High Court · 2025

5. Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that barring the husband, father and mother-in-law, none of the applicants answer the description of the respondents as per Section 2(q) of the Act and further there is no domestic relationship between the applicants and the opposite party no. 2 as per Section 2(f) of the Act and there is no shared household under Section 2(s) of the household. Contention is that the address of the applicants are different in the complaint vis-a-vis the address of the opposite party no. 2. He submits that only general and omnibus allegations have been levelled and the opposite party no. 2 had at no point of time been subjected to domestic violence. Submission is that the present proceedings is nothing but the grossest misuse of process of law. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of a Coordinate Bench in Application u/s 482 No. 14626 of 2019 (Krishnawati Devi and 6 others Vs. State of U.P. and another) decided on

22.01.2025 as well as the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 (Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi Vs. Vidhi Rawal) decided on 19.05.2025.

6. Learned AGA, while countering the submission so made by the learned counsel for the applicant, has submitted that the complaint had been lodged on 21.10.2021 and the present application has been preferred in the year 2025 after a period of four years and there is no cogent explanation as to interfere at this stage. He further submits that already the applicant no. 2 has appeared before the court below and he is contesting the matter. According to him, no orders whatever under Chapter IV of the 2005 Act has been passed, thus, it may not be appropriate for this Court to throttle the proceedings at this stage.

7. I have heard the submission so made across the bar and perused the record carefully.

8. The sole question which arises for determination in the present proceedings is the extent of judicial intervention at this stage. Apparently, a complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 was lodged on 21.10.2021 against the applicants and notices were issued to the applicants and an application also came to be preferred by the applicant no. 2 with a prayer that the Court may be pleased to hold that the proceedings of applicants no. 4 and 5 would not be maintainable as they are minor. The said application came to be rejected on 07.06.2023. As a matter of fact, the first and foremost question which would arise would be whether the opposite party no. 2 would come within the definition of aggrieved person under Section 2(a) or not.

9. Pertinently, the opposite party no. 2 is the daughter-in-law of the applicants no. 2 and 3 and wife of the applicant no. 1 and the other applicants are either brother-in-law, sister-in-law or maternal father-in-law or the daughter of the maternal father-in-law.

10. Importantly, the opposite party no. 2 comes within the definition of an aggrieved person in the background of the fact that she alleges that she had been subjected to domestic violence by the respondents. The question as to whether there happens to be a domestic relationship is a question of fact as obviously in a given case the wife vis-a-vis the in-laws would be termed to be having a domestic relationship unless explicitly proved otherwise. As regards the respondents is concerned, once it is alleged that the woman has been subjected to domestic violence then the necessary parties would be those against whom the allegations have been made. With respect to shared household, the definition itself is very clear and exhaustive wherein not only a household where a person aggrieved lives at the time of filing of the complaint but also at any stage had lived, stands covered. The allegations so made by the opposite party no. 2 against the applicants, need not be scrutinized and the veracity of the same are not required to be adjudged at the stage of the complaint as they are the matters of evidences which would be given a final shape this way or that way when the proceedings are allowed to continue.

11. Looking into the nature of the allegations so sought to be levelled by the opposite party no. 2 against the applicants prima facie, it cannot be said that the case is not liable to be proceeded or they are flimsy or frivolous so as to throttle the investigation. As regards the reliance placed upon the judgment of Krishnawati Devi (supra) concerned, there is no quarrel to the proposition of law so laid down, however, each and every case is to be decided on the basis of the facts therein and whether the opposite party no. 2 is an aggrieved person, there is a shared household and the applicants' answer, the description of the respondents and the question of domestic relationship are subject matter of proceedings. What the Court is required at this stage of a challenge made to the complaint is that the averment and the allegations contained in the complaint are not frivolous as the case may not be triable in that nature. In Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi (supra) the extent of judicial intervention under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS came into consideration 35 and 39, it was observed as under.- "...35. When it comes to exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC in relation to application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005 is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence and for preventing acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated.

39. To conclude, the view taken in the impugned order of the High Court that a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC for challenging the proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view. We hold that High Courts can exercise power under Section 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings emanating from the application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate. However, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application under Section 12(1). Normally, interference under Section 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice."

12. Cumulatively analyzing the case from the four corners of law bearing in mind the fact that no order whatsoever has been passed under Chapter IV this Court is of the firm opinion that the present case does not come into an exceptional category.

13. Thus, interference is declined, the application is disposed of. However, it is left open for the applicants to contest the proceedings on merits taking all legal and factual grounds and once such grounds are taken then this Court has no reasons to disbelieve that the same shall be considered with most expedition. Subject to the orders being passed they are always open to be challenged under the remedies available under law. Order Date :- 28.5.2025 Rajesh RAJESH KUMAR RAJESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

5. Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that barring the husband, father and mother-in-law, none of the applicants answer the description of the respondents as per Section 2(q) of the Act and further there is no domestic relationship between the applicants and the opposite party no. 2 as per Section 2(f) of the Act and there is no shared household under Section 2(s) of the household. Contention is that the address of the applicants are different in the complaint vis-a-vis the address of the opposite party no. 2. He submits that only general and omnibus allegations have been levelled and the opposite party no. 2 had at no point of time been subjected to domestic violence. Submission is that the present proceedings is nothing but the grossest misuse of process of law. Reliance has been placed upon the decision of a Coordinate Bench in Application u/s 482 No. 14626 of 2019 (Krishnawati Devi and 6 others Vs. State of U.P. and another) decided on

22.01.2025 as well as the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 2688 of 2025 (Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi Vs. Vidhi Rawal) decided on 19.05.2025.

6. Learned AGA, while countering the submission so made by the learned counsel for the applicant, has submitted that the complaint had been lodged on 21.10.2021 and the present application has been preferred in the year 2025 after a period of four years and there is no cogent explanation as to interfere at this stage. He further submits that already the applicant no. 2 has appeared before the court below and he is contesting the matter. According to him, no orders whatever under Chapter IV of the 2005 Act has been passed, thus, it may not be appropriate for this Court to throttle the proceedings at this stage.

7. I have heard the submission so made across the bar and perused the record carefully.

8. The sole question which arises for determination in the present proceedings is the extent of judicial intervention at this stage. Apparently, a complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act, 2005 was lodged on 21.10.2021 against the applicants and notices were issued to the applicants and an application also came to be preferred by the applicant no. 2 with a prayer that the Court may be pleased to hold that the proceedings of applicants no. 4 and 5 would not be maintainable as they are minor. The said application came to be rejected on 07.06.2023. As a matter of fact, the first and foremost question which would arise would be whether the opposite party no. 2 would come within the definition of aggrieved person under Section 2(a) or not.

9. Pertinently, the opposite party no. 2 is the daughter-in-law of the applicants no. 2 and 3 and wife of the applicant no. 1 and the other applicants are either brother-in-law, sister-in-law or maternal father-in-law or the daughter of the maternal father-in-law.

10. Importantly, the opposite party no. 2 comes within the definition of an aggrieved person in the background of the fact that she alleges that she had been subjected to domestic violence by the respondents. The question as to whether there happens to be a domestic relationship is a question of fact as obviously in a given case the wife vis-a-vis the in-laws would be termed to be having a domestic relationship unless explicitly proved otherwise. As regards the respondents is concerned, once it is alleged that the woman has been subjected to domestic violence then the necessary parties would be those against whom the allegations have been made. With respect to shared household, the definition itself is very clear and exhaustive wherein not only a household where a person aggrieved lives at the time of filing of the complaint but also at any stage had lived, stands covered. The allegations so made by the opposite party no. 2 against the applicants, need not be scrutinized and the veracity of the same are not required to be adjudged at the stage of the complaint as they are the matters of evidences which would be given a final shape this way or that way when the proceedings are allowed to continue.

11. Looking into the nature of the allegations so sought to be levelled by the opposite party no. 2 against the applicants prima facie, it cannot be said that the case is not liable to be proceeded or they are flimsy or frivolous so as to throttle the investigation. As regards the reliance placed upon the judgment of Krishnawati Devi (supra) concerned, there is no quarrel to the proposition of law so laid down, however, each and every case is to be decided on the basis of the facts therein and whether the opposite party no. 2 is an aggrieved person, there is a shared household and the applicants' answer, the description of the respondents and the question of domestic relationship are subject matter of proceedings. What the Court is required at this stage of a challenge made to the complaint is that the averment and the allegations contained in the complaint are not frivolous as the case may not be triable in that nature. In Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi (supra) the extent of judicial intervention under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS came into consideration 35 and 39, it was observed as under.- "...35. When it comes to exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC in relation to application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005 is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence and for preventing acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated.

39. To conclude, the view taken in the impugned order of the High Court that a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC for challenging the proceedings emanating from Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005 is not maintainable, is not the correct view. We hold that High Courts can exercise power under Section 482 of CrPC (Section 528 of the BNSS) for quashing the proceedings emanating from the application under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, pending before the Court of the learned Magistrate. However, considering the object of the DV Act, 2005, the High Courts should exercise caution and circumspection when dealing with an application under Section 12(1). Normally, interference under Section 482 is warranted only in the case of gross illegality or injustice."

12. Cumulatively analyzing the case from the four corners of law bearing in mind the fact that no order whatsoever has been passed under Chapter IV this Court is of the firm opinion that the present case does not come into an exceptional category.

13. Thus, interference is declined, the application is disposed of. However, it is left open for the applicants to contest the proceedings on merits taking all legal and factual grounds and once such grounds are taken then this Court has no reasons to disbelieve that the same shall be considered with most expedition. Subject to the orders being passed they are always open to be challenged under the remedies available under law. Order Date :- 28.5.2025 Rajesh RAJESH KUMAR RAJESH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad High Court of Judicature at Allahabad