HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD vs Counsel for Petitioner(s)

Smt. Saroj Devi State Of U.P. And 3 Others Versus .....Petitioner(s) .....Respondent(s) Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Devansh Misra, Mohammad Alam, Ramanuj Counsel for Respondent(s) Court No. - 9 Yadav, Sunil Kumar Chaudhari : C.S.C., Jalaj Kumar Kushwaha HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR, J.

1. Heard Sri Devansh Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order of District Magistrate, Banda dated 22.08.2025 ceasing financial and administrative powers of the petitioner as a Gram Pradhan in exercise of powers under Section 95(1)(g) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1947").

3. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was elected as a Gram Pradhan of Village Gram Sabha Badusa, District Banda. A complaint was made against the petitioner alleging financial irregularities. The District Panchayat Raj Officer had submitted an enquiry report dated 22.05.2025 and the District Magistrate, Banda issued a show cause notice dated 29.05.2025 to the petitioner. An explanation was submitted by the petitioner on 25.06.2025. Thereafter, the respondent no. 2 has passed the impugned order dated 22.08.2025 without considering the reply of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that, the show cause notice issued to the petitioner, pre supposes the conclusion of each allegation. The petitioner had submitted specific reply to each allegation in his explanation. However, the District Magistrate after reproducing the contents of the show cause notice has simply referred to the reply of the petitioner and without giving consideration to the reply submitted by her, has proceeded to record his prima facie satisfaction regarding embezzlement of Rs. 10,34,493/- ceasing the administrative and financial powers of the petitioner. The only reason assigned in the order to discard the petitioner reply is that the explanation submitted by her is not satisfactory. 2 WRIC No. 30222 of 2025

4. The question as to what would be the manner of exercising powers by the State Government/District Magistrate for ceasing financial and administrative powers of the Pradhan fell for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Hafiz Ataullah Ansari Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2011 (2) UPLBEC 889. A subsequent Full Bench in the case of Shamim (supra) has examined all previous judgments and the powers of District Magistrate for the purposes of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 95(1)(g) of the Act of 1947. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments have been noticed by the Full Bench to observe that Panchayats and Municipalities have now been conferred constitutional status. The question for consideration before the Full Bench has been noticed in para 23 of the judgment, which is reproduced hereinafter:- "23. In the backdrop of the legislative history and the status of an elected Pradhan, after the Constitutional Amendment, the primary issue is whether the power exercised by the State Government/District Magistrate under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of Panchayat Raj Act is a purely administrative or a quasi judicial. In other words whether State Government/District Magistrate while exercising power under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) is a Tribunal." While answering the reference, the Full Bench observed as under in para 37 of the judgment in Shamim (supra):- "37. In Vivekanand, Hafiz Ataullah Ansari and thereafter reiterated in Paras Jain that the elected representative would have to be given an opportunity to raise objection to the findings returned in the preliminary enquiry and his/or her objections will have be considered, though prima facie, by the State Government/District Magistrate before an order ceasing the financial and administrative power and functions is passed. The consequence of the order passed in exercise of power under Section 95(1)(g) is serious consequence as it divests the elected representative from exercising power until exonerated in final enquiry and the decision of the State Government is final. The decision taken by the State Government is not based on any expediency or policy of the State, rather, it is a statutory power conferred upon the State Government exercising inherent judicial power after confronting the elected representative, with show cause notice based on the preliminary report, thereafter, taking a decision upon due application of mind on the objections of the elected Pradhan. Once such an order is passed, it is not open for the State Government to either review or modify the order during the course of final enquiry. The order, therefore, finally decides the issue between Pradhan and the Authority (State Government) in so far it relates to exercise of financial and administrative power. The office of the local body is an elected office of the constitutional democratic institution; the elected head is not a government servant and it would be improper to compare these proceeding with departmental proceeding in service jurisprudence. A head of a local body is elected for a limited term. If during the removal proceedings, he is denuded from exercising financial and administrative powers then even if he is exonerated in the enquiry the time spent during enquiry is lost, he does not get his period extended. The consideration about the presence of all or some of the trappings of a court is really not decisive. The main and basic test is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. Applying this test there can be no doubt that the power which the State 3 WRIC No. 30222 of 2025 Government/District Magistrate exercises under proviso to Section 95(1)(g) is a quasi-judicial power exercised by a quasi-judicial authority."

5. Since the power to be exercised by the District Magistrate is quasi- judicial in nature and has serious consequences for elected representative, it is expected that the District Magistrate would apply his mind to the nature of charges levelled and would record a prima facie satisfaction with regard to existence of materials collected in the preliminary enquiry, which necessitates holding of regular enquiry and justify seizure of financial and administrative powers of Pradhan. The District Magistrate, therefore, is expected to look into the nature of charges as also the defence set up by the elected Pradhan or else the very object of issuing show cause notice would be frustrated. Law is otherwise settled that reason is the soul of an order and considerations which have prevailed in passing of the order must be reflected from the order itself. Merely stating that the explanation is not satisfactory would not suffice. In such circumstances this Court finds that the order of District Magistrate is wanting on relevant parameters, notice above, and therefore the order impugned cannot be sustained.

6. Learned Standing Counsel submits that instead of keeping the matter pending it would be appropriate that the authority concerned be permitted to re-visit the issue.

7. In that view of the matter, it would be appropriate to set aside the order of the District Magistrate dated 22.08.2025, and remit the matter to the District Magistrate to objectively consider the reply of the petitioner and to pass a fresh order, depicting application of mind to the materials collected in the preliminary enquiry as also the defence of petitioner in that regard.

8. Writ petition, accordingly, is allowed. October 15, 2025 M.S. Ansari (Arun Kumar,J.) MOHD SAQIB ANSARI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Smt. Saroj Devi State Of U.P. And 3 Others Versus .....Petitioner(s) .....Respondent(s) Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Devansh Misra, Mohammad Alam, Ramanuj Counsel for Respondent(s) Court No. - 9 Yadav, Sunil Kumar Chaudhari : C.S.C., Jalaj Kumar Kushwaha HON'BLE ARUN KUMAR, J.

1. Heard Sri Devansh Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the order of District Magistrate, Banda dated 22.08.2025 ceasing financial and administrative powers of the petitioner as a Gram Pradhan in exercise of powers under Section 95(1)(g) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act, 1947").

3. The case of the petitioner is that the petitioner was elected as a Gram Pradhan of Village Gram Sabha Badusa, District Banda. A complaint was made against the petitioner alleging financial irregularities. The District Panchayat Raj Officer had submitted an enquiry report dated 22.05.2025 and the District Magistrate, Banda issued a show cause notice dated 29.05.2025 to the petitioner. An explanation was submitted by the petitioner on 25.06.2025. Thereafter, the respondent no. 2 has passed the impugned order dated 22.08.2025 without considering the reply of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that, the show cause notice issued to the petitioner, pre supposes the conclusion of each allegation. The petitioner had submitted specific reply to each allegation in his explanation. However, the District Magistrate after reproducing the contents of the show cause notice has simply referred to the reply of the petitioner and without giving consideration to the reply submitted by her, has proceeded to record his prima facie satisfaction regarding embezzlement of Rs. 10,34,493/- ceasing the administrative and financial powers of the petitioner. The only reason assigned in the order to discard the petitioner reply is that the explanation submitted by her is not satisfactory. 2 WRIC No. 30222 of 2025

4. The question as to what would be the manner of exercising powers by the State Government/District Magistrate for ceasing financial and administrative powers of the Pradhan fell for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court in Hafiz Ataullah Ansari Vs. State of U.P. and others, 2011 (2) UPLBEC 889. A subsequent Full Bench in the case of Shamim (supra) has examined all previous judgments and the powers of District Magistrate for the purposes of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 95(1)(g) of the Act of 1947. The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments have been noticed by the Full Bench to observe that Panchayats and Municipalities have now been conferred constitutional status. The question for consideration before the Full Bench has been noticed in para 23 of the judgment, which is reproduced hereinafter:- "23. In the backdrop of the legislative history and the status of an elected Pradhan, after the Constitutional Amendment, the primary issue is whether the power exercised by the State Government/District Magistrate under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) of Panchayat Raj Act is a purely administrative or a quasi judicial. In other words whether State Government/District Magistrate while exercising power under the proviso to Section 95(1)(g) is a Tribunal." While answering the reference, the Full Bench observed as under in para 37 of the judgment in Shamim (supra):- "37. In Vivekanand, Hafiz Ataullah Ansari and thereafter reiterated in Paras Jain that the elected representative would have to be given an opportunity to raise objection to the findings returned in the preliminary enquiry and his/or her objections will have be considered, though prima facie, by the State Government/District Magistrate before an order ceasing the financial and administrative power and functions is passed. The consequence of the order passed in exercise of power under Section 95(1)(g) is serious consequence as it divests the elected representative from exercising power until exonerated in final enquiry and the decision of the State Government is final. The decision taken by the State Government is not based on any expediency or policy of the State, rather, it is a statutory power conferred upon the State Government exercising inherent judicial power after confronting the elected representative, with show cause notice based on the preliminary report, thereafter, taking a decision upon due application of mind on the objections of the elected Pradhan. Once such an order is passed, it is not open for the State Government to either review or modify the order during the course of final enquiry. The order, therefore, finally decides the issue between Pradhan and the Authority (State Government) in so far it relates to exercise of financial and administrative power. The office of the local body is an elected office of the constitutional democratic institution; the elected head is not a government servant and it would be improper to compare these proceeding with departmental proceeding in service jurisprudence. A head of a local body is elected for a limited term. If during the removal proceedings, he is denuded from exercising financial and administrative powers then even if he is exonerated in the enquiry the time spent during enquiry is lost, he does not get his period extended. The consideration about the presence of all or some of the trappings of a court is really not decisive. The main and basic test is whether the adjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function. Applying this test there can be no doubt that the power which the State 3 WRIC No. 30222 of 2025 Government/District Magistrate exercises under proviso to Section 95(1)(g) is a quasi-judicial power exercised by a quasi-judicial authority."

5. Since the power to be exercised by the District Magistrate is quasi- judicial in nature and has serious consequences for elected representative, it is expected that the District Magistrate would apply his mind to the nature of charges levelled and would record a prima facie satisfaction with regard to existence of materials collected in the preliminary enquiry, which necessitates holding of regular enquiry and justify seizure of financial and administrative powers of Pradhan. The District Magistrate, therefore, is expected to look into the nature of charges as also the defence set up by the elected Pradhan or else the very object of issuing show cause notice would be frustrated. Law is otherwise settled that reason is the soul of an order and considerations which have prevailed in passing of the order must be reflected from the order itself. Merely stating that the explanation is not satisfactory would not suffice. In such circumstances this Court finds that the order of District Magistrate is wanting on relevant parameters, notice above, and therefore the order impugned cannot be sustained.

6. Learned Standing Counsel submits that instead of keeping the matter pending it would be appropriate that the authority concerned be permitted to re-visit the issue.

7. In that view of the matter, it would be appropriate to set aside the order of the District Magistrate dated 22.08.2025, and remit the matter to the District Magistrate to objectively consider the reply of the petitioner and to pass a fresh order, depicting application of mind to the materials collected in the preliminary enquiry as also the defence of petitioner in that regard.

8. Writ petition, accordingly, is allowed. October 15, 2025 M.S. Ansari (Arun Kumar,J.) MOHD SAQIB ANSARI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad