✦ High Court of India · 17 Sep 2025

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD vs Counsel for Petitioner(s)

Case Details High Court of India · 17 Sep 2025
Court
High Court of India
Decided
17 Sep 2025
Length
1,748 words

Cited in this judgment

1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Santosh Kumar Paliwal, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents and Sri J.P. Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.5.

2. Present writ petition has been filed aggrieved by the order dated

30.07.2019 passed by Regional Level Committee, Azamgarh Region, Azamgarh.

3. The entire controversy pertains to the approval of the appointment of the petitioner dated 22.08.2014. All papers pertaining to selection was submitted to the District Inspector of Schools, Azamgarh, respondent no.3 herein by the respondent no.5 vide communication dated 6.9.2014. But surprisingly, the Regional Level Committee has considered and rejected the approval vide order dated 15.10.2014. The said orders were assailed before this Court in Writ Petition No. 57276 of 2014. Initially, this Court has considered the record and passed orders on 29.10.2014, staying the operation of the impugned rejection order dated 15.10.2014 and finally, the said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 5.1.2018, with following observations: "I have considered and rival submissions and perused the record. On perusal of the impugned order, I find that other grounds that have been taken in the counter affidavit that the posts were not advertised properly and that there was no mention of subject-wise post and necessary qualification etc, have not been taken in the impugned order. It is settled law that the grounds/reasons for passing the impugned order cannot be supplemented by means of counter affidavit. In the 2 WRIA No. 15770 of 2019 impugned order, the sole ground given for setting aside the selection and appointment of the petitioners is that the election of Committee of Management was quashed by this Court. A reference may be made in this regard to a judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, (1978) 1 SCC 405, paragraph 8 whereof is quoted as under: "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Commr. of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16: Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow order." (Emphasis supplied) A perusal of the judgement passed in M/s Beopar Sahayak (supra), Dr. A.R. Sircar (supra), Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra) and Immedisetti Ramkrishnaiah (supra) would clearly indicate that when an authority or elected body (see paragraph 11 of Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra) was acting in the colour of his authority and was validly exercising its power at the time of the action that was taken, such action is protected by de facto doctrine. In such view of the matter, the order impugned herein is not sustainable in the eye of law. Accordingly, the present petition stands allowed. The impugned order dated 15.10.2014 (wrongly mentioned as 15.10.2011) passed by the respondent no. 2- Regional Level Committee, Azamgarh is quashed. The matter is remanded back to the respondent no. 2 for decision afresh, which shall be taken by the respondent no. 2 within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. In case the decision is taken in favour of the petitioners, all consequential benefits shall also be extended to the petitioners. " 3 WRIA No. 15770 of 2019

4. Consequent to the abovesaid direction, the respondents, once again, disapproved the appointment of the petitioner vide order dated 25.05.2018. The said orders were interdicted by this Court in Writ Petition No. 15940 of 2018 vide order dated 7.8.2018.

5. Finally, the respondents, once again, rejected the case of the petitioners vide order dated 30.7.2019 taking new ground that respondent no.5 has not made particulars of the post in the advertisement and subjectwise notification was not issued and accordingly, petitioners are not qualified for the said post.

6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that in fact as per Section 16-FF of the U.P Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), powers are vested with District Inspector of Schools. Per contra, the Regional Level Committee has considered the proposals sent by respondent no.5 and rejected the case of the petitioners. In fact, first order dated 15.10.2014 was passed on the ground of election of committee of management and the said order was set aside by this Court, remanding the matter to the respondents, once again to reconsider based on the proposals submitted by respondent no.5. Surprisingly, the respondents are taking different stand and rejecting the case of the petitioners on one ground or other. The fact remains that as per the interim order granted by this Court on 29.10.2014, the petitioners are continuing and worked for substantive length of service. As per Section 16-FF of the Act, the power is vested with District Inspector of Schools, but respondent no.2 is exercising jurisdiction, which is contrary to provisions of the Act.

7. Learned Senior Counsel has made his submissions based on the observations made by this Court in Writ A No. 11844 of 2019 (C/M Yadgar- E-Hussaini Inter College, Allahabad and another vs. State of U.P. and 4 others), wherein the issue of jurisdiction was considered by a co-ordinate Bench according to Section 16-FF (4) & (5) of the Act and held that the power to accord approval to teachers in minority institutions is vested with District Inspector of Schools. If District Inspector of Schools is failed to exercise such power, then the petitioners may again approach to Regional Deputy Director of Education. But here in the instant case, initial appointment was made on 22.08.2014 and the proposal was communicated to respondent no.3 vide letter dated 6.9.2014, in such circumstances, the first rejection order passed by respondent no. 2 dated 15.10.2014 was interdicted 4 WRIA No. 15770 of 2019 by this Court and on different grounds, respondent no.2 has disapproved the case of the petitioners. Hence, he requested to remand the matter to respondent no.3, who is the competent authority as per the provisions of the Act.

8. Reply to the said submissions, learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions that as disapproval orders were passed by respondent no.2 on the ground that petitioners' appointments were made without following the procedure and as the advertisement was not subjectwise and no such expert was nominated in the selection committee and they are not having requisite qualification. Hence, the rejection order is in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order vitiates only on the ground that the petitioners are not having qualifications as provided under Section 16-FF of the Act. In fact, the petitioners are fully eligible and qualified. Surprisingly, without mentioning the requisite qualifications in the impugned order they have rejected the case of the petitioners on the ground of not having qualification which itself discloses the mala fide intention of the respondents and because of one ground or other, respondent no.2 chosen to reject the case of the petitioners. Finally, they have passed an order on 15.10.2014 and the said order was interdicted by this Court vide order dated 5.1.2018 and the respondents again have chosen to reject the case of the petitioners vide order dated 25.05.2018 and the said orders were set aside by this Court in Writ A No. 15940 of

2018. Again, respondents have rejected the case on a new ground, hence, respondent no.2, who has no jurisdiction as per the provisions of the Act disapproving the appointment of the petitioners with mala fide intention. Accordingly, requested to set aside the same by remanding the matter to respondent no.3 as per Section 16-FF of the Act as well as per the observations made by this Court in Writ A No. 11844 of 2019 (C/M Yadgar- E-Hussaini Inter College, Allahabad and another vs. State of U.P. and 4 others).

10. Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it appears that there is no doubt that in the instant case, the respondents are lacking good faith. Initially, they have rejected the case of the petitioners on one ground and the said orders were set aside and without following the principles of natural justice, the second order was passed and the said order 5 WRIA No. 15770 of 2019 was also interdicted by this Court. Now, the respondents have chosen to reject the case of the petitioners on a new ground without mentioning proper reasons. In fact, as observed by the co-ordinate Bench in the above-referred judgment and perusal of Section 16-FF (4) & (5) of the Act, it clearly discloses that District Inspector of Schools is the competent authority to pass orders.

11. In view of the same, the impugned order dated 30.07.2019 passed by Regional Level Committee, Azamgarh Region, Azamgarh is set aside and the matter is remanded to respondent no.3-District Inspector of Schools, Azamgarh to pass appropriate orders, more particularly, as per Section 16- FF (4) & (5) of the Act, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.

12. Writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. September 17, 2025 Noman (Donadi Ramesh,J.) NOMAN AHMAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1. Heard Sri Ashok Khare, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Santosh Kumar Paliwal, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents and Sri J.P. Singh, learned counsel for respondent no.5.

2. Present writ petition has been filed aggrieved by the order dated

30.07.2019 passed by Regional Level Committee, Azamgarh Region, Azamgarh.

3. The entire controversy pertains to the approval of the appointment of the petitioner dated 22.08.2014. All papers pertaining to selection was submitted to the District Inspector of Schools, Azamgarh, respondent no.3 herein by the respondent no.5 vide communication dated 6.9.2014. But surprisingly, the Regional Level Committee has considered and rejected the approval vide order dated 15.10.2014. The said orders were assailed before this Court in Writ Petition No. 57276 of 2014. Initially, this Court has considered the record and passed orders on 29.10.2014, staying the operation of the impugned rejection order dated 15.10.2014 and finally, the said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 5.1.2018, with following observations: "I have considered and rival submissions and perused the record. On perusal of the impugned order, I find that other grounds that have been taken in the counter affidavit that the posts were not advertised properly and that there was no mention of subject-wise post and necessary qualification etc, have not been taken in the impugned order. It is settled law that the grounds/reasons for passing the impugned order cannot be supplemented by means of counter affidavit. In the 2 WRIA No. 15770 of 2019 impugned order, the sole ground given for setting aside the selection and appointment of the petitioners is that the election of Committee of Management was quashed by this Court. A reference may be made in this regard to a judgement of Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others, (1978) 1 SCC 405, paragraph 8 whereof is quoted as under: "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Commr. of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16: Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow order." (Emphasis supplied) A perusal of the judgement passed in M/s Beopar Sahayak (supra), Dr. A.R. Sircar (supra), Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra) and Immedisetti Ramkrishnaiah (supra) would clearly indicate that when an authority or elected body (see paragraph 11 of Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra) was acting in the colour of his authority and was validly exercising its power at the time of the action that was taken, such action is protected by de facto doctrine. In such view of the matter, the order impugned herein is not sustainable in the eye of law. Accordingly, the present petition stands allowed. The impugned order dated 15.10.2014 (wrongly mentioned as 15.10.2011) passed by the respondent no. 2- Regional Level Committee, Azamgarh is quashed. The matter is remanded back to the respondent no. 2 for decision afresh, which shall be taken by the respondent no. 2 within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. In case the decision is taken in favour of the petitioners, all consequential benefits shall also be extended to the petitioners. " 3 WRIA No. 15770 of 2019

4. Consequent to the abovesaid direction, the respondents, once again, disapproved the appointment of the petitioner vide order dated 25.05.2018. The said orders were interdicted by this Court in Writ Petition No. 15940 of 2018 vide order dated 7.8.2018.

5. Finally, the respondents, once again, rejected the case of the petitioners vide order dated 30.7.2019 taking new ground that respondent no.5 has not made particulars of the post in the advertisement and subjectwise notification was not issued and accordingly, petitioners are not qualified for the said post.

6. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that in fact as per Section 16-FF of the U.P Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), powers are vested with District Inspector of Schools. Per contra, the Regional Level Committee has considered the proposals sent by respondent no.5 and rejected the case of the petitioners. In fact, first order dated 15.10.2014 was passed on the ground of election of committee of management and the said order was set aside by this Court, remanding the matter to the respondents, once again to reconsider based on the proposals submitted by respondent no.5. Surprisingly, the respondents are taking different stand and rejecting the case of the petitioners on one ground or other. The fact remains that as per the interim order granted by this Court on 29.10.2014, the petitioners are continuing and worked for substantive length of service. As per Section 16-FF of the Act, the power is vested with District Inspector of Schools, but respondent no.2 is exercising jurisdiction, which is contrary to provisions of the Act.

7. Learned Senior Counsel has made his submissions based on the observations made by this Court in Writ A No. 11844 of 2019 (C/M Yadgar- E-Hussaini Inter College, Allahabad and another vs. State of U.P. and 4 others), wherein the issue of jurisdiction was considered by a co-ordinate Bench according to Section 16-FF (4) & (5) of the Act and held that the power to accord approval to teachers in minority institutions is vested with District Inspector of Schools. If District Inspector of Schools is failed to exercise such power, then the petitioners may again approach to Regional Deputy Director of Education. But here in the instant case, initial appointment was made on 22.08.2014 and the proposal was communicated to respondent no.3 vide letter dated 6.9.2014, in such circumstances, the first rejection order passed by respondent no. 2 dated 15.10.2014 was interdicted 4 WRIA No. 15770 of 2019 by this Court and on different grounds, respondent no.2 has disapproved the case of the petitioners. Hence, he requested to remand the matter to respondent no.3, who is the competent authority as per the provisions of the Act.

8. Reply to the said submissions, learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions that as disapproval orders were passed by respondent no.2 on the ground that petitioners' appointments were made without following the procedure and as the advertisement was not subjectwise and no such expert was nominated in the selection committee and they are not having requisite qualification. Hence, the rejection order is in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners has submitted that the impugned order vitiates only on the ground that the petitioners are not having qualifications as provided under Section 16-FF of the Act. In fact, the petitioners are fully eligible and qualified. Surprisingly, without mentioning the requisite qualifications in the impugned order they have rejected the case of the petitioners on the ground of not having qualification which itself discloses the mala fide intention of the respondents and because of one ground or other, respondent no.2 chosen to reject the case of the petitioners. Finally, they have passed an order on 15.10.2014 and the said order was interdicted by this Court vide order dated 5.1.2018 and the respondents again have chosen to reject the case of the petitioners vide order dated 25.05.2018 and the said orders were set aside by this Court in Writ A No. 15940 of

2018. Again, respondents have rejected the case on a new ground, hence, respondent no.2, who has no jurisdiction as per the provisions of the Act disapproving the appointment of the petitioners with mala fide intention. Accordingly, requested to set aside the same by remanding the matter to respondent no.3 as per Section 16-FF of the Act as well as per the observations made by this Court in Writ A No. 11844 of 2019 (C/M Yadgar- E-Hussaini Inter College, Allahabad and another vs. State of U.P. and 4 others).

10. Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it appears that there is no doubt that in the instant case, the respondents are lacking good faith. Initially, they have rejected the case of the petitioners on one ground and the said orders were set aside and without following the principles of natural justice, the second order was passed and the said order 5 WRIA No. 15770 of 2019 was also interdicted by this Court. Now, the respondents have chosen to reject the case of the petitioners on a new ground without mentioning proper reasons. In fact, as observed by the co-ordinate Bench in the above-referred judgment and perusal of Section 16-FF (4) & (5) of the Act, it clearly discloses that District Inspector of Schools is the competent authority to pass orders.

11. In view of the same, the impugned order dated 30.07.2019 passed by Regional Level Committee, Azamgarh Region, Azamgarh is set aside and the matter is remanded to respondent no.3-District Inspector of Schools, Azamgarh to pass appropriate orders, more particularly, as per Section 16- FF (4) & (5) of the Act, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.

12. Writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. September 17, 2025 Noman (Donadi Ramesh,J.) NOMAN AHMAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

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