✦ High Court of India · 06 Oct 2025

In the matter of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra

Case Details High Court of India · 06 Oct 2025
Court
High Court of India
Decided
06 Oct 2025
Length
1,797 words

Sarvind Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the informant, for the State and perused the record.

2. The present anticipatory bail application has been moved on behalf of applicant Upendra Nath seeking anticipatory bail in Case Crime no. 521 of 2025, under Sections 75, 65(2), 351(2) of B.N.S., and Section 5n, 6, 11(iii), 12 of POCSO Act, 2012, Police Station Civil Lines, District Moradabad with the prayer that in the event of arrest, applicant may be released on anticipatory bail.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the F.I.R., in the present case has been lodged pursuant to an order passed on an application under 173(4) of B.N.S.S. He further submits that the opposite party no.2 was a divorcee having one daughter aged about 09 years, who later on, was married with the son of the applicant and out of the said wedlock one male child was also born. He further submits that the opposite party no.2 was of bad character as such the son of the applicant filed an application under Section 173 (4) of B.N.S.S., which was treated as a complaint case vide order

10.06.2025 and as a counter blast to the same, the instant prosecution has been launched against the applicant and his son. Learned counsel further argued that applicant is innocent and he has an apprehension that he may be arrested in the above- mentioned case, whereas there is no credible evidence against him. It has further been submitted that no coercive process has been issued against the applicant so far. It was also submitted that applicant undertakes to co-operate during investigation and trial and he would appear as and when required by the investigating agency or Court. It has 2 NABAIL No. 8046 of 2025 been stated that in case, the applicant is granted anticipatory bail, he shall not misuse the liberty of bail and will co-operate with the investigation and would obey all conditions of bail.

4. Learned A.G.A. and learned counsel for first informant have opposed the application for anticipatory bail. Learned counsel further submits that the applicant is absconding on account of which, process under Section 84 of B.N.S.S., has been issued against the applicant. Learned counsel further argued that the applicant is absconding and by the efflux of time proclamation under Section 84 of B.N.S.S., is running against the applicant, therefore the applicant is not entitled for anticipatory bail.

5. In the matter of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694, it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that while deciding anticipatory bail, Court must consider nature and gravity of accusation, antecedent of accused, possibility of accused to flee from justice and that Court must evaluate entire available material against the accused carefully and that the exact role of the accused has also to be taken into consideration.

6. Further the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradeep Sharma reported in 2014 (2) SCC 171 has held that a person against whom the proclamation has been issued and the proceeding under Sections 82/83 Cr.P.C. have been initiated, is not entitled to the benefit of anticipatory bail. In paragraph no.14 to 16, it has been observed as under: “14. In order to answer the above question, it is desirable to refer to Section 438 of the Code which reads as under: “438. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest.—(1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a nonbailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia, the following factors, namely— (i) the nature and gravity of the accusation; (ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in respect of any cognizable 3 NABAIL No. 8046 of 2025 offence; (iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and (iv) where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested, either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail: Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any interim order under this sub-section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in charge of a police station to arrest, without warrant the applicant on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application.” The above provision makes it clear that the power exercisable under Section 438 of the Code is somewhat extraordinary in character and it is to be exercised only in exceptional cases where it appears that the person may be falsely implicated or where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to otherwise misuse his liberty.

15. In Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B. [(2005) 4 SCC 303] this Court considered the scope of Section 438 of the Code as under : (SCC pp. 311-12, para 16) “16. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who is entitled to plead innocence, since he is not on the date of application for exercise of power under Section 438 of the Code convicted for the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. The applicant must show that he has ‘reason to believe’ that he may be arrested in a non-bailable offence. Use of the expression ‘reason to believe’ shows that the belief that the applicant may be arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief’ for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of vague apprehension that someone is going to make an accusation against him in pursuance of which he may be arrested. Grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested in non-bailable offence must be capable of being examined. If an application is made to the High Court or the Court of Session, it is for the court concerned to decide whether a case has been made out for granting of the relief sought. The provisions cannot be invoked after arrest of the accused. A blanket order should not be generally 4 NABAIL No. 8046 of 2025 passed. It flows from the very language of the section which requires the applicant to show that he has reason to believe that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. Normally a direction should not issue to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail ‘whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever’. Such ‘blanket order’ should not be passed as it would serve as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity. An order under Section 438 is a device to secure the individual's liberty, it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations likely or unlikely. On the facts of the case, considered in the background of the legal position set out above, this does not prima facie appear to be a case where any order in terms of Section 438 of the Code can be passed.”

16. Recently, in Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 8 SCC 730] , this Court (of which both of us were parties) considered the scope of granting relief under Section 438 vis-a-vis a person who was declared as an absconder or proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code. In para 12, this Court held as under : (SCC p. 733) “12. From these materials and information, it is clear that the present appellant was not available for interrogation and investigation and was declared as ‘absconder’. Normally, when the accused is ‘absconding’ and declared as a ‘proclaimed offender’, there is no question of granting anticipatory bail. We reiterate that when a person against whom a warrant had been issued and is absconding or concealing himself in order to avoid execution of warrant and declared as a proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.” It is clear from the above decision that if anyone is declared as an absconder/proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code, he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.”

7. Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court, relying upon decision of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradeep Sharma (supra) as well as Lavesh Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra) has held in the matter of Prem Shanker Prasad Vs. The State of Bihar and another reported in 2022 (14) SCC 516, that if any one is declared absconder/proclaimed offender in term of Section 82 Cr.P.C., is not entitled to relief of anticipatory bail even in the business transaction also there may be offences under I.P.C. more particularly Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 etc. what is required to be considered is nature of 5 NABAIL No. 8046 of 2025 allegation and accusation and not that nature of accusation arising out of a business transaction.

8. In the instant case, perusal of the record shows that specific allegation has been levelled against the applicant in commission of offence and that the accused-applicant is absconding till date, against whom proclamation under Section 84 of B.N.S.S., has also been issued, considering the settled principle of law regarding anticipatory bail, submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, nature of accusation, role of applicant and all attending facts and circumstances of the case, without expressing any opinion on merit of the case, no case for anticipatory bail is made out.

9. The anticipatory bail application is rejected. October 6, 2025 S.Ali/C.P.Sahani (Dr. Gautam Chowdhary,J.) SHAUKAT ALI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Sarvind Kumar Pandey, learned counsel for the informant, for the State and perused the record.

2. The present anticipatory bail application has been moved on behalf of applicant Upendra Nath seeking anticipatory bail in Case Crime no. 521 of 2025, under Sections 75, 65(2), 351(2) of B.N.S., and Section 5n, 6, 11(iii), 12 of POCSO Act, 2012, Police Station Civil Lines, District Moradabad with the prayer that in the event of arrest, applicant may be released on anticipatory bail.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the F.I.R., in the present case has been lodged pursuant to an order passed on an application under 173(4) of B.N.S.S. He further submits that the opposite party no.2 was a divorcee having one daughter aged about 09 years, who later on, was married with the son of the applicant and out of the said wedlock one male child was also born. He further submits that the opposite party no.2 was of bad character as such the son of the applicant filed an application under Section 173 (4) of B.N.S.S., which was treated as a complaint case vide order

10.06.2025 and as a counter blast to the same, the instant prosecution has been launched against the applicant and his son. Learned counsel further argued that applicant is innocent and he has an apprehension that he may be arrested in the above- mentioned case, whereas there is no credible evidence against him. It has further been submitted that no coercive process has been issued against the applicant so far. It was also submitted that applicant undertakes to co-operate during investigation and trial and he would appear as and when required by the investigating agency or Court. It has 2 NABAIL No. 8046 of 2025 been stated that in case, the applicant is granted anticipatory bail, he shall not misuse the liberty of bail and will co-operate with the investigation and would obey all conditions of bail.

4. Learned A.G.A. and learned counsel for first informant have opposed the application for anticipatory bail. Learned counsel further submits that the applicant is absconding on account of which, process under Section 84 of B.N.S.S., has been issued against the applicant. Learned counsel further argued that the applicant is absconding and by the efflux of time proclamation under Section 84 of B.N.S.S., is running against the applicant, therefore the applicant is not entitled for anticipatory bail.

5. In the matter of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694, it has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that while deciding anticipatory bail, Court must consider nature and gravity of accusation, antecedent of accused, possibility of accused to flee from justice and that Court must evaluate entire available material against the accused carefully and that the exact role of the accused has also to be taken into consideration.

6. Further the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradeep Sharma reported in 2014 (2) SCC 171 has held that a person against whom the proclamation has been issued and the proceeding under Sections 82/83 Cr.P.C. have been initiated, is not entitled to the benefit of anticipatory bail. In paragraph no.14 to 16, it has been observed as under: “14. In order to answer the above question, it is desirable to refer to Section 438 of the Code which reads as under: “438. Direction for grant of bail to person apprehending arrest.—(1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may be arrested on accusation of having committed a nonbailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the Court of Session for a direction under this section that in the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and that court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia, the following factors, namely— (i) the nature and gravity of the accusation; (ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether he has previously undergone imprisonment on conviction by a court in respect of any cognizable 3 NABAIL No. 8046 of 2025 offence; (iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice; and (iv) where the accusation has been made with the object of injuring or humiliating the applicant by having him so arrested, either reject the application forthwith or issue an interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail: Provided that, where the High Court or, as the case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed any interim order under this sub-section or has rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail, it shall be open to an officer in charge of a police station to arrest, without warrant the applicant on the basis of the accusation apprehended in such application.” The above provision makes it clear that the power exercisable under Section 438 of the Code is somewhat extraordinary in character and it is to be exercised only in exceptional cases where it appears that the person may be falsely implicated or where there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to otherwise misuse his liberty.

15. In Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B. [(2005) 4 SCC 303] this Court considered the scope of Section 438 of the Code as under : (SCC pp. 311-12, para 16) “16. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the personal liberty of an individual who is entitled to plead innocence, since he is not on the date of application for exercise of power under Section 438 of the Code convicted for the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. The applicant must show that he has ‘reason to believe’ that he may be arrested in a non-bailable offence. Use of the expression ‘reason to believe’ shows that the belief that the applicant may be arrested must be founded on reasonable grounds. Mere ‘fear’ is not ‘belief’ for which reason it is not enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of vague apprehension that someone is going to make an accusation against him in pursuance of which he may be arrested. Grounds on which the belief of the applicant is based that he may be arrested in non-bailable offence must be capable of being examined. If an application is made to the High Court or the Court of Session, it is for the court concerned to decide whether a case has been made out for granting of the relief sought. The provisions cannot be invoked after arrest of the accused. A blanket order should not be generally 4 NABAIL No. 8046 of 2025 passed. It flows from the very language of the section which requires the applicant to show that he has reason to believe that he may be arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that the applicant's apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. Normally a direction should not issue to the effect that the applicant shall be released on bail ‘whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever’. Such ‘blanket order’ should not be passed as it would serve as a blanket to cover or protect any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity. An order under Section 438 is a device to secure the individual's liberty, it is neither a passport to the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of accusations likely or unlikely. On the facts of the case, considered in the background of the legal position set out above, this does not prima facie appear to be a case where any order in terms of Section 438 of the Code can be passed.”

16. Recently, in Lavesh v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 8 SCC 730] , this Court (of which both of us were parties) considered the scope of granting relief under Section 438 vis-a-vis a person who was declared as an absconder or proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code. In para 12, this Court held as under : (SCC p. 733) “12. From these materials and information, it is clear that the present appellant was not available for interrogation and investigation and was declared as ‘absconder’. Normally, when the accused is ‘absconding’ and declared as a ‘proclaimed offender’, there is no question of granting anticipatory bail. We reiterate that when a person against whom a warrant had been issued and is absconding or concealing himself in order to avoid execution of warrant and declared as a proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.” It is clear from the above decision that if anyone is declared as an absconder/proclaimed offender in terms of Section 82 of the Code, he is not entitled to the relief of anticipatory bail.”

7. Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court, relying upon decision of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Pradeep Sharma (supra) as well as Lavesh Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra) has held in the matter of Prem Shanker Prasad Vs. The State of Bihar and another reported in 2022 (14) SCC 516, that if any one is declared absconder/proclaimed offender in term of Section 82 Cr.P.C., is not entitled to relief of anticipatory bail even in the business transaction also there may be offences under I.P.C. more particularly Sections 406, 420, 467, 468 etc. what is required to be considered is nature of 5 NABAIL No. 8046 of 2025 allegation and accusation and not that nature of accusation arising out of a business transaction.

8. In the instant case, perusal of the record shows that specific allegation has been levelled against the applicant in commission of offence and that the accused-applicant is absconding till date, against whom proclamation under Section 84 of B.N.S.S., has also been issued, considering the settled principle of law regarding anticipatory bail, submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, nature of accusation, role of applicant and all attending facts and circumstances of the case, without expressing any opinion on merit of the case, no case for anticipatory bail is made out.

9. The anticipatory bail application is rejected. October 6, 2025 S.Ali/C.P.Sahani (Dr. Gautam Chowdhary,J.) SHAUKAT ALI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

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