Anil Kumar Singh v. State of U.P. and

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. The present writ petition has been filed for direction to the respondents to pay retiral benefits including Pension from 1st July, 1999, Gratuity, Commutation of Pension, Leave Encashment, G.P.F. etc. Further prayer has been made to pay the arrears of salary from 14.7.1994 to 30.06.1999.

3. The petitioner was implicated in a criminal case and he was detained in jail from 15.3.1994 to 13.6.1994 and 28.6.1994 to

13.7.1994. While he was in jail the respondents have neither initiated any disciplinary proceedings nor suspended his services. Consequent upon released on bail, he reported in the institution on

14.7.1994 for joining but the institution denied and from that date the petitioner's salaries have not been released. As he demanded salaries from the date of reporting i.e. 14.7.1994, he moved a representation on 25.02.1999, but the same is still pending. Hence, the present writ petition.

4. As the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on order passed by this Court in Writ-A No.11555 of 2021 (Anil Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and 4 Others), wherein an identical issue is filed for consideration and this Court has passed the following order:- "10. In the absence of any departmental proceeding being drawn, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that petitioner was restrained from discharging duties on account of his detention in jail in connection with a criminal case a circumstance to be taken as beyond his control and his innocence ultimately being proved by way of acquittal in the said criminal case, he should not be penalized.

11. The principle of 'no work no pay' could have been attracted if petitioner had enjoyed bail in criminal case and had been merely kept under suspension but this is not the case either. Petitioner remained in detention until he was acquitted. There was no question of petitioner giving any certificate that he was not gainfully employed anywhere during the period he was under suspension. One must draw difference between an under-trial on bail and convicted person in jail.

12. In the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner I find that the some observations regarding payment of salary for the period during the employee was under detention, but there was a decree of trial court which is not a case here. In principle petitioner might have been simply acquitted but petitioner was not responsible in any manner for not discharging his duties in the department.

13. There is nothing in the counter affidavit to demonstrate that even otherwise the conduct of the petitioner has not been good and fair while discharging his official duties. The averments raised in the counter affidavit are quite sketchy as they only refer to the criminal case and detention of petitioner in jail.

14. On the backwages to the petitioner for the period he remained suspended due to detention in jail and upon his reinstatement by revoking his suspension for acquittal in the criminal case, I find support of my view in an authority of Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain v. Union of India and others (2019) 5 SCC 809 in which an identical issue was dealt with. In the said case even though departmental inquiry was set up but was later on dropped and upon acquittal the employee was reinstated revoking his suspension order. Vide paragraphs 7 and 8 the Court held thus:- "7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The appellant was placed under suspension on 23-10-1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21-10-1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21-3-1983. It is clear from the record that the appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental enquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental enquiry. Thereafter, the respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23-10-1979 came to an end on 21-3-1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21-10-1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the IA, we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the appellant is entitled for full wages from 23-10-1979 to 21-10-1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.

8. For the reasons mentioned above, we approve the judgment of the High Court by holding that the appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31-8-2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20-1- 2003. Further, the appellant shall be entitled to full salary from 23-10-1979 to 21-10-1987."

15. I find petitioner's case to be on a much better footing as he was only suspended for detention in jail without there being any inquiry in contemplation and his suspension was revoked immediately upon his acquittal in the criminal case and no appeal was preferred against the judgment of acquittal.

16. In view of the above, therefore, the Court is of the considered view that respondents are not justified in denying salary to the petitioner applying the principle of 'no work no pay'."

5. Learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent, based on the assertions made in the counter affidavit has submitted that the petitioner was appointed in an aided school which is applicable to the payment of salary from 1991. An F.I.R. was registered against the petitioner under Sections 498A, 304B, 406, 307 IPC and accordingly he was detained in jail. To support the contention they have also relied on judgment of this Court in Writ-A No. 41555 of 2009 (Kalyan Prasad Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and Others).

6. Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and also on perusal of the order of this Court in Anil Kumar Singh (supra) wherein this Court has followed the principle laid down by Apex Court in Raj Narain V. Union of India and Others (2019) 5 SCC 809 and as observed by the Apex Court the writ petition was allowed by granting the monetary benefits to the persons who are detained and subsequently who got clear acquittal.

7. Considering the observations made by the Apex Court as well as the order passed in Anil Kumar Singh (supra), this writ petition is also disposed of on same terms. Order Date :- 21.5.2025 Noman (Donadi Ramesh, J.) NOMAN AHMAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. The present writ petition has been filed for direction to the respondents to pay retiral benefits including Pension from 1st July, 1999, Gratuity, Commutation of Pension, Leave Encashment, G.P.F. etc. Further prayer has been made to pay the arrears of salary from 14.7.1994 to 30.06.1999.

3. The petitioner was implicated in a criminal case and he was detained in jail from 15.3.1994 to 13.6.1994 and 28.6.1994 to

13.7.1994. While he was in jail the respondents have neither initiated any disciplinary proceedings nor suspended his services. Consequent upon released on bail, he reported in the institution on

14.7.1994 for joining but the institution denied and from that date the petitioner's salaries have not been released. As he demanded salaries from the date of reporting i.e. 14.7.1994, he moved a representation on 25.02.1999, but the same is still pending. Hence, the present writ petition.

4. As the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on order passed by this Court in Writ-A No.11555 of 2021 (Anil Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P. and 4 Others), wherein an identical issue is filed for consideration and this Court has passed the following order:- "10. In the absence of any departmental proceeding being drawn, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that petitioner was restrained from discharging duties on account of his detention in jail in connection with a criminal case a circumstance to be taken as beyond his control and his innocence ultimately being proved by way of acquittal in the said criminal case, he should not be penalized.

11. The principle of 'no work no pay' could have been attracted if petitioner had enjoyed bail in criminal case and had been merely kept under suspension but this is not the case either. Petitioner remained in detention until he was acquitted. There was no question of petitioner giving any certificate that he was not gainfully employed anywhere during the period he was under suspension. One must draw difference between an under-trial on bail and convicted person in jail.

12. In the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner I find that the some observations regarding payment of salary for the period during the employee was under detention, but there was a decree of trial court which is not a case here. In principle petitioner might have been simply acquitted but petitioner was not responsible in any manner for not discharging his duties in the department.

13. There is nothing in the counter affidavit to demonstrate that even otherwise the conduct of the petitioner has not been good and fair while discharging his official duties. The averments raised in the counter affidavit are quite sketchy as they only refer to the criminal case and detention of petitioner in jail.

14. On the backwages to the petitioner for the period he remained suspended due to detention in jail and upon his reinstatement by revoking his suspension for acquittal in the criminal case, I find support of my view in an authority of Supreme Court in the case of Raj Narain v. Union of India and others (2019) 5 SCC 809 in which an identical issue was dealt with. In the said case even though departmental inquiry was set up but was later on dropped and upon acquittal the employee was reinstated revoking his suspension order. Vide paragraphs 7 and 8 the Court held thus:- "7. The point that remains to be considered is whether the appellant is entitled to payment of full wages between 1979 and 1987. The appellant was placed under suspension on 23-10-1979 and his suspension was revoked on 21-10-1987. An interesting development took place during the interregnum by which the disciplinary proceedings were dropped on 21-3-1983. It is clear from the record that the appellant was the one who was seeking postponement of the departmental enquiry in view of the pendency of criminal case. The order of suspension was in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings. By virtue of the disciplinary proceedings being dropped, the appellant becomes entitled to claim full salary for the period from the date of his suspension till the date of closure of the departmental enquiry. Thereafter, the respondents took four years to reinstate him by revoking his suspension. The order of suspension dated 23-10-1979 came to an end on 21-3-1983 which is the date on which disciplinary proceedings were dropped. The appellant ought to have been reinstated immediately thereafter unless a fresh order was passed, placing him under suspension during the pendency of the criminal trial which did not happen. Ultimately, the appellant was reinstated by an order dated 21-10-1987 by revocation of the order of suspension. Though, technically, the learned Additional Solicitor General is right in submitting that the impugned judgment does not even refer to the IA, we are not inclined to remit the matter to the High Court at this stage for fresh consideration of this point. We hold that the appellant is entitled for full wages from 23-10-1979 to 21-10-1987 after adjustment of the amounts already paid towards subsistence allowance.

8. For the reasons mentioned above, we approve the judgment of the High Court by holding that the appellant shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal on 31-8-2001, till the date of his reinstatement on 20-1- 2003. Further, the appellant shall be entitled to full salary from 23-10-1979 to 21-10-1987."

15. I find petitioner's case to be on a much better footing as he was only suspended for detention in jail without there being any inquiry in contemplation and his suspension was revoked immediately upon his acquittal in the criminal case and no appeal was preferred against the judgment of acquittal.

16. In view of the above, therefore, the Court is of the considered view that respondents are not justified in denying salary to the petitioner applying the principle of 'no work no pay'."

5. Learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent, based on the assertions made in the counter affidavit has submitted that the petitioner was appointed in an aided school which is applicable to the payment of salary from 1991. An F.I.R. was registered against the petitioner under Sections 498A, 304B, 406, 307 IPC and accordingly he was detained in jail. To support the contention they have also relied on judgment of this Court in Writ-A No. 41555 of 2009 (Kalyan Prasad Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and Others).

6. Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and also on perusal of the order of this Court in Anil Kumar Singh (supra) wherein this Court has followed the principle laid down by Apex Court in Raj Narain V. Union of India and Others (2019) 5 SCC 809 and as observed by the Apex Court the writ petition was allowed by granting the monetary benefits to the persons who are detained and subsequently who got clear acquittal.

7. Considering the observations made by the Apex Court as well as the order passed in Anil Kumar Singh (supra), this writ petition is also disposed of on same terms. Order Date :- 21.5.2025 Noman (Donadi Ramesh, J.) NOMAN AHMAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad