High Court · 2025
Case Details
Acts & Sections
Judgment
1. Heard Sri Anoop Baranwal and Sri Juned Alam, Sri Nitya Prakash Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Akhilesh Kumar Dwivedi, learned counsel for the respondent No.- 5 and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents.
2. At the very outset, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioner Nos.- 1, 2 and 5, namely, Brajesh Mani Tripathi, Pradyumn Rao and Arvind Pati Tripathi have already withdrawn their petition as they stood subsequently promoted as Registrar, Kanungo and the withdrawal application have already stood allowed in their respect, and now a statement is made that petitioner No.- 3, namely Awadhesh Mishra does not want to press this petition as he also stood promoted as Registrar Kanungo and hence he wants to withdraw this petition.
3. Sri Akhilesh Kumar Dwivedi, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent No.- 5 and learned Standing Counsel representing State respondents have no objections to the writ petition being withdrawn at the behest of petitioner No.- 3. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn on behalf of the respondent No.- 3.
It is also agreed between the parties that respondent No.- 5, namely Markandey Mani Tripathi has also been promoted subsequently as Registrar Kanungo and hence he also has no stakes in the matter.
5. The petitioner No.- 5 before this Court, who was working as Lekhpal and had requisite number of experience of service to spread as required the U.P. Subordinate Revenue Clerk (Registrar, Kanungo and Assistant Registrar, Kanungo) Service Rules, 1958 (herein after referred to as ‘Service Rules, 1958’) came to be promoted on account of recommendations made in his favour on the basis of selection conducted by a four member committee constituted for the purposes to assess the candidature of a candidates working as Lekhpal with the department vide Rule 8(2) (b) of Service Rules, 1958. Upon being given total marks 46 by adding marks in different heads he scored the highest marks. A chart allocating the marks to the eligible candidates while considering their candidature by four member committee has been 2 of 19 brought on record as Annexure-3 to the supplementary affidavit. This chart discloses that besides the details of service and qualifications and the place of residence of candidates, the further heads prescribed were relating to the annual appraisal and assessment of annual entries of the last five years as well as marks allotted on the basis of academic qualification and also the marks awarded to the candidates in interview conducted by the committee.
6. However, later on, promotions made on the basis of recommendations made by the four member committee qua these successful candidates including the petitioner, came to be cancelled vide order dated 24th January, 2008 on account of irregularities cited in the selection process for being de hors the procedure prescribed under the Service Rules, 1958. It is this order which is put to challenge in this petition.
7. In order to put the record straight, it is necessary to state further that earlier writ petition was dismissed by learned Single Judge of this Court vide judgment and order dated 27th July, 2010 holding that Rules 1974 would be taken to have overridden Service Rules, 1958 and hence in any circumstance, the criteria of seniority could not have been diluted with merits. The said judgment upon being challenged in special appeal vide Special Appeal No.- 1238 of 2010, the Division Bench doubted the view taken by the learned Single Judge for two reasons: firstly, learned Single Judge did not 3 of 19 notice the impact of special service rules, 1958 specially framed for the services of department which prescribed for selection to assess fitness of a candidate for departmental promotion; and secondly, the order impugned in the writ petition which came to be affirmed by his Lordship absolutely ignored the relevant provisions of Service Rules, 1958 inasmuch as the criteria adopted for selection relating to the academic qualifications and assessment of the annual entries of these employees of the last five years.
8. It is in these circumstances that the Division Bench set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge on 27th July, 2010 dismissing this petition and remitted the matter for a decision afresh.
9. Now, this is how this petition is before this Court to be decided on merits but since four out of five petitioners have already stood promoted subsequently as Registrar Kanungo and respondent No.- 5 is also promoted, the Court confines its scrutiny and examination as to the merit of the petitioner and relevancy of Rules, 1958, even after Rules, 1974 coming into force.
10. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel sought to defend the order on the ground that State Government having framed Rules, 1994 clearly mandated that hence onwards for the purposes of post or service governed under the rule making power of the 4 of 19 Governor, shall be governed by the criteria as laid down in Rule 4 of Rules, 1994.
11. It is submitted that Rules, 1994 having been brought into effect exercising power under the proviso to Article 309, may have an overriding effect over and above departmental Service Rules, 1958, though the same has also been brought into force exercising power under proviso to Rule 309.
12. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel though sought to defend the points raised in the order impugned regarding anomalies and discrepancies occurred in the selection process but failed to counter the government orders that have been issued subsequently by the State Government laying down the criteria for the purposes of awarding marks in interview and also the marks on the basis of the assessment of service records.
13. Meeting the submissions learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before the Court a judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ganesh Prasad and others v. State of U.P. and others in Writ – A No.- 25811 of 2009 decided on 2nd December, 2013 in which vide paragraphs 8 and 9 it has been held thus: “8. The aforesaid rules have been discussed by this Court in Writ Petition No.45999 of 2013 (Jagvir Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.) decided on 3.9.2013, wherein this Court in para 8 and 9 has said: 5 of 19 "8. Rule 8(2)(b) and (d) of Rules, 1958 makes it very clear that criteria for promotion is suitability for which relevant guidelines /traits are indicated in Rule 8(2)(d). The aforesaid criteria cannot be at par with seniority subject to rejection of unfit but here the criteria is sheer suitability for promotion for which the relevant aspects to be considered are also indicated in the rules. The Selection Committee, in the present case, has considered all the eligible persons and thereafter has made its recommendation, which has been accepted and promotion has been made. It is not the case of the petitioner that Selection Committee has any malice or otherwise committed illegality in the matter of selection. It is also not the case of petitioner that he has not at all been considered by the Selection Committee.
9. In these facts and circumstances this Court do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order of promotion since judicial review in such matter is very limited. In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke and others Versus Dr.B.S.Mahajan and others reported in 1990(1) SCC 305 a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court considering the scope of judicial review in selection matters observed as under: "It is needless to emphasise that it is not the function of the court to hear appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committees and to scrutinize the relative merits of the candidates. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee, which has the expertise on the subject. The court has no such expertise. The decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc. It is not disputed that in the present case the University has constituted the Committee in due compliance with the relevant statutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it selected the candidates after going through all the relevant material before it. In sitting in appeal over the selection so made and in setting it aside on the ground of the so called comparative merits of the candidates as assessed by the court, the High Court went wrong and exceeded its jurisdiction." (Para-12)
9. The exposition of law, laid down above, makes it very clear that it is not sheer seniority, which has to be seen in the matter but vide Rule 8(2)(d), Selection Committee will have to look into entire details of service, integrity, character, intelligence and ability with preference to those candidates having better education qualification and service record and thereafter fitness of candidates would be decided.” 6 of 19
14. The said judgment has been further followed in the case of Jagdev Singh v. State of U.P. and others in Writ – A No.- 45999 of 2013 decided on 3rd September, 2013.
15. To buttress the argument regarding merit cum seniority as is claimed to be borne out of conjoint reading of Rule 7 and Rule 8 of Service Rules, 1958, learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon authority of Supreme Court in the case of Sarat Kumar Dash and others v. Biswajit Patnaik and others, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 434 in which vide paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 the Court has held thus: “8. In case of merit-cum-suitability, the seniority should have no role to play when the candidates were found to be meritorious and suitable for higher posts. Even a juniormost man may steal a march over his seniors and jump the queue for accelerated promotion. This principle inculcates dedicated service, and accelerates ability and encourages merit to improve excellence. The seniority would have its due place only where the merit and ability are approximately equal or where it is not possible to assess inter se merit and the suitability of two equally eligible competing candidates who come very close in the order of merit and ability. Under those circumstances, the seniority will play its due role and calls it in aid for consideration. But in case where the relative merit and suitability or ability have been considered and evaluated, and found to be superior, then the seniority has no role to play. In our view the PSC has evolved correct procedure in grading the officers and the marks have been awarded according to the grading. It is seen that the four officers have come in the grading of ‘B’. In consequence, the PSC had adopted the seniority of the appellants and Panda in the lower cadre in recommending their cases for appointment in the order of merit.
9. Mr Mehta, the learned counsel for the respondent-J.P. Mishra contended that the PSC itself has evolved grading of outstanding, very good, good, satisfactory, average etc. from C Rs which is not open to the PSC to evolve grading. We cannot accept that contention to be correct. Firstly, this contention was not raised in the Tribunal and secondly, from the file produced before us by the 7 of 19 PSC, it is clear that they have seen the grading was given by the Government and they evolved the criteria of giving marks on the basis of the grading given by the Government. With regard to the merit and ability this Court has consistently been following the view as extracted herein from Capoor case [(1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : (1974) 1 SCR 797] in other decisions vide R.S. Dass v. Union of India [1986 Supp SCC 617 : (1987) 2 ATC 628] , National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. Dr K. Kalyana Raman [1992 Supp (2) SCC 481, para 7 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 959 : (1992) 21 ATC 680 : AIR 1992 SC 1806] and Syed Khalid Rizvi v. Union of India [1993 Supp (3) SCC 575, 584-86 (paras 8 and 9) : 1994 SCC (L&S) 84 : (1994) 26 ATC 192] .
10. Accordingly, we hold that the principle of “merit-cum- suitability with due regard to seniority” has been correctly applied on the facts in this case. We have also seen that the PSC has objectively evolved the criteria and determined the merit and suitability of the candidates. In R.S. Dass case [1986 Supp SCC 617 : (1987) 2 ATC 628] the amended Rule 5(2) of the IAS (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, Rule 5(4) evolved the principle to classify eligible officers as, outstanding, very good, good or unfit, as the case may be, on an overall-relative assessment of their service record. Rule 5(5) directed to prepare list and include the candidates for appointment to the required number of vacancies. Considering the Rule at p. 631 in para 16 and following the ratio in Capoor case [(1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : (1974) 1 SCR 797] this Court held that the grading was for the purpose of being placed in the select list to ensure that select list is drawn up on the basis of merit and suitability and to obviate the necessity of giving reasons for the supersession of any officer. In para 18 at p. 632, it was further held that there was no necessity to record any reason, in view of the amended statutory provisions. Therefore, the criticism of the Tribunal that due regard to the seniority was not given is not correct.”
16. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the records and the order impugned and having closely examined the relevant rules and also having gone through the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the questions that arise for consideration is, as to whether petitioner’s selection for promotion on the post of Registrar Kanungo was in consonance with procedure laid down under Rule 7 read with Rule 8 of 19 8 (2) (d) and whether in the event 1994 Rules coming into force the criteria should have been chiefly seniority and in no circumstances, a junior person could have been superseded.
17. In order to find the answer to this above question, I first proceed to appreciate Service Rules, 1958. Relevant Rule 1, 7 and 8 of Service Rules, 1958 in their entirety are reproduced hereunder: “1. Short title and commencement. - These rules may be called the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Ministerial (Registrar Kanungos and Assistant Registrar Kanungos) Service Rules, 1958 and shall take effect from the date of publication of the notification.
7. Sources of recruitment. - Recruitment to the cadre of Registrar Kanungos shall be made by promotion of permanent Assistant Registrar Kanungos of at least three years’ standing and to the cadre of Assistant Registrar Kanungos by promotion of Lekhpals of at least six years’ standing. Note – A Supervisor Kanungo, who through age or infirmity is unfit to carry out the field duties of a Supervisor Kanungo, shall also be eligible for appointment as Registrar Kanungo.
8. Method of recruitment. - (i) For purposes of recruitment of Registrar Kanungos under rule 7, selection shall be made on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit from amongst the permanent Assistant Registrar Kanungos who have put in not less than three years’ service as such on the first day of January of the year in which the selection is made. (ii) (a) For purposes of recruitment of Assistant Registrar Kanungos selection shall be made on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit from amongst the Lekhpals who have been nominated under clause (b) of this sub-rule. Note – A candidate who is rejected as unfit will be held unfit for that occasion only and his case will be duly considered at every subsequent selection. (b) The Collector shall, in September each year, ascertain the likely number of vacancies in the district cadre of Assistant Registrar Kanungo and ask each Sub-Divisional Officer in his district to nominate, after the winter tour, a certain number of Lekhpals, to be fixed by him, who have put in not less than six years’ service as 9 of 19 Lekhpal on the first day of January of the year in which the nomination is made, have passed the Junior or High School Examination (with English) or an equivalent or higher examination of the State, are not more than 35 years of age on the first day of January of the year in which the nomination is made and are considered suitable for promotion as Assistant Registrar Kanungos. Provided that preference shall be given to those with better educational qualifications and record of service. (c) The Collector will consider the case of all the candidates nomination under clause (b) and may, at his discretion, interview at the headquarters of the district such of them as he may consider necessary. (d) In selecting the candidates for promotion regard shall be had to- (1) record of previous service, (2) integrity, (3) character, and (4) intelligence and ability, preference being given to those with better educational qualifications and record of service. (e) The Collector shall prepare a list containing the names of Lekhpals whom he has selected for promotion. The number of candidates on the list shall be as indicated in clause (f) below: (f) The names of Lekhpals selected under clause (a) above shall be brought on a list to be maintained by the Collector for his district. The names of listed candidates shall be arranged according to the date of their selection, provided the Lekhpals selected on the same date shall rank inter se according to their substantive pay prior to selection, and, if of equal pay, according to the length of their service. The number of Lekhpals on the list shall be approximately, two-thirds of the number of vacancies likely to occur in the district cadre of Assistant Registrar Kanungos over a period of three years but shall not be less than two-thirds of the number of Assistant Registrar Kanungos sanctioned for the district.”
18. Upon a bare reading of preamble to the rules, I find that the Rules, 1958 have come to be framed invoking power vested under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to provide for 10 of 19 recruitment and promotion rules in respect of Registrar Kanungo and Assistant Registrar Kanungo. Rule 1 provides for title whereas Rule 7 provides for sources qua recruitment though promotion to the post of Registrar Kanungo and Assistant Registrar Kanungo, prescribing for minimum 3 years and 6 years service respectively for the Lekhpal (feeding cadre) to be promoted against two positions. Recruitment procedure prescribed under Rule 8(2)(d) lays down the criteria for the purposes of promotion by way of selection. I further notice that four points have been prescribed for the assessment of the merits and that are: (i) Old service records; (ii). Integrity; (iii). Character; and (iv). Intelligence. Naturally, service records and integrity would relate to entries made in the character role of the employee and the character would reflect from the entries of the service book and intelligence would certainly mean assessment in interview, if it is held.
19. As I have already noticed above, the selection chart prescribed for marks in respect of the annual entries, the academic records and also the interview. The Government order that have been brought on record and have not been disputed by the state respondents prescribed for 5 years assessment of character roles and service records of the last five years of candidates seeking promotion and last 10 years’ character role for the purposes of entries. 11 of 19
20. A guideline issued by the department concerned lays down the criteria for allotment of marks for High School and Intermediate Certificates, 10 marks for first division, 6 marks for second division and 3 marks for third division.
21. Now, looking to the chart which has been appended along with supplementary affidavit and has not been disputed, I find that petitioner has been awarded full marks for outstanding entries, so in all 20 marks of five years, there has been no adverse entry and 10 marks each for High School and Intermediate for he having passed in first division, totalling to 40 marks and then has been awarded 6 marks in interview, thus totalling to 46 marks in all and I find it to be the highest marks awarded to any candidate in the chart.
22. The order impugned does not disclose as to in what manner the procedure prescribed had not been followed. It talks of consideration of entries of the entire service period quite contrary to the circular letters issued by the department itself.
23. There is no counter affidavit filed to the supplementary affidavit, questioning the circular letters and criteria adopted and the averments made in that regard in supplementary affidavit.
24. Thus, the point as sought to be raised in the order impugned regarding preparation of merit list, does not find favour from the records before the Court, inasmuch as Rule 7 and 8 if read together, 12 of 19 any person of a prudent mind would come to conclude that the criteria laid down under the relevant service rules was merit cum seniority.
25. The relevant paragraphs of Supreme Court that have been reproduced herein above and which have been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner emphasise absolutely on this aspect of the matter that when merit cum seniority is there, then merit has to be taken into consideration in the first instance and the seniority will be the secondary one.
26. Insofar as the other point is concerned regarding overriding effect of Rules 1994, there are two judgments of coordinate Bench of this Court which have reiterated that Service Rules, 1958 would prevail.
27. So far as the promotion for the post in question is concerned, and Rule 8(2)(d) has been emphasised as mandatory for the selection committee for selecting candidates for the purposes of promotion on the post of Assistant Registrar Kanungo, needless to add, the Registrar Kanungo is also a post given under the said rules which lay down same criteria, though Rules, 1994 had not been taken into account by earlier Single Judge Bench and the matter under remand relates to the issue as to the binding effect of service rules 1958 after coming into force of 1994 Rules. 13 of 19
28. I proceed to examine this law point as well, to find answer to the second question as framed above. The U.P. Government Servants Criterion for Recruitment by Promotion Rules, 1994 is reproduced in its entirety hereunder: “In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the Government is pleased to make the following rules:
1. Short title, commencement and application. - (1) These rules may be called the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Criterion for Recruitment by Promotion Rules, 1994. (2) They shall come into force at once. (3) They shall apply to a recruitment by promotion to a post or service for which no consultation with the Public Service Commission is required on the principles to be followed in making promotions under the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (Limitation of Functions) Regulations, 1954, as amended from time to time.
2. Overriding effect. - These rules shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other service rules made by the Governor under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or orders for the time being in force.
3. Definitions. - Unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context: (a) “Constitution” means the Constitution of India; (b) “Governor” means the Governor of Uttar Pradesh; (c) “Post” or “Service” means a post or service under the rule- making power of the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution.
4. Criterion for recruitment by promotion.- Recruitment by promotion to the post of Head of Department, to a post just one rank below the Head of Department and to a post in any service carrrying the pay scale the maximum of which is Rs18,300/- or above shall be made on the basis of merit, and to the rest of the posts, in all services to be filled by promotion, including a post where promotion is made from a non-Gazetted post to a Gazetted 14 of 19 post or from one service to another service, shall be made on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit.”
29. There is no preamble to the rules attached except for the title and commencement and its application. Vide clause 1.3 it is provided under the rules that this would apply for the post not covered by Public Service Commission for the purposes of promotion from lower cadre to a higher cadre. Rule 4 further provides that rules would be attracted only in the matter of post other than the head of department. The language and the import of the rules, therefore, clearly appear to indicate that these are general rules framed for the purposes of promotion in government service and not specific to a particular department.
30. Applying the principles of applicability of rules framed in general, in my considered view, where there are no procedures prescribed for the purposes of promotion, then general rules of recruitment by way of promotion 1994 Rules would be applicable but where the rules framed taking recourse to the same power vide proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution for a particular department, then those rules would be liable to be termed as special rules framed for the purposes of recruitment and promotion in a particular department and, therefore, would have primacy and would, therefore, definitely occupying the field. 15 of 19
31. The doctrine of eclipse is attracted in those cases where the special rules are framed to overshadow the existing rules. Had it been the intention of the rule making authority, then the rule making authority would have also provided for repeal and saving clause. Rules, 1994 are absolutely silent. Both the rules having been framed invoking the provisions contained under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, in my view, the general rules would not be having overriding effect upon the special rules and hence Rules, 1994 would not be taken to have overshadowed the Service Rules, 1958 which are specific to the department and the posts as well.
32. Recruitment and promotion Service Rules, 1958 are common rules of recruitment and promotion whereas the Rules 1994 are only promotion rules and so naturally these rules would be attracted only where there is no promotion rule provided in of the Government departments. Even though a non obstant cause has been used vide Rule 2 seems to be giving it an overriding effect, it would not have any override effect over and above special rules framed especially for a particular department of a government establishment.
33. In my above view, I am supported by authorities of Supreme Court in the case of R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka and another (1992) 1 SCC 335, wherein relying upon “Interpretation 16 of 19 of Statutes” by Maxwell vide paragraph 7 the Supreme Court has held thus: “7. …….In Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, this principle of law is stated as under: (11th edn., page 168) “A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication. Generalia specialibus non derogant, or, in other words, ‘where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. In such cases it is presumed to have only general cases in view, and not particular cases which have been already otherwise provided for by the special Act.” In Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur v. Thakur Manmohan Dey [AIR 1966 SC 1931 : (1966) 3 SCR 663] applying this principle it is held that general law does not abrogate earlier special law by mere implication. In Eileen Louise Nicolle v. John Winter Nicolle [(1922) 1 AC 284] , Lord Phillimore observed as under: “It is no doubt a sound principle of all jurisprudence that a prior particular law is not easily to be held to be abrogated by a posterior law, expressed in general terms and by the apparent generality of its language applicable to and covering a number of cases of which the particular law is but one. This as a matter of jurisprudence, as understood in England, has been laid down in a great number of cases, whether the prior law be an express statute … or be the underlying common or customary law of the country. … ‘Where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation … that earlier and special legislation is not to be held indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so’. ” In Justiniano Augusto De Piedade Barreto v. Antonio Vicente Da Fonseca [(1979) 3 SCC 47 : AIR 1979 SC 984] this Court observed that a law which is essentially general in nature may contain special provisions on certain matters and in respect of these matters it would be classified as a special law. Therefore unless the special law is abrogated by express repeal or by making provisions which are wholly inconsistent with it, the special law cannot be held to have been abrogated by mere implication.”
34. In view of the above, questions framed stand answered in favour of the petitioner. 17 of 19
35. The writ petition thus succeeds and is allowed. The order impugned dated 24th January, 2008 is hereby quashed.
36. Petitioner No.-5 shall stand promoted with effect from the date he was promoted Registrar Kanungo initially and since this promotion was wholly illegally set aside, he shall also be entitled to all consequential benefits including arrears of salary for the post of Supervisor Kanungo in the light of an authority of Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Boardv. C. Muddaiah (2007) 7 SCC 689, which is reproduced hereunder: "33. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. It is true that while granting a relief in favour of a party, the Court must consider the relevant provisions of law and issue appropriate directions keeping in view such provisions. There may, however, be cases where on the facts and in the circumstances, the Court may issue necessary directions in the larger interest of justice keeping in view the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Take a case, where ex facie injustice has been meted out to an employee. In spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. His representations have been illegally and unjustifiably turned down. He finally approaches a Court of Law. The Court is convinced that gross injustice has been done to him and he was wrongfully, unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of those benefits. The Court, in the circumstances, directs the Authority to extend all benefits which he would have obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it open to the Authorities in such case to urge that as he has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he would not be granted the benefits? Upholding of such plea would amount to allowing a party to take undue advantage of his own wrong. It would perpetrate injustice rather than doing justice to the person wronged. 34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is 'no work no pay'. In appropriate cases, however, a Court of Law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The Court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The Court may in the circumstances, direct the Authority to grant him all benefits considering 'as if he had worked'. It, 18 of 19 therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of Law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the Authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case). The bald contention of the appellant-Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected."
37. The authority shall determine pay scale and pay grade of the petitioner treating him to be promoted w.e.f. 28th September, 2007. The department shall redraw the seniority accordingly and petitioner would also be entitled to further promotion as per the relevant service rules.
38. Cost made easy. Order Date :- 10.7.2025 Atmesh 19 of 19
It is also agreed between the parties that respondent No.- 5, namely Markandey Mani Tripathi has also been promoted subsequently as Registrar Kanungo and hence he also has no stakes in the matter.
5. The petitioner No.- 5 before this Court, who was working as Lekhpal and had requisite number of experience of service to spread as required the U.P. Subordinate Revenue Clerk (Registrar, Kanungo and Assistant Registrar, Kanungo) Service Rules, 1958 (herein after referred to as ‘Service Rules, 1958’) came to be promoted on account of recommendations made in his favour on the basis of selection conducted by a four member committee constituted for the purposes to assess the candidature of a candidates working as Lekhpal with the department vide Rule 8(2) (b) of Service Rules, 1958. Upon being given total marks 46 by adding marks in different heads he scored the highest marks. A chart allocating the marks to the eligible candidates while considering their candidature by four member committee has been 2 of 19 brought on record as Annexure-3 to the supplementary affidavit. This chart discloses that besides the details of service and qualifications and the place of residence of candidates, the further heads prescribed were relating to the annual appraisal and assessment of annual entries of the last five years as well as marks allotted on the basis of academic qualification and also the marks awarded to the candidates in interview conducted by the committee.
6. However, later on, promotions made on the basis of recommendations made by the four member committee qua these successful candidates including the petitioner, came to be cancelled vide order dated 24th January, 2008 on account of irregularities cited in the selection process for being de hors the procedure prescribed under the Service Rules, 1958. It is this order which is put to challenge in this petition.
7. In order to put the record straight, it is necessary to state further that earlier writ petition was dismissed by learned Single Judge of this Court vide judgment and order dated 27th July, 2010 holding that Rules 1974 would be taken to have overridden Service Rules, 1958 and hence in any circumstance, the criteria of seniority could not have been diluted with merits. The said judgment upon being challenged in special appeal vide Special Appeal No.- 1238 of 2010, the Division Bench doubted the view taken by the learned Single Judge for two reasons: firstly, learned Single Judge did not 3 of 19 notice the impact of special service rules, 1958 specially framed for the services of department which prescribed for selection to assess fitness of a candidate for departmental promotion; and secondly, the order impugned in the writ petition which came to be affirmed by his Lordship absolutely ignored the relevant provisions of Service Rules, 1958 inasmuch as the criteria adopted for selection relating to the academic qualifications and assessment of the annual entries of these employees of the last five years.
8. It is in these circumstances that the Division Bench set aside the judgment of learned Single Judge on 27th July, 2010 dismissing this petition and remitted the matter for a decision afresh.
9. Now, this is how this petition is before this Court to be decided on merits but since four out of five petitioners have already stood promoted subsequently as Registrar Kanungo and respondent No.- 5 is also promoted, the Court confines its scrutiny and examination as to the merit of the petitioner and relevancy of Rules, 1958, even after Rules, 1974 coming into force.
10. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel sought to defend the order on the ground that State Government having framed Rules, 1994 clearly mandated that hence onwards for the purposes of post or service governed under the rule making power of the 4 of 19 Governor, shall be governed by the criteria as laid down in Rule 4 of Rules, 1994.
11. It is submitted that Rules, 1994 having been brought into effect exercising power under the proviso to Article 309, may have an overriding effect over and above departmental Service Rules, 1958, though the same has also been brought into force exercising power under proviso to Rule 309.
12. Learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel though sought to defend the points raised in the order impugned regarding anomalies and discrepancies occurred in the selection process but failed to counter the government orders that have been issued subsequently by the State Government laying down the criteria for the purposes of awarding marks in interview and also the marks on the basis of the assessment of service records.
13. Meeting the submissions learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before the Court a judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ganesh Prasad and others v. State of U.P. and others in Writ – A No.- 25811 of 2009 decided on 2nd December, 2013 in which vide paragraphs 8 and 9 it has been held thus: “8. The aforesaid rules have been discussed by this Court in Writ Petition No.45999 of 2013 (Jagvir Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.) decided on 3.9.2013, wherein this Court in para 8 and 9 has said: 5 of 19 "8. Rule 8(2)(b) and (d) of Rules, 1958 makes it very clear that criteria for promotion is suitability for which relevant guidelines /traits are indicated in Rule 8(2)(d). The aforesaid criteria cannot be at par with seniority subject to rejection of unfit but here the criteria is sheer suitability for promotion for which the relevant aspects to be considered are also indicated in the rules. The Selection Committee, in the present case, has considered all the eligible persons and thereafter has made its recommendation, which has been accepted and promotion has been made. It is not the case of the petitioner that Selection Committee has any malice or otherwise committed illegality in the matter of selection. It is also not the case of petitioner that he has not at all been considered by the Selection Committee.
9. In these facts and circumstances this Court do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order of promotion since judicial review in such matter is very limited. In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke and others Versus Dr.B.S.Mahajan and others reported in 1990(1) SCC 305 a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Hon'ble Apex Court considering the scope of judicial review in selection matters observed as under: "It is needless to emphasise that it is not the function of the court to hear appeals over the decisions of the Selection Committees and to scrutinize the relative merits of the candidates. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee, which has the expertise on the subject. The court has no such expertise. The decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc. It is not disputed that in the present case the University has constituted the Committee in due compliance with the relevant statutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it selected the candidates after going through all the relevant material before it. In sitting in appeal over the selection so made and in setting it aside on the ground of the so called comparative merits of the candidates as assessed by the court, the High Court went wrong and exceeded its jurisdiction." (Para-12)
9. The exposition of law, laid down above, makes it very clear that it is not sheer seniority, which has to be seen in the matter but vide Rule 8(2)(d), Selection Committee will have to look into entire details of service, integrity, character, intelligence and ability with preference to those candidates having better education qualification and service record and thereafter fitness of candidates would be decided.” 6 of 19
14. The said judgment has been further followed in the case of Jagdev Singh v. State of U.P. and others in Writ – A No.- 45999 of 2013 decided on 3rd September, 2013.
15. To buttress the argument regarding merit cum seniority as is claimed to be borne out of conjoint reading of Rule 7 and Rule 8 of Service Rules, 1958, learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon authority of Supreme Court in the case of Sarat Kumar Dash and others v. Biswajit Patnaik and others, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 434 in which vide paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 the Court has held thus: “8. In case of merit-cum-suitability, the seniority should have no role to play when the candidates were found to be meritorious and suitable for higher posts. Even a juniormost man may steal a march over his seniors and jump the queue for accelerated promotion. This principle inculcates dedicated service, and accelerates ability and encourages merit to improve excellence. The seniority would have its due place only where the merit and ability are approximately equal or where it is not possible to assess inter se merit and the suitability of two equally eligible competing candidates who come very close in the order of merit and ability. Under those circumstances, the seniority will play its due role and calls it in aid for consideration. But in case where the relative merit and suitability or ability have been considered and evaluated, and found to be superior, then the seniority has no role to play. In our view the PSC has evolved correct procedure in grading the officers and the marks have been awarded according to the grading. It is seen that the four officers have come in the grading of ‘B’. In consequence, the PSC had adopted the seniority of the appellants and Panda in the lower cadre in recommending their cases for appointment in the order of merit.
9. Mr Mehta, the learned counsel for the respondent-J.P. Mishra contended that the PSC itself has evolved grading of outstanding, very good, good, satisfactory, average etc. from C Rs which is not open to the PSC to evolve grading. We cannot accept that contention to be correct. Firstly, this contention was not raised in the Tribunal and secondly, from the file produced before us by the 7 of 19 PSC, it is clear that they have seen the grading was given by the Government and they evolved the criteria of giving marks on the basis of the grading given by the Government. With regard to the merit and ability this Court has consistently been following the view as extracted herein from Capoor case [(1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : (1974) 1 SCR 797] in other decisions vide R.S. Dass v. Union of India [1986 Supp SCC 617 : (1987) 2 ATC 628] , National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. Dr K. Kalyana Raman [1992 Supp (2) SCC 481, para 7 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 959 : (1992) 21 ATC 680 : AIR 1992 SC 1806] and Syed Khalid Rizvi v. Union of India [1993 Supp (3) SCC 575, 584-86 (paras 8 and 9) : 1994 SCC (L&S) 84 : (1994) 26 ATC 192] .
10. Accordingly, we hold that the principle of “merit-cum- suitability with due regard to seniority” has been correctly applied on the facts in this case. We have also seen that the PSC has objectively evolved the criteria and determined the merit and suitability of the candidates. In R.S. Dass case [1986 Supp SCC 617 : (1987) 2 ATC 628] the amended Rule 5(2) of the IAS (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955, Rule 5(4) evolved the principle to classify eligible officers as, outstanding, very good, good or unfit, as the case may be, on an overall-relative assessment of their service record. Rule 5(5) directed to prepare list and include the candidates for appointment to the required number of vacancies. Considering the Rule at p. 631 in para 16 and following the ratio in Capoor case [(1973) 2 SCC 836 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 5 : (1974) 1 SCR 797] this Court held that the grading was for the purpose of being placed in the select list to ensure that select list is drawn up on the basis of merit and suitability and to obviate the necessity of giving reasons for the supersession of any officer. In para 18 at p. 632, it was further held that there was no necessity to record any reason, in view of the amended statutory provisions. Therefore, the criticism of the Tribunal that due regard to the seniority was not given is not correct.”
16. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the records and the order impugned and having closely examined the relevant rules and also having gone through the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the questions that arise for consideration is, as to whether petitioner’s selection for promotion on the post of Registrar Kanungo was in consonance with procedure laid down under Rule 7 read with Rule 8 of 19 8 (2) (d) and whether in the event 1994 Rules coming into force the criteria should have been chiefly seniority and in no circumstances, a junior person could have been superseded.
17. In order to find the answer to this above question, I first proceed to appreciate Service Rules, 1958. Relevant Rule 1, 7 and 8 of Service Rules, 1958 in their entirety are reproduced hereunder: “1. Short title and commencement. - These rules may be called the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Ministerial (Registrar Kanungos and Assistant Registrar Kanungos) Service Rules, 1958 and shall take effect from the date of publication of the notification.
7. Sources of recruitment. - Recruitment to the cadre of Registrar Kanungos shall be made by promotion of permanent Assistant Registrar Kanungos of at least three years’ standing and to the cadre of Assistant Registrar Kanungos by promotion of Lekhpals of at least six years’ standing. Note – A Supervisor Kanungo, who through age or infirmity is unfit to carry out the field duties of a Supervisor Kanungo, shall also be eligible for appointment as Registrar Kanungo.
8. Method of recruitment. - (i) For purposes of recruitment of Registrar Kanungos under rule 7, selection shall be made on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit from amongst the permanent Assistant Registrar Kanungos who have put in not less than three years’ service as such on the first day of January of the year in which the selection is made. (ii) (a) For purposes of recruitment of Assistant Registrar Kanungos selection shall be made on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit from amongst the Lekhpals who have been nominated under clause (b) of this sub-rule. Note – A candidate who is rejected as unfit will be held unfit for that occasion only and his case will be duly considered at every subsequent selection. (b) The Collector shall, in September each year, ascertain the likely number of vacancies in the district cadre of Assistant Registrar Kanungo and ask each Sub-Divisional Officer in his district to nominate, after the winter tour, a certain number of Lekhpals, to be fixed by him, who have put in not less than six years’ service as 9 of 19 Lekhpal on the first day of January of the year in which the nomination is made, have passed the Junior or High School Examination (with English) or an equivalent or higher examination of the State, are not more than 35 years of age on the first day of January of the year in which the nomination is made and are considered suitable for promotion as Assistant Registrar Kanungos. Provided that preference shall be given to those with better educational qualifications and record of service. (c) The Collector will consider the case of all the candidates nomination under clause (b) and may, at his discretion, interview at the headquarters of the district such of them as he may consider necessary. (d) In selecting the candidates for promotion regard shall be had to- (1) record of previous service, (2) integrity, (3) character, and (4) intelligence and ability, preference being given to those with better educational qualifications and record of service. (e) The Collector shall prepare a list containing the names of Lekhpals whom he has selected for promotion. The number of candidates on the list shall be as indicated in clause (f) below: (f) The names of Lekhpals selected under clause (a) above shall be brought on a list to be maintained by the Collector for his district. The names of listed candidates shall be arranged according to the date of their selection, provided the Lekhpals selected on the same date shall rank inter se according to their substantive pay prior to selection, and, if of equal pay, according to the length of their service. The number of Lekhpals on the list shall be approximately, two-thirds of the number of vacancies likely to occur in the district cadre of Assistant Registrar Kanungos over a period of three years but shall not be less than two-thirds of the number of Assistant Registrar Kanungos sanctioned for the district.”
18. Upon a bare reading of preamble to the rules, I find that the Rules, 1958 have come to be framed invoking power vested under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to provide for 10 of 19 recruitment and promotion rules in respect of Registrar Kanungo and Assistant Registrar Kanungo. Rule 1 provides for title whereas Rule 7 provides for sources qua recruitment though promotion to the post of Registrar Kanungo and Assistant Registrar Kanungo, prescribing for minimum 3 years and 6 years service respectively for the Lekhpal (feeding cadre) to be promoted against two positions. Recruitment procedure prescribed under Rule 8(2)(d) lays down the criteria for the purposes of promotion by way of selection. I further notice that four points have been prescribed for the assessment of the merits and that are: (i) Old service records; (ii). Integrity; (iii). Character; and (iv). Intelligence. Naturally, service records and integrity would relate to entries made in the character role of the employee and the character would reflect from the entries of the service book and intelligence would certainly mean assessment in interview, if it is held.
19. As I have already noticed above, the selection chart prescribed for marks in respect of the annual entries, the academic records and also the interview. The Government order that have been brought on record and have not been disputed by the state respondents prescribed for 5 years assessment of character roles and service records of the last five years of candidates seeking promotion and last 10 years’ character role for the purposes of entries. 11 of 19
20. A guideline issued by the department concerned lays down the criteria for allotment of marks for High School and Intermediate Certificates, 10 marks for first division, 6 marks for second division and 3 marks for third division.
21. Now, looking to the chart which has been appended along with supplementary affidavit and has not been disputed, I find that petitioner has been awarded full marks for outstanding entries, so in all 20 marks of five years, there has been no adverse entry and 10 marks each for High School and Intermediate for he having passed in first division, totalling to 40 marks and then has been awarded 6 marks in interview, thus totalling to 46 marks in all and I find it to be the highest marks awarded to any candidate in the chart.
22. The order impugned does not disclose as to in what manner the procedure prescribed had not been followed. It talks of consideration of entries of the entire service period quite contrary to the circular letters issued by the department itself.
23. There is no counter affidavit filed to the supplementary affidavit, questioning the circular letters and criteria adopted and the averments made in that regard in supplementary affidavit.
24. Thus, the point as sought to be raised in the order impugned regarding preparation of merit list, does not find favour from the records before the Court, inasmuch as Rule 7 and 8 if read together, 12 of 19 any person of a prudent mind would come to conclude that the criteria laid down under the relevant service rules was merit cum seniority.
25. The relevant paragraphs of Supreme Court that have been reproduced herein above and which have been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner emphasise absolutely on this aspect of the matter that when merit cum seniority is there, then merit has to be taken into consideration in the first instance and the seniority will be the secondary one.
26. Insofar as the other point is concerned regarding overriding effect of Rules 1994, there are two judgments of coordinate Bench of this Court which have reiterated that Service Rules, 1958 would prevail.
27. So far as the promotion for the post in question is concerned, and Rule 8(2)(d) has been emphasised as mandatory for the selection committee for selecting candidates for the purposes of promotion on the post of Assistant Registrar Kanungo, needless to add, the Registrar Kanungo is also a post given under the said rules which lay down same criteria, though Rules, 1994 had not been taken into account by earlier Single Judge Bench and the matter under remand relates to the issue as to the binding effect of service rules 1958 after coming into force of 1994 Rules. 13 of 19
28. I proceed to examine this law point as well, to find answer to the second question as framed above. The U.P. Government Servants Criterion for Recruitment by Promotion Rules, 1994 is reproduced in its entirety hereunder: “In exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, the Government is pleased to make the following rules:
1. Short title, commencement and application. - (1) These rules may be called the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Criterion for Recruitment by Promotion Rules, 1994. (2) They shall come into force at once. (3) They shall apply to a recruitment by promotion to a post or service for which no consultation with the Public Service Commission is required on the principles to be followed in making promotions under the Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission (Limitation of Functions) Regulations, 1954, as amended from time to time.
2. Overriding effect. - These rules shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other service rules made by the Governor under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or orders for the time being in force.
3. Definitions. - Unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context: (a) “Constitution” means the Constitution of India; (b) “Governor” means the Governor of Uttar Pradesh; (c) “Post” or “Service” means a post or service under the rule- making power of the Governor under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution.
4. Criterion for recruitment by promotion.- Recruitment by promotion to the post of Head of Department, to a post just one rank below the Head of Department and to a post in any service carrrying the pay scale the maximum of which is Rs18,300/- or above shall be made on the basis of merit, and to the rest of the posts, in all services to be filled by promotion, including a post where promotion is made from a non-Gazetted post to a Gazetted 14 of 19 post or from one service to another service, shall be made on the basis of seniority subject to the rejection of the unfit.”
29. There is no preamble to the rules attached except for the title and commencement and its application. Vide clause 1.3 it is provided under the rules that this would apply for the post not covered by Public Service Commission for the purposes of promotion from lower cadre to a higher cadre. Rule 4 further provides that rules would be attracted only in the matter of post other than the head of department. The language and the import of the rules, therefore, clearly appear to indicate that these are general rules framed for the purposes of promotion in government service and not specific to a particular department.
30. Applying the principles of applicability of rules framed in general, in my considered view, where there are no procedures prescribed for the purposes of promotion, then general rules of recruitment by way of promotion 1994 Rules would be applicable but where the rules framed taking recourse to the same power vide proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution for a particular department, then those rules would be liable to be termed as special rules framed for the purposes of recruitment and promotion in a particular department and, therefore, would have primacy and would, therefore, definitely occupying the field. 15 of 19
31. The doctrine of eclipse is attracted in those cases where the special rules are framed to overshadow the existing rules. Had it been the intention of the rule making authority, then the rule making authority would have also provided for repeal and saving clause. Rules, 1994 are absolutely silent. Both the rules having been framed invoking the provisions contained under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution, in my view, the general rules would not be having overriding effect upon the special rules and hence Rules, 1994 would not be taken to have overshadowed the Service Rules, 1958 which are specific to the department and the posts as well.
32. Recruitment and promotion Service Rules, 1958 are common rules of recruitment and promotion whereas the Rules 1994 are only promotion rules and so naturally these rules would be attracted only where there is no promotion rule provided in of the Government departments. Even though a non obstant cause has been used vide Rule 2 seems to be giving it an overriding effect, it would not have any override effect over and above special rules framed especially for a particular department of a government establishment.
33. In my above view, I am supported by authorities of Supreme Court in the case of R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka and another (1992) 1 SCC 335, wherein relying upon “Interpretation 16 of 19 of Statutes” by Maxwell vide paragraph 7 the Supreme Court has held thus: “7. …….In Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes, this principle of law is stated as under: (11th edn., page 168) “A general later law does not abrogate an earlier special one by mere implication. Generalia specialibus non derogant, or, in other words, ‘where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier and special legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so. In such cases it is presumed to have only general cases in view, and not particular cases which have been already otherwise provided for by the special Act.” In Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur v. Thakur Manmohan Dey [AIR 1966 SC 1931 : (1966) 3 SCR 663] applying this principle it is held that general law does not abrogate earlier special law by mere implication. In Eileen Louise Nicolle v. John Winter Nicolle [(1922) 1 AC 284] , Lord Phillimore observed as under: “It is no doubt a sound principle of all jurisprudence that a prior particular law is not easily to be held to be abrogated by a posterior law, expressed in general terms and by the apparent generality of its language applicable to and covering a number of cases of which the particular law is but one. This as a matter of jurisprudence, as understood in England, has been laid down in a great number of cases, whether the prior law be an express statute … or be the underlying common or customary law of the country. … ‘Where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation … that earlier and special legislation is not to be held indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of a particular intention to do so’. ” In Justiniano Augusto De Piedade Barreto v. Antonio Vicente Da Fonseca [(1979) 3 SCC 47 : AIR 1979 SC 984] this Court observed that a law which is essentially general in nature may contain special provisions on certain matters and in respect of these matters it would be classified as a special law. Therefore unless the special law is abrogated by express repeal or by making provisions which are wholly inconsistent with it, the special law cannot be held to have been abrogated by mere implication.”
34. In view of the above, questions framed stand answered in favour of the petitioner. 17 of 19
35. The writ petition thus succeeds and is allowed. The order impugned dated 24th January, 2008 is hereby quashed.
36. Petitioner No.-5 shall stand promoted with effect from the date he was promoted Registrar Kanungo initially and since this promotion was wholly illegally set aside, he shall also be entitled to all consequential benefits including arrears of salary for the post of Supervisor Kanungo in the light of an authority of Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Boardv. C. Muddaiah (2007) 7 SCC 689, which is reproduced hereunder: "33. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. It is true that while granting a relief in favour of a party, the Court must consider the relevant provisions of law and issue appropriate directions keeping in view such provisions. There may, however, be cases where on the facts and in the circumstances, the Court may issue necessary directions in the larger interest of justice keeping in view the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Take a case, where ex facie injustice has been meted out to an employee. In spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. His representations have been illegally and unjustifiably turned down. He finally approaches a Court of Law. The Court is convinced that gross injustice has been done to him and he was wrongfully, unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of those benefits. The Court, in the circumstances, directs the Authority to extend all benefits which he would have obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it open to the Authorities in such case to urge that as he has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he would not be granted the benefits? Upholding of such plea would amount to allowing a party to take undue advantage of his own wrong. It would perpetrate injustice rather than doing justice to the person wronged. 34. We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is 'no work no pay'. In appropriate cases, however, a Court of Law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The Court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The Court may in the circumstances, direct the Authority to grant him all benefits considering 'as if he had worked'. It, 18 of 19 therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of Law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the Authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case). The bald contention of the appellant-Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected."
37. The authority shall determine pay scale and pay grade of the petitioner treating him to be promoted w.e.f. 28th September, 2007. The department shall redraw the seniority accordingly and petitioner would also be entitled to further promotion as per the relevant service rules.
38. Cost made easy. Order Date :- 10.7.2025 Atmesh 19 of 19