Vinod Kumar Mishra v. Mishra

Heard Sri Arun Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for respondent no.2 and learned Standing Counsel for the respondent no.1 and perused the record.

Petitioner has preferred the present writ petition, inter alia with the prayer to quash the order dated 27.03.2025 and the sale notice dated 01.03.2025.

From the perusal of the order dated 27.03.2025, it is clear that the aforesaid order has been passed under Section 14 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act of 2002).

A preliminary objection has been raised by learned counsel for the respondent that against the aforesaid order a statutory remedy is available to the petitioner under Section 17 of the Act of 2002 to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction and a prayer has been made to dismiss the present petition on the ground of availability of the statutory remedy.

Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tandon and others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 wherein the Supreme Court in paragraph 42 & 43 has held as under : "42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression "any person" used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the 2 WRIC No. 14573 of 2025 Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pas interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.

43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. "

Reliance has also been placed in the case of Standard Chartered Bank Vs. V. Noble Kumar and others reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620, the Supreme Court in paragraph 27 has held as under: "27. The "appeal" under section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. Depending upon the nature of the secured asset and the terms and conditions of the security agreement, measures other than taking the possession of the secured asset are possible under section 13(4). Alienating the asset either by lease or sale, etc. and appointing a person to manage the secured asset are some of those possible measures. On the other hand, section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to take possession of the property and forward the asset along with the connected documents to the borrower (sic the secured creditor). Therefore, the borrower is always entitled to prefer an "appeal" under section 17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under section 17 is available. "

Further, respondent no.2 in its paragraph no.11 of the short counter 3 WRIC No. 14573 of 2025 affidavit has stated the property was put to e-auction on

18.06.2025.Thus the prayer for quashing the auction notice dated

01.03.2025 has been rendered infructuous.

No order as to costs. October 6, 2025 Deepika (Vivek Saran,J.) (Prakash Padia,J.) DEEPIKA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad