The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan and others, reported in

1. Heard Ms. Suman Jaiswal, learned counsel for applicant, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State-respondent no.1, Sri Pradip Kumar Rao, Advocate on behalf of opposite party No.3- victim and perused the record.

2. Present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the proceedings of Special Trial No.125 of 2019 arising out of case crime No.323 of 2016, under Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC and 3/4 of POCSO Act relating to police station Khukhundu, District Deoria pending before Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1/Special Judge (POCSO Act), Deoria.

3. It has been submitted that subsequently the applicant and the victim- opposite party No.3 have got married and are living as husband and wife. It has also been submitted that opposite party No.3 has filed an affidavit before the trial court stating that she has married with the applicant and out of the said wedlock they have two children; one daughter aged about 6 and half years and another son aged about four years. Learned counsel for the parties jointly submitted that the applicant and O.P. no.3 settled their dispute out of the Court and they have entered into compromise and they have also filed compromise deed dated 9.12.2024, which has been duly verified by Additional District and Sessions Judge / Special Judge (POCSO Act), Court No.1, Deoria. They further submitted that a joint affidavit has already been filed on 17.7.2025 disclosing the entire facts, which is on record.

4. On perusal of the joint affidavit, it transpires that the parties had 2 NA528 No. 20683 of 2025 compromise the matter out side the Court and O.P. no.3 does not want to pursue the matter. Since parties have amicably settled their dispute outside the Court and opposite party no.3 does not want to prosecute the applicant, no useful purpose would be served in keeping the present application pending.

5. Learned A.G.A. for the State has no objection if the instant application is allowed and the entire proceedings are quashed in terms of the compromise between the parties.

6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 has laid down principles for quashing the proceeding on the basis of settlement/compromise. Relevant paragraphs are quoted herein below:- "15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to herein above, it is observed and held as under: i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC 3 NA528 No. 20683 of 2025 and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and

29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc."

7. This Court is not unmindful of the following judgements of the Apex Court: (i). B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and Another; (2003)4 SCC 675, (ii). Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation; (2008) 9 SCC 677, (iii). Manoj Sharma Vs. State and Others; (2008) 16 SCC 1, (iv). Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab; (2012); 10 SCC 303, 4 NA528 No. 20683 of 2025 (v). Narindra Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab; ( 2014) 6 SCC 466,

8. In the aforesaid judgments, the Apex Court has categorically held that compromise can be made between the parties even in respect of certain cognizable and non compoundable offences. Reference may also be made to the decision given by this Court in Shaifullah and Others Vs. State of U.P. & Another; 2013 (83) ACC 278 and Pramod & Another Vs. State of U.P. & Another (Application U/S 482 No.12174 of 2020, decided on 23rd February, 2021) and Daxaben Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 936 in which the law expounded by the Apex court in the aforesaid cases has been explained in detail.

9. In view of the aforesaid facts, since the parties have amicably settled their dispute outside the Court and compromise between the parties has already been verified by the trial Court, the present Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C.is liable to be allowed.

10. Accordingly, the present Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed and consequently, proceedings of Special Trial No.125 of 2019 arising out of case crime No.323 of 2016, under Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC and 3/4 of POCSO Act relating to police station Khukhundu, District Deoria pending before Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1/Special Judge (POCSO Act), Deoria, qua the present applicant is hereby quashed. September 15, 2025 RKM. (Alok Mathur,J.) RAKESH KUMAR MAURYA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1. Heard Ms. Suman Jaiswal, learned counsel for applicant, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State-respondent no.1, Sri Pradip Kumar Rao, Advocate on behalf of opposite party No.3- victim and perused the record.

2. Present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing the proceedings of Special Trial No.125 of 2019 arising out of case crime No.323 of 2016, under Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC and 3/4 of POCSO Act relating to police station Khukhundu, District Deoria pending before Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1/Special Judge (POCSO Act), Deoria.

3. It has been submitted that subsequently the applicant and the victim- opposite party No.3 have got married and are living as husband and wife. It has also been submitted that opposite party No.3 has filed an affidavit before the trial court stating that she has married with the applicant and out of the said wedlock they have two children; one daughter aged about 6 and half years and another son aged about four years. Learned counsel for the parties jointly submitted that the applicant and O.P. no.3 settled their dispute out of the Court and they have entered into compromise and they have also filed compromise deed dated 9.12.2024, which has been duly verified by Additional District and Sessions Judge / Special Judge (POCSO Act), Court No.1, Deoria. They further submitted that a joint affidavit has already been filed on 17.7.2025 disclosing the entire facts, which is on record.

4. On perusal of the joint affidavit, it transpires that the parties had 2 NA528 No. 20683 of 2025 compromise the matter out side the Court and O.P. no.3 does not want to pursue the matter. Since parties have amicably settled their dispute outside the Court and opposite party no.3 does not want to prosecute the applicant, no useful purpose would be served in keeping the present application pending.

5. Learned A.G.A. for the State has no objection if the instant application is allowed and the entire proceedings are quashed in terms of the compromise between the parties.

6. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan and others, reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688 has laid down principles for quashing the proceeding on the basis of settlement/compromise. Relevant paragraphs are quoted herein below:- "15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to herein above, it is observed and held as under: i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender; iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC 3 NA528 No. 20683 of 2025 and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and

29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove; v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc."

7. This Court is not unmindful of the following judgements of the Apex Court: (i). B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and Another; (2003)4 SCC 675, (ii). Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation; (2008) 9 SCC 677, (iii). Manoj Sharma Vs. State and Others; (2008) 16 SCC 1, (iv). Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab; (2012); 10 SCC 303, 4 NA528 No. 20683 of 2025 (v). Narindra Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab; ( 2014) 6 SCC 466,

8. In the aforesaid judgments, the Apex Court has categorically held that compromise can be made between the parties even in respect of certain cognizable and non compoundable offences. Reference may also be made to the decision given by this Court in Shaifullah and Others Vs. State of U.P. & Another; 2013 (83) ACC 278 and Pramod & Another Vs. State of U.P. & Another (Application U/S 482 No.12174 of 2020, decided on 23rd February, 2021) and Daxaben Vs. State of Gujarat, reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 936 in which the law expounded by the Apex court in the aforesaid cases has been explained in detail.

9. In view of the aforesaid facts, since the parties have amicably settled their dispute outside the Court and compromise between the parties has already been verified by the trial Court, the present Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C.is liable to be allowed.

10. Accordingly, the present Application U/S 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed and consequently, proceedings of Special Trial No.125 of 2019 arising out of case crime No.323 of 2016, under Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC and 3/4 of POCSO Act relating to police station Khukhundu, District Deoria pending before Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.1/Special Judge (POCSO Act), Deoria, qua the present applicant is hereby quashed. September 15, 2025 RKM. (Alok Mathur,J.) RAKESH KUMAR MAURYA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad