✦ High Court of India · 22 Sep 2025

Saniya v. Babar Another), under Section

Case Details High Court of India · 22 Sep 2025

happened to be a first information lodged by the sister of the applicant no. 2 against the brother of the opposite party no. 2 Shahvej under Sections 452, 354, 354Ka, 354Kha, 354Gha and 506 of the IPC being FIR No. 0662 of 2023 pursuant whereto proceedings were initiated which became the motive and the basis for lodging of the false complaint. Submission is that the present complaint is nothing but a counter blast and a retaliation just in order to dictate terms so that the criminal proceedings lodged in pursuance of the FIR be withdrawn.

6. Learned AGA, on the other hand, submits that a perusal of the complaint vis-a-vis the allegations contained in the complaint and the 3 NA528 No. 31868 of 2025 statements under Section 200 and 202 discloses prima facie offences and the case is triable.

7. I have heard the submission so made across the bar and perused the record carefully.

8. At the instance of the applicants, challenge has been raised to an order summoning the applicants under Section 354 read with Section 7/8 of the POCSO Act, there are certain criteria which are to be taken into consideration before determining the fact whether the summoning order suffers from infirmity or not and one of the criteria amongst others would be the nature of the allegations contained in the complaint vis-a-vis the statements under Section 200 and 202. Once there are no material contradiction which goes to the root of the matter and the statements of the witnesses support the allegations in the complaint then the case becomes triable and the court would be reluctant in interfering at this stage. In the present case, as per the complaint pin pointed allegations have been levelled upon the applicants regarding molestation and commission of the offences under Section 354 IPC. Since the allegations have been levelled by the opposite party no. 2 who alleges to be 14 years of age, thus, the provisions of the POCSO Act had been applied. The allegation that on 29.12.2023 the applicants who were in a motocycle tried to pull the opposite party no. 2 tore her clothes, touched the private parts allegation is being sought to be supported by virtue of the statement of the opposite party no. 2 i.e. complainant. Prima facie, the court does not find the complaint to be frivolous particularly when the complaint has been lodged by the victim herself. Since prima facie there does not appear to be any material contradiction which goes to the root of the matter, thus, the case becomes triable. Moreover, non-subjection of the victim to medical examination is a factor which needs consideration at its own strength when the trial commences when a decision is to be taken whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction and the same cannot be a ground to throttle the investigation at the summoning stage. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the applicants that the present proceedings are counter blast or a retaliation or vicious tactics is concerned, the same at best is a defence consideration whereof would be required only when trial commences. 4 NA528 No. 31868 of 2025

9. There is another facet of the matter which also needs consideration at this stage i.e. Section 29 of the POCSO Act. Section 29 deals with presumption as to certain offences according to which where a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit any offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the Act, the special court is to presume that such person has committed or abetted or attempted to commit the offence as the case may be unless the contrary is proved. The word employed by the legislature contrary is proved "mark significance" as the same pre-supposes a trial.

10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 2021 SC 1918 had the occasion to consider the ambit and the extent of intervention under Article 482 Cr.P.C. wherein it was observed as under:- “23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during investigation or the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the 5 NA528 No. 31868 of 2025 formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide 6 NA528 No. 31868 of 2025 power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court 7 NA528 No. 31868 of 2025 has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”

11. Analyzing the case from four corners of law, this Court does not find the present case to be a fit case for interference in exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

12. Accordingly, the application stands disposed of leaving it open for the applicants to contest the trial taking all legal and factual grounds.

13. Needless to point out that this Court has not adjudicated on the merits of the matter and whatever observations have been made in the order passed today are limited to the challenge raised to the summoning order, thus, any observation or expression made herein may not be construed to be an expression on the merits and the trial court shall decide the proceedings with independent application of mind. September 22, 2025 Rajesh (Vikas Budhwar,J.) RAJESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

happened to be a first information lodged by the sister of the applicant no. 2 against the brother of the opposite party no. 2 Shahvej under Sections 452, 354, 354Ka, 354Kha, 354Gha and 506 of the IPC being FIR No. 0662 of 2023 pursuant whereto proceedings were initiated which became the motive and the basis for lodging of the false complaint. Submission is that the present complaint is nothing but a counter blast and a retaliation just in order to dictate terms so that the criminal proceedings lodged in pursuance of the FIR be withdrawn.

6. Learned AGA, on the other hand, submits that a perusal of the complaint vis-a-vis the allegations contained in the complaint and the 3 NA528 No. 31868 of 2025 statements under Section 200 and 202 discloses prima facie offences and the case is triable.

7. I have heard the submission so made across the bar and perused the record carefully.

8. At the instance of the applicants, challenge has been raised to an order summoning the applicants under Section 354 read with Section 7/8 of the POCSO Act, there are certain criteria which are to be taken into consideration before determining the fact whether the summoning order suffers from infirmity or not and one of the criteria amongst others would be the nature of the allegations contained in the complaint vis-a-vis the statements under Section 200 and 202. Once there are no material contradiction which goes to the root of the matter and the statements of the witnesses support the allegations in the complaint then the case becomes triable and the court would be reluctant in interfering at this stage. In the present case, as per the complaint pin pointed allegations have been levelled upon the applicants regarding molestation and commission of the offences under Section 354 IPC. Since the allegations have been levelled by the opposite party no. 2 who alleges to be 14 years of age, thus, the provisions of the POCSO Act had been applied. The allegation that on 29.12.2023 the applicants who were in a motocycle tried to pull the opposite party no. 2 tore her clothes, touched the private parts allegation is being sought to be supported by virtue of the statement of the opposite party no. 2 i.e. complainant. Prima facie, the court does not find the complaint to be frivolous particularly when the complaint has been lodged by the victim herself. Since prima facie there does not appear to be any material contradiction which goes to the root of the matter, thus, the case becomes triable. Moreover, non-subjection of the victim to medical examination is a factor which needs consideration at its own strength when the trial commences when a decision is to be taken whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction and the same cannot be a ground to throttle the investigation at the summoning stage. As regards the submission of the learned counsel for the applicants that the present proceedings are counter blast or a retaliation or vicious tactics is concerned, the same at best is a defence consideration whereof would be required only when trial commences. 4 NA528 No. 31868 of 2025

9. There is another facet of the matter which also needs consideration at this stage i.e. Section 29 of the POCSO Act. Section 29 deals with presumption as to certain offences according to which where a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or attempting to commit any offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of the Act, the special court is to presume that such person has committed or abetted or attempted to commit the offence as the case may be unless the contrary is proved. The word employed by the legislature contrary is proved "mark significance" as the same pre-supposes a trial.

10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 2021 SC 1918 had the occasion to consider the ambit and the extent of intervention under Article 482 Cr.P.C. wherein it was observed as under:- “23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, our final conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Court would be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether the High Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during investigation or the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminal proceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article of the Constitution of India, our final conclusions are as under: i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to investigate into a cognizable offence; ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizable offences; iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information report that the Court will not permit an investigation to go on; iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confused with the 5 NA528 No. 31868 of 2025 formation in the context of death penalty). v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint; vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage; vii) Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception rather than an ordinary rule; viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere; ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping; x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences; xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims or caprice; xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there is no substance in the application made by the complainant, investigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before the learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure; xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, but conferment of wide 6 NA528 No. 31868 of 2025 power requires the court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court; xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint; xv) When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the alleged accused and the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose commission of a cognizable offence or not. The court is not required to consider on merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable offence and the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR; xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or the aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the High Court while passing an interim order in a quashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order of stay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petition can be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order should not require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the High Court, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The High Court shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till the final report/chargesheet Section 173 Cr.P.C., while dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. xvii) Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie of the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interim stay of further investigation, after considering the broad parameters while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the High Court 7 NA528 No. 31868 of 2025 has to give brief reasons why such an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Court and the higher forum can consider what was weighed with the High Court while passing such an interim order. xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the High Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”

11. Analyzing the case from four corners of law, this Court does not find the present case to be a fit case for interference in exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

12. Accordingly, the application stands disposed of leaving it open for the applicants to contest the trial taking all legal and factual grounds.

13. Needless to point out that this Court has not adjudicated on the merits of the matter and whatever observations have been made in the order passed today are limited to the challenge raised to the summoning order, thus, any observation or expression made herein may not be construed to be an expression on the merits and the trial court shall decide the proceedings with independent application of mind. September 22, 2025 Rajesh (Vikas Budhwar,J.) RAJESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

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