Others connected with v. WRIT TAX No

: Prakash Chandra Srivastava, Vishnu Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C. Prakash Court No. - 3 HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J. HON'BLE INDRAJEET SHUKLA, J.

1. Heard Sri Prakash Chandra Srivastava along with Sri Vishnu Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Arimardan Singh Rajpoot, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. Present petitions have been filed for the following reliefs: (i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the writ of demand/citation dated 12.07.2025 issued by respondent no.3. (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the recovery certificate dated 10.07.2025 issued by District Magistrate Jaunpur against the petitioner for recovery of amount of Rs.1,07,295. (iii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the recovery 2 WTAX No. 4056 of 2025 certificate dated 10.07.2025 issued by District Magistrate Jaunpur against the petitioner for recovery of amount of Rs.14,63,983.

3. Submission is that the amounts Rs.15,71,278/- together with interest and Rs.14,63,983/- together with interest being claimed vide writ of demand dated 12.07.2025, are time barred demands. The petitioner had obtained license to run a liquor shop on Minimum Guaranteed Quantity (MGQ) basis for the excise year 2002-03 and excise year 2003-04. For reason of breach of that contract, the revenue claims compensation for which the present recoveries have been issued. Both recoveries are described time barred-on the strength of provisions of Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Ancillary to the above, it has been further submitted, though the petitioner's writ petitions to assail the demand of compensation, being Writ Tax Nos.1429 of 2006, 385 of 2007 & 386 of 2007 had been dismissed vide order dated 09.03.2011, the first application to seek a direction from the District Collector to recover those amounts, was issued on 10.07.2025. Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, that application was time barred.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel would submit in the first place the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the demand in issue. He relies on Section 39 of the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Excise Act'). Thus, it has been submitted that the Excise Act is a special law and a complete code in itself. Therefore, the Limitation Act, 1963 would have no application. In any case the recoveries are for sovereign dues, to which Article 55 of the Limitation Act does not apply and further Articled 137 of the Limitation Act may have no applicability as the present recovery proceedings are in continuation of recovery proceedings initiated earlier, which became the subject matter of Writ Tax Nos. 1429 of 2006, 385 of 2007 & 386 of 2007.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, Section 39 of the Excise Act amongst others applies to recovery of excise revenue including relating to any amount due from any person under a "contract relating to the excise revenue". The Excise Act is a complete code regarding impost quantification of recovery of excise duty. Therefore, that provision of law would hold the field and not the provisions under the general law of limitation, under the Limitation Act, 1963. Consequently, 3 WTAX No. 4056 of 2025 Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would have no application as that is applicable only to compensation claims, for breach of a contract. The excise revenue being claimed from the petitioner is not in the nature of the compensation for breach of contract but an amount referable solely to Section 39 of the Excise Act being in the nature of "excise revenue".

6. Similarly, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application as that is a residuary clause applicable only where the Limitation Act applies in absence of any special law. Here, the provisions of that general law stand excluded by the own force of Section 39 of the Excise Act. Second, Section 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to applications etc. for which limitation has not been provided elsewhere and which application may be filed by nature of institution of a proceeding, clasically civil, before any Court or Authority. Here, the application being referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner is not a fresh application to institute a proceeding or a case of that nature but is clearly an application seeking continuance and conclusion of the recovery proceedings for "excise revenue", that may have been initiated earlier.

7. We have also perused the order dated 09.03.2011 passed in Writ Tax Nos.1429 of 2006, 385 of 2007 & 386 of 2007. Paragraph No.10 of that order reads as below: "10. The notices dated 25.12.2002 were issued to the petitioners in the first WP, requiring them to deposit the remaining security amount as well as the licence fee on the MGQ. They filed their reply on 20.02.2003 and 04.01.2003. It is not clear, if any orders were passed on their replies however, the recoveries dated 06.02.2003 were issued against them for the remaining license fee on the MGQ." (emphasis supplied)

8. Thus, recovery proceedings have come into existence on 06.02.2003. Those recovery proceedings were specifically challenged in the earlier writ petitions. That fact is clear from a bare perusal of the paragraph nos. 11 and 12 of the above noted order. They read as below: "11. The petitioners in the first WP filed a writ petition no.1365 (M/B) of 2003 against the aforesaid recovery before the Lucknow bench of the court. It was dismissed on 12.03.2003 on the ground of alternative remedy of filing appeal under the Act. They filed the appeal. It was dismissed on 09.05.2006. They have filed the first WP against this order as well as against the recovery. 4 WTAX No. 4056 of 2025

12. In the second and third WPs, the petitioners did not file any appeals. They have filed the WPs challenging the recoveries dated 03.06.2004 on the remaining licence fee on the MGQ."

9. Upon dismissal of the writ petitions, the recoveries were expected to be continued and taken to their logical end. What caused the delay is not the subject matter of this petition. Only this much have been disclosed that there is a delay of 14 years in conclusion of the recovery proceedings.

10. In view of the above, we are not impressed with the submission advanced that a fresh recovery has been initiated against the petitioner. The recovery is old and is continuing. Merely because the recovery may not have been concluded, it may not be inferred that the communication dated

10.07.2025 to the District Collector to conclude the recovery, amounts to a fresh request. In law it would continue to be a reminder, only.

11. To the extent the dues being claimed from the petitioner are sovereign dues in the nature of "excise revenue", covered under Section 39 of the Excise Act, the recovery being pressed against the petitioner does not suffer from any legal infirmity.

12. The writ petition fails and accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. October 6, 2025 Mohit (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.) MOHIT KUMAR KUSHWAHA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

: Prakash Chandra Srivastava, Vishnu Counsel for Respondent(s) : C.S.C. Prakash Court No. - 3 HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J. HON'BLE INDRAJEET SHUKLA, J.

1. Heard Sri Prakash Chandra Srivastava along with Sri Vishnu Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Arimardan Singh Rajpoot, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. Present petitions have been filed for the following reliefs: (i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the writ of demand/citation dated 12.07.2025 issued by respondent no.3. (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the recovery certificate dated 10.07.2025 issued by District Magistrate Jaunpur against the petitioner for recovery of amount of Rs.1,07,295. (iii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the recovery 2 WTAX No. 4056 of 2025 certificate dated 10.07.2025 issued by District Magistrate Jaunpur against the petitioner for recovery of amount of Rs.14,63,983.

3. Submission is that the amounts Rs.15,71,278/- together with interest and Rs.14,63,983/- together with interest being claimed vide writ of demand dated 12.07.2025, are time barred demands. The petitioner had obtained license to run a liquor shop on Minimum Guaranteed Quantity (MGQ) basis for the excise year 2002-03 and excise year 2003-04. For reason of breach of that contract, the revenue claims compensation for which the present recoveries have been issued. Both recoveries are described time barred-on the strength of provisions of Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Ancillary to the above, it has been further submitted, though the petitioner's writ petitions to assail the demand of compensation, being Writ Tax Nos.1429 of 2006, 385 of 2007 & 386 of 2007 had been dismissed vide order dated 09.03.2011, the first application to seek a direction from the District Collector to recover those amounts, was issued on 10.07.2025. Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, that application was time barred.

4. On the other hand, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel would submit in the first place the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the demand in issue. He relies on Section 39 of the United Provinces Excise Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Excise Act'). Thus, it has been submitted that the Excise Act is a special law and a complete code in itself. Therefore, the Limitation Act, 1963 would have no application. In any case the recoveries are for sovereign dues, to which Article 55 of the Limitation Act does not apply and further Articled 137 of the Limitation Act may have no applicability as the present recovery proceedings are in continuation of recovery proceedings initiated earlier, which became the subject matter of Writ Tax Nos. 1429 of 2006, 385 of 2007 & 386 of 2007.

5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, Section 39 of the Excise Act amongst others applies to recovery of excise revenue including relating to any amount due from any person under a "contract relating to the excise revenue". The Excise Act is a complete code regarding impost quantification of recovery of excise duty. Therefore, that provision of law would hold the field and not the provisions under the general law of limitation, under the Limitation Act, 1963. Consequently, 3 WTAX No. 4056 of 2025 Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would have no application as that is applicable only to compensation claims, for breach of a contract. The excise revenue being claimed from the petitioner is not in the nature of the compensation for breach of contract but an amount referable solely to Section 39 of the Excise Act being in the nature of "excise revenue".

6. Similarly, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application as that is a residuary clause applicable only where the Limitation Act applies in absence of any special law. Here, the provisions of that general law stand excluded by the own force of Section 39 of the Excise Act. Second, Section 137 of the Limitation Act is applicable only to applications etc. for which limitation has not been provided elsewhere and which application may be filed by nature of institution of a proceeding, clasically civil, before any Court or Authority. Here, the application being referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner is not a fresh application to institute a proceeding or a case of that nature but is clearly an application seeking continuance and conclusion of the recovery proceedings for "excise revenue", that may have been initiated earlier.

7. We have also perused the order dated 09.03.2011 passed in Writ Tax Nos.1429 of 2006, 385 of 2007 & 386 of 2007. Paragraph No.10 of that order reads as below: "10. The notices dated 25.12.2002 were issued to the petitioners in the first WP, requiring them to deposit the remaining security amount as well as the licence fee on the MGQ. They filed their reply on 20.02.2003 and 04.01.2003. It is not clear, if any orders were passed on their replies however, the recoveries dated 06.02.2003 were issued against them for the remaining license fee on the MGQ." (emphasis supplied)

8. Thus, recovery proceedings have come into existence on 06.02.2003. Those recovery proceedings were specifically challenged in the earlier writ petitions. That fact is clear from a bare perusal of the paragraph nos. 11 and 12 of the above noted order. They read as below: "11. The petitioners in the first WP filed a writ petition no.1365 (M/B) of 2003 against the aforesaid recovery before the Lucknow bench of the court. It was dismissed on 12.03.2003 on the ground of alternative remedy of filing appeal under the Act. They filed the appeal. It was dismissed on 09.05.2006. They have filed the first WP against this order as well as against the recovery. 4 WTAX No. 4056 of 2025

12. In the second and third WPs, the petitioners did not file any appeals. They have filed the WPs challenging the recoveries dated 03.06.2004 on the remaining licence fee on the MGQ."

9. Upon dismissal of the writ petitions, the recoveries were expected to be continued and taken to their logical end. What caused the delay is not the subject matter of this petition. Only this much have been disclosed that there is a delay of 14 years in conclusion of the recovery proceedings.

10. In view of the above, we are not impressed with the submission advanced that a fresh recovery has been initiated against the petitioner. The recovery is old and is continuing. Merely because the recovery may not have been concluded, it may not be inferred that the communication dated

10.07.2025 to the District Collector to conclude the recovery, amounts to a fresh request. In law it would continue to be a reminder, only.

11. To the extent the dues being claimed from the petitioner are sovereign dues in the nature of "excise revenue", covered under Section 39 of the Excise Act, the recovery being pressed against the petitioner does not suffer from any legal infirmity.

12. The writ petition fails and accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs. October 6, 2025 Mohit (Indrajeet Shukla,J.) (Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.) MOHIT KUMAR KUSHWAHA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad