High Court · 2025

2. Sri Aditya Yadav, learned counsel for petitioner, has initially submitted that procedure prescribed for disciplinary proceedings was not followed and charges were proved without any basis. However, when confronted with material available and reasons assigned in impugned order, he fairly submitted that petitioner’s case may be considered to the extent of interfering with quantum of punishment, i.e., dismissal.

3. Learned counsel appearing for respondents while opposing aforesaid prayer refers the judgments passed by Supreme Court in North West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. H.H. Pujar, AIR 2008 SC 3060 and Divisional Manager, Rajasthan S.R.T.C. vs. Kamruddin, AIR 2009 SC 2528 that if a bus conductor found carrying passengers without ticket, it is a serious misconduct and concerned incumbent shall be awarded with major penalty of dismissal.

4. I have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the material available on record.

5. The only question is, whether punishment awarded to petitioner is shockingly disproportionate or not and in this regard the Court takes note of a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Ram Karan, (2022) 1 SCC 373, relevant part thereof is mentioned hereinafter: "23. The well ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee, it is not open for the Courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority.

24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the Court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons.

25. The principles have been culled out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. 1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it was observed as under:

18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.

26. It has been further examined by this Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and Anr. v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 as under:

19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows:

19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.

19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.

19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.

19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case.

19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable."

6. In aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the view that on proved charge that petitioner, a Bus Conductor, was carrying passengers without ticket, the punishment awarded appears to be disproportionate considering that earlier service period of petitioner was unblemished.

7. In view of above, the writ petition is disposed of and impugned order dated

12.03.2025 is interfered so far as punishment is concerned and matter is remitted back to Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order taking a more lenient view. This exercise shall be concluded within a period of two months from today. Order Date :- 9.7.2025 AK AWADESH KUMAR AWADESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

2. Sri Aditya Yadav, learned counsel for petitioner, has initially submitted that procedure prescribed for disciplinary proceedings was not followed and charges were proved without any basis. However, when confronted with material available and reasons assigned in impugned order, he fairly submitted that petitioner’s case may be considered to the extent of interfering with quantum of punishment, i.e., dismissal.

3. Learned counsel appearing for respondents while opposing aforesaid prayer refers the judgments passed by Supreme Court in North West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation vs. H.H. Pujar, AIR 2008 SC 3060 and Divisional Manager, Rajasthan S.R.T.C. vs. Kamruddin, AIR 2009 SC 2528 that if a bus conductor found carrying passengers without ticket, it is a serious misconduct and concerned incumbent shall be awarded with major penalty of dismissal.

4. I have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the material available on record.

5. The only question is, whether punishment awarded to petitioner is shockingly disproportionate or not and in this regard the Court takes note of a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Union of India and others vs. Ram Karan, (2022) 1 SCC 373, relevant part thereof is mentioned hereinafter: "23. The well ingrained principle of law is that it is the disciplinary authority, or the appellate authority in appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given to the delinquent employee. Keeping in view the seriousness of the misconduct committed by such an employee, it is not open for the Courts to assume and usurp the function of the disciplinary authority.

24. Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty. The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/appellate authority to take a call and it is not for the Court to substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment. However, it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons.

25. The principles have been culled out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court way back in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors. 1995(6) SCC 749 wherein it was observed as under:

18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.

26. It has been further examined by this Court in Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Now Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh Gramin Bank) and Anr. v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 as under:

19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows:

19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.

19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/ departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.

19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.

19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case.

19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable."

6. In aforesaid circumstances, this Court is of the view that on proved charge that petitioner, a Bus Conductor, was carrying passengers without ticket, the punishment awarded appears to be disproportionate considering that earlier service period of petitioner was unblemished.

7. In view of above, the writ petition is disposed of and impugned order dated

12.03.2025 is interfered so far as punishment is concerned and matter is remitted back to Disciplinary Authority to pass a fresh order taking a more lenient view. This exercise shall be concluded within a period of two months from today. Order Date :- 9.7.2025 AK AWADESH KUMAR AWADESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad High Court of Judicature at Allahabad