State of U.P v. Rajvanti Devi). By that judgement and order, learned court below has convicted th

first informant Daroga Singh was examined as P.W.-1. He is not an eye-witness of the occurrence. He proved that the occurrence was caused inside his house where his family members had assembled on the occasion of marriage of his younger daughter, solemnized two days earlier. At the time of the occurrence, his family members were present at his house. He learnt of the occurrence when he heard cries of his family members. He reached the house and found the dead body of the deceased Nand Lal lying on a cot. He also proved that the village Pradhan arrived at the house and the Written Report was prepared thereafter. He proved that Written Report. At the same time, he also proved that the narration in the F.I.R. - that the assault was caused on the deceased, by the appellant with a spade/'Fawda', was made on the strength of facts disclosed to him by others. During his cross- examination, he further proved that he reached the place of occurrence after about half an hour.

10. Next, Sukhu Kushwaha - father of the first husband of the present appellant was examined as P.W.-2. He proved that the appellant was married to his son Saktu. The deceased Nand Lal used to reside with him while the appellant had solemnized second marriage and had two sons born to her from that marriage. He then proved that the appellant visited her maternal home to attend the marriage of her younger sister when the occurrence was caused. He learnt of the occurrence from the police. By the time he reached the house of Daroga Singh (P.W.-1), the dead body of the deceased had been sealed and the police had arrested the appellant. He also tried to prove that the clothing of the appellant bore blood stain marks. During his cross- examination, he specifically stated that he had not seen the occurrence.

11. Thereafter, Lal Keshwar, the witness of inquest was examined as P.W.-3. He proved that fact.

12. Next, Sunil Kumar, a villager, was examined as P.W.-4. He also proved that he learnt about the occurrence from others. Being a witness of the inquest, he proved the same. He proved his signature on the Inquest Report.

13. Thereafter, Ram Suresh, the Village Pradhan, was examined as P.W.-5. He also proved, he reached the house of the informant Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) after the occurrence had been caused.

14. Thereafter, Dr. Manoj Ekka was examined as P.W.-6. He proved the ante mortem injuries and the cause of death.

15. Next, Constable Bhupendra Narayan Singh was examined as P.W.-7. He proved the registration of F.I.R. and the relevant G.D. entries.

16. Thereafter, Investigation Officer - Manoj Kumar Pandey was examined as P.W.-

8. He proved the investigation, recoveries including the blood stained 'saree' from the person of the appellant.

17. Last, Meera Devi, sister-in-law ('bhabhi') of the appellant was examined as P.W.-9. She proved her presence at the place and time of occurrence. In that, she proved that the appellant had arrived to attend the marriage of her younger sister. Her first born son (from her first marriage) i.e. the deceased Nand Lal had also arrived to attend that marriage from the home of his paternal grand-father. She proved that the appellant was disgruntled for reason of deceased Nand Lal living with his paternal grand-father. In that circumstance, deceased attributed to the appellant that she had uttered words to the effect that if the deceased came before her, she would assault him ('Usey Maarengey'). However, the witness did not understand that the appellant intended to kill the deceased. Two days after the marriage of her younger sister, the appellant caused the occurrence by assaulting the deceased with the spade/'Fawda' while he was asleep. At the same time, she proved, she saw the appellant flee from the house wearing a bloodstained 'saree'.

18. During her cross-examination, the said witness (P.W.-9) admitted that the appellant used to reside in her own house located at the distance of about 1 kilometre (from the place of occurrence). In fact, the latter had come to the house of her father Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) to attend the marriage of her younger sister. She also admitted, her statement was not recorded during the investigation but only her presence was recorded in the investigation. As to how she learnt about the occurrence, she appears to have narrated that she saw the dead body and raised alarm. She specifically stated, she had not seen the occurrence being caused by the appellant.

19. Thereafter, statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. She completely denied her role in the occurrence and suggested false implication for reason of claiming a share in the family property.

20. In such state of evidence, learned court below has convicted the appellant and sentenced him, as noted above.

21. Submission of learned counsel for the appellant is, present is a case of circumstantial evidence, only. Absolutely, no direct evidence exists. As to the circumstantial evidence, the occurrence was caused not inside the house of the present appellant but at the house of her father Daroga Singh (P.W.-1). There not only his immediate family members but presence of his other family members and relatives was established by the prosecution - to attend the marriage of his younger daughter. Therefore, in the context of case built solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution never excluded multiple possibilities of the occurrence being caused by any of the other members or persons present inside the house of Daroga Singh (P.W.-1), at the time of occurrence.

22. Second, it has been strenuously urged, the appellant is the mother of the deceased. She may never have any motive to kill her own son. In any case, no motive has been ascribed. Merely because the deceased was living with her paternal grand-father in a situation where the appellant had re-married and was living with her two children born to that marriage, the motive ascribed is wholly weak, if at all.

23. Third, no other circumstance - either of recovery made at the pointing out by the appellant or any other recovery has been made as may lead the Court to the conclusion that the appellant alone may have caused such heinous offence. In that regard, it has been stressed, in the first place, there is no valid Recovery Memo with respect to blood stained 'saree' described recovered, from the person of the appellant, at the time of her arrest. Referring to the reports of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Varanasi, it has been stressed, no scientific evidence exists to establish that the blood stains on the 'saree' described worn by the appellant was of the deceased or that his blood type matched. Thus, the chain of evidence required to be completed by the prosecution not only to establish that the appellant may have caused the occurrence but the occurrence may not have been caused by any other person or in any other way, was not established. Learned court below has completely erred in law in invoking Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. The scope of that section is clearly alien to the facts brought by the prosecution.

24. On the other hand, learned A.G.A. would submit, the F.I.R. was lodged by none other than the father of the present appellant. It is wholly prompt. The recovery of the 'saree' with blood stains from the person of the appellant (on her arrest) exists. Statement was made by Meera Devi (P.W.-9) that the appellant fled after causing the occurrence. Further, it has been stressed, sufficient evidence has been led to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant alone had caused the occurrence.

25. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, in the first place, present is not a case of direct evidence. Though no rule of law may pre-exist or operate in such facts, at the same time, we find it remarkable that an occurrence caused inside the house of the first informant Daroga Singh (P.W.-1), that too soon after the marriage of the younger daughter, when his family and some nearest relatives were present in the house, no eye-witness account emerged at the hands of the prosecution – as to the actual occurrence, caused upon daylight. Here, we also note, no detailed description of the exact place of the occurrence caused inside the house of the Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) was disclosed or narrated by the prosecution, either in the F.I.R. or at the trial. A bald narration appears that the appellant had assaulted her son with the spade/'Fawda' inside the house of Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) in the morning hours of 01.05.2015. No family member saw and no family member heard anything before Meera Devi (P.W.-9) claimed to see - the appellant flee from the place of occurrence. No cry let out by the deceased or other distress call or noise was heard, by anyone.

26. Thus, the prosecution story emerged solely at the pointing out of Meera Devi (P.W.-9) having seen the appellant flee from the house wearing a blood-stained 'saree'. At the same time, all prosecution witness of fact have admitted that the occurrence was caused two days after the 'Vidai' ceremony following the marriage of the younger daughter of the first informant Daroga Singh (P.W.-1). They also established the presence of the immediate family members of the said Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) inside his house. They further established that the present appellant was not a permanent resident of that dwelling house. She used to live with her two children born from her second marriage, at her own dwelling house situate about 1 kilometre from the place of occurrence. No other disclosure exists why the appellant stayed in the house of her father Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) after the marriage of her sister was over. Thus, the prosecution appears to have assumed that the appellant continued to live in her father's house to cause the occurrence. Also, she chose to stay with all her family members though she was motived to kill the deceased (her son). She did not chose to go with the deceased to her own house.

27. As to the evidence of Meera Devi (P.W.-9) having seen the appellant flee from the house wearing a blood stained 'saree', in the first place, there is no Recovery Memo proven by the prosecution of that blood stained 'saree'. Assuming that the material exhibit i.e. 'saree' had been proven, the report by Forensic Science Laboratory does not establish that the blood stains on that 'saree' had been caused by the blood of the deceased. The report only suggests blood was of human origin. Even then in the context of the admitted relationship of the mother and son between the appellant and the deceased, presence of that blood, if at all, may not eliminate the normal circumstances/behavioural reactions that may arise in such facts, wherein a mother may remain the first responder/reactor, to the discovery of such an occurrence. On going towards the dead body of her son who may have been assaulted with a spade/'Fawda' as described by the prosecution, may itself led to such bloodstains appearing on her clothes. Also, other circumstances may exist as to how such bloodstains may have been caused on the clothes of a mother in the context of the basic occurrence disclosed by the prosecution.

28. Therefore, we are not in a position to place undue reliance on the presence of bloodstains as claimed by the prosecution on the clothing of the appellant. It may remain one circumstance which may permit plural possibilities. Those may lead to links in different chains of evidence each leading to different conclusions, as to the exact manner of the occurrences.

29. As to motive, the same has not been established by the prosecution. Neither any earlier circumstance or specific dispute has been proven by the prosecution as to the custody of the deceased between Sukhu Kushwaha (P.W.-2) and the appellant with respect to the deceased Nand Lal nor it may be accepted as plausible (on its own strength) that a mother would kill her son by assaulting him brutally with the spade/'Fawda' while he was asleep solely for the reason he may not have agreed to live with her but may have chosen to live with her paternal grand-father. To the extent admittedly Sukhu Kushwaha (P.W.-2) was the paternal grand-father of the deceased and was living with him while the appellant was living with her two sons born from the second marriage. Also, the appellant had not been deprived of the company of the deceased completely. He was visiting his family at the time of the occurrence. Beside, it is wholly unnatural, that the appellant would kill her son whose company and custody she was seeking.

30. In absence of any earlier disputes and further in absence of any specific evidence led by Sukhu Kushwaha (P.W.-2) as to such prior occurrences, we are unable to accept the existence of any motive by the appellant. We may observe that the motive is lacking in the present case.

31. Therefore, in the entire prosecution story, other than the recovery of bloodstained clothing, and of appellant leaving after the occurrence, no circumstance has been proven as may lead to formation of chain of evidence necessary to be established to lead conviction of the appellant. In fact, the prosecution story is found woefully lacking in multiple aspects as discussed above. As to her leaving of the house of her father after the occurrence, she has clearly indicated in her statement made under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that she had been falsely implicated because she had asked for her share in ancestral properties. Having realized that her family was opposed to her claims and they were now seeking to implicate her in the occurrence, her act of moving away from the place of the occurrence may not be read as a circumstance that establishes her guilt.

32. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside. The appellant is in jail. She shall be released forthwith unless she is wanted in any other case. She is directed to furnish bail bond in compliance of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. to the satisfaction of the Court concerned within two months from today.

33. Copy of the judgment along with original record of Court below be transmitted to the Court concerned for necessary compliance. Compliance report be submitted to this Court at the earliest. Office is directed to keep the compliance report on record. Order Date :- 12.8.2025 Prakhar (Tej Pratap Tiwari, J.) (S.D. Singh, J.) PRAKHAR SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

first informant Daroga Singh was examined as P.W.-1. He is not an eye-witness of the occurrence. He proved that the occurrence was caused inside his house where his family members had assembled on the occasion of marriage of his younger daughter, solemnized two days earlier. At the time of the occurrence, his family members were present at his house. He learnt of the occurrence when he heard cries of his family members. He reached the house and found the dead body of the deceased Nand Lal lying on a cot. He also proved that the village Pradhan arrived at the house and the Written Report was prepared thereafter. He proved that Written Report. At the same time, he also proved that the narration in the F.I.R. - that the assault was caused on the deceased, by the appellant with a spade/'Fawda', was made on the strength of facts disclosed to him by others. During his cross- examination, he further proved that he reached the place of occurrence after about half an hour.

10. Next, Sukhu Kushwaha - father of the first husband of the present appellant was examined as P.W.-2. He proved that the appellant was married to his son Saktu. The deceased Nand Lal used to reside with him while the appellant had solemnized second marriage and had two sons born to her from that marriage. He then proved that the appellant visited her maternal home to attend the marriage of her younger sister when the occurrence was caused. He learnt of the occurrence from the police. By the time he reached the house of Daroga Singh (P.W.-1), the dead body of the deceased had been sealed and the police had arrested the appellant. He also tried to prove that the clothing of the appellant bore blood stain marks. During his cross- examination, he specifically stated that he had not seen the occurrence.

11. Thereafter, Lal Keshwar, the witness of inquest was examined as P.W.-3. He proved that fact.

12. Next, Sunil Kumar, a villager, was examined as P.W.-4. He also proved that he learnt about the occurrence from others. Being a witness of the inquest, he proved the same. He proved his signature on the Inquest Report.

13. Thereafter, Ram Suresh, the Village Pradhan, was examined as P.W.-5. He also proved, he reached the house of the informant Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) after the occurrence had been caused.

14. Thereafter, Dr. Manoj Ekka was examined as P.W.-6. He proved the ante mortem injuries and the cause of death.

15. Next, Constable Bhupendra Narayan Singh was examined as P.W.-7. He proved the registration of F.I.R. and the relevant G.D. entries.

16. Thereafter, Investigation Officer - Manoj Kumar Pandey was examined as P.W.-

8. He proved the investigation, recoveries including the blood stained 'saree' from the person of the appellant.

17. Last, Meera Devi, sister-in-law ('bhabhi') of the appellant was examined as P.W.-9. She proved her presence at the place and time of occurrence. In that, she proved that the appellant had arrived to attend the marriage of her younger sister. Her first born son (from her first marriage) i.e. the deceased Nand Lal had also arrived to attend that marriage from the home of his paternal grand-father. She proved that the appellant was disgruntled for reason of deceased Nand Lal living with his paternal grand-father. In that circumstance, deceased attributed to the appellant that she had uttered words to the effect that if the deceased came before her, she would assault him ('Usey Maarengey'). However, the witness did not understand that the appellant intended to kill the deceased. Two days after the marriage of her younger sister, the appellant caused the occurrence by assaulting the deceased with the spade/'Fawda' while he was asleep. At the same time, she proved, she saw the appellant flee from the house wearing a bloodstained 'saree'.

18. During her cross-examination, the said witness (P.W.-9) admitted that the appellant used to reside in her own house located at the distance of about 1 kilometre (from the place of occurrence). In fact, the latter had come to the house of her father Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) to attend the marriage of her younger sister. She also admitted, her statement was not recorded during the investigation but only her presence was recorded in the investigation. As to how she learnt about the occurrence, she appears to have narrated that she saw the dead body and raised alarm. She specifically stated, she had not seen the occurrence being caused by the appellant.

19. Thereafter, statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. She completely denied her role in the occurrence and suggested false implication for reason of claiming a share in the family property.

20. In such state of evidence, learned court below has convicted the appellant and sentenced him, as noted above.

21. Submission of learned counsel for the appellant is, present is a case of circumstantial evidence, only. Absolutely, no direct evidence exists. As to the circumstantial evidence, the occurrence was caused not inside the house of the present appellant but at the house of her father Daroga Singh (P.W.-1). There not only his immediate family members but presence of his other family members and relatives was established by the prosecution - to attend the marriage of his younger daughter. Therefore, in the context of case built solely on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution never excluded multiple possibilities of the occurrence being caused by any of the other members or persons present inside the house of Daroga Singh (P.W.-1), at the time of occurrence.

22. Second, it has been strenuously urged, the appellant is the mother of the deceased. She may never have any motive to kill her own son. In any case, no motive has been ascribed. Merely because the deceased was living with her paternal grand-father in a situation where the appellant had re-married and was living with her two children born to that marriage, the motive ascribed is wholly weak, if at all.

23. Third, no other circumstance - either of recovery made at the pointing out by the appellant or any other recovery has been made as may lead the Court to the conclusion that the appellant alone may have caused such heinous offence. In that regard, it has been stressed, in the first place, there is no valid Recovery Memo with respect to blood stained 'saree' described recovered, from the person of the appellant, at the time of her arrest. Referring to the reports of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Varanasi, it has been stressed, no scientific evidence exists to establish that the blood stains on the 'saree' described worn by the appellant was of the deceased or that his blood type matched. Thus, the chain of evidence required to be completed by the prosecution not only to establish that the appellant may have caused the occurrence but the occurrence may not have been caused by any other person or in any other way, was not established. Learned court below has completely erred in law in invoking Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. The scope of that section is clearly alien to the facts brought by the prosecution.

24. On the other hand, learned A.G.A. would submit, the F.I.R. was lodged by none other than the father of the present appellant. It is wholly prompt. The recovery of the 'saree' with blood stains from the person of the appellant (on her arrest) exists. Statement was made by Meera Devi (P.W.-9) that the appellant fled after causing the occurrence. Further, it has been stressed, sufficient evidence has been led to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant alone had caused the occurrence.

25. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, in the first place, present is not a case of direct evidence. Though no rule of law may pre-exist or operate in such facts, at the same time, we find it remarkable that an occurrence caused inside the house of the first informant Daroga Singh (P.W.-1), that too soon after the marriage of the younger daughter, when his family and some nearest relatives were present in the house, no eye-witness account emerged at the hands of the prosecution – as to the actual occurrence, caused upon daylight. Here, we also note, no detailed description of the exact place of the occurrence caused inside the house of the Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) was disclosed or narrated by the prosecution, either in the F.I.R. or at the trial. A bald narration appears that the appellant had assaulted her son with the spade/'Fawda' inside the house of Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) in the morning hours of 01.05.2015. No family member saw and no family member heard anything before Meera Devi (P.W.-9) claimed to see - the appellant flee from the place of occurrence. No cry let out by the deceased or other distress call or noise was heard, by anyone.

26. Thus, the prosecution story emerged solely at the pointing out of Meera Devi (P.W.-9) having seen the appellant flee from the house wearing a blood-stained 'saree'. At the same time, all prosecution witness of fact have admitted that the occurrence was caused two days after the 'Vidai' ceremony following the marriage of the younger daughter of the first informant Daroga Singh (P.W.-1). They also established the presence of the immediate family members of the said Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) inside his house. They further established that the present appellant was not a permanent resident of that dwelling house. She used to live with her two children born from her second marriage, at her own dwelling house situate about 1 kilometre from the place of occurrence. No other disclosure exists why the appellant stayed in the house of her father Daroga Singh (P.W.-1) after the marriage of her sister was over. Thus, the prosecution appears to have assumed that the appellant continued to live in her father's house to cause the occurrence. Also, she chose to stay with all her family members though she was motived to kill the deceased (her son). She did not chose to go with the deceased to her own house.

27. As to the evidence of Meera Devi (P.W.-9) having seen the appellant flee from the house wearing a blood stained 'saree', in the first place, there is no Recovery Memo proven by the prosecution of that blood stained 'saree'. Assuming that the material exhibit i.e. 'saree' had been proven, the report by Forensic Science Laboratory does not establish that the blood stains on that 'saree' had been caused by the blood of the deceased. The report only suggests blood was of human origin. Even then in the context of the admitted relationship of the mother and son between the appellant and the deceased, presence of that blood, if at all, may not eliminate the normal circumstances/behavioural reactions that may arise in such facts, wherein a mother may remain the first responder/reactor, to the discovery of such an occurrence. On going towards the dead body of her son who may have been assaulted with a spade/'Fawda' as described by the prosecution, may itself led to such bloodstains appearing on her clothes. Also, other circumstances may exist as to how such bloodstains may have been caused on the clothes of a mother in the context of the basic occurrence disclosed by the prosecution.

28. Therefore, we are not in a position to place undue reliance on the presence of bloodstains as claimed by the prosecution on the clothing of the appellant. It may remain one circumstance which may permit plural possibilities. Those may lead to links in different chains of evidence each leading to different conclusions, as to the exact manner of the occurrences.

29. As to motive, the same has not been established by the prosecution. Neither any earlier circumstance or specific dispute has been proven by the prosecution as to the custody of the deceased between Sukhu Kushwaha (P.W.-2) and the appellant with respect to the deceased Nand Lal nor it may be accepted as plausible (on its own strength) that a mother would kill her son by assaulting him brutally with the spade/'Fawda' while he was asleep solely for the reason he may not have agreed to live with her but may have chosen to live with her paternal grand-father. To the extent admittedly Sukhu Kushwaha (P.W.-2) was the paternal grand-father of the deceased and was living with him while the appellant was living with her two sons born from the second marriage. Also, the appellant had not been deprived of the company of the deceased completely. He was visiting his family at the time of the occurrence. Beside, it is wholly unnatural, that the appellant would kill her son whose company and custody she was seeking.

30. In absence of any earlier disputes and further in absence of any specific evidence led by Sukhu Kushwaha (P.W.-2) as to such prior occurrences, we are unable to accept the existence of any motive by the appellant. We may observe that the motive is lacking in the present case.

31. Therefore, in the entire prosecution story, other than the recovery of bloodstained clothing, and of appellant leaving after the occurrence, no circumstance has been proven as may lead to formation of chain of evidence necessary to be established to lead conviction of the appellant. In fact, the prosecution story is found woefully lacking in multiple aspects as discussed above. As to her leaving of the house of her father after the occurrence, she has clearly indicated in her statement made under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that she had been falsely implicated because she had asked for her share in ancestral properties. Having realized that her family was opposed to her claims and they were now seeking to implicate her in the occurrence, her act of moving away from the place of the occurrence may not be read as a circumstance that establishes her guilt.

32. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside. The appellant is in jail. She shall be released forthwith unless she is wanted in any other case. She is directed to furnish bail bond in compliance of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. to the satisfaction of the Court concerned within two months from today.

33. Copy of the judgment along with original record of Court below be transmitted to the Court concerned for necessary compliance. Compliance report be submitted to this Court at the earliest. Office is directed to keep the compliance report on record. Order Date :- 12.8.2025 Prakhar (Tej Pratap Tiwari, J.) (S.D. Singh, J.) PRAKHAR SRIVASTAVA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad