Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kailash Nath and others v. State of U.P. and another reported in A.I.R

2. The facts in brief as contained in the writ petition are that earlier the same authority has rejected the application for grant of fire-arm license vide order dated 12.10.2016. Aggrieved against the aforesaid statutory appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad as provided under Section 18 of the Arms Act 1959, which was numbered as Appeal No.C20170200185, the same was rejected vide order dated

11.10.2017. The aforesaid order was subsequently amended vide order dated 31.07.2018. Aggrieved against the aforesaid orders, petitioner preferred a petition being Writ C No.34113 of 2018. The aforesaid writ petition was finally allowed by Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgement and order dated 01.07.2024. By the aforesaid order earlier orders passed against the petitioner were set aside and District Magistrate, Prayagraj/Licensing Authority was directed to decide the matter afresh. Pursuant to the aforesaid now fresh decision has been taken by the respondent no.3 rejecting the application for grant of fire-arm license vide order dated

29.03.2025. Aggrieved against the aforesaid petitioner has preferred present writ petition.

3. On the other hand it is argued by learned Standing Counsel that against the order impugned statutory alternative remedy is available to the petitioner to file an appeal before the Commissioner as provided under Section 18 Arms Act, 1959. In so far as merits of the case is concerned, it is argued by learned Standing Counsel that cogent findings were recorded in the impugned order passed by the Licensing Authority while rejecting the application for grant of fire-arm license of the petitioner which could not be looked into by this Court specially under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

4. In view of the preliminary objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of State, the Court is of the opinion that writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy.

5. It is argued by counsel for the petitioner that he does not wish to file any appeal before the appellate authority and the validity of the order passed by the Licensing Authority be decided on merits in the present writ petition itself.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

7. From perusal of the order impugned dated 29.03.2025 apart from various other findings the following findings were recorded : - "पपुललिस जजाሞच आख्यज मम ऐससे ककिससी तथ्य किज भसी उलसेख नहीሻ ककियज गयज हहै ककि आवसेदकि किक ककिससी व्यकሹኌ कवशसेष अथवज समपुदजय ससे जसीवन किज भय उत्प्ቐ हक गयज हक अथवज आस्ቐ खतरज हक। यजचसी दजरज भसी अपनसे जसीवन भय किसे साሞबाሞध मम ककिससी व्यकሹኌ अथवज समपुदजय ससे ककिससी ्ቚकिजर किसे खतरसे आकद किसे साሞबाሞध मम किकई अकभयकग पाሞजसीकिकत नहसी किरजयज गयज हहै। शस लिजइससेन्स एकि साሞवसेदनशसीलि ्ቚकिरण हहै और लिजइससेन्स स्वसीकिकत ककियसे जजनसे किसे पपूवर लिजइससेनन्साሞग अथजररटसी दजरज लिजइससेन्स लिसेनसे वजलिसे आवसेदकि किकी वजस्तकवकि आवश्यकितज , जसीवन भय एवाሞ जजनमजलि किकी सपुरकज किज आाሞकिलिन ककियज जजनज आवश्यकि हहै। आवसेदकि किसे ्ቚकिरण मम ऐसज किकई तथ्य एवाሞ सजቌኚय पतजवलिसी पर उपलिब्ध नहसी हहै लजसससे यह स्प्ቖ हकतज हक ककि आवसेदकि किक शस लिजइससेन्स किकी आवश्यकितज हहै। आयपुध कनयम -2016 किसे ्ቚस्तर-12 (2) कि, मम उकललखत शसेणसी एवाሞ उपयपुरሹኌ शजसनजदसेश मम वकणरत वरसीयतज शसेणसी ससे आवसेदकि आच्छजकदत नहसी हहै। उሹኌ किसे दृक्ቖगत यजचसी किसे पक मम एन०पसी०बसी० ररवजल्वर / कपस्टलि किज लिजइससेन्स स्वसीकिकत ककियसे जजनसे किज किकई औकचत्यपपूणर आधजर नहसी हहै।"

8. There is no right to have an arms licence which is a privilege and it is a question of fact which is to be ascertained by the authorities concerned whether a person is entitled to the said privilege or not and no interference with such factual findings is possible in writ jurisdiction. Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kailash Nath and others Vs. State of U.P. and another reported in A.I.R. 1985 All 291 observed as under:- "A right is distinct from a mere privilege. The case of a licencee to possess or use firearm is materially different from a case of licence to deal in or sell firearms. Section 3 of the Arms Act, 1959 deals with acquisition and possession of firearms or ammunition on the strength of a licence whereas Section 5 provides for a licence for manufacture, sale etc. of arms and ammunition. The licence for acquisition and possession of firearms is materially different from a licence for manufacture, sale etc. While the latter confers a right to carry on a trade or business and is a source of earning livelihood, the former is merely a personal privilege for doing something which without such privilege would be unlawful. In my opinion the obtaining of a licence for acquisition and possession of firearms and ammunition under the Arms Act is nothing more than a privilege and the grant of such privilege does not involve the adjudication of the right of an individual nor does it entail civil consequences. I may, however, hasten to add that even an order rejecting the application for grant of licence may become legally vulnerable if it is passed arbitrarily or capriciously or without application of mind. No doubt, a citizen, may apply for grant of a licence of firearms mostly with the object of protecting his person or property but that is mainly the function of the State. Even remotely this cannot be comprehended within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution which postulates the fundamental right of protection of life and personal liberty."

9. In the same judgment it was also observed that: "The consistent trend of judicial decisions has been that the official granting of the licence involves the exercise of discretionary licensing powers which are concerned with privileges and not rights. See Randall v. Northcote Council (1910) 11 CLR 100, 117-119, Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v. Finlayson (1916) 22 CLR 340; Ex. P. Macarthy, re The Milk Board (1935) SR (NSW) 47; Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne 1951 AC 66; R. v. Metropolitan Police Commr., ex p. Parker (1953) 1 WLR 1150; Modern Theatres (Provincial) Ltd. v. Peryman (1960) NZLR 191 See also Merchants Bank Ltd. v. Federal Minister of Finance (1961) 1 All NLR 598 (Nigeria) (revocation of licence). The decision in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne 1951 AC 66 was to the effect that the Controller of Textiles in Ceylon had cancelled a textile dealer's licence in pursuance of a power to revoke a licence when he had 'reasonable grounds' for believing its holder to be unfit to continue as a dealer. It was held that the Controller was not determining a question affecting the rights of subjects but was merely taking executive action to withdraw a privilege. It is therefore, apparent that no citizen has a blanket right to carry firearms. Its grant is subject to his applying for a license, and fulfilling the qualifications and criteria, spelt out in the Act and Rules. The National Rifle Associations position, therefore, that its members have a right to secure a license, is untenable. They have, at best a right to apply for, and be considered for the grant of a license, subject to fulfillment of the prescribed qualifications."

10. The similar view has also been taken by this Court in the case of Ram Milan Vs. State of U.P. and others (Writ C No.24708 of 2021). Paragraph 9 of the aforesaid judgement is reproduced hereinbelow:- "In this case the petitioner has claimed himself to be an active Advocate, who desires to have arm licence for his personal and professional safety. If an Advocate requires a firearm licence for his personal and professional safety, it would be a very dangerous practice. The profession of Advocate is a noble profession. An Advocate always appears fearlessly before the Court to protect the rights of his clients. In case there is a threat in the mind of Advocate, the entire basis of nobleness of the profession would fall. If such applications are allowed without any concrete basis, a day will come that every Advocate will carry an arm inside the Court premises. Every Advocate has a weapon of his legal arguments with bullets of judgments passed by High Courts and Supreme Court in support of his submission, which are enough to provide safety to his profession and client and are sufficient to demand justice from the Courts. Normally they do not need firearm for their professional safety. It is made clear that there is no bar for the Advocate to apply for firearm licence and their application can be considered in accordance with law under the provisions of Arms Act, 1959 read with Arms Rules, 2016. However, a general trend to have a firearm licence by an Advocate without any good reason is not appreciable and it is not in the interest of noble profession of Advocate."

11. The only reason that is forthcoming is that the Petitioner wishes to own an arms licence for the purpose of his self- defence/protection.

12. Right to own a fire arm is not a Fundamental Right in India. This legal position is settled in several decisions including the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [SLP(Crl.) No. 12831/2022, decision dated 13th February, 2023] where it has been observed as under: "It is again one of those cases where we find that according to the prosecution case, an unlicensed fire arm was used in commission of the offence involving Section 302 IPC also. We have come across cases where there is this phenomenon of use of unlicensed fire arms in the commission of serious offences and this is very disturbing. Unlike the Constitution of the United States where the right to bear fire arms is a fundamental freedom, in the wisdom of our founding fathers, no such right has been conferred on anyone under the Constitution of India. The matter relating to regulation of fire arms is governed by Statute, viz., Arms Act, 1959, inter alia. It is of the greatest significance to preserve the life of all, that resort must not be made to unlicensed fire arms. In particular, if unlicensed fire arms are freely used, this will sound the death knell of rule of law."

13. Insofar as the judgment cited by the petitioner in the case of Manoj Kumar Yadav (supra) is concerned, in the said case the impugned order which is under challenge does not narrate any reason on which ground refusal has been made, therefore, the aforesaid order has been set aside by this Court but in the present case, the ground has been specifically mentioned, therefore, the aforesaid judgement does not apply in this case.

14. Arms licence is a creation of the statute and the Licensing Authority is vested with the discretion whether to grant or not grant such a licence, depending upon the fact situation in each case. This view has also been taken by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the case of Adv. Shiv Kumar Vs. Union of India and others (W.P. (C) 7034/2023 & CM APPL. 27372/2023) decided on 22.05.2023. Paragraph 13 of the aforesaid judgement is reproduced hereinbelow:- "13. Arms licence is a creation of the statute and the Licensing Authority is vested with the discretion whether to grant or not grant such a licence, depending upon the fact situation in each case. All lawyers/advocates who are appearing on the criminal side for the accused or the prosecution cannot claim a right to own an arms license, inasmuch as this could result in issuance of arms licenses indiscriminately. The perceived weakness of the State, which is one of the grounds, which the Petitioner has urged for seeking the arms license, if accepted, would result in recognition of a right to own a fire arm. This recognition leading to issuance of a licence and unbridled owning of fire arms, could also pose a threat to the safety and security of the other citizens, which the Licensing Authority would have to keep in mind while allowing or rejecting the arms license. The Licensing Authority has to assess the threat perception and the reasons for the request for a license which has been given by the applicant concerned. It is only after assessing the same that such a license can be issued. An application by an advocate merely based on the ground of appearance on behalf of the accused persons, in the opinion of this Court, would not be sufficient to grant an arms license."

15. In the facts of this case, after having perused the impugned order, this Court is of the opinion that no interference is called for in writ jurisdiction as the refusal of grant of arms license is well reasoned.

16. The petition is dismissed. Order Date :- 1.8.2025 Pramod Tripathi PRAMOD TRIPATHI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

2. The facts in brief as contained in the writ petition are that earlier the same authority has rejected the application for grant of fire-arm license vide order dated 12.10.2016. Aggrieved against the aforesaid statutory appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the Commissioner, Allahabad Division, Allahabad as provided under Section 18 of the Arms Act 1959, which was numbered as Appeal No.C20170200185, the same was rejected vide order dated

11.10.2017. The aforesaid order was subsequently amended vide order dated 31.07.2018. Aggrieved against the aforesaid orders, petitioner preferred a petition being Writ C No.34113 of 2018. The aforesaid writ petition was finally allowed by Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgement and order dated 01.07.2024. By the aforesaid order earlier orders passed against the petitioner were set aside and District Magistrate, Prayagraj/Licensing Authority was directed to decide the matter afresh. Pursuant to the aforesaid now fresh decision has been taken by the respondent no.3 rejecting the application for grant of fire-arm license vide order dated

29.03.2025. Aggrieved against the aforesaid petitioner has preferred present writ petition.

3. On the other hand it is argued by learned Standing Counsel that against the order impugned statutory alternative remedy is available to the petitioner to file an appeal before the Commissioner as provided under Section 18 Arms Act, 1959. In so far as merits of the case is concerned, it is argued by learned Standing Counsel that cogent findings were recorded in the impugned order passed by the Licensing Authority while rejecting the application for grant of fire-arm license of the petitioner which could not be looked into by this Court specially under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

4. In view of the preliminary objection raised by the learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of State, the Court is of the opinion that writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy.

5. It is argued by counsel for the petitioner that he does not wish to file any appeal before the appellate authority and the validity of the order passed by the Licensing Authority be decided on merits in the present writ petition itself.

6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

7. From perusal of the order impugned dated 29.03.2025 apart from various other findings the following findings were recorded : - "पपुललिस जजाሞच आख्यज मम ऐससे ककिससी तथ्य किज भसी उलसेख नहीሻ ककियज गयज हहै ककि आवसेदकि किक ककिससी व्यकሹኌ कवशसेष अथवज समपुदजय ससे जसीवन किज भय उत्प्ቐ हक गयज हक अथवज आस्ቐ खतरज हक। यजचसी दजरज भसी अपनसे जसीवन भय किसे साሞबाሞध मम ककिससी व्यकሹኌ अथवज समपुदजय ससे ककिससी ्ቚकिजर किसे खतरसे आकद किसे साሞबाሞध मम किकई अकभयकग पाሞजसीकिकत नहसी किरजयज गयज हहै। शस लिजइससेन्स एकि साሞवसेदनशसीलि ्ቚकिरण हहै और लिजइससेन्स स्वसीकिकत ककियसे जजनसे किसे पपूवर लिजइससेनन्साሞग अथजररटसी दजरज लिजइससेन्स लिसेनसे वजलिसे आवसेदकि किकी वजस्तकवकि आवश्यकितज , जसीवन भय एवाሞ जजनमजलि किकी सपुरकज किज आाሞकिलिन ककियज जजनज आवश्यकि हहै। आवसेदकि किसे ्ቚकिरण मम ऐसज किकई तथ्य एवाሞ सजቌኚय पतजवलिसी पर उपलिब्ध नहसी हहै लजसससे यह स्प्ቖ हकतज हक ककि आवसेदकि किक शस लिजइससेन्स किकी आवश्यकितज हहै। आयपुध कनयम -2016 किसे ्ቚस्तर-12 (2) कि, मम उकललखत शसेणसी एवाሞ उपयपुरሹኌ शजसनजदसेश मम वकणरत वरसीयतज शसेणसी ससे आवसेदकि आच्छजकदत नहसी हहै। उሹኌ किसे दृक्ቖगत यजचसी किसे पक मम एन०पसी०बसी० ररवजल्वर / कपस्टलि किज लिजइससेन्स स्वसीकिकत ककियसे जजनसे किज किकई औकचत्यपपूणर आधजर नहसी हहै।"

8. There is no right to have an arms licence which is a privilege and it is a question of fact which is to be ascertained by the authorities concerned whether a person is entitled to the said privilege or not and no interference with such factual findings is possible in writ jurisdiction. Full Bench of this Court in the case of Kailash Nath and others Vs. State of U.P. and another reported in A.I.R. 1985 All 291 observed as under:- "A right is distinct from a mere privilege. The case of a licencee to possess or use firearm is materially different from a case of licence to deal in or sell firearms. Section 3 of the Arms Act, 1959 deals with acquisition and possession of firearms or ammunition on the strength of a licence whereas Section 5 provides for a licence for manufacture, sale etc. of arms and ammunition. The licence for acquisition and possession of firearms is materially different from a licence for manufacture, sale etc. While the latter confers a right to carry on a trade or business and is a source of earning livelihood, the former is merely a personal privilege for doing something which without such privilege would be unlawful. In my opinion the obtaining of a licence for acquisition and possession of firearms and ammunition under the Arms Act is nothing more than a privilege and the grant of such privilege does not involve the adjudication of the right of an individual nor does it entail civil consequences. I may, however, hasten to add that even an order rejecting the application for grant of licence may become legally vulnerable if it is passed arbitrarily or capriciously or without application of mind. No doubt, a citizen, may apply for grant of a licence of firearms mostly with the object of protecting his person or property but that is mainly the function of the State. Even remotely this cannot be comprehended within the ambit of Article 21 of the Constitution which postulates the fundamental right of protection of life and personal liberty."

9. In the same judgment it was also observed that: "The consistent trend of judicial decisions has been that the official granting of the licence involves the exercise of discretionary licensing powers which are concerned with privileges and not rights. See Randall v. Northcote Council (1910) 11 CLR 100, 117-119, Metropolitan Meat Industry Board v. Finlayson (1916) 22 CLR 340; Ex. P. Macarthy, re The Milk Board (1935) SR (NSW) 47; Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne 1951 AC 66; R. v. Metropolitan Police Commr., ex p. Parker (1953) 1 WLR 1150; Modern Theatres (Provincial) Ltd. v. Peryman (1960) NZLR 191 See also Merchants Bank Ltd. v. Federal Minister of Finance (1961) 1 All NLR 598 (Nigeria) (revocation of licence). The decision in Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne 1951 AC 66 was to the effect that the Controller of Textiles in Ceylon had cancelled a textile dealer's licence in pursuance of a power to revoke a licence when he had 'reasonable grounds' for believing its holder to be unfit to continue as a dealer. It was held that the Controller was not determining a question affecting the rights of subjects but was merely taking executive action to withdraw a privilege. It is therefore, apparent that no citizen has a blanket right to carry firearms. Its grant is subject to his applying for a license, and fulfilling the qualifications and criteria, spelt out in the Act and Rules. The National Rifle Associations position, therefore, that its members have a right to secure a license, is untenable. They have, at best a right to apply for, and be considered for the grant of a license, subject to fulfillment of the prescribed qualifications."

10. The similar view has also been taken by this Court in the case of Ram Milan Vs. State of U.P. and others (Writ C No.24708 of 2021). Paragraph 9 of the aforesaid judgement is reproduced hereinbelow:- "In this case the petitioner has claimed himself to be an active Advocate, who desires to have arm licence for his personal and professional safety. If an Advocate requires a firearm licence for his personal and professional safety, it would be a very dangerous practice. The profession of Advocate is a noble profession. An Advocate always appears fearlessly before the Court to protect the rights of his clients. In case there is a threat in the mind of Advocate, the entire basis of nobleness of the profession would fall. If such applications are allowed without any concrete basis, a day will come that every Advocate will carry an arm inside the Court premises. Every Advocate has a weapon of his legal arguments with bullets of judgments passed by High Courts and Supreme Court in support of his submission, which are enough to provide safety to his profession and client and are sufficient to demand justice from the Courts. Normally they do not need firearm for their professional safety. It is made clear that there is no bar for the Advocate to apply for firearm licence and their application can be considered in accordance with law under the provisions of Arms Act, 1959 read with Arms Rules, 2016. However, a general trend to have a firearm licence by an Advocate without any good reason is not appreciable and it is not in the interest of noble profession of Advocate."

11. The only reason that is forthcoming is that the Petitioner wishes to own an arms licence for the purpose of his self- defence/protection.

12. Right to own a fire arm is not a Fundamental Right in India. This legal position is settled in several decisions including the recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [SLP(Crl.) No. 12831/2022, decision dated 13th February, 2023] where it has been observed as under: "It is again one of those cases where we find that according to the prosecution case, an unlicensed fire arm was used in commission of the offence involving Section 302 IPC also. We have come across cases where there is this phenomenon of use of unlicensed fire arms in the commission of serious offences and this is very disturbing. Unlike the Constitution of the United States where the right to bear fire arms is a fundamental freedom, in the wisdom of our founding fathers, no such right has been conferred on anyone under the Constitution of India. The matter relating to regulation of fire arms is governed by Statute, viz., Arms Act, 1959, inter alia. It is of the greatest significance to preserve the life of all, that resort must not be made to unlicensed fire arms. In particular, if unlicensed fire arms are freely used, this will sound the death knell of rule of law."

13. Insofar as the judgment cited by the petitioner in the case of Manoj Kumar Yadav (supra) is concerned, in the said case the impugned order which is under challenge does not narrate any reason on which ground refusal has been made, therefore, the aforesaid order has been set aside by this Court but in the present case, the ground has been specifically mentioned, therefore, the aforesaid judgement does not apply in this case.

14. Arms licence is a creation of the statute and the Licensing Authority is vested with the discretion whether to grant or not grant such a licence, depending upon the fact situation in each case. This view has also been taken by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in the case of Adv. Shiv Kumar Vs. Union of India and others (W.P. (C) 7034/2023 & CM APPL. 27372/2023) decided on 22.05.2023. Paragraph 13 of the aforesaid judgement is reproduced hereinbelow:- "13. Arms licence is a creation of the statute and the Licensing Authority is vested with the discretion whether to grant or not grant such a licence, depending upon the fact situation in each case. All lawyers/advocates who are appearing on the criminal side for the accused or the prosecution cannot claim a right to own an arms license, inasmuch as this could result in issuance of arms licenses indiscriminately. The perceived weakness of the State, which is one of the grounds, which the Petitioner has urged for seeking the arms license, if accepted, would result in recognition of a right to own a fire arm. This recognition leading to issuance of a licence and unbridled owning of fire arms, could also pose a threat to the safety and security of the other citizens, which the Licensing Authority would have to keep in mind while allowing or rejecting the arms license. The Licensing Authority has to assess the threat perception and the reasons for the request for a license which has been given by the applicant concerned. It is only after assessing the same that such a license can be issued. An application by an advocate merely based on the ground of appearance on behalf of the accused persons, in the opinion of this Court, would not be sufficient to grant an arms license."

15. In the facts of this case, after having perused the impugned order, this Court is of the opinion that no interference is called for in writ jurisdiction as the refusal of grant of arms license is well reasoned.

16. The petition is dismissed. Order Date :- 1.8.2025 Pramod Tripathi PRAMOD TRIPATHI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad