Dharamveer v. Sudesh Pal and Others), Police Station- Parikshitgarh, District- Meerut, whereby

was submitted that there is property related dispute between the parties and the private opposite parties wanted to oust the applicant from the disputed shop and for that purpose they have submitted a false affidavit before the Electricity Department to disconnect the electricity connection. The applicant has got examined the signature shown on the said affidavit from a private hand-writing expert, who has opined that signature shown on the affidavit were not made by applicant. It was submitted that the question of forgery is involved and a prima-facie cognizable offence is made out and thus learned Magistrate must have directed the police to register a case. It was submitted that the application filed by applicant under Section 156(3) 2 NA528 No. 29124 of 2025 Cr.P.C. has been rejected in a routine manner without considering facts and position of law. Similarly, learned revisional court has not considered facts in correct perspective and revision was dismissed.

4. Learned A.G.A. has opposed the application and submitted that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned orders.

5. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.

6. At the outset it may be mentioned that by impugned order dated

13.08.2024 the application filed by applicant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been rejected and thereafter, the applicant has preferred a criminal revision against aforesaid order dated 13.08.2024, which has been dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge vide impugned order dated 04.03.2025 . It is correct that availing of the remedy of the revision before the Sessions Judge under Section 399 CrPC / 404 BNSS does not bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / 528 BNSS but it is equally true that the High Court should not act as a second Revisional Court under the garb of exercising inherent powers. While exercising its inherent powers in such a matter it must be conscious of the fact that the Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory power in the matter.

7. In Deepti aliasArati Rai v. Akhil Rai & Ors, (1995) 5 SCC 751, the Apex Court held that second revision application, after dismissal of the first one by sessions court is not maintainable and that inherent power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. In case of Laxmi Bai Patel Vs. Shyam Kumar Patel; 2002 0 Supreme (SC) 283, the Court held: "3. Before taking up the merits of the case, it would be proper to consider the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482Cr.P.C. of the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a case where the sessions court exercising revisional power under Section 397(3)Cr.P.C. has dismissed the revision petition by the aggrieved party, a second revision petition about acceptance of the same party is barred. The position is well- settled that in such a case power under Section 482Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court in rare cases and in exceptional circumstances where the court finds that permitting the impugned order to remain undisturbed will amount to abuse of process of the court and will result in failure of justice."

8. Similarly, in the case of Dharampal & Ors. v. Ramshri; 1993 (1) SCC 435, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that- 3 NA528 No. 29124 of 2025 " .... Section 397(3) bars a second revision application by the same party. It is now well-settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Hence, the High Court had clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of Respondent 1. Onthis short ground itself, the impugned order of the High Court can be set aside."

9. In the case of Rajathi Vs. C.Ganesan; 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118, the Court held as follows:- "In Krishnan v. Krishnaveni(1997 (4) SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 544), this Court explained the scope and power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The question before the Court was if in view of the bar of second revision under sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code was prohibited, whether inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings.''

10. Thus, it is clear that availing of remedy of revision before Sessions Judge under section 399 Cr.P.C. does not bar a person from invoking power of High Court under Section 482 CrPC / 528 BNSS but High Court should not act as a second Revisional Court under garb of exercising inherent powers. However, in such matters the interference under Section 482 CrPC / 528 BNSS can be made when there has been miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of court or there has been failure of justice.

11. The issue whether the Magistrate is bound to pass an order for registration of the FIR and its investigation by the police on each and every application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. containing allegation of commission of a cognizance offence is no more 'res-integra', as this controversy has been settled by the Division Bench of the Court in the case of Sukhwasi vs. State of U.P. 2007 (59) ACC 739. After considering the full Bench decision of the Court in the case of Ram Babu Gupta & others vs. State of U.P. 2001 (43) ACC 50 and many other cases, the Division Bench in the case of Sukhwasi vs. State of U.P. (supra) has answered the 4 NA528 No. 29124 of 2025 question referred to it, in paragraph 23 of the judgment as under:- "The reference is, therefore, answered in the manner that it is not incumbent upon a Magistrate to allow an application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and there is no such legal mandate. He may or may not allow the application in his discretion. The second leg of the reference is also answered in the manner that the Magistrate has a discretion to treat an application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint."

12. Thus, it is apparent that Magistrate is not bound to pass order of investigation by police, even if such application discloses cognizable offence. The Magistrate is required to apply its mind to find out whether the first information sought to be lodged by applicant had any substance or not. Even in the cases, where prima facie cognizable offence is disclosed from the averments made in the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. in appropriate case according to facts and nature of the offences alleged to have been committed, the Magistrate can decline to direct investigation and in such cases the application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can be treated as complaint.

13. In case Mrs. Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of U.P. and others; 2015 AIR(SC)1758, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same."

14. Thus, while dealing with application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., Magistrate is required to apply its mind to find out whether the first information sought to be lodged by the applicant had any substance or not. If the allegations made in the application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. prima- facie appear to be without any substance, then in such case the Magistrate can refuse to direct registration of the FIR and its investigation by the police, even if the application contains the allegations of commission of a cognizable offence. In such case, the Magistrate is fully competent to reject the application. Even in the cases, where prima facie cognizable offence is disclosed from the averments made in the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. in appropriate case according to facts and nature of the offences alleged to have been committed, the Magistrate can decline to direct investigation and in such cases the application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 5 NA528 No. 29124 of 2025 can be treated as complaint, as held by the Division Bench in the case of Sukhwasi vs. State of U.P. (supra).

15. In the instant matter, it appears that there is property related dispute between the parties. As per applicant, a false affidavit was filed on his behalf before the Electricity Department to disconnect his electricity connection. Only general and vague allegations have been levelled that opposite party no. 2 to 7 were involved in the forgery and submission of said affidavit. No specific role has been assigned to any of the applicant. The application filed by applicant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been rejected by learned Magistrate by a reasoned order. The revision against that order has also been dismissed by a detailed reasoned order. In view of attending facts and circumstances, it can not be said that impugned orders are suffering from any material illegality or perversity. As stated above, once revision against order of Magistrate is dismissed, in such situation the interference under Section 482 CrPC / 528 BNSS can only be made in case when there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice. In the instant matter no such case is made out. Applying the principles set out in the judgments referred above to the case on hand, no case for invocation of powers under Section 528 BNSS is made out. Therefore, this application under section 528 BNSS deserves to be dismissed.

16. The application u/s 528 BNSS is hereby dismissed. September 9, 2025 'SP'/- (Raj Beer Singh,J.) SANDEEP PAL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

was submitted that there is property related dispute between the parties and the private opposite parties wanted to oust the applicant from the disputed shop and for that purpose they have submitted a false affidavit before the Electricity Department to disconnect the electricity connection. The applicant has got examined the signature shown on the said affidavit from a private hand-writing expert, who has opined that signature shown on the affidavit were not made by applicant. It was submitted that the question of forgery is involved and a prima-facie cognizable offence is made out and thus learned Magistrate must have directed the police to register a case. It was submitted that the application filed by applicant under Section 156(3) 2 NA528 No. 29124 of 2025 Cr.P.C. has been rejected in a routine manner without considering facts and position of law. Similarly, learned revisional court has not considered facts in correct perspective and revision was dismissed.

4. Learned A.G.A. has opposed the application and submitted that there is no illegality or perversity in the impugned orders.

5. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.

6. At the outset it may be mentioned that by impugned order dated

13.08.2024 the application filed by applicant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been rejected and thereafter, the applicant has preferred a criminal revision against aforesaid order dated 13.08.2024, which has been dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge vide impugned order dated 04.03.2025 . It is correct that availing of the remedy of the revision before the Sessions Judge under Section 399 CrPC / 404 BNSS does not bar a person from invoking the power of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / 528 BNSS but it is equally true that the High Court should not act as a second Revisional Court under the garb of exercising inherent powers. While exercising its inherent powers in such a matter it must be conscious of the fact that the Sessions Judge has declined to exercise his revisory power in the matter.

7. In Deepti aliasArati Rai v. Akhil Rai & Ors, (1995) 5 SCC 751, the Apex Court held that second revision application, after dismissal of the first one by sessions court is not maintainable and that inherent power under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. In case of Laxmi Bai Patel Vs. Shyam Kumar Patel; 2002 0 Supreme (SC) 283, the Court held: "3. Before taking up the merits of the case, it would be proper to consider the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482Cr.P.C. of the High Court in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a case where the sessions court exercising revisional power under Section 397(3)Cr.P.C. has dismissed the revision petition by the aggrieved party, a second revision petition about acceptance of the same party is barred. The position is well- settled that in such a case power under Section 482Cr.P.C. can be exercised by the High Court in rare cases and in exceptional circumstances where the court finds that permitting the impugned order to remain undisturbed will amount to abuse of process of the court and will result in failure of justice."

8. Similarly, in the case of Dharampal & Ors. v. Ramshri; 1993 (1) SCC 435, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that- 3 NA528 No. 29124 of 2025 " .... Section 397(3) bars a second revision application by the same party. It is now well-settled that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilized for exercising powers which are expressly barred by the Code. Hence, the High Court had clearly erred in entertaining the second revision at the instance of Respondent 1. Onthis short ground itself, the impugned order of the High Court can be set aside."

9. In the case of Rajathi Vs. C.Ganesan; 1999 SCC (Cri) 1118, the Court held as follows:- "In Krishnan v. Krishnaveni(1997 (4) SCC 241 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 544), this Court explained the scope and power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The question before the Court was if in view of the bar of second revision under sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code was prohibited, whether inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code. Ordinarily, when revision has been barred by Section 397(3) of the Code, a person - accused/complainant - cannot be allowed to take recourse to the revision to the High Court under Section 397(1) or under inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code since it may amount to circumvention of the provisions of Section 397(3) or Section 397(2) of the Code. It is seen that the High Court has suo motu power under Section 401 and continuous supervisory jurisdiction under Section 483 of the Code. So, when the High Court on examination of the record finds that there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the courts or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice or order passed or sentence imposed by the Magistrate requires correction, it is but the duty of the High Court to have it corrected at the inception lest grave miscarriage of justice would ensue. It is, therefore, to meet the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process that the High Court is preserved with inherent power and would be justified, under such circumstances, to exercise the inherent power and in an appropriate case even revisional power under Section 397(1) read with Section 401 of the Code. As stated earlier, it may be exercised sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure, unnecessary delay in trial and protraction of proceedings.''

10. Thus, it is clear that availing of remedy of revision before Sessions Judge under section 399 Cr.P.C. does not bar a person from invoking power of High Court under Section 482 CrPC / 528 BNSS but High Court should not act as a second Revisional Court under garb of exercising inherent powers. However, in such matters the interference under Section 482 CrPC / 528 BNSS can be made when there has been miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of court or there has been failure of justice.

11. The issue whether the Magistrate is bound to pass an order for registration of the FIR and its investigation by the police on each and every application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. containing allegation of commission of a cognizance offence is no more 'res-integra', as this controversy has been settled by the Division Bench of the Court in the case of Sukhwasi vs. State of U.P. 2007 (59) ACC 739. After considering the full Bench decision of the Court in the case of Ram Babu Gupta & others vs. State of U.P. 2001 (43) ACC 50 and many other cases, the Division Bench in the case of Sukhwasi vs. State of U.P. (supra) has answered the 4 NA528 No. 29124 of 2025 question referred to it, in paragraph 23 of the judgment as under:- "The reference is, therefore, answered in the manner that it is not incumbent upon a Magistrate to allow an application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and there is no such legal mandate. He may or may not allow the application in his discretion. The second leg of the reference is also answered in the manner that the Magistrate has a discretion to treat an application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint."

12. Thus, it is apparent that Magistrate is not bound to pass order of investigation by police, even if such application discloses cognizable offence. The Magistrate is required to apply its mind to find out whether the first information sought to be lodged by applicant had any substance or not. Even in the cases, where prima facie cognizable offence is disclosed from the averments made in the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. in appropriate case according to facts and nature of the offences alleged to have been committed, the Magistrate can decline to direct investigation and in such cases the application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. can be treated as complaint.

13. In case Mrs. Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of U.P. and others; 2015 AIR(SC)1758, the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same."

14. Thus, while dealing with application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., Magistrate is required to apply its mind to find out whether the first information sought to be lodged by the applicant had any substance or not. If the allegations made in the application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. prima- facie appear to be without any substance, then in such case the Magistrate can refuse to direct registration of the FIR and its investigation by the police, even if the application contains the allegations of commission of a cognizable offence. In such case, the Magistrate is fully competent to reject the application. Even in the cases, where prima facie cognizable offence is disclosed from the averments made in the application under section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. in appropriate case according to facts and nature of the offences alleged to have been committed, the Magistrate can decline to direct investigation and in such cases the application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. 5 NA528 No. 29124 of 2025 can be treated as complaint, as held by the Division Bench in the case of Sukhwasi vs. State of U.P. (supra).

15. In the instant matter, it appears that there is property related dispute between the parties. As per applicant, a false affidavit was filed on his behalf before the Electricity Department to disconnect his electricity connection. Only general and vague allegations have been levelled that opposite party no. 2 to 7 were involved in the forgery and submission of said affidavit. No specific role has been assigned to any of the applicant. The application filed by applicant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. has been rejected by learned Magistrate by a reasoned order. The revision against that order has also been dismissed by a detailed reasoned order. In view of attending facts and circumstances, it can not be said that impugned orders are suffering from any material illegality or perversity. As stated above, once revision against order of Magistrate is dismissed, in such situation the interference under Section 482 CrPC / 528 BNSS can only be made in case when there is grave miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court or the required statutory procedure has not been complied with or there is failure of justice. In the instant matter no such case is made out. Applying the principles set out in the judgments referred above to the case on hand, no case for invocation of powers under Section 528 BNSS is made out. Therefore, this application under section 528 BNSS deserves to be dismissed.

16. The application u/s 528 BNSS is hereby dismissed. September 9, 2025 'SP'/- (Raj Beer Singh,J.) SANDEEP PAL High Court of Judicature at Allahabad