National Highways Authority of India v. Kunj Bihari and

1. Heard Sri Phool Singh Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioners, Ms. Uttara Bahuguna, learned A.C.S.C. for the State respondent and Sri Santosh Kumar Singh for respondent nos. 2 and 3.

2. The instant writ petition is preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to pay the compensation to the petitioners of the Gata No. 305 area 0.0750 hectare situated at Mauja- Sikandra Nagar, Tehsil-Sikandra, District-Kanpur Dehat and to accord compensation in pursuance of the award dated 17.11.2016 passed by the Competent Authority/Additional District Magistrate (F&R), Kanpur Dehat within stipulated time.

3. At the very outset, learned counsel for the respondents raised an objection qua the maintainability of the instant writ petition on the premises that admittedly the acquisition proceedings took place under the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred as 'Act, 1956'). The award was made on 17.11.2016 holding the land in question as non-agriculture and compensation was, accordingly, decided. Against the said award the petitioners had preferred a petition under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 before the Additional Commissioner (Administration)/Arbitrator Kanpur Division, Kanpur, who vide order dated 24.04.2018 remanded the matter to the Competent Authority on the ground that opportunity of hearing was not 2 WRIC No. 29067 of 2025 accorded to the petitioners. Thereafter, the Authority had passed the supplementary award dated 16.03.2021, wherein part of the land in question was declared as agricultural and part of the land was declared as non- agricultural. Against the said supplementary award, the National Highways Authority of India (in short 'NHAI') had preferred a petition under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 before the Additional Commissioner (Administration), Division: Kanpur, but the supplementary award was affirmed in favour of the petitioners and petition of the NHAI was rejected vide order dated 07.12.2021. Thereafter, the NHAI has preferred an appeal under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the District Judge, Ramabai Nagar (Kanpur Dehat), which was dismissed vide order dated 24.03.2023. Against the order dated 24.03.2023, the NHAI has preferred an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, being Appeal No. 652 of 2023; National Highways Authority of India vs. Kunj Bihari and 3 others, which was also dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 24.04.2025. He submits that even though the NHAI has preferred a Civil Appeal No. 818 of 2025, which is stated to be pending consideration.

4. In this backdrop, the primary objection has been taken in light of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in National Highways Authority of India vs. Seetal Jaidev Vade and others; (2022) 16 SCC 391. He submits that the instant writ petition, which is preferred to execute the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal/Court, the efficacious remedy is to prefer an execution case. He placed reliance upon Paras 3, 10, 11, 12, 13 to 13.2 of the aforesaid judgment. For ready reference paragraphs 3, 10, 11, 12, 13 to 13.2 are being reproduced hereunder:- "3. By the impugned judgment and order the High Court has disposed of the said writ petition by directing the appellant – NHAI to deposit the entire amount along with interest with the Land Acquisition Authority and thereafter has directed the original writ petitioners – land owners to withdraw 50% of the amount along with interest on filing an affidavit of undertaking that if in the litigation journey, an adverse order is passed against them and they are found to have withdrawn excess amount, the said amount would be redeposited with the authority. 3 WRIC No. 29067 of 2025

10. Apart from the fact that the award dated 12.06.2018 has been challenged by the NHAI by initiating proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act which are reported to be pending, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the reliefs to execute the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court, when the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court is to be executed by initiating an execution proceeding before the concerned Executing Court. But, by passing the impugned order/directions the High Court has virtually converted itself into Executing Court.

11. Therefore, once the original writ petitioner was having an efficacious, alternative remedy to execute the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court, by initiating an appropriate execution proceeding before the competent Executing Court, the High Court ought to have relegated the original writ petitioners to avail the said remedy instead of entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was filed to execute the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal/Court. If the High Courts convert itself to the Executing Court and entertain the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to execute the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal/Court, the High Courts would be flooded with the writ petitions to execute awards passed by the learned Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal/Arbitral Court.

12. We disapprove the entertaining of such writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to execute the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court, without relegating the judgment creditor in whose favour the award is passed to file an execution proceeding before the competent Executing Court.

13. In view of the above discussion, we would have set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court on the aforesaid ground alone. However, taking into consideration the similar order passed by this Court in the case of Saraswatibai Chandrakant Shinde (supra), we deem it appropriate to dispose of the present proceedings/appeal with the following directions:

13.1 The NHAI shall deposit 50 per cent of the compensation amount, as 4 WRIC No. 29067 of 2025 awarded by the Arbitral Court, with the Executing Court within a period of four weeks. The said amount shall be released to the land owners unconditionally.

13.2. The learned District Court, before whom the proceedings under Section34 of the Arbitration Act are pending, shall make an endeavour to decide such proceedings within a period of six months from the next date of hearing before the said court."

5. Considering the aforesaid facts, we find that once the petitioners have efficacious remedy, we are not inclined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the execution of an award as the issue is no more res integra after the order passed in the case of Seetal jaidev Vade (supra).

6. However, confronted with the situation, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the instant writ petition may be dismissed as not pressed and the leave may be accorded to press an execution case before the competent authority.

7. Considering the facts and circumstances and the leave in question as has been pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the instant writ petition stands dismissed as not pressed with the aforesaid leave. (Kunal Ravi Singh,J.) (Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,J.) October 27, 2025 Pkb/

1. Heard Sri Phool Singh Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioners, Ms. Uttara Bahuguna, learned A.C.S.C. for the State respondent and Sri Santosh Kumar Singh for respondent nos. 2 and 3.

2. The instant writ petition is preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a mandamus commanding and directing the respondents to pay the compensation to the petitioners of the Gata No. 305 area 0.0750 hectare situated at Mauja- Sikandra Nagar, Tehsil-Sikandra, District-Kanpur Dehat and to accord compensation in pursuance of the award dated 17.11.2016 passed by the Competent Authority/Additional District Magistrate (F&R), Kanpur Dehat within stipulated time.

3. At the very outset, learned counsel for the respondents raised an objection qua the maintainability of the instant writ petition on the premises that admittedly the acquisition proceedings took place under the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred as 'Act, 1956'). The award was made on 17.11.2016 holding the land in question as non-agriculture and compensation was, accordingly, decided. Against the said award the petitioners had preferred a petition under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 before the Additional Commissioner (Administration)/Arbitrator Kanpur Division, Kanpur, who vide order dated 24.04.2018 remanded the matter to the Competent Authority on the ground that opportunity of hearing was not 2 WRIC No. 29067 of 2025 accorded to the petitioners. Thereafter, the Authority had passed the supplementary award dated 16.03.2021, wherein part of the land in question was declared as agricultural and part of the land was declared as non- agricultural. Against the said supplementary award, the National Highways Authority of India (in short 'NHAI') had preferred a petition under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956 before the Additional Commissioner (Administration), Division: Kanpur, but the supplementary award was affirmed in favour of the petitioners and petition of the NHAI was rejected vide order dated 07.12.2021. Thereafter, the NHAI has preferred an appeal under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the District Judge, Ramabai Nagar (Kanpur Dehat), which was dismissed vide order dated 24.03.2023. Against the order dated 24.03.2023, the NHAI has preferred an appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, being Appeal No. 652 of 2023; National Highways Authority of India vs. Kunj Bihari and 3 others, which was also dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 24.04.2025. He submits that even though the NHAI has preferred a Civil Appeal No. 818 of 2025, which is stated to be pending consideration.

4. In this backdrop, the primary objection has been taken in light of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in National Highways Authority of India vs. Seetal Jaidev Vade and others; (2022) 16 SCC 391. He submits that the instant writ petition, which is preferred to execute the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal/Court, the efficacious remedy is to prefer an execution case. He placed reliance upon Paras 3, 10, 11, 12, 13 to 13.2 of the aforesaid judgment. For ready reference paragraphs 3, 10, 11, 12, 13 to 13.2 are being reproduced hereunder:- "3. By the impugned judgment and order the High Court has disposed of the said writ petition by directing the appellant – NHAI to deposit the entire amount along with interest with the Land Acquisition Authority and thereafter has directed the original writ petitioners – land owners to withdraw 50% of the amount along with interest on filing an affidavit of undertaking that if in the litigation journey, an adverse order is passed against them and they are found to have withdrawn excess amount, the said amount would be redeposited with the authority. 3 WRIC No. 29067 of 2025

10. Apart from the fact that the award dated 12.06.2018 has been challenged by the NHAI by initiating proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act which are reported to be pending, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the reliefs to execute the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court, when the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court is to be executed by initiating an execution proceeding before the concerned Executing Court. But, by passing the impugned order/directions the High Court has virtually converted itself into Executing Court.

11. Therefore, once the original writ petitioner was having an efficacious, alternative remedy to execute the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court, by initiating an appropriate execution proceeding before the competent Executing Court, the High Court ought to have relegated the original writ petitioners to avail the said remedy instead of entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was filed to execute the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal/Court. If the High Courts convert itself to the Executing Court and entertain the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to execute the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal/Court, the High Courts would be flooded with the writ petitions to execute awards passed by the learned Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal/Arbitral Court.

12. We disapprove the entertaining of such writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to execute the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court, without relegating the judgment creditor in whose favour the award is passed to file an execution proceeding before the competent Executing Court.

13. In view of the above discussion, we would have set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court on the aforesaid ground alone. However, taking into consideration the similar order passed by this Court in the case of Saraswatibai Chandrakant Shinde (supra), we deem it appropriate to dispose of the present proceedings/appeal with the following directions:

13.1 The NHAI shall deposit 50 per cent of the compensation amount, as 4 WRIC No. 29067 of 2025 awarded by the Arbitral Court, with the Executing Court within a period of four weeks. The said amount shall be released to the land owners unconditionally.

13.2. The learned District Court, before whom the proceedings under Section34 of the Arbitration Act are pending, shall make an endeavour to decide such proceedings within a period of six months from the next date of hearing before the said court."

5. Considering the aforesaid facts, we find that once the petitioners have efficacious remedy, we are not inclined to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the execution of an award as the issue is no more res integra after the order passed in the case of Seetal jaidev Vade (supra).

6. However, confronted with the situation, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the instant writ petition may be dismissed as not pressed and the leave may be accorded to press an execution case before the competent authority.

7. Considering the facts and circumstances and the leave in question as has been pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the instant writ petition stands dismissed as not pressed with the aforesaid leave. (Kunal Ravi Singh,J.) (Mahesh Chandra Tripathi,J.) October 27, 2025 Pkb/