High Court
Case Details
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:75962 Court No. - 75 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 45345 of 2023 Applicant :- Mustaqueem And 5 Others Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Obaidur Rahman Khan,Saddam Husain Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal,J.
Legal Reasoning
1. Vakalatnama filed by Mr. S.M. Khalid, learned counsel on behalf of opposite party no.2 is taken on record. 2. Heard Mohd. Sami Uzma Khan, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Saddam Husain, learned counsel for the applicants, Mr. S. M. Khalid, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. for the State. 3. The instant application has been filed praying for the following reliefs :- "It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to allow the present application and quash the entire criminal proceedings of Case No. 240 of 2018 (State versus Mustaqueem and Others) arising out of Case Crime No. 1137 of 2017, Under Section 498-A, 323 and 504 1.P.C. and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, Police Station Sarain Khwaja, District-Jaunpur against the Applicants were charge sheeted Section 498-A, 323 and 504 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 only, Police Station Sarain Khwaja, District-Jaunpur as well as Charge Sheet No. 85. of 2018, dated 02.07.2018 as well as Cognizance Order dated 24.10.2018 and Summoning Order dated 24.10.2018 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate District-Jaunpur and pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, District-Jaunpur as compromise dated 25.10.2018 and 04.01.2019 have been executed by both the parties. It is further prayed that this Hon'ble court may graciously be pleased to stay the further proceeding of entire Case No. 240 of 2018 (State versus Mustaqueem and Others) arising out of Case Crime No. 1137 of 2017, Under Section 498-A, 323 and 504 I.P.C. Prohibition Act 1961, and Section 3/4 Dowry Police Station Sarain Khwaja, District-Jaunpur against the Applicants were charge sheeted Section 498-A, 323 and 504 I.P.C. and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 only, Police Station Sarain Khwaja, District-Jaunpur as well as Charge Sheet No. 85 of 2018, dated 02.07.2018 as well as Cognizance Order dated 24.10.2018 and Summoning Order dated 24.10.2018 passed by Chief Judicial Magistrate District-Jaunpur and pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, District-Jaunpur as compromise dated 25.10.2018 and 04.01.2019 have been executed by both the parties, during the pendency of present application before this Hon'ble Court, otherwise the Applicants will suffer irreparable loss and injury." 4. The S.I. Brijesh Kumar Singh as well as lady constable Smt. Phoolmati of Police Station Sarain Khwaja has produced opposite party no.2- Tazim Fatima before this court who was also identified by her counsel Mr. S.M. Khalid. 5. The opposite party no.2 admitted the fact that after getting Talaq-e-Ahsan from the applicant no.1, she moved an application before the C.J.M., Jaunpur on 25.10.2018 mentioning the fact that she has settled the dispute with opposite party no.2 and she does not want to pursue the case. Thereafter, the matter was referred to Mediation Centre, Jaunpur where the settlement agreement dated 4.1.2019 was also entered into by the parties. This fact is also admitted to the opposite party no.2 that as per the settlement agreement dated 4.1.2019 executed before the District Court, Jaunpur, it was decided to withdraw the impugned proceedings but because of the ignorance about the legal procedure, she could not pursue her withdrawal application. The counsel for the applicant has submitted that as the parties have settled the dispute through Mediation Centre, Jaunpur and the settlement agreement dated 4.1.2019 has also been entered into between the parties, therefore, the impugned proceedings may be quashed. 6. The counsel for the opposite party no.2 has no objection if the impugned proceedings are being quashed on the basis of settlement agreement dated 4.1.2019 executed before the Mediation Centre, Jaunpur. 7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another; (2012) 10 SCC 303, in paragraph No. 61 of the judgement, observed as under:- "The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 8. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Laxmi Narayan; (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed as under:- "15.1. the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves; 15.2. such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society; 15.3 similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;" 9. From above noted judgements, it is clear that merely mentioning the section of serious offences will not refrain the court from quashing the proceeding, if on considering the material on record, offences under that section is not made out. 10. From the perusal of the record, it appears that an application filed by the opposite party no.2 before the C.J.M., Jaunpur on 25.10.2018 has been annexed at page-49 of the application to withdraw the impugned proceedings and the settlement agreement entered into between the parties before the Mediation Centre, Jaunpur has been annexed at page-52 of the application. Paragraph -5 of the agreements reads as under :- "(A) यह ककि प्ቌकिकारोሲ किके मध्य समस्त सकामकान, सᮌᯚधन आकदि किका कहसकाब-ककितकाब हहो गयका हहै अब ककिसᮌᯚ भᮌᯚ प्ቌकिकार किका किकछ भᮌᯚ लकेनका दिकेनका शकेष नहीሻ रह गयका हहै। (B) यह ककि प्ቌकिकार किके मध्य आपस मम मकसस्लम धमर किके अनकसकार तलकाकि हहो गयका हहै और प्ቌकिकार अपनका पकनरकविविकाह किरनके किके ललए स्विततं्ቔ हह।" 11. As the parties have settled the dispute amicably after getting Talaq-e-Ahsan, the opposite party no.2 also contracted second marriage, therefore, continuation of impugned proceeding will amount to travesty of justice. 12. In view of the above as well as in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another ; (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh & Others vs. State of Punjab & Another (2014) 6 SCC 477, State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 and State of M.P. vs. Dhruv Gurjar, AIR 2017 SC 1106, the proceeding of Case No. 240 of 2018 (State versus Mustaqueem and Others) arising out of Case Crime No. 1137 of 2017, Under Section 498-A, 323 and 504 1.P.C. and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act 1961, Police Station Sarain Khwaja, District-Jaunpur as well as charge-sheet dated 02.07.2018, cognizance order dated 24.10.2018 and summoning order dated 24.10.2018, is hereby quashed. 13. With the aforesaid direction, the present application is allowed. Order Date :- 9.5.2025 Shiv Digitally signed by :- SHIV KUMAR SHARMA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad