High Court · 2025

Complaint Case No. 3285 of 2018 (Smt. Munni Vs. Rizwan and Others), Police Station - Fatehganj Paschimi, District - Bareilly, whereby applicants have been summoned for offence under Section - 363, 366, 376 I.P.C.. The order dated 04.03.2024, passed by learned Special Judge (Essential Commodities Act)/Additional Session Judge, Court, Bareilly, in Criminal Revision No. 202 of 2019 (CNR-UP BR 01-005900-2019) (Rizwan @ Veeran Vs. State of U.P. and Another), is also being impugned, whereby the revision against summoning order has been dismissed.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the opposite party no.2 has lodged first information report of this case making false allegations of kidnapping and rape of her daughter. After investigation, police have submitted final report. The complainant has preferred a protest petition, which was registered as a complaint case and applicants were summoned vide impugned summoning order dated 29.01.2019. Learned counsel submitted that now both the parties have settled the dispute and compromised the case and thus, there is no possibility of conviction and thus, the impugned orders and proceedings may be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon case of Rashid Vs. State of U.P. and Another (Application u/s 482 No. 32654 of 2024), decided on 21.01.2025.

4. Learned A.G.A. has opposed the application and submitted that in the alleged incident, the minor daughter of complainant was enticed away by the applicants and they took her to Chaddha Palace and committed rape upon her. It was submitted that such cases cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties.

5. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.

6. So far as position of law on the point of quashing of proceedings on ground of settlement, is concerned, in Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019, State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others, AIR 2019 SC 1296, Hon'ble Apex Court, after considering its earlier decisions, has held as under :- "13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc."

7. Thus, from aforesaid case law, it is apparent that proceedings of heinous offences like that of rape cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties. In the instant matter, there is allegation of gang rape of a minor girl. In case of Rashid (supra), the proceedings were quashed by this Court considering specific facts and circumstances of that case. In facts of that matter, the prosecutrix has married with accused and she was legally wedded wife of the accused and it was in view of those facts that proceedings under Section - 376 I.P.C. were quashed. The facts of the instant matter are on differing footing and thus, the said case law does not help the applicants.

8. It would also be pertinent to mention that earlier applicants have filed an application under Section - 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of summoning order dated 29.01.2019, whereby the said prayer of applicants was refused and applicants were granted liberty to seek bail. Considering entire facts and nature of accusations as well as aforesaid position of law, no case for quashing of impugned orders and proceedings, on the basis of compromise between the parties is made out. Hence, the prayer sought by applicant is refused.

9. However, it is directed that in case, applicants appear/surrender before the court concerned within a period of three weeks from today and apply for bail, their bail application shall be considered and decided expeditiously in accordance with settled law. For a period of three weeks from today or till the applicants surrender before the court below, whichever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants in the aforesaid case.

10. With the aforesaid observations, the instant application is disposed of. Order Date :- 18.2.2025 S Rawat SHOBHIT RAWAT High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Complaint Case No. 3285 of 2018 (Smt. Munni Vs. Rizwan and Others), Police Station - Fatehganj Paschimi, District - Bareilly, whereby applicants have been summoned for offence under Section - 363, 366, 376 I.P.C.. The order dated 04.03.2024, passed by learned Special Judge (Essential Commodities Act)/Additional Session Judge, Court, Bareilly, in Criminal Revision No. 202 of 2019 (CNR-UP BR 01-005900-2019) (Rizwan @ Veeran Vs. State of U.P. and Another), is also being impugned, whereby the revision against summoning order has been dismissed.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the opposite party no.2 has lodged first information report of this case making false allegations of kidnapping and rape of her daughter. After investigation, police have submitted final report. The complainant has preferred a protest petition, which was registered as a complaint case and applicants were summoned vide impugned summoning order dated 29.01.2019. Learned counsel submitted that now both the parties have settled the dispute and compromised the case and thus, there is no possibility of conviction and thus, the impugned orders and proceedings may be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon case of Rashid Vs. State of U.P. and Another (Application u/s 482 No. 32654 of 2024), decided on 21.01.2025.

4. Learned A.G.A. has opposed the application and submitted that in the alleged incident, the minor daughter of complainant was enticed away by the applicants and they took her to Chaddha Palace and committed rape upon her. It was submitted that such cases cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties.

5. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record.

6. So far as position of law on the point of quashing of proceedings on ground of settlement, is concerned, in Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019, State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others, AIR 2019 SC 1296, Hon'ble Apex Court, after considering its earlier decisions, has held as under :- "13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under: i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc."

7. Thus, from aforesaid case law, it is apparent that proceedings of heinous offences like that of rape cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties. In the instant matter, there is allegation of gang rape of a minor girl. In case of Rashid (supra), the proceedings were quashed by this Court considering specific facts and circumstances of that case. In facts of that matter, the prosecutrix has married with accused and she was legally wedded wife of the accused and it was in view of those facts that proceedings under Section - 376 I.P.C. were quashed. The facts of the instant matter are on differing footing and thus, the said case law does not help the applicants.

8. It would also be pertinent to mention that earlier applicants have filed an application under Section - 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of summoning order dated 29.01.2019, whereby the said prayer of applicants was refused and applicants were granted liberty to seek bail. Considering entire facts and nature of accusations as well as aforesaid position of law, no case for quashing of impugned orders and proceedings, on the basis of compromise between the parties is made out. Hence, the prayer sought by applicant is refused.

9. However, it is directed that in case, applicants appear/surrender before the court concerned within a period of three weeks from today and apply for bail, their bail application shall be considered and decided expeditiously in accordance with settled law. For a period of three weeks from today or till the applicants surrender before the court below, whichever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicants in the aforesaid case.

10. With the aforesaid observations, the instant application is disposed of. Order Date :- 18.2.2025 S Rawat SHOBHIT RAWAT High Court of Judicature at Allahabad