Supreme Court · 2025

and conducive to the profession is croppingup. Mr. Mariaputham, Advocate-on-Record had filed vakalatnama for the petitioner- respondent when the special leave petition was filed. After the matter was disposed of, Mr. V. Balachandran, Advocate had filed a petition for review. That was also dismissed by this Court on April 24, 1996. Yet another advocate, Mr. S.U.K. Sagar, has now been engaged to file the present application styled as "application for clarification", on the specious plea that the order is not clear and unambiguous. When an appeal/special leave petition is dismissed, except in rare cases where error of law or fact is apparent on the record, no review can be filed; that too by the advocate on record who neither appeared nor was party in the main case. It is salutary to not that court spends valuable time in deciding a case. Review petition is not, and should not be, an attempt for hearing the matter again on merits. Unfortunately, it has become, in recent time, a practice to file such review petitions as a routine; that too, with change of counsel, without obtaining consent of the advocate on record at earlier stage. This is not conducive to healthy practice of the Bar which has the responsibility to maintain the salutary practice of profession. In Review Petition No.2670/96 in CA No.1867/92, a Bench of three Judges to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy,J., was a member, has held as under: "The record of the appeal indicates that Shri Sudarsh Menon was heard and decided on merits. The Review Petition has been filed by Shri Prabir Chowdhury who was neither an arguing counsel when the appeal was heard nor was he present at the time of arguments. It is unknown on what basis he has written the grounds in the Review Petition as if it is a rehearing of an appeal against our order. He did not confine to the scope of review. It would be not in the interest of the profession to permit such practice. That part, he has not obtained " No Objection Certificate" from the Advocate-on-Record in the appeal, in spite of the fact that Registry had informed him of the requirement for doing so. Filing of the "No Objection Certificate" would be the basis for him to come on record. Otherwise, the Advocate-on-Record is answerable to the Court. The failure to obtain the "No Objection Certificate" from the erstwhile counsel has disentitled him to file the Review Petition. Even otherwise, the Review Petition has no merits, It is an attempt to reargue the matter on merits. On these grounds, we dismiss the Review Petition".

2. Once the petition for review is dismissed, no application for clarification should be filed, much less with the change of the advocate-on-record. This practice of changing the advocates and filing repeated petitions should be deprecated with heavy had for purity of administration of law and salutary and healthy practice.”

3. A Full Bench of this Court in (Smt.) Krishna Pathak v. Vinod Shankar Tiwari and others reported at 2005(29) AIC (Alld. H.C.) in a similar matter held as under: “6. For this purpose Shri H.N. Singh, was confronted with the memo of appeal and no such ground had ever been taken by the applicant/appellant in the appeal. Nor there is anything on record to show that the aforesaid issues had been agitated before the appeal Court. Thus, the question does arise as to whether, a review petition can be entertained on a ground not urged at the time of hearing of the main petition/appeal.

7. Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called C.P.C.) prescribes the limitations for entertaining a review petition. The same are; that the party filing the application for review has discovered a new and important matter or evidence after exercise of due diligence which was not within its knowledge or could not be produced by it at the time when the decree was passed; or order made or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or 'for any other sufficient reason.

8. The aforesaid limitations are prescribed in a crystal clear language and before a party submits that it had discovered a new and important matter or evidence which could not be produced at the earlier stage, the condition precedent for entertaining the review would be to record the finding as to whether at the initial stage, the party has acted with due diligence. "Due" means just and proper in view of the facts and circumstances of the case (vide A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27).

9. Some mistake or error, if made ground for review, it must be apparent on the face of record and if a party files an application on the ground of 'some other sufficient reason' it has to satisfy that the said sufficient reason is analogous to the other conditions mentioned in the said rule i.e. discovery of new and important matter or evidence which it could not discover with due diligence or it was not within his knowledge and, thus, could not produce at the initial stage. Apparent error on the face of record has been explained to include failure to apply the law of limitation to the facts found by the Court or failure to consider a particular provision of a statute or a part thereof or a statutory provision has been applied though it was not in operation. Review is permissible if there is an error of procedure apparent on the face of the record e.g. the judgment is delivered without notice to the parties, or judgment does not effectively deal with or determine any important issue in the case though argued by the parties. There may be merely a smoke-line demarketing an error simplicitor from the error apparent on the face of record. But there cannot be a ground for entertaining the review in the former case. "Sufficient reason" may include disposal of a case without proper notice to the party aggrieved. Thus, if a person comes and satisfies the Court that the matter has been heard without serving a notice upon it, review is maintainable for the "sufficient reason" though there may be no error apparent on the face of record.

10. The expression 'any other sufficient reason' contained in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC means "sufficient reason" which is analogous to those specified immediately to it in the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

25. In view of the above discussion, the law of review can be summarised that it lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. The party must satisfy the Court that the matter or evidence discovered by it at a subsequent stage could not be discovered or produced at the initial stage though it had acted with due diligence. A party filing a review application on the ground of any other "sufficient reason" must satisfy that the said reason is analogous to the conditions mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. Under the garb of review, a party cannot be permitted to re-open the case and to gain a full-fledged inning for making submissions, nor review lies merely on the ground that it may be possible for the Court to take a view contrary to what had been taken earlier. Even the judgment given subsequent to the decision in a case can be no ground for entertaining the review. Review lies only when there is error apparent on the face of the record and that fallibility is by the over-sight of the Court. If a counsel has argued a case to his satisfaction and he had not raised the particular point for any reason whatsoever, it cannot be a ground of review for the reason that he was the master of his case and might not have considered it proper to press the same or could have thought that arguing that point would not serve any purpose. If a case has been decided after full consideration of arguments made by a counsel, he cannot be permitted, even under the garb of doing justice or substantial justice, to engage the court again to decide the controversy already decided. If a party is aggrieved of a judgment, it must approach the Higher Court but entertaining a review to re-consider the case would amount to exceeding its jurisdiction, conferred under the limited jurisdiction for the purpose of review. Justice, as explained above, connotes different meaning to different persons in different contexts, therefore, courts cannot be persuaded to entertain a review application to do justice unless it lies only on the grounds mentioned in the statutory provisions.

27. Undoubtedly, a party can be permitted to raise a pure legal plea, not requiring investigation of fact, at any stage of proceeding but review is, generally, not a part of proceedings in that sense as it lies in exceptional circumstances. The submission made by Mr. H.N. Singh may be relevant only where the issue was raised before the writ court or in special appeal. Admittedly, the grounds on which Shri H.N. Singh, tried to argue the review petition had not been taken in the memo of appeal, nor the same had been agitated earlier. No explanation could be furnished as to why these grounds had not been taken therein. It cannot be the case that these facts were not in applicant's knowledge and could be discovered later on There is no error apparent on the face of the record, nor there is any sufficient ground, on the basis of which the application can be entertained. It is not a case where interference at this stage is required in the interest of justice. Therefore, the question of entertaining such pleas does not arise. Review petition is totally misconceived."

4. It is admitted that the findings recorded in the order dated 17.02.2025 were consistent with the records, inasmuch as, relevant papers were not part of the writ petition. No due diligence has been shown to procure those documents when the writ petition was filed since they were very much accessible to the applicant for all these years.

5. The applicant claims that he is entitled to a job in view of the fact that the land had been acquired by the respondent-corporation. The law is well settled. A Full Bench of this Court in Ravindra Kumar v. District Magistrate, Agra and others, reported at 2005(2) AWC 1650 (FB) has held as under: “22. There is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act under which the Circular dated 28.12.1974 could be issued. Whatever compensation has to be given for acquisition of the land is provided under the Land Acquisition Act itself which is a self- contained Code. Any G.O. providing for any further benefit not mentioned in the Land Acquisition Act would be inconsistent with the intention of Parliament as contained in the Land Acquisition Act. Hence any such GO. would be violative of the Land Acquisition Act and would hence be invalid. Such a G.O. will also violate Article 16 of the Constitution as already mentioned above.

25. In view of the above we answer the questions referred to us as follows:

1. The Government Orders/Circulars providing employment to one member of a family of a person whose land has been acquired (over and above the compensation awarded under the law) are invalid.

2. The acquiring body for whose benefit the land is acquired are not bound by such Government Order/Circular.

3. No writ can be issued directing the acquiring body to consider the claim in accordance with the aforesaid Order/Government Circular."

6. In this wake, the review petition is dismissed. ASHISH NAYAN TRIPATHI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Order Date :- 14.8.2025 Ashish Tripathi

and conducive to the profession is croppingup. Mr. Mariaputham, Advocate-on-Record had filed vakalatnama for the petitioner- respondent when the special leave petition was filed. After the matter was disposed of, Mr. V. Balachandran, Advocate had filed a petition for review. That was also dismissed by this Court on April 24, 1996. Yet another advocate, Mr. S.U.K. Sagar, has now been engaged to file the present application styled as "application for clarification", on the specious plea that the order is not clear and unambiguous. When an appeal/special leave petition is dismissed, except in rare cases where error of law or fact is apparent on the record, no review can be filed; that too by the advocate on record who neither appeared nor was party in the main case. It is salutary to not that court spends valuable time in deciding a case. Review petition is not, and should not be, an attempt for hearing the matter again on merits. Unfortunately, it has become, in recent time, a practice to file such review petitions as a routine; that too, with change of counsel, without obtaining consent of the advocate on record at earlier stage. This is not conducive to healthy practice of the Bar which has the responsibility to maintain the salutary practice of profession. In Review Petition No.2670/96 in CA No.1867/92, a Bench of three Judges to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy,J., was a member, has held as under: "The record of the appeal indicates that Shri Sudarsh Menon was heard and decided on merits. The Review Petition has been filed by Shri Prabir Chowdhury who was neither an arguing counsel when the appeal was heard nor was he present at the time of arguments. It is unknown on what basis he has written the grounds in the Review Petition as if it is a rehearing of an appeal against our order. He did not confine to the scope of review. It would be not in the interest of the profession to permit such practice. That part, he has not obtained " No Objection Certificate" from the Advocate-on-Record in the appeal, in spite of the fact that Registry had informed him of the requirement for doing so. Filing of the "No Objection Certificate" would be the basis for him to come on record. Otherwise, the Advocate-on-Record is answerable to the Court. The failure to obtain the "No Objection Certificate" from the erstwhile counsel has disentitled him to file the Review Petition. Even otherwise, the Review Petition has no merits, It is an attempt to reargue the matter on merits. On these grounds, we dismiss the Review Petition".

2. Once the petition for review is dismissed, no application for clarification should be filed, much less with the change of the advocate-on-record. This practice of changing the advocates and filing repeated petitions should be deprecated with heavy had for purity of administration of law and salutary and healthy practice.”

3. A Full Bench of this Court in (Smt.) Krishna Pathak v. Vinod Shankar Tiwari and others reported at 2005(29) AIC (Alld. H.C.) in a similar matter held as under: “6. For this purpose Shri H.N. Singh, was confronted with the memo of appeal and no such ground had ever been taken by the applicant/appellant in the appeal. Nor there is anything on record to show that the aforesaid issues had been agitated before the appeal Court. Thus, the question does arise as to whether, a review petition can be entertained on a ground not urged at the time of hearing of the main petition/appeal.

7. Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called C.P.C.) prescribes the limitations for entertaining a review petition. The same are; that the party filing the application for review has discovered a new and important matter or evidence after exercise of due diligence which was not within its knowledge or could not be produced by it at the time when the decree was passed; or order made or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or 'for any other sufficient reason.

8. The aforesaid limitations are prescribed in a crystal clear language and before a party submits that it had discovered a new and important matter or evidence which could not be produced at the earlier stage, the condition precedent for entertaining the review would be to record the finding as to whether at the initial stage, the party has acted with due diligence. "Due" means just and proper in view of the facts and circumstances of the case (vide A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27).

9. Some mistake or error, if made ground for review, it must be apparent on the face of record and if a party files an application on the ground of 'some other sufficient reason' it has to satisfy that the said sufficient reason is analogous to the other conditions mentioned in the said rule i.e. discovery of new and important matter or evidence which it could not discover with due diligence or it was not within his knowledge and, thus, could not produce at the initial stage. Apparent error on the face of record has been explained to include failure to apply the law of limitation to the facts found by the Court or failure to consider a particular provision of a statute or a part thereof or a statutory provision has been applied though it was not in operation. Review is permissible if there is an error of procedure apparent on the face of the record e.g. the judgment is delivered without notice to the parties, or judgment does not effectively deal with or determine any important issue in the case though argued by the parties. There may be merely a smoke-line demarketing an error simplicitor from the error apparent on the face of record. But there cannot be a ground for entertaining the review in the former case. "Sufficient reason" may include disposal of a case without proper notice to the party aggrieved. Thus, if a person comes and satisfies the Court that the matter has been heard without serving a notice upon it, review is maintainable for the "sufficient reason" though there may be no error apparent on the face of record.

10. The expression 'any other sufficient reason' contained in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC means "sufficient reason" which is analogous to those specified immediately to it in the provision of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

25. In view of the above discussion, the law of review can be summarised that it lies only on the grounds mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. The party must satisfy the Court that the matter or evidence discovered by it at a subsequent stage could not be discovered or produced at the initial stage though it had acted with due diligence. A party filing a review application on the ground of any other "sufficient reason" must satisfy that the said reason is analogous to the conditions mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. Under the garb of review, a party cannot be permitted to re-open the case and to gain a full-fledged inning for making submissions, nor review lies merely on the ground that it may be possible for the Court to take a view contrary to what had been taken earlier. Even the judgment given subsequent to the decision in a case can be no ground for entertaining the review. Review lies only when there is error apparent on the face of the record and that fallibility is by the over-sight of the Court. If a counsel has argued a case to his satisfaction and he had not raised the particular point for any reason whatsoever, it cannot be a ground of review for the reason that he was the master of his case and might not have considered it proper to press the same or could have thought that arguing that point would not serve any purpose. If a case has been decided after full consideration of arguments made by a counsel, he cannot be permitted, even under the garb of doing justice or substantial justice, to engage the court again to decide the controversy already decided. If a party is aggrieved of a judgment, it must approach the Higher Court but entertaining a review to re-consider the case would amount to exceeding its jurisdiction, conferred under the limited jurisdiction for the purpose of review. Justice, as explained above, connotes different meaning to different persons in different contexts, therefore, courts cannot be persuaded to entertain a review application to do justice unless it lies only on the grounds mentioned in the statutory provisions.

27. Undoubtedly, a party can be permitted to raise a pure legal plea, not requiring investigation of fact, at any stage of proceeding but review is, generally, not a part of proceedings in that sense as it lies in exceptional circumstances. The submission made by Mr. H.N. Singh may be relevant only where the issue was raised before the writ court or in special appeal. Admittedly, the grounds on which Shri H.N. Singh, tried to argue the review petition had not been taken in the memo of appeal, nor the same had been agitated earlier. No explanation could be furnished as to why these grounds had not been taken therein. It cannot be the case that these facts were not in applicant's knowledge and could be discovered later on There is no error apparent on the face of the record, nor there is any sufficient ground, on the basis of which the application can be entertained. It is not a case where interference at this stage is required in the interest of justice. Therefore, the question of entertaining such pleas does not arise. Review petition is totally misconceived."

4. It is admitted that the findings recorded in the order dated 17.02.2025 were consistent with the records, inasmuch as, relevant papers were not part of the writ petition. No due diligence has been shown to procure those documents when the writ petition was filed since they were very much accessible to the applicant for all these years.

5. The applicant claims that he is entitled to a job in view of the fact that the land had been acquired by the respondent-corporation. The law is well settled. A Full Bench of this Court in Ravindra Kumar v. District Magistrate, Agra and others, reported at 2005(2) AWC 1650 (FB) has held as under: “22. There is no provision under the Land Acquisition Act under which the Circular dated 28.12.1974 could be issued. Whatever compensation has to be given for acquisition of the land is provided under the Land Acquisition Act itself which is a self- contained Code. Any G.O. providing for any further benefit not mentioned in the Land Acquisition Act would be inconsistent with the intention of Parliament as contained in the Land Acquisition Act. Hence any such GO. would be violative of the Land Acquisition Act and would hence be invalid. Such a G.O. will also violate Article 16 of the Constitution as already mentioned above.

25. In view of the above we answer the questions referred to us as follows:

1. The Government Orders/Circulars providing employment to one member of a family of a person whose land has been acquired (over and above the compensation awarded under the law) are invalid.

2. The acquiring body for whose benefit the land is acquired are not bound by such Government Order/Circular.

3. No writ can be issued directing the acquiring body to consider the claim in accordance with the aforesaid Order/Government Circular."

6. In this wake, the review petition is dismissed. ASHISH NAYAN TRIPATHI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad Order Date :- 14.8.2025 Ashish Tripathi