deed dated 9-1-1970 and the land transferred vide sale-deed is liable to be excluded from the holding of the petitioner.

9. With regard to the sale-deed dated 28-8-1971, no doubt the sale-deed was executed after 24-1-1971 and the same could be ignored under Section 5(6) subject to the provision of proviso (b) to sub-section (6) of Section 5, which contemplates that the tenure holder can prove to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority that the transfer was made in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument and that it was not a benami transaction. The Prescribed Authority cannot ignore the sale-deed on the sole ground that it was executed after 24-1-1977. The Prescribed Authority was liable to consider the effect of the mutation in favour of Vimla Devi pursuant to the sale- deed and consider the genuineness of the transaction as to whether adequate consideration was paid and whether she was put in cultivatory 12 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 possession. This aspect has not been considered. Consequently, the order of the Prescribed Authority ignoring the sale-deed of 25-8-1971 in favour of Vimla Devi cannot be sustained.”

12. From the record it is clear that in the objection filed by petitioner, petitioner has filed various documents showing therein that a sale deed has already been executed by father of petitioner in the year 1959 but authorities below has not taken into consideration the aforesaid fact. From the provision of Ceiling Act it is clear that if sale deed has been executed prior to 24-1-1971, ceiling authority has got no jurisdiction to hold that tenure holder is not entitled for benefit. Petitioner has filed a registered sale deed as well as revenue record showing therein that sale deed has been executed in 1959 by father of petitioner. Name of purchaser has been mutated and he was possession in the land in dispute. As regards finding recorded by court below that during period of execution of sale deed, there was consolidation in village, as such, without permission of settlement officer (Consolidation), sale deed cannot be executed, as such, petitioner is not entitled for benefit of aforesaid land mentioned in sale deed. The state-respondent has not filed any document therein showing that during that period when sale deed was executed by father of petitioner, village in question was under consolidation, though petitioner has submitted a document showing therein that after execution of sale deed, village in question was notified under Section 4 of Consolidation of Holdings Act and plot number has been changed but authorities below has not taken into consideration the said fact. Further authorities have committed a manifest error in holding that no evidence was filed to show that some of the plots were grove. Prescribed Authority has not recorded a finding to this effect.

13. The Supreme Court in Ram Adhar's case (supra) has held that no inquiry regarding validity of the sale deed under Section 5(6) of the Act could be made with regard to the genuineness of sale deed executed prior to 24-1-1971. The Supreme Court has further held that court below had no jurisdiction to put the validity of the sale deed to test since its jurisdiction arose only when the deed of transfer had been effected on or after the appointed day i.e. 24-1-1971. 13 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999

14. In such situation, Court holds that authorities below cannot consider the genuineness of sale deed executed in the year 1959, as such, land transferred vide sale deed by father of petitioner is liable to be excluded from holding of petitioner." (iv) Chimman Lal Shah Vs. State of U.P. [1979 SCC OnLine All 308]. Relevant paragraphs 1 and 4 are being quoted below :- "1. The only controversy that arose for consideration was whether the authorities constituted under the provisions of U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act were justified in rejecting the partition decree dated 2-4-1970. It is stated that this decree was given effect to in revenue records prior to 24-1-1971. Both, the prescribed authority and the District Judge, have rejected petitioner's claim only because it was a decree between petitioner and his sons and there was nothing to show that the sons were co-tenants. Whether the view taken by the District Judge or the prescribed authority is correct or not needs no comment as the effectiveness of the decree for determining ceiling area has to be examined in the light of provisions containd in Section 5 and its sub- sections. Sub-Section (7) deals with partition decrees passed after 24-1-

1971. As the partition decree was passed prior to this date the sub-section did not apply. Nor did the provisos apply as the suit for partition or proceeding was not pending on 24-1-1971. The learned State counsel argued that petitioners case was covered by Explanation I and II to sub- section (1) of the Act. It may be so but those explanations apply on certain facts. For instance for applicability of Expl. 1 there has to be evidence that the land was held by the petitioner in his own right.

4. In the result, this petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The order passed by the District Judge is quashed. He is directed to decide the appeal afresh on the question whether partition decree was liable to be ignored. The petitioner shall be entitled to its costs."

17. On the basis of the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, he tried to submit that cut off date fixed as 24.1.1971 was not taken into consideration while deciding the issue in regard to execution of sale deed. 14 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999

18. On the other hand, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits that the order passed by the prescribed authority and appellate court do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality and are just and valid orders. He further submits that the prescribed authority and appellate authority have recorded reasons to disbelieve the execution of sale deed in favour of the petitioners. In support of his submission, he placed reliance upon a judgment rendered in the case of Sant Singh Vs. The Additional District Judge, Jhansi & others [1996 (3) SCC 400. Relevant paragraphs D and E are being quoted below :- "The proviso provides that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to “a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a ‘Benami’ transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of the family”. The question is: whether the sale deed is executed in good faith and for adequate consideration and is not a ‘Benami’ transaction for the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of the family. ‘Family’ has been defined under the Act to include wife and minor children in relation to himself or herself and his wife or her husband, as the case may be (other than a judicially separated wife or husband), minor sons and minor daughters (other than married daughters). It is seen that the District Judge had recorded the finding, as a fact, that she was a minor and the sale deed was executed by the father making the wife the guardian of the minor daughter."

19. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel further placed reliance upon a judgment rendered in Writ-C No.55503 of 2002 (Vyas Prasad Vs. Additional Commissioner & others). Relevant paragraphs-18 and 21 are being quoted as under :- "18. The judgment in the case of Ramadhar Singh (supra) was held to be per incurium and in Sant Singh v. ADJ, Jhansi.2 The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sant Singh (supra) has held that in view of the specific language used in section 5(6) of the Rural Ceiling Act. The Prescribed Authority in determining the ceiling applicable to tenure-holder shall ignore any transfer of land made after the 24.1.1971, which, but for the transfer 15 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 would have been declared as surplus land under the Act. However, the proviso further says thus “provided that nothing in the sub-section shall apply to (a) transfer in favour of any person (including the Government) referred to in sub-section (2)(b) transfer proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority to be in good faith and for adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument, not being benami transaction, or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder, or other members of the family, is outside the scope of the aforesaid subsection. Thereafter, Explanation II provides that the burden of proving that case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit.

21. The Supreme Court observed that sale deed executed even prior to

24.1.1971 could be looked into and the question would be whether the sale-deed is executed in good faith and for adequate consideration and is not benami transaction for the immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of the family."

20. After having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I perused the material on record as well as the law reports cited by both the parties.

21. The law is settled and it is provided under Section 5(6) of the Ceiling Act, only transfers made on or after 24.01.1971 can be examined to check if they are in good faith, for adequate consideration, etc. Transfers made before 24.01.1971 cannot be challenged by ceiling authorities merely on suspicion regarding consideration, possession, relationship, or genuineness. The Supreme Court in Ramadhar Singh (Supra) has clearly held that the authority has no jurisdiction to test the genuineness of a registered sale deed executed before the appointed day. It has to be seen under what provision of the Act can the validity of the sale executed prior to January 24, 1971, the appointed day, be gone into? Sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the said Act says that in determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenureholder, any transfer of land made after the 24th day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared as surplus land under the Act shall be ignored and not taken into account. The proviso (b) thereto, inter alia, provides that a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed authority to be in good faith and for 16 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 adequate consideration and an irrevocable instrument, not being of benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit for the tenureholder or other members of the family, is outside the scope of the aforesaid sub-section. Thereafter Explanation II provides that the burden of proving that a case falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party claiming its benefit.

22. Narendra Pal Singh Gahlot (Supra). This decision reiterates that pre ‑appointed‑day transfers must be excluded from ceiling calculations. The Court held that the authority cannot question the genuineness of such transfers except where clear evidence of fraud, benami or sham transaction exists. The judgment also supports the principle that mutation and possession records strengthen pre‑cut‑off transfers.

23. Indrapal Singh (Supra). The Court held that the Prescribed Authority cannot reject a registered pre-1971 sale deed merely because consolidation proceedings existed or because the authority suspected inadequate consideration. Again, the principle is that the existence of a registered deed and mutation/possession is sufficient unless there is strong proof of fraud.

24. Chimman Lal Shah (Supra). The Court held that partition decrees or transfers prior to 24.01.1971 must be considered valid for ceiling computation. Authorities cannot ignore such documents merely on presumptions.

25. Sant Singh (Supra). The State cited this case to argue that authorities may examine whether a transfer is benami or for the benefit of the family. However, that case involved specific proof that the transfer was for the benefit of a minor daughter and was not a genuine sale. The factual matrix in Sant Singh (Supra) is distinguishable because in the present case no such evidence has been produced.

26. After considering the above judgments and the material on record, it is evident that in the present case all sale deeds relied upon by the petitioners were registered and executed before 24.01.1971. Revenue 17 WRIC No. 3000022 of 1999 records and possession entries also supported these transfers. Despite several remand directions, the Prescribed Authority repeatedly ignored these sale deeds and treated them as invalid. There is no material on record showing that these deeds were benami, sham, forged, or executed for the continued benefit of the tenure‑holder. In view of the above, there is no hesitation to hold that the authorities below exceeded their jurisdiction by examining and rejecting pre‑cut‑off sale deeds.

27. On overall consideration of facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the foregoing discussion, the impugned orders being per se illegal and are not sustainable in law, thus, they are liable to be set aside by this Court. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 18.1.1999, passed by opposite party no.1 and the order dated 27.4.1998, passed by opposite party no. 2, as contained in annexures no.1 and 2 respectively are hereby set aside. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed.

28. No order as to costs. November 13, 2025 Gautam (Irshad Ali,J.) GAUTAM TECKCHANDANI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench