Revisionist(s) v. State of U.P

4. The facts of the case are that on 31.05.1995 the Chief Food Inspector found the accused revisionist selling milk on Police Line, Churkhi Road, Orai and on suspicion of the same to be adulterated gave him a notice under Form-VI after which he purchased 750 ml of the said milk by paying Rs. 6/- to him from a can after stirring it and it was homogenized. The seller informed him that he is a servant of Thakur Das. The purchased milk was then distributed in three parts and sealed in three bottles in front of the seller and witnesses in equal quantity as per rules. The persons there were requested be witnesses to the same who denied it. Form-VII was then prepared and one of the sealed pack was sent to the Food Analyst through registered parcel for its analysis whereas the two other bottles were stored in the office of the Chief Medical Officer, Orai.

5. The Food Analyst vide his report dated 06.07.1995 found the sample of buffalo milk to contain milk fat 5.4 percent and milk solids not fat 6.6 percent and thus opined that as per standard, the sample is milk fat deficient by 10 percent and milk solids not fat deficient by about 27 percent. A complaint dated 01.11.1995 was thus filed before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai for offence under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. It is stated by the prosecution that notice under Section 13(2) of the Act was sent by registered post to the accused.

6. The statement under Section 244 Cr.P.C. of Chutkan Verma the Chief Food Inspector was recorded as PW-1, Hari Mohan Verma the Food Clerk in the office of CMO concerned was recorded as PW-2. 3 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 Subsequently, charge under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was framed against the revisionist vide order dated 28.05.2010 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Orai. The statement of Chutkan Verma the Chief Food Inspector was recorded as PW-1 under Section 246 Cr.P.C., the witness Krishna Prasad was recorded as PW-3. The accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case. He stated that he is a handicapped and unable to ride a bicycle. He further states that he is not a servant of Thakur Das and does not sell milk. In defence Mata Prasad DW-1 was produced who stated that Thakur Das used to repair watches and had a shop besides a hotel at the said place. He was not dealing in milk. Maiyya Deen was not servant of Thakur Das. The trial court after recording of the evidence passed the judgment and order as aforesaid. Against the said judgment and order, the accused revisionist Maiyya Deen preferred an appeal before the Appellate Court which was dismissed but the sentence as imposed on him was enhanced as aforesaid. This revision has thus been filed challenging the judgments and orders as aforesaid.

7. Learned counsel for the revisionist raised two submissions before the Court. The first submission is a challenge to the judgment and order of the Appellate Court. It is submitted that the judgment and order of the trial court dated 12.12.2013 convicted and sentenced him for offence under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 to six months imprisonment, fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to two months additional imprisonment against which an appeal was preferred before the Appellate Court in which the Appellate Court has enhanced the sentence as imposed against the revisionist to two years rigorous imprisonment, fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to six months simple imprisonment. It is submitted that there was no appeal filed by the complainant or State for enhancement against the judgment and order of the trial court but in an appeal challenging the judgment and order of conviction of the trial court by the accused, the Appellate Court has enhanced the sentence as awarded to 4 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 him. It is submitted that the view as taken by the Appellate Court is totally illegal inasmuch in the absence of any appeal by the complainant or State for enhancement, the Appellate Court cannot enhance the sentence as awarded by the trial court in an appeal filed by an accused convict challenging his conviction and sentence. It is further submitted that in an appeal from a conviction, the Appellate Court cannot enhance the sentence awarded to the accused by the trial court.

8. The Apex Court in the case Sachin Vs. State of Maharashtra : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 834 has held that in an filed by an accused / convict against his conviction the sentence cannot be enhanced by the appellate court. It was held as under: “18. We find merit in the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the record does not reflect that the counsel for the appellant-accused or the accused himself was heard on the question of modifying the charge from a minor offence to a major offence and thereby altering the finding and enhancing the sentence. The further and more important submission is that, in an appeal filed by the accused/convict the sentence cannot be enhanced by the appellate court.

19. Section 386 CrPC discusses the powers of the appellate court. For ease of reference, Section 386 reads as under: “386. Powers of the Appellate Court.— After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may— (a) in an appeal from an order or acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law; (b) in an appeal from a conviction— (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same— 5 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 (c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence— (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re-tried by a Court competent to try the offence, or (ii) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or, the nature and extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or reduce the same; (d) in an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such order; (e) make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper: Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement: Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence under appeal.” The said provision delineates four categories of appeals, (i) an appeal from an order of acquittal; (ii) an appeal from conviction; (iii) an appeal for enhancement of sentence; and (iv) an appeal from any other order.

20. Section 377 CrPC which provides for appeal by the State Government against inadequacy of sentence was a novel provision brought in by the CrPC. The 41st Law Commission had noted in its report that, pre-1973, in the absence of a statutory provision which permitted the State to prefer an appeal against inadequate sentence, the State was compelled to invoke the revisional powers of the High Court for correction of any error in sentencing. Finding this to be unsatisfactory, the Law Commission recommended that the State Government should be able to appeal against an inadequate sentence before an ordinary Court of Appeal as well. To effectuate this intent, the Parliament inserted Section 377.

20.1. In Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1975) 2 SCC 406 (“Nadir Khan”), the petitioner was found in illegal possession of ganja weighing 7 kgs, and was convicted under Section 61(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 as extended to Delhi and sentenced to two months' rigorous imprisonment. As no right to appeal was available, an unsuccessful revision application was preferred before the Sessions Court. Aggrieved, the petitioner had then moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC read with Article 227 of the Constitution against the conviction. In turn, the High Court left the petitioner worse off as it 6 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 thought that the sentence awarded was inadequate. By suo moto invoking its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court enhanced the sentence to six months. In a special leave petition before this Court, the question raised was, whether, the High Court, in a revision under Section 401 CrPC, has the jurisdiction to enhance the sentence in the absence of an appeal by the State against the inadequacy of sentence under Section 377.

20.1.1. Noting that the High Court did leave the petitioner worse off, this Court speaking through Goswami, J., characterised the question to be an unmerited doubt on the undoubted jurisdiction of the High Court in acting suo motu in criminal revision in appropriate cases. It was observed that the High Court is not required to act in revision merely through a conduit application at the instance of an aggrieved party. It was held as follows: “The High Court, as an effective instrument for administration of criminal justice, keeps a constant vigil and wherever it finds that justice has suffered, it takes upon itself as its bounden duty to suo motu act where there is flagrant abuse of the law. The character of the offence and the nature of disposal of a particular case by the subordinate court prompt remedial action on the part of the High Court for the ultimate social good of the community, even though the State may be slow or silent in preferring an appeal provided for under the new Code. … This position was true and extant in the old Code of 1898 and this salutary power has not been denied by Parliament under the new Code by rearrangement of the sections. It is true the new Code has expressly given a right to the State under Section 377 CrPC to appeal against inadequacy of sentence which was not there under the old Code. That however does not exclude revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to act suo motu for enhancement of sentence in appropriate cases. What is an appropriate case has to be left to the discretion of the High Court.… Section 401 expressly preserves the power of the High Court, by itself, to call for the records without the intervention of another agency and has kept alive the ancient exercise of power when something extraordinary comes to the knowledge of the High Court. The provisions under Section 401 read with Section 386(c)(iii) CrPC are clearly supplemental to those under Section 377 whereby appeals are provided for against inadequacy of sentence at the instance of the State Government or Central Government, as the case may be. There is therefore absolutely no merit in the contention of the learned counsel that the High Court acted without 7 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 jurisdiction in exercising the power of revision suo motu, for enhancement of the sentence in this case. The application stands rejected.” (underlining by us) under Section 377(1) CrPC against

20.2. In Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 25 (“Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar”), an appeal was indeed preferred by the State Government inadequacy of the sentence of the appellant convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Sections 2(i)(1) and 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 and in default rigorous imprisonment for two months. The High Court allowed the appeal of the State with regard to the inadequacy of the sentence and while affirming the conviction of the appellant under aforesaid provisions enhanced the sentence to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000 and in default simple imprisonment for two months. In appeal before this Court, the principal submission of the appellant was that the appeal under Section 377(1) was not maintainable due to the bar operating then under Section 377(2). This argument is not relevant for our consideration in the present case. Additionally and alternatively, it was argued that the appeal not being maintainable, the High Court could not have, in any event, invoked its revisional powers under Section 401 CrPC to enhance the sentence suo moto as the power of the High Court to enhance sentence which was available under Sections 435/439 CrPC of the old CrPC is absolutely replaced by the provision of appeal under Section 377 CrPC of the new CrPC. Rejecting the submission, a three-judge Bench of this Court held that the High Court has revisional powers to, suo motu, enhance the sentence. It was held that: sentence by exercising “6. We should at once remove the misgiving that the new Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, has abolished the High Court's power of enhancement revisional jurisdiction, suo motu. The provision for appeal against inadequacy of sentence by the State Government or the Central Government does not lead to such a conclusion. High Court's power of enhancement of sentence, in an appropriate case, by exercising suo motu power of revision is still extant under Section Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, inasmuch as the High Court can “by itself” call for the record of proceedings of any inferior criminal court under its jurisdiction. The provision of Section 401(4) is a bar to a party, who does not appeal, when appeal lies, but applies in revision. Such a legal bar under Section 401(4) does not stand in the way of the read with Section 397 401 8 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 High Court's exercise of power of revision, suo motu, which continues as before in the new Code.” (underlining by us) The aforesaid judgments of this Court settled the question that a High Court has the jurisdiction to suo moto enhance the sentence under the CrPC by invoking its revisional powers. The pertinent question then is, whether, the High Court could enhance the sentence under its revisional powers in a convict's appeal against conviction.

21. In this case we are concerned with an appeal from a conviction. In such an appeal the appellate court can exercise its powers in three ways, as per clause (b) of Section 386 CrPC. Clause (c) is with regard to an appeal for enhancement of sentence. While an appeal from a conviction is filed by the accused, an appeal from an order of acquittal or for enhancement of sentence could be filed either by the State or by the complainant or even by the victim under Section 378 CrPC and in the case of a victim as per proviso to Section 372. In the case of an appeal from any other order i.e. not an order of conviction or acquittal, the High Court can either alter or reverse such order under clause (d). The High Court has also the power to make an amendment or pass any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper in any of the above situations. However, there are two provisos to Section 386. The first proviso states that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. The second proviso states that the appellate court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing that order for sentence under appeal.

22. Some judgments of this Court on the interpretation of Section 386 CrPC may be referred to at this stage.

4. The facts of the case are that on 31.05.1995 the Chief Food Inspector found the accused revisionist selling milk on Police Line, Churkhi Road, Orai and on suspicion of the same to be adulterated gave him a notice under Form-VI after which he purchased 750 ml of the said milk by paying Rs. 6/- to him from a can after stirring it and it was homogenized. The seller informed him that he is a servant of Thakur Das. The purchased milk was then distributed in three parts and sealed in three bottles in front of the seller and witnesses in equal quantity as per rules. The persons there were requested be witnesses to the same who denied it. Form-VII was then prepared and one of the sealed pack was sent to the Food Analyst through registered parcel for its analysis whereas the two other bottles were stored in the office of the Chief Medical Officer, Orai.

5. The Food Analyst vide his report dated 06.07.1995 found the sample of buffalo milk to contain milk fat 5.4 percent and milk solids not fat 6.6 percent and thus opined that as per standard, the sample is milk fat deficient by 10 percent and milk solids not fat deficient by about 27 percent. A complaint dated 01.11.1995 was thus filed before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai for offence under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. It is stated by the prosecution that notice under Section 13(2) of the Act was sent by registered post to the accused.

6. The statement under Section 244 Cr.P.C. of Chutkan Verma the Chief Food Inspector was recorded as PW-1, Hari Mohan Verma the Food Clerk in the office of CMO concerned was recorded as PW-2. 3 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 Subsequently, charge under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was framed against the revisionist vide order dated 28.05.2010 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Orai. The statement of Chutkan Verma the Chief Food Inspector was recorded as PW-1 under Section 246 Cr.P.C., the witness Krishna Prasad was recorded as PW-3. The accused in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case. He stated that he is a handicapped and unable to ride a bicycle. He further states that he is not a servant of Thakur Das and does not sell milk. In defence Mata Prasad DW-1 was produced who stated that Thakur Das used to repair watches and had a shop besides a hotel at the said place. He was not dealing in milk. Maiyya Deen was not servant of Thakur Das. The trial court after recording of the evidence passed the judgment and order as aforesaid. Against the said judgment and order, the accused revisionist Maiyya Deen preferred an appeal before the Appellate Court which was dismissed but the sentence as imposed on him was enhanced as aforesaid. This revision has thus been filed challenging the judgments and orders as aforesaid.

7. Learned counsel for the revisionist raised two submissions before the Court. The first submission is a challenge to the judgment and order of the Appellate Court. It is submitted that the judgment and order of the trial court dated 12.12.2013 convicted and sentenced him for offence under Section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 to six months imprisonment, fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to two months additional imprisonment against which an appeal was preferred before the Appellate Court in which the Appellate Court has enhanced the sentence as imposed against the revisionist to two years rigorous imprisonment, fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to six months simple imprisonment. It is submitted that there was no appeal filed by the complainant or State for enhancement against the judgment and order of the trial court but in an appeal challenging the judgment and order of conviction of the trial court by the accused, the Appellate Court has enhanced the sentence as awarded to 4 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 him. It is submitted that the view as taken by the Appellate Court is totally illegal inasmuch in the absence of any appeal by the complainant or State for enhancement, the Appellate Court cannot enhance the sentence as awarded by the trial court in an appeal filed by an accused convict challenging his conviction and sentence. It is further submitted that in an appeal from a conviction, the Appellate Court cannot enhance the sentence awarded to the accused by the trial court.

8. The Apex Court in the case Sachin Vs. State of Maharashtra : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 834 has held that in an filed by an accused / convict against his conviction the sentence cannot be enhanced by the appellate court. It was held as under: “18. We find merit in the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the record does not reflect that the counsel for the appellant-accused or the accused himself was heard on the question of modifying the charge from a minor offence to a major offence and thereby altering the finding and enhancing the sentence. The further and more important submission is that, in an appeal filed by the accused/convict the sentence cannot be enhanced by the appellate court.

19. Section 386 CrPC discusses the powers of the appellate court. For ease of reference, Section 386 reads as under: “386. Powers of the Appellate Court.— After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor if he appears, and in case of an appeal under section 377 or section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may— (a) in an appeal from an order or acquittal, reverse such order and direct that further inquiry be made, or that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial, as the case may be, or find him guilty and pass sentence on him according to law; (b) in an appeal from a conviction— (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same— 5 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 (c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence— (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re-tried by a Court competent to try the offence, or (ii) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or, the nature and extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or reduce the same; (d) in an appeal from any other order, alter or reverse such order; (e) make any amendment or any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper: Provided that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement: Provided further that the Appellate Court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing the order or sentence under appeal.” The said provision delineates four categories of appeals, (i) an appeal from an order of acquittal; (ii) an appeal from conviction; (iii) an appeal for enhancement of sentence; and (iv) an appeal from any other order.

20. Section 377 CrPC which provides for appeal by the State Government against inadequacy of sentence was a novel provision brought in by the CrPC. The 41st Law Commission had noted in its report that, pre-1973, in the absence of a statutory provision which permitted the State to prefer an appeal against inadequate sentence, the State was compelled to invoke the revisional powers of the High Court for correction of any error in sentencing. Finding this to be unsatisfactory, the Law Commission recommended that the State Government should be able to appeal against an inadequate sentence before an ordinary Court of Appeal as well. To effectuate this intent, the Parliament inserted Section 377.

20.1. In Nadir Khan v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1975) 2 SCC 406 (“Nadir Khan”), the petitioner was found in illegal possession of ganja weighing 7 kgs, and was convicted under Section 61(a) of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 as extended to Delhi and sentenced to two months' rigorous imprisonment. As no right to appeal was available, an unsuccessful revision application was preferred before the Sessions Court. Aggrieved, the petitioner had then moved the High Court under Section 482 CrPC read with Article 227 of the Constitution against the conviction. In turn, the High Court left the petitioner worse off as it 6 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 thought that the sentence awarded was inadequate. By suo moto invoking its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court enhanced the sentence to six months. In a special leave petition before this Court, the question raised was, whether, the High Court, in a revision under Section 401 CrPC, has the jurisdiction to enhance the sentence in the absence of an appeal by the State against the inadequacy of sentence under Section 377.

20.1.1. Noting that the High Court did leave the petitioner worse off, this Court speaking through Goswami, J., characterised the question to be an unmerited doubt on the undoubted jurisdiction of the High Court in acting suo motu in criminal revision in appropriate cases. It was observed that the High Court is not required to act in revision merely through a conduit application at the instance of an aggrieved party. It was held as follows: “The High Court, as an effective instrument for administration of criminal justice, keeps a constant vigil and wherever it finds that justice has suffered, it takes upon itself as its bounden duty to suo motu act where there is flagrant abuse of the law. The character of the offence and the nature of disposal of a particular case by the subordinate court prompt remedial action on the part of the High Court for the ultimate social good of the community, even though the State may be slow or silent in preferring an appeal provided for under the new Code. … This position was true and extant in the old Code of 1898 and this salutary power has not been denied by Parliament under the new Code by rearrangement of the sections. It is true the new Code has expressly given a right to the State under Section 377 CrPC to appeal against inadequacy of sentence which was not there under the old Code. That however does not exclude revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to act suo motu for enhancement of sentence in appropriate cases. What is an appropriate case has to be left to the discretion of the High Court.… Section 401 expressly preserves the power of the High Court, by itself, to call for the records without the intervention of another agency and has kept alive the ancient exercise of power when something extraordinary comes to the knowledge of the High Court. The provisions under Section 401 read with Section 386(c)(iii) CrPC are clearly supplemental to those under Section 377 whereby appeals are provided for against inadequacy of sentence at the instance of the State Government or Central Government, as the case may be. There is therefore absolutely no merit in the contention of the learned counsel that the High Court acted without 7 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 jurisdiction in exercising the power of revision suo motu, for enhancement of the sentence in this case. The application stands rejected.” (underlining by us) under Section 377(1) CrPC against

20.2. In Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 3 SCC 25 (“Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar”), an appeal was indeed preferred by the State Government inadequacy of the sentence of the appellant convicted under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Sections 2(i)(1) and 7(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and sentenced to imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 and in default rigorous imprisonment for two months. The High Court allowed the appeal of the State with regard to the inadequacy of the sentence and while affirming the conviction of the appellant under aforesaid provisions enhanced the sentence to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000 and in default simple imprisonment for two months. In appeal before this Court, the principal submission of the appellant was that the appeal under Section 377(1) was not maintainable due to the bar operating then under Section 377(2). This argument is not relevant for our consideration in the present case. Additionally and alternatively, it was argued that the appeal not being maintainable, the High Court could not have, in any event, invoked its revisional powers under Section 401 CrPC to enhance the sentence suo moto as the power of the High Court to enhance sentence which was available under Sections 435/439 CrPC of the old CrPC is absolutely replaced by the provision of appeal under Section 377 CrPC of the new CrPC. Rejecting the submission, a three-judge Bench of this Court held that the High Court has revisional powers to, suo motu, enhance the sentence. It was held that: sentence by exercising “6. We should at once remove the misgiving that the new Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, has abolished the High Court's power of enhancement revisional jurisdiction, suo motu. The provision for appeal against inadequacy of sentence by the State Government or the Central Government does not lead to such a conclusion. High Court's power of enhancement of sentence, in an appropriate case, by exercising suo motu power of revision is still extant under Section Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, inasmuch as the High Court can “by itself” call for the record of proceedings of any inferior criminal court under its jurisdiction. The provision of Section 401(4) is a bar to a party, who does not appeal, when appeal lies, but applies in revision. Such a legal bar under Section 401(4) does not stand in the way of the read with Section 397 401 8 CRLR No. - 2206 of 2015 High Court's exercise of power of revision, suo motu, which continues as before in the new Code.” (underlining by us) The aforesaid judgments of this Court settled the question that a High Court has the jurisdiction to suo moto enhance the sentence under the CrPC by invoking its revisional powers. The pertinent question then is, whether, the High Court could enhance the sentence under its revisional powers in a convict's appeal against conviction.

21. In this case we are concerned with an appeal from a conviction. In such an appeal the appellate court can exercise its powers in three ways, as per clause (b) of Section 386 CrPC. Clause (c) is with regard to an appeal for enhancement of sentence. While an appeal from a conviction is filed by the accused, an appeal from an order of acquittal or for enhancement of sentence could be filed either by the State or by the complainant or even by the victim under Section 378 CrPC and in the case of a victim as per proviso to Section 372. In the case of an appeal from any other order i.e. not an order of conviction or acquittal, the High Court can either alter or reverse such order under clause (d). The High Court has also the power to make an amendment or pass any consequential or incidental order that may be just or proper in any of the above situations. However, there are two provisos to Section 386. The first proviso states that the sentence shall not be enhanced unless the accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. The second proviso states that the appellate court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the Court passing that order for sentence under appeal.

22. Some judgments of this Court on the interpretation of Section 386 CrPC may be referred to at this stage.