High Court · 2025

applicants and Sri Sunil Kumar Kushwaha, learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. The present application has been filed to set aside the entire criminal proceeding as well as impugned summoning order dated 03.01.2022 arising out of Complaint Case No. 1230/2017 (Smt. Uma Vs. Sujeet Kumar and others) u/s 498- A, 323, 506 I.P.C. & 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station- Colonelganj, District- Allahabad, pending before Civil Judge (S.D.), F.T.C., Court No.21, Allahabad.

3. Facts giving rise to the present controversy is that opposite party no. 2 has filed a complaint against the applicants and the applicants were summoned u/s 498-A, 323, 506 I.P.C. & 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act vide order dated 03.01.2022 which is under challenge in the present case.

4. Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that the parties have settled their dispute amicably and on the basis of compromise, application u/s 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act was also allowed vide order dated 18.08.2023 by the Family Court wherein the factum of compromise has also been recorded. It is further submitted that in pursuance of compromise, opposite party no. 2 has also filed an application before the court below for withdrawing the complaint case on the ground that she has settled the dispute with the applicants. That application was dismissed by the court below vide order dated 24.11.2022 which has been annexed at page 78 to the afÏdavit.

5. As the parties have settled their dispute amicably and divorce on the basis of mutual consent was also granted by the Family Court vide judgement and order dated 18.08.2023, the court below while rejecting the application to withdraw the impugned proceedings, has also recorded the fact that parties have settled their dispute, in such circumstances, permitting to continue the impugned proceeding will amount to travesty of justice.

6. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another; (2012) 10 SCC 303, in paragraph No. 61 of the judgement, observed as under:- "The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the afÏrmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Laxmi Narayan; (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed as under:- "15.1. the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2. such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3 similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufÏcient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;"

8. From above noted judgements, it is clear that merely mentioning the section of serious offences will not refrain the court from quashing the proceeding, if on considering the material on record, offences under that section is not made out.

9. Considering the material on record, this Court finds that no serious offence is made out against the applicant, which falls in the category of mental depravity or serious offences.

10. Considering the fact as well as on perusal of record, it appears that no heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or other offences, which may affect the society in general, are made out and both the parties have amicably settled their dispute through compromise which has been duly verified by the court below as well as in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another; (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh & Others vs. State of Punjab & Another (2014) 6 SCC 477, State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 and State of M.P. vs. Dhruv Gurjar, AIR 2017 SC 1106, the entire criminal proceeding as well as impugned summoning order dated 03.01.2022 arising out of Complaint Case No. 1230/2017 (Smt. Uma Vs. Sujeet Kumar and others) u/s 498-A, 323, 506 I.P.C. & 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station- Colonelganj, District- Allahabad, pending before Civil Judge (S.D.), F.T.C., Court No.21, Allahabad, are hereby quashed.

11. With the aforesaid direction, the application is allowed. Order Date :- 12.5.2025 KS KISHAN SINHA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

applicants and Sri Sunil Kumar Kushwaha, learned A.G.A. for the State.

2. The present application has been filed to set aside the entire criminal proceeding as well as impugned summoning order dated 03.01.2022 arising out of Complaint Case No. 1230/2017 (Smt. Uma Vs. Sujeet Kumar and others) u/s 498- A, 323, 506 I.P.C. & 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station- Colonelganj, District- Allahabad, pending before Civil Judge (S.D.), F.T.C., Court No.21, Allahabad.

3. Facts giving rise to the present controversy is that opposite party no. 2 has filed a complaint against the applicants and the applicants were summoned u/s 498-A, 323, 506 I.P.C. & 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act vide order dated 03.01.2022 which is under challenge in the present case.

4. Learned counsel for the applicants has submitted that the parties have settled their dispute amicably and on the basis of compromise, application u/s 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act was also allowed vide order dated 18.08.2023 by the Family Court wherein the factum of compromise has also been recorded. It is further submitted that in pursuance of compromise, opposite party no. 2 has also filed an application before the court below for withdrawing the complaint case on the ground that she has settled the dispute with the applicants. That application was dismissed by the court below vide order dated 24.11.2022 which has been annexed at page 78 to the afÏdavit.

5. As the parties have settled their dispute amicably and divorce on the basis of mutual consent was also granted by the Family Court vide judgement and order dated 18.08.2023, the court below while rejecting the application to withdraw the impugned proceedings, has also recorded the fact that parties have settled their dispute, in such circumstances, permitting to continue the impugned proceeding will amount to travesty of justice.

6. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another; (2012) 10 SCC 303, in paragraph No. 61 of the judgement, observed as under:- "The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the afÏrmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Laxmi Narayan; (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed as under:- "15.1. the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2. such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3 similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufÏcient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;"

8. From above noted judgements, it is clear that merely mentioning the section of serious offences will not refrain the court from quashing the proceeding, if on considering the material on record, offences under that section is not made out.

9. Considering the material on record, this Court finds that no serious offence is made out against the applicant, which falls in the category of mental depravity or serious offences.

10. Considering the fact as well as on perusal of record, it appears that no heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or other offences, which may affect the society in general, are made out and both the parties have amicably settled their dispute through compromise which has been duly verified by the court below as well as in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Another; (2012) 10 SCC 303, Narinder Singh & Others vs. State of Punjab & Another (2014) 6 SCC 477, State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 and State of M.P. vs. Dhruv Gurjar, AIR 2017 SC 1106, the entire criminal proceeding as well as impugned summoning order dated 03.01.2022 arising out of Complaint Case No. 1230/2017 (Smt. Uma Vs. Sujeet Kumar and others) u/s 498-A, 323, 506 I.P.C. & 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, Police Station- Colonelganj, District- Allahabad, pending before Civil Judge (S.D.), F.T.C., Court No.21, Allahabad, are hereby quashed.

11. With the aforesaid direction, the application is allowed. Order Date :- 12.5.2025 KS KISHAN SINHA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad