In the case of Standard Chartered Bank v. vs Noble Kumar and others reported in

behalf of the petitioner though learned Standing Counsel and Sri Sanjai Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent- Bank are present.

2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner inter- alia with the prayer to quash the order dated 20.06.2025 passed by respondent no.2/District Magistrate, Bijnor.

3. The aforesaid order was passed pursuant to Section 14 of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. It has been argued by Sri Sanjai Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank that against the aforesaid order, statutory alternative remedy is available to the petitioner to file an appeal before the Debt Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction as provided under Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

4. The Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. 2 WRIC No. 23281 of 2025 Satyawati Tandon and others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 in paragraph no.42 and 43 has held as under:- "42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression "any person" used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pas interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in 3 WRIC No. 23281 of 2025 all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute."

5. In the case of Standard Chartered Bank Vs. V. Noble Kumar and others reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620 wherein the Supreme Court in paragraph no.27 has held as under:- "27.The "appeal" under section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. Depending upon the nature of the secured asset and the terms and conditions of the security agreement, measures other than taking the possession of the secured asset are possible under section 13(4). Alienating the asset either by lease or sale, etc. and appointing a person to manage the secured asset are some of those possible measures. On the other hand, section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to take possession of the property and forward the asset along with the connected documents to the borrower (sic the secured creditor). Therefore, the borrower is always entitled to prefer an "appeal" under section 17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under section 17 is available." 4 WRIC No. 23281 of 2025

6. In the case of PHR Invent Educational Society Vs. Uco Bank and others reported in (2024) 6 SCC 579 the Supreme Court in paragraph no.23 has held as under:- "23. It could thus be seen that, this Court has clearly held that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. It has been held that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. The Court clearly observed that, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. It has been held that, though the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are of widest amplitude, still the Courts cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court. The Court further held that though the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, still it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution."

6. In this view of the matter, the present petition is dismissed on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy.

7. Since the present order has been passed in the absence of the 5 WRIC No. 23281 of 2025 counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner is free to move a recall application within 30 days from today. October 14, 2025 Gaurav Kuls (Vivek Saran,J.) (Prakash Padia,J.) GAURAV KULSHRESTHA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

behalf of the petitioner though learned Standing Counsel and Sri Sanjai Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent- Bank are present.

2. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner inter- alia with the prayer to quash the order dated 20.06.2025 passed by respondent no.2/District Magistrate, Bijnor.

3. The aforesaid order was passed pursuant to Section 14 of Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. It has been argued by Sri Sanjai Singh, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank that against the aforesaid order, statutory alternative remedy is available to the petitioner to file an appeal before the Debt Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction as provided under Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.

4. The Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. 2 WRIC No. 23281 of 2025 Satyawati Tandon and others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 in paragraph no.42 and 43 has held as under:- "42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression "any person" used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pas interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in 3 WRIC No. 23281 of 2025 all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute."

5. In the case of Standard Chartered Bank Vs. V. Noble Kumar and others reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620 wherein the Supreme Court in paragraph no.27 has held as under:- "27.The "appeal" under section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. Depending upon the nature of the secured asset and the terms and conditions of the security agreement, measures other than taking the possession of the secured asset are possible under section 13(4). Alienating the asset either by lease or sale, etc. and appointing a person to manage the secured asset are some of those possible measures. On the other hand, section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to take possession of the property and forward the asset along with the connected documents to the borrower (sic the secured creditor). Therefore, the borrower is always entitled to prefer an "appeal" under section 17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under section 17 is available." 4 WRIC No. 23281 of 2025

6. In the case of PHR Invent Educational Society Vs. Uco Bank and others reported in (2024) 6 SCC 579 the Supreme Court in paragraph no.23 has held as under:- "23. It could thus be seen that, this Court has clearly held that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. It has been held that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. The Court clearly observed that, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. It has been held that, though the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are of widest amplitude, still the Courts cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court. The Court further held that though the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, still it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution."

6. In this view of the matter, the present petition is dismissed on the ground of availability of statutory alternative remedy.

7. Since the present order has been passed in the absence of the 5 WRIC No. 23281 of 2025 counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner is free to move a recall application within 30 days from today. October 14, 2025 Gaurav Kuls (Vivek Saran,J.) (Prakash Padia,J.) GAURAV KULSHRESTHA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad