High Court
Case Details
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:14896 Court No. - 71 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 38122 of 2024 Applicant :- Aman Tripathi Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- A.Z.Khan Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Pravesh Kumar Tripathi,Vijendra Kumar Mishra Hon'ble Rajeev Misra,J. 1. Heard Mr. A.Z.Khan, the learned counsel for applicant, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Vijendra Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel representing first informant/opposite party-2. 2. Perused the Court. 3. This application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by accused/applicant-Aman Tripathi challenging the order dated 07.10.2024 passed by Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court, Court No. 2 (14th Finance Commission) Gorakhpur in Sessions Trial No. 2865 of 2023 ( State Vs. Aman Tripathi) arising out of Case Crime No. 598 of 2023 under Sections 307 and 302 I.P.C., P.S. Cantt., District-Gorakhpur whereby the discharge application filed by applicant in terms of Section 227 Cr.P.C. before court below has been rejected. 4. Record shows that in respect of an incident, which is alleged to have occurred on 09.08.2023 a delayed F.I.R. dated 10.08.2024 was lodged by first informant/opposite party-2, Satyam Singh and was registered as Case Crime No. 0598 of 2023 under Section 307 I.P.C., P.S. Cantt., District-Gorakhpur. In the aforesaid F. I.R., the Driver and passengers of Alto Car bearing Registration No. U.P. 53 E. K. 7641 were nominated as not named accused. 5. After aforementioned F.I.R. was lodged, the Investigating Officer proceeded with statutory investigation of concerned case crime number in terms of Chapter XII Cr.P.C. The Investigating Officer examined the first informant/opposite party-2 and other witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Most of the witnesses so examined have not only supported the F.I..R. but have also disclosed about the manner of occurrence. 6. It is opposite to mention here that the disputed Alto Car was also recovered by the Investigating Officer during course of investigation. On the basis of above and other material collected by the Investigating Officer during course of investigation, he came to the conclusion that the complicity of only one person namely Aman Tripathi, the driver of the disputed vehicle, is established in the crime in question. However, the injured namely Swapnil Singh died during course of investigation.. Accordingly, Section 302 I.P.C. was added. Investigating Officer thus opined to submit the charge sheet (police report). He accordingly submitted the charge sheet (police report) dated 19.11.2023 in terms of Section 173 (2) Cr.P.C. whereby and whereunder applicant Aman Tripathi has been charge sheeted under Sections 307 and 302 I.P.C. 7. Upon submission of aforementioned charge sheet, cognizance was taken upon same by the jurisdictional magistrate. Since offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, therefore, the jurisdictional magistrate in line with Section 209 Cr.P.C. committed the case to the Court of Sessions. Resultantly, Sessions Trial No. 2865 of 2023 ( State Vs. Aman Tripathi) under Sections 307 and 302 I.P.C., P.S. Cantt., District- Gorakhpur came to be registered and is now pending in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge/Fast Track Court, Court No. 2 (14th Finance Commission) Gorakhpur. 8. During pendency of aforementioned sessions trial, applicant- Aman Tripathi, who is a charge sheeted accused, filed a discharge application dated 04.01.2024 in terms of Section 227 Cr.P.C. From perusal of the discharge application, it is apparent that following grounds were raised in support of the discharge prayed by applicant: " 26. That accused-applicant had taken following grounds in his discharge application:- (i) That from the bare perusal of the charge-sheet it would be evident that the investigating officer of the case has not conducted fair investigation and he had arbitrarily recorded the statement of professional witnesses, who has no concern with the incident and with utmost malafide incident he had forwarded the charge-sheet in u/s 302 IPC for an alleged accident.
Facts
(ii) That from the bare perusal of the FIR as well as the Chik of the FIR it would be evident that informant is not an eyewitness but no-where he has disclosed that upon whose information he has lodged the FIR. (iii) That as per the prosecution version the accused-applicant has hit the bike of the deceased with his from the back side of the bike but surprisingly the pillion rider of the bike sustained almost no injuries on his person and driver had sustained fatal injuries, this fact itself creates serious doubts upon the version of the prosecution version. (iv) That from the bare perusal of the entire prosecution story it would be clear that after the alleged incident, when demand of illegal gratification of the concern police had not fulfilled by the accused-applicant, then only to harass him and teaching him a lesson the concern police colluded with the informant and by faulty and tainted investigation the investigating officer of the case had ensured that there would be no scope remains for the accused- applicant to prove his innocence. (v) That from the bare perusal of the entire prosecution version it would be clear that absolutely no motive has been assigned to the accused-applicant for the commission of the alleged offence. (vi) That from the bare perusal of the FIR itself it would be clear that number of the alleged ALTO Car has been mentioned as UP 53 EK 764 but in real the number of the ALTO Car of the accused-applicant is UP 58 EK 7641, this fact itself shows that actually the alleged incident had been taken place by some other vehicle but informant with the collusion of the local police had implicated the accused-applicant for the reason best known to them. (vii) That real fact behind the story is on the alleged date of the incident the deceased alongwith one other person were going with wearing no helmet, accused-applicant was also going towards there at that time, deceased had met an accident with some vehicle but local persons had caught the accused-applicant and handed-over him to the local police, who thereafter had asked the accused-applicant to pay illegal gratification but when accused-applicant had refused for the same the concern police with the collusion of the informant has implicated the accused-applicant in the instant case. (viii) That from the bare perusal of the CD-3 it would be clear that at the time of giving consent for the operation of the deceased it had been mentioned at the consent form that deceased had met and accident with a Bolero car, this fact itself shows that actually alleged incident had taken place in some other manner but the informant has malafidely implicated the accused-applicant for the reason best known to them. (ix) That from the bare perusal of the entire case diary it would be clear that entire alleged incident looks completely accidental in nature but only to harass the accused-applicant informant had given it a different nature and colour only to harass the accused-applicant (x) That from the bare perusal of the entire prosecution story it would be evident that no one actually ever seen the incident and only to implicate the accused-applicant the informant cooked-up this false and frivolous story." 9. The discharge application filed by accused/applicant was opposed by the D.D.C. (Criminal). He only raised oral objection to the same. The concerned Sessions Judge thereafter evaluated the grounds raised in support of discharge application filed by accused/applicant in the light of material on record. After having undertaken the aforesaid exercise, court below came to the conclusion that no good ground exists to discharge the accused/applicant. As per the material on record, the trial of applicant cannot be sustained. On the aforesaid findings, court below vide order dated 07.10.2024 rejected the discharge application filed by accused/applicant. 10. Thus feeling aggrieved by the order dated 07.410.2024 passed by court below, applicant has now approached this Court by means of present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
Legal Reasoning
prima facie case is made out against applicant. The issue as to whether the death of the deceased is on account of murder or on account of accidental death is an issue of fact which cannot be decided either way at this stage but only during course of trial where parties will be at liberty to lead evidence in support of their respective cases. Learned A.G.A. has then referred to paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the order impugned and on basis there of he contends that no illegality or infirmity can be attached to the order passed by court below. For ready reference paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the order impugned are extracted herein under:- " 5. बचचव पक कक ववदचन अधधवकच दचरच जज तकर उठचयच गयच हह, उनकच वनसतचरण इस सतर पर वकयच जचनच सममवचत नहह हह कययवक अवभयजजन पपतय कक स डचयरर कक अवलजकन सक सपष सतयमम धससड एसव हरर यचदव दचरच वचहन ससखयच यय०पर० sa हह वक कक स डचयरर कक पचचर ससखयच 2 इस०कक ० 7641 अलटज कक सवचर लजगय सक समनर हजनक कक बचत अपनक सचकय मम बतचयर हह तथच जचनबयझकर कचर सक उनकक मजटरसचईकल मम टककर मचरनक कक बचत बतचयर हह जबवक इसर पचर कक सगई सचकर आशमतजर वतपचटर दचरच जचनबयझकर दमररटनच कचररत करनक कक आशय सक टककर मचरनक कक बचत कहर हह। जबवक कक स डचयरर कक पचचर मसनबर 8 समबनध मम बतचयच गयच हह। जबवक कक स डचयरर कक पचचर नस० 14 ई 0 7641 कक स डचयरर कक पचचर नस० 15 मम सवपपनल कक ननतयम हजनक कक मम वचहन ससखयच यय०पर० 53 कक कशन ववभचग सक हजनक कक समबनध मम वववकचनच कक गयर हह। जबवक मम सर०सर० टर०बर० फम टकज एकत करकक सचकय मम पसतमत कक कक जचनकचरर रधजसटट गयर हह।। जबवक यह तथय महतवपयणर हह वक अवभयमक कक पहचचन ददरचन वववकचनच वववकचक दचरच मम असवकत वकयच हह. धजसमम कक गयगर हह. धजसकक वववकचनच कस स डचयरर कक पचचर नस0 16 अवभयमकगण दचरच जममर इकबचल वकयच गयच हह। 6. उपरजक समसत तथयय पर ववचचररत करनक सपष हह वक वववकचक दचरच मचमलक मम सरन वववकचनच कर अवभयमक अमन वतपचठर कक ववरद धचरच 302, 307 आई०पर०सर० मम आरजपपत पसतमत वकयच गयच हह। 7. जहचह तक अवभयमक अमन वतपचठर कज उनमजवचत वकयक जचनक कच पश हह मचननरय सवरचच नयचयचलय कक वनमनधलधखत ववधध वयवसथचओस परववचचररत वकयच गयच- (1) A prima faci case is to be seen only for framing the charges under section 228, Bhawna Bai V. Ghanshyams JT 2019 (12) S.C. 80 (ii) Judge is not required to record detailed reasons for framing charge under 228 if there are sufficient gounds to presume that the accused has committed the offence Dinesh Twari V, State of Uttar Pradesh and another (2014) 13 S.C.C. 137 (II) Court while exercising power under section 228 Cr.P.C, the judge Mob required to record his reasons for framing the charges ainst the accused Kratni Bhadra Shab and Another V. State of Bengal (2000) 1 S.C.C. 722 " 13. Having heard the learned counsel for applicant, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Vijendra Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel representing first informant/opposite party-2 this court finds that primarily discharge was claimed by accused/applicant before court below on the ground that the death of the deceased is an accidental death and not murder. 14. Be that as it may, the issue raised before this Court is primarily an issue of fact which cannot be decided either way at this stage but can be decided only during the course of trial when evidence is led by the parties. Parameters regarding exercise of jurisdiction under Section 227 Cr.P.C. stands crystalized by the Supreme Court in the Three Judges Bench Judgement in Tarun Jit Tejpal v. State of Goa, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1053, wherein following has been observed by Court in paragraphs 8, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5: "8. Now, so far as the prayer of the appellant to discharge him and the submissions made by Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Advocate on merits are concerned, the law on the scope at the stage of Section 227/228 CrPC is required to be considered. 8.1. In the case of N. Suresh Rajan (Supra) this Court had an occasion to consider in detail the scope of the proceedings at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227/228 CrPC. After considering earlier decisions of this Court on the point thereafter in paragraph 29 to 31 this Court has observed and held as under: "29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage. 30. Reference in this connection can be made to a recent decision of this Court in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P. [(2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 2013 SC 52], in which, after analysing various decisions on the point, this Court endorsed the following view taken in Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507]: (Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat case [(2013) 11 SCC 476 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 21 : AIR 2013 SC 52], SCC p. 482, para 15) "15. '11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.' (Onkar Nath case [(2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507], SCC p. 565, para 11)"(emphasis in original) 31. Now reverting to the decisions of this Court in Sajjan Kumar [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371] and Dilawar Balu Kurane [Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310], relied on by the respondents, we are of the opinion that they do not advance their case. The aforesaid decisions consider the provision of Section 227 of the Code and make it clear that at the stage of discharge the court cannot make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial. It is worth mentioning that the Code contemplates discharge of the accused by the Court of Session under Section 227 in a case triable by it; cases instituted upon a police report are covered by Section 239 and cases instituted otherwise than on a police report are dealt with in Section 245. From a reading of the aforesaid sections it is evident that they contain somewhat different provisions with regard to discharge of an accused: 31.1. Under Section 227 of the Code, the trial court is required to discharge the accused if it "considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". However, discharge under Section 239 can be ordered when "the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless". The power to discharge is exercisable under Section 245(1) when, "the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his conviction". 31.2. Section 227 and 239 provide for discharge before the recording of evidence on the basis of the police report, the documents sent along with it and examination of the accused after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard. However, the stage of discharge under Section 245, on the other hand, is reached only after the evidence referred in Section 244 has been taken. 31.3. Thus, there is difference in the language employed in these provisions. But, in our opinion, notwithstanding these differences, and whichever provision may be applicable, the court is required at this stage to see that there is a prima facie case for proceeding against the accused. Reference in this connection can be made to a judgment of this Court in R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay [(1986) 2 SCC 716 : 1986 SCC (Cri) 256]. The same reads as follows : (SCC pp. 755 56, para 43) "43…. Notwithstanding this difference in the position there is no scope for doubt that the stage at which the Magistrate is required to consider the question of framing of charge under Section 245(1) is a preliminary one and the test of 'prima facie' case has to be applied. In spite of the difference in the language of the three sections, the legal position is that if the trial court is satisfied that a prima facie case is made out, charge has to be framed." 8.2. In the subsequent decision in the case of S. Selvi (Supra) this Court has summarised the principles while framing of the charge at the stage of Section 227/228 of the CrPC. This Court has observed and held in paragraph 6 and 7 as under: "6. It is well settled by this Court in a catena of judgments including Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609], Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra [Dilawar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 310], Sajjan Kumar v. CBI[Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371], State v. A. Arun Kumar [State v. A. Arun Kumar, (2015) 2 SCC 417 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 96 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 505], Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta [Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta, (2015) 3 SCC 424 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 265], State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi [State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2003) 2 SCC 711 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 688], Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya [Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya, (1990) 4 SCC 76 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 47] and Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] that the Judge while considering the question of framing charge under Section 227 of the Code in sessions cases (which is akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out; where the material placed before the court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the charge; by and large if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his rights to discharge the accused. The Judge cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the statements and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the materials as if he was conducting a trial. 7. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI [Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1371], this Court on consideration of the various decisions about the scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, laid down the following principles : (SCC pp. 376, 77, para 21) "(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend upon the facts of each case. (ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. (iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. (v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the accused was possible. (vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. (vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal." 8.3. In the case of Mauvin Godinho (Supra) this Court had an occasion to consider how to determine prima facie case while framing the charge under Section 227/228 of the CrPC. In the same decision this Court observed and held that while considering the prima facie case at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227 of the CrPC there cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. 8.4. At this stage the decision of this Court in the case of Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad (Supra) is also required to be referred to. In that aforesaid decision this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of enquiry at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227/228 of the CrPC. In paragraphs 11 to 14 observations of this Court in the aforesaid decision are as under: "11. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having bearing on the contentions urged for the parties, provides: "227. Discharge.—If, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing." 12. Section 228 requires the Judge to frame charge if he considers that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The interaction of these two sections has already been the subject matter of consideration by this Court. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh [(1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 : (1978) 1 SCR 257], Untwalia, J., while explaining the scope of the said sections observed : [SCR p. 259 : SCC pp. 41 42 : SCC (Cri) pp. 535 36, para 4] Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously Judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 13. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal [(1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609 : (1979) 2 SCR 229], Fazal Ali, J., summarised some of the principles : [SCR pp. 23435 : SCC p. 9 : SCC (Cri) pp. 61314, para 10]" (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused had been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial." 14. These two decisions do not lay down different principles. Prafulla Kumar case [(1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609 : (1979) 2 SCR 229] has only reiterated what has been stated in Ramesh Singh case [(1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 533 : (1978) 1 SCR 257]. In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of discharging an accused. It provides that "the Judge shall discharge when he considers that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused". The "ground" in the context is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the accused will be determined and not at the time of framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into various aspects. All that the court has to consider is whether the evidentiary material on record if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the accused with the crime. No more need be enquired into." 8.5. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions and considering the scope of enquiry at the stage of framing of the charge under Section 227/228 if the CrPC, we are of the opinion that the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on merits, at this stage, are not required to be considered. Whatever submissions are made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant are on merits are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the course of the trial. Some of the submissions may be considered to be the defence of the accused. Some of the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant on the conduct of the victim/prosecutrix are required to be dealt with and considered at an appropriate stage during the trial. The same are not required to be considered at this stage of framing of the charge. On considering the material on record, we are of the opinion that there is more than a prima facie case against the accused for which he is required to be tried. There is sufficient ample material against the accused and therefore the learned Trial Court has rightly framed the charge against the accused and the same is rightly confirmed by the High Court. No interference of this Court is called for." 15. When the order impugned is examined in the light of the parameters laid down by Apex Court in aforementioned judgement, this court finds that a strong prima facie case is made out against applicant and therefore the trial of applicant can be sustained. The issue as to whether the applicant should be tried under Sections 302, 307 and Section 304A I.P.C. can be raised and agitated at the time of framing of charge by court below but simply on the basis of above, applicant cannot be discharged. In view of above, the Principle No. VII laid down in the case of Sajjan Kumar (supra) are squarely attracted. 16. In view of above, no good ground for discharge of applicant is made out. As such, no illegality can be said to have been committed by court below in passing the order impugned. 17. In view of discussion made above, present application fails and is liable to be dismissed. 18. It is accordingly dismissed. Order Date :- 15.1.2025 YK
Arguments
11. Mr. A. Z. Khan, the learned counsel for applicant in support of this application vehemently contends that the order impugned in present application is not only illegal and arbitrary but also in excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the same is liable to be quashed by this Court. According to the learned counsel for applicant, as per the material on record, present case is a case of accidental death and not of murder. To lend legal support to his aforesaid submission, he has referred to the grounds raised in support of the discharge application filed by accused/applicant. On the above premise, he therefore urged that prosecution of applicant under Sections 307 and 302 I.P.C. cannot be sustained. Court below while dealing with the discharge application has clearly omitted to consider the grounds raised by applicant in support of the discharge application. He therefore concludes by submitting that present application is liable to be allowed by this Court. 12. Per contra, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Vijendra Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel representing first informant/opposite party-2 have vehemently opposed the present application. They submit that in view of the material on record, no good ground exists to discharge the accused/applicant. In view of the material on record, the trial of applicant can be sustained as