State of U.P. and Others v. Counsel for

6. Shri Khare, submitted that the resultant action pursuant to the judgment was that Government issued a Government Order fixing pay-scale of the different offices in the Collectorate qua the Stenographers as Rs. 1350- 2200 and later on the pay-scale stood further revised on the basis of recommendations of the sixth pay commission w.e.f 1.1.1996 with grade pay Rs. 4600 and revised to pay scale of Rs. 4500-7000 qua the pay-scale 1350-2200. It is submitted that by Shri Khare here the anomaly arose as the petitioners were continued in the pay-scale of Rs. 4000-6000 taking their earlier pay-scale as Rs. 1200-2040 whereas the Stenographers of District Offices were given higher pay-scale of 4500-7000 on account of the judgment of High Court whereby their pay-scale of Rs. 1350-2200 was restored.

7. Shri Khare argues that there was no occasion for the petitioner to approach the Lucknow Bench of this Court as basically the Stenographers of the office of Collectorate had raised the issue and the reason being petitioners were getting the same pay-scale of Rs. 1200-2040 which the Stenographers of the Collectorate office were also getting. It is submitted that because of this anomaly that the State Government had recalled the Government order dated 12.03.1991 by revoking the same vide 4 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 Government order dated 17.01.1992 giving parity of pay in respect of the Stenographers of the office of the Collectorate with that of the similar Stenographers working in the office of Divisional Commissioners.

8. Shri Khare has vehemently urged before the Court that after merging of the cadre of the Stenographers working in the office of Divisional Commissioner with those working in Collectorate bringing in at par, in terms of the academic qualification and eligibility criteria laid down under the Rules, then such working employees in the office of the Divisional Commissioners falling in the same cadre, could not have been discriminated against in matters of pay. Shri Khare further emphatically submitted before the Court that petitioners are discharging the same duties as is being discharged by the identically placed employees in the office of the Collectorate and yet in the matter of pay-scale they are being discriminated against as they are being paid in lesser scale of pay for which there is no justification shown by the respondents and hence, the action of the respondents for such discrimination is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.

9. It is further contended that even the seniority list of such employees is common under the new rules. Shri Khare submitted further that there is no intelligible differentia available to the state respondents in classifying two different set of Stenographers to justify two different pay-scales. He argues that if the identically placed employees under the same employers are discharging the same duties, and here the state government being the employer, then there appears to be no nexus between the object sought to be achieved by taking work from such Stenographers and classifications made to justify different set of pay-scales. Thus, according to learned Senior Advocate this discrimination meted out to the 5 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 petitioners and identically placed employees of the Divisional Commissionerate is absolutely an arbitrary one. Shri Khare further submitted that realising this anomaly to be unjustified one a recommendation came to be made by the Commissioner Allahabad Division, Allahabad (now Prayagraj) on 17.01.2008 to the State Government but no decision has been taken by the State Government till date.

10. In support of his submission Shri Khare has relied upon various authorities on the point of parity in pay on the principle of “equal pay for equal work” where the employees are discharging similar duties. In the case of State of Punjab and others v. Jagjit Singh and others 2017 (1) SCC 148, Union of India and others v. D.G.O.F Employees Association and another [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1471)] Bhawani Prasad Sahu and others v. State of U.P. and another [2023(1) ADJ 638 (LB)].

11. Meeting the submissions, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel though agreed that the matter has been referred to the State Government and decision is yet to be taken but has relied upon various paragraphs of the counter affidavit to contest the matter on the ground that the pay- scales have been prescribed for differently placed employees working in different departments which itself is a justification. Pleadings to this effect have been taken in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the counter affidavit. However, insofar as pleadings raised about discrimination and claim for equal pay for equal work for the cadre being unified one governed under the common service rules as taken in paragraphs 8, 21, 22, 31 and 35 are concerned, an evasive reply has been made in the counter affidavit by taking a plea of the judgment by the Lucknow Bench of this Court being 6 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 specific to the employees of District Offices. Interestingly paragraph 8 of the writ petition that takes a plea of unified cadre coming into force under the relevant rules, have not been commented upon vide paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit.

12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the records, the question that I find to be arising for consideration of this Court is, whether petitioners are entitled for equal pay protection as their counterparts are getting in the District offices under the Collectorate.

13. In order to find answer to this above question if I look to the relevant service rules that have come into force on 09.12.1998, I find that the for the purposes of recruitment to various posts a common qualification has been prescribed vide rule 8 the qualification prescribed as under: “8. A candidate for direct recruitment to the various posts in the service must posses the following qualification: [1] must have passed intermediate Examination of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh or an examination recognized by the Government as equivalent thereto and [2] must have a minimum speed of eighty words per minute in Hindi Shorthand and twenty five words per minute in Hindi typewriting”

14. Part 2 of the Rules vide Rule 4(1) creates a common cadre for the post of Stenographers working in the office of Commissioner or Collectorate. Part 5 of the Rules that provide for procedure for recruitment are also the same. Appointment, Probation, Confirmation and Seniority. Rule 17(1) of part 6 also speaks of common seniority though the channel of promotion both in the office of the Commissioner and of the Collectorate have been defined distinctly. Further, I find that Rule 21 except for the post of Stenographer in the District Offices naturally the Collector/ District Magistrate, the pay-scale of the Stenographers working Commissioner office, Additional Commissioner office and the District 7 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 Offices in the rank of Additional District Offices and Sub-Divisional Officers is common. The judgment in the case of Uttar Pradesh Collectorate Stenographers Association v. State of U.P. and others (supra) was confined to the justification of the Government Order dated

17.01.1992 revoking the earlier order of 1991 whereby Stenographers of the District office under Collectorate, were prescribed pay-scale of 1350-

2200. What is interesting to notice in the judgment is that the High Court gave parity to the Stenographers working in the office of the Revenue Department of the District with those working in the medical and labour department and came to conclude that if the officers are discharging same duties, then there cannot be disparity in the pay-scale of identically placed officer discharging identical duties. The relevant paragraph of the judgment dated 06.02.2009 is reproduced hereunder: “ It is not the case of the opposite parties that the Stenographers working in the Revenue Department have duties in comparison to the Stenographers working in Medical and Labour Department nor it is the case of the opposite parties that the qualifications for appointment on the post of Stenographers in the Medical and Labour Department is higher than required in the Revenue Department. Looking to the nature of duties of the members of the petitioner’s association, there is no reason to treat them differently and deny the same benefits which have been given to similarly situated other government employees. Moreso, when it is an undisputed fact that the source of recruitment, qualification and nature of duties is almost similar, therefore, the action of the opposite parties in reducing the pay-scale is not legally sustainable. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the Government Order dated 17th January, 1992 [Annexure-4 to the writ petition] issued by the State Government is hereby quashed. It is relevant to point that by an interim order dated 19.2.1992, the impugned order dated 17.1.1992 was stayed and the members of the petitioner-Association are getting salary, in the pay-scale of Rs. 1350-22--/- which has now been revised and as such opposite parties shall continue to pay the salary in revised pay-scale of Rs. 1350-2200/- The writ petition stands allowed in above terms”.

15. Soon after the judgment came to be delivered by the Court, the next consequential action was on the part of the State Government to restore the pay-scale of the Stenographers of the office of the collectorate by passing order dated 26.03.2020, instead of any further challenge to it. It 8 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 appears, therefore, that those Stenographers working in the office of Commissioner since did not approach the High Court for claiming parity at that point of time, the Government created a new cadre within the cadre for the purposes of pay-scale in order to comply with the directions issued by this Court though without any formal declaration as such. The course open for the State was either to file appeal or to give parity to the pay- scale of all similarly placed employees working in the same cadre whether in the office of Commissioner or in the office of Collectorate, more especially in the circumstances when pay parity was awarded to the Stenographers working in the District offices by the Court on the ground that their working was identical to those Stenographers working in the medical and labour department.

16. The Court absolutely fails to understand as to how the State Government while complying the directions of the High Court could have restored pay Rs. 1350-2200 in respect of one set of employees in the same cadre ignoring the other set of employees. The discrimination, therefore, is writ large on the face of records for no justification. If the same cadre of employees whose selection and appointment are done in the same manner and are also required to possess the same eligibility criterion, inasmuch as they are discharging the same duties as Stenographers whether in the office of Collectorate or in the office of Divisional Commissioner doing the work of shorthand and typing only, they must be awarded pay parity and denial of which is bound to be held an act and conduct absolutely discriminatory and arbitrary.

17. Interestingly the State Government committed another illegality and a serious one by passing another Government Order dated 12.03.2007 ignoring the pay-scale of the Stenographers of the same cadre working in 9 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 the office of the Commissioner as the pay-scale of the Stenographers working in the Collectorate was further enhanced to Rs. 4500-125-7000 whereas petitioners were made to satisfy with enhancement of Rs. 4100- 6000 as their pay-scale was at that point of time was only 1200-2040. Again discriminatory action on the part of the State Government. What is very disheartening and disappointing to the Court is that even though the recommendation came to be made by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division Allahabad on 17.01.2008 to remove this disparity, the State Government even after a lapse of 27 years has not been able to take decision. In the counter affidavit a plea has been taken vide paragraph 11 that the matter is engaging attention of the State Government but this counter affidavit was also sworn on 10.12.2012. It is therefore, rendered meaningless to wait a decision on the parity of pay by State government. If a popularly elected Government in a democratic set up cannot meet the aspiration of its populace moreso when they are employees of its own, then it can be only said very very unfortunate. It, therefore, appears that even the reasonable time of six months in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Surjeet Singh Sahni v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2022) 15 Supreme Court Cases 356 has expired and, therefore, it would be deemed that respondents have denied this claim to the petitioners. 18 In matters of pay parity Courts have repeatedly held that if identically placed employees are discharging same duties under the same employer then they are entitled to the same benefit in terms of pay/ remuneration and the identical benefits provided they are able to prove it. In the case of State of M.P. v. Pramod Bhartiya (1993) 1 SCC 539 Vide paragraph- 13 Supreme Court has held thus: 10 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 " It would be evident from this definition that the stress is upon the similarity of skill, effort and responsibility when performed under similar conditions. Further as pointed out by Mukharji, J. (as he then was ) in Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, the quality of work may vary from post to post. It may vary from institution to institution. We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter of assumption but one of proof. The respondents (original petitioners) have failed to establish that their duties responsibilities and functions are similar to those of the non-technical lecturers in Technical Colleges. They have also failed to establish that the distinction between their scale of pay and that of non-technical lecturers working in Technical Schools is either irrational and that it has no basis, or that it is vitiated by mala fides, either in law or in fact (see the approach adopted in Federation case). It must be remembered that since the plea of equal pay for equal work has to be examined with reference to Article 14, the burden is upon the petitioners to establish their rights to equal pay, or the plea of discrimination, as the case may be. This burden the original petitioners (respondents herein) have failed to discharge."

19. I am conscious of legal position and limitations of Courts of law while considering claims of pay parity. It is true that burden lies upon the petitioners to prove disparity. Vide judgment in the matter of State of West Bengal and another v. West Bengal Minimum Wages Inspector Association and others, 2010 (5) SCC 225 the Court has held thus: “20. The burden to prove disparity is on the employees claiming parity vide State of U.P. v. Ministerial Karamchari Sangh, 1997(4) S.C.T. 769 (1998) 1 SCC 422; Associate Banks Officers' Association v. SBI, 1997(4) S.C.T 790 (1998) 1 SCC 428; State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, 2002(3) S.C.T. 674: (2002) 6 SCC 72; State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, 2003(4) S.C.T. 485: (2003) 6 SCC 123; S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, 2007(4) S.C.T. 76: (2007) 8 SCC 279 and U.P. SEB v. Aziz Ahmad, 2009(1) S.C.T. 670: (2009) 2 SCC 606.

21. What is significant in this case is that parity is claimed by Inspectors, AMW, by seeking extension of the pay scale applicable to Inspector (Cooperative Societies), Extension Officers (Panchayat) and KGO-JLRO (Revenue Officers) not on the basis that the holders of those posts were performing similar duties or functions as Inspectors, AMW. On the other hand, the relief was claimed on the ground that prior to ROPA Rules 1981, the posts in the said three reference categories, and Inspectors, AMW were all in the same pay scale (Pay Scale 9), and that under ROPA Rules 1981, those other three categories have been given a higher Pay Scale of No.11, while they - Inspectors, AMW- were discriminated by continuing them in the Pay Scale 9.

22. The claim in the writ petition was not based on the ground that subject post and reference category posts carried similar or identical duties and responsibilities but on the contention that as the subject post holders and the holders of reference category posts who were enjoying equal pay at an earlier point of time, should be continued to be given equal pay even after pay revision. In other words, the parity claimed was not on the basis of equal pay for equal work, 11 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 but on the basis of previous equal pay.

23. It is now well-settled that parity cannot be claimed merely on the basis that earlier the subject post and the reference category posts were carrying the same scale of pay. In fact, one of the functions of the Pay Commission is to identify the posts which deserve a higher scale of pay than what was earlier being enjoyed with reference to their duties and responsibilities, and extend such higher scale to those categories of posts.

24. The Pay Commission has two functions; to revise the existing pay scale, by recommending revised pay scales corresponding to the prerevised pay scales and, secondly, make recommendations for upgrading or downgrading posts resulting in higher pay scales or lower pay scales, depending upon the nature of duties and functions attached to those posts. Therefore, the mere fact that at an earlier point of time, two posts were carrying the same pay scale does not mean that after the implementation of revision in pay scales, they should necessarily have the same revised pay scale.

25. As noticed above, one post which is considered as having a lesser pay scale may be assigned a higher pay scale and another post which is considered to have a proper pay scale may merely be assigned the corresponding revised pay scale but not any higher pay scale. Therefore, the benefit of higher pay scale can only be claimed by establishing that holders of the subject post and holders of reference category posts, discharge duties and functions identical with, or similar to, each other and that the continuation of disparity is irrational and unjust."

20. In Steel Authority of India Limited and others v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya, (2011) 11 SCC 122 "30. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that parity of pay can be claimed by invoking the provisions of Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India by establishing that the eligibility, mode of selection/recruitment, nature and quality of work and duties and effort, reliability, confidentiality, dexterity, functional need and responsibilities and status of both the posts are identical. The functions may be the same but the skills and responsibilities may be really and substantially different. The other post may not require any higher qualification, seniority or other like factors. Granting parity in pay scales depends upon the comparative evaluation of job and equation of posts. The person claiming parity, must plead necessary averments and prove that all things are equal between the posts concerned. Such a complex issue cannot be adjudicated by evaluating the affidavits filed by the parties.

31. The onus to establish the discrimination by the employer lies on the person claiming the parity of pay. The Expert Committee has to decide such issues, as the fixation of pay scales etc. falls within the exclusive domain of the executive. So long as the value judgment of those who are responsible for administration Le. service conditions, etc., is found to be bona fide, reasonable, and on intelligible criteria which has a rational nexus of objective of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is not prohibited in law to have two grades of posts in the same cadre. Thus, the nomenclature of a post may not 12 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 be the sole determinative factor. The courts in exercise of their limited power of judicial review can only examine whether the decision of the State authorities is rational and just or prejudicial to a particular set of employees. The court has to keep in mind that a mere difference in service conditions does not amount to discrimination. Unless there is complete and wholesale/wholesome identity between the two posts they should not be treated as equivalent and the Court should avoid applying the principle of equal pay for equal work."

21. I am equally conscious of the parameters delineated by Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association (2002) 6 SCC 72 as under: "10. It is to be kept in mind that the claim of equal pay for equal work is not a fundamental right vested in any employee though it is a constitutional goal to be achieved by the Government. Fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which is for the executive to discharge. While taking a decision in the matter several relevant factors, some of which have been noted by this Court in the decided case, are to be considered keeping in view the prevailing financial position and capacity of the State Government to bear the additional liability of a revised scale of pay. It is also to be kept in mind that the priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the State Government is also a relevant factor for consideration by the State Government. In the context of complex nature of issues involved, the far reaching consequences of a decision in the matter and its impact on the administration of the State Government courts have taken the view that ordinarily courts should not try to delve deep into administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity. That is not to say that the matter is not justiciable or that the courts cannot entertain any proceeding against such administrative decision taken by the Government. The courts should approach such matters with restraint and interfere only when they are satisfied that the decision of the Government is patently irrational, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and the Government while taking the decision has ignored factors which are material and relevant for a decision in the matter. Even in a case where the court holds the order passed by the Government to be unsustainable then ordinarily a direction should be given to the State Government or the authority taking the decision to reconsider the matter and pass a proper order. The court should avoid giving a declaration granting a particular scale of pay and compelling the Government to implement the same. As noted earlier, in the present case the High Court has not even made any attempt to compare the nature of duties and responsibilities of the two sections of the employees, in the State Secretariat and the other in the Central Secretariat. It has also ignored the basic principle that there are certain rules, regulations and executive instructions issued by the employers which govern the administration of the cadre."

22. Testing the facts of the present case upon the above principles, I find there to be no dispute regarding nature of work/ performance of duties of stenographers working with the office of Divisional Commissioner it being same as of Stenographers working in the District Offices. I have 13 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 already discussed it above and have also gone above through the relevant service rules that provide for a unified cadre. It has been held in the case of Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618 vide paragraphs 8 and 9 thus: “8. It is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. 'Equal pay for equal work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive Principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the take-over of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane the may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The Preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word 'Socialist' must mean some-thing. Even if it does not mean 'to each according to his need', it must at least mean 'equal pay for equal work'. "The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g., Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 35 of the Rumanian Code. Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western Labour Codes too. Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to, Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements. Ir accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federa Republic, and Clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given universal significance (vide International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy, p. 265). The Preamble to the Constitution of the Inter national Labour Organisation recognises the principle of 'equal remuneration for work of equal value' as constituting one of the means of achieving th improvement of conditions "involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace an harmony of the world are imperilled". Construing Articles 14 and 16 i the light of the Preamble and Article 39(d), we are of the view that the principle 'equal pay for equal work' is deducible from those Articles an may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no class fication or irrational classification though those drawing the different scale of pay do identical work under the same employer. 14 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012

9. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Dell Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government. If an thing, by reason of their investiture with the 'powers, functions and privileg of a police officer', their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. In answer to the allegation in the petition that the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous duties than drivers in other departments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous. What then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others? There is none. The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not a principle which the courts may recognise and act upon. We have shown that the answer is unsound. The clarification is irrational. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force at least on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force. The scale of pay shall be effective from January 1, 1973, the date from which the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect.” (emphasis added)

23. Again in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh and others 2017 (1) SCC 148 vide paragraph 60 the Court has held thus: “60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work, in relation to temporary employees (daily wage employees, ad hoc a ppointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of equal pay for equal work summarised by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of their employment, the concerned temporary employees were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at some point in time, were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees, from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarised by us in paragraph 42 herein above. There can be no doubt, that the principle of equal pay for equal work' would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of 15 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post.”. (emphasis added)

24. The state respondents in their counter affidavit having not denied that cadre of stenographers working in the office of Divisional Commissioner and those working in the district offices under the Collectorates in the State, form a unified cadre. I do not see there to be any justification to remand the matter to the state government. There would have been a factual issue to be resolved by the State, had these employees belonged to two different cadres and the qualifications had been different. In such exceptional circumstances there could have been an occasion to asses and appreciate work of employees belonging to different cadres upon well laid parameters and, therefore, in such condition it will have to be left for the employer to take a decision and it would also incur a financial burden. Under these exceptional circumstances this would not have convenient and feasible for the state to bring two cadres at part in terms of pay. But here is the case where discrimination is being meted out to the two identically placed employees falling in in the same cadre with two different set of pay structure prescribed and hence the above judgment is distinguishable on facts. It is well settled principles of law that judgments are not theorems of law. The legal principles are to be applied but in setting of facts of a case. It has been held in the case of Chintels India Limited v. Bhayana Builders Private Limited (2021) 4 Supreme Court Cases 602 vide paragraphs 31 and 32 thus: "31. It is well settled that judgments are not to be construed like Euclid's theorems (see Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab), but all observations made therein must relate to the context in which they were made. In that case, the Court put it thus(SCC pp.362-63, paras 10- 11)

10. There is one other significant sentence in Sreenivasa General Traaders v. State of A.P. with which we must express our agreement, it was said: (SCCp. 377 paras 26-27) '26-27.... with utmost respect, these observations of the learned Jude are not to be read as 16 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 Euclid's theorems, nor as provisions of a statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear.' We consider it proper to say, as we have already said in other cases, that judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrase and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be intercepted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd v. Horton, Lord MacDermott observed (AC. 761) '...The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge; ..." In Home Office v. Doret Yacht Co. Ltd Lord Reid said: (AC p. 1027) '... Lord Atkin's speech [Donoghue v. Stevenson, AC at p. 580 All ER p. 11] ... is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances' Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) observed (WLR p. 1069) '.... One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board Lord Morris said ( AC p. 902) 'There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or an judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.'

11. There are a few other observations in Kewal Krishan Puri case to which apply with the same force all that we have said above. It is needless to repeat the oft quoted truism of Lord Halsbury that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not for what may seem to follow logically from it." (emphasis added)

25. Nowhere in the entire counter affidavit it has been stated that petitioners are not discharging duties identical to those Stenographers who are employed in the the District Offices of the Revenue Department and hence, the respondents now cannot take the plea that this disparity in the pay is justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution.

26. In view of the above, writ petitioners therefore, deserve to be awarded with the same pay-scale as is admissible to their counterparts working in District Offices, more especially in the circumstances when the 1998 rules are the common rules creating a unified cadre.

27. Accordingly the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 17 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012

28. A writ of mandamus is issued to the respondent No. 1 to immediately remove this pay disparity amongst the Stenographers working in the office of the Divisional Commissioner and their counter parts in the district offices being members of a unified cadre.

29. Petitioners who are working in the office of the Divisional Commissioner are held entitled to the same benefit of pay-scale w.e.f from the date their counter parts in the district offices were awarded with the pay-scale i.e. 1991.

30. Since the pay-scale of the Stenographers of the District Office was restored under the judgment of this Court at Lucknow dated 06.02.2009 w.e.f. 17.01.1992 the arrears will be calculated accordingly and shall be paid. The State Government shall be passing necessary orders in the light of the observations and directions made above within a maximum period of two months of production of certified copy of this order. August 13, 2025 Nadeem (Ajit Kumar,J.) NADEEM AHMAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

6. Shri Khare, submitted that the resultant action pursuant to the judgment was that Government issued a Government Order fixing pay-scale of the different offices in the Collectorate qua the Stenographers as Rs. 1350- 2200 and later on the pay-scale stood further revised on the basis of recommendations of the sixth pay commission w.e.f 1.1.1996 with grade pay Rs. 4600 and revised to pay scale of Rs. 4500-7000 qua the pay-scale 1350-2200. It is submitted that by Shri Khare here the anomaly arose as the petitioners were continued in the pay-scale of Rs. 4000-6000 taking their earlier pay-scale as Rs. 1200-2040 whereas the Stenographers of District Offices were given higher pay-scale of 4500-7000 on account of the judgment of High Court whereby their pay-scale of Rs. 1350-2200 was restored.

7. Shri Khare argues that there was no occasion for the petitioner to approach the Lucknow Bench of this Court as basically the Stenographers of the office of Collectorate had raised the issue and the reason being petitioners were getting the same pay-scale of Rs. 1200-2040 which the Stenographers of the Collectorate office were also getting. It is submitted that because of this anomaly that the State Government had recalled the Government order dated 12.03.1991 by revoking the same vide 4 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 Government order dated 17.01.1992 giving parity of pay in respect of the Stenographers of the office of the Collectorate with that of the similar Stenographers working in the office of Divisional Commissioners.

8. Shri Khare has vehemently urged before the Court that after merging of the cadre of the Stenographers working in the office of Divisional Commissioner with those working in Collectorate bringing in at par, in terms of the academic qualification and eligibility criteria laid down under the Rules, then such working employees in the office of the Divisional Commissioners falling in the same cadre, could not have been discriminated against in matters of pay. Shri Khare further emphatically submitted before the Court that petitioners are discharging the same duties as is being discharged by the identically placed employees in the office of the Collectorate and yet in the matter of pay-scale they are being discriminated against as they are being paid in lesser scale of pay for which there is no justification shown by the respondents and hence, the action of the respondents for such discrimination is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.

9. It is further contended that even the seniority list of such employees is common under the new rules. Shri Khare submitted further that there is no intelligible differentia available to the state respondents in classifying two different set of Stenographers to justify two different pay-scales. He argues that if the identically placed employees under the same employers are discharging the same duties, and here the state government being the employer, then there appears to be no nexus between the object sought to be achieved by taking work from such Stenographers and classifications made to justify different set of pay-scales. Thus, according to learned Senior Advocate this discrimination meted out to the 5 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 petitioners and identically placed employees of the Divisional Commissionerate is absolutely an arbitrary one. Shri Khare further submitted that realising this anomaly to be unjustified one a recommendation came to be made by the Commissioner Allahabad Division, Allahabad (now Prayagraj) on 17.01.2008 to the State Government but no decision has been taken by the State Government till date.

10. In support of his submission Shri Khare has relied upon various authorities on the point of parity in pay on the principle of “equal pay for equal work” where the employees are discharging similar duties. In the case of State of Punjab and others v. Jagjit Singh and others 2017 (1) SCC 148, Union of India and others v. D.G.O.F Employees Association and another [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1471)] Bhawani Prasad Sahu and others v. State of U.P. and another [2023(1) ADJ 638 (LB)].

11. Meeting the submissions, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel though agreed that the matter has been referred to the State Government and decision is yet to be taken but has relied upon various paragraphs of the counter affidavit to contest the matter on the ground that the pay- scales have been prescribed for differently placed employees working in different departments which itself is a justification. Pleadings to this effect have been taken in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the counter affidavit. However, insofar as pleadings raised about discrimination and claim for equal pay for equal work for the cadre being unified one governed under the common service rules as taken in paragraphs 8, 21, 22, 31 and 35 are concerned, an evasive reply has been made in the counter affidavit by taking a plea of the judgment by the Lucknow Bench of this Court being 6 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 specific to the employees of District Offices. Interestingly paragraph 8 of the writ petition that takes a plea of unified cadre coming into force under the relevant rules, have not been commented upon vide paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit.

12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the records, the question that I find to be arising for consideration of this Court is, whether petitioners are entitled for equal pay protection as their counterparts are getting in the District offices under the Collectorate.

13. In order to find answer to this above question if I look to the relevant service rules that have come into force on 09.12.1998, I find that the for the purposes of recruitment to various posts a common qualification has been prescribed vide rule 8 the qualification prescribed as under: “8. A candidate for direct recruitment to the various posts in the service must posses the following qualification: [1] must have passed intermediate Examination of the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar Pradesh or an examination recognized by the Government as equivalent thereto and [2] must have a minimum speed of eighty words per minute in Hindi Shorthand and twenty five words per minute in Hindi typewriting”

14. Part 2 of the Rules vide Rule 4(1) creates a common cadre for the post of Stenographers working in the office of Commissioner or Collectorate. Part 5 of the Rules that provide for procedure for recruitment are also the same. Appointment, Probation, Confirmation and Seniority. Rule 17(1) of part 6 also speaks of common seniority though the channel of promotion both in the office of the Commissioner and of the Collectorate have been defined distinctly. Further, I find that Rule 21 except for the post of Stenographer in the District Offices naturally the Collector/ District Magistrate, the pay-scale of the Stenographers working Commissioner office, Additional Commissioner office and the District 7 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 Offices in the rank of Additional District Offices and Sub-Divisional Officers is common. The judgment in the case of Uttar Pradesh Collectorate Stenographers Association v. State of U.P. and others (supra) was confined to the justification of the Government Order dated

17.01.1992 revoking the earlier order of 1991 whereby Stenographers of the District office under Collectorate, were prescribed pay-scale of 1350-

2200. What is interesting to notice in the judgment is that the High Court gave parity to the Stenographers working in the office of the Revenue Department of the District with those working in the medical and labour department and came to conclude that if the officers are discharging same duties, then there cannot be disparity in the pay-scale of identically placed officer discharging identical duties. The relevant paragraph of the judgment dated 06.02.2009 is reproduced hereunder: “ It is not the case of the opposite parties that the Stenographers working in the Revenue Department have duties in comparison to the Stenographers working in Medical and Labour Department nor it is the case of the opposite parties that the qualifications for appointment on the post of Stenographers in the Medical and Labour Department is higher than required in the Revenue Department. Looking to the nature of duties of the members of the petitioner’s association, there is no reason to treat them differently and deny the same benefits which have been given to similarly situated other government employees. Moreso, when it is an undisputed fact that the source of recruitment, qualification and nature of duties is almost similar, therefore, the action of the opposite parties in reducing the pay-scale is not legally sustainable. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the Government Order dated 17th January, 1992 [Annexure-4 to the writ petition] issued by the State Government is hereby quashed. It is relevant to point that by an interim order dated 19.2.1992, the impugned order dated 17.1.1992 was stayed and the members of the petitioner-Association are getting salary, in the pay-scale of Rs. 1350-22--/- which has now been revised and as such opposite parties shall continue to pay the salary in revised pay-scale of Rs. 1350-2200/- The writ petition stands allowed in above terms”.

15. Soon after the judgment came to be delivered by the Court, the next consequential action was on the part of the State Government to restore the pay-scale of the Stenographers of the office of the collectorate by passing order dated 26.03.2020, instead of any further challenge to it. It 8 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 appears, therefore, that those Stenographers working in the office of Commissioner since did not approach the High Court for claiming parity at that point of time, the Government created a new cadre within the cadre for the purposes of pay-scale in order to comply with the directions issued by this Court though without any formal declaration as such. The course open for the State was either to file appeal or to give parity to the pay- scale of all similarly placed employees working in the same cadre whether in the office of Commissioner or in the office of Collectorate, more especially in the circumstances when pay parity was awarded to the Stenographers working in the District offices by the Court on the ground that their working was identical to those Stenographers working in the medical and labour department.

16. The Court absolutely fails to understand as to how the State Government while complying the directions of the High Court could have restored pay Rs. 1350-2200 in respect of one set of employees in the same cadre ignoring the other set of employees. The discrimination, therefore, is writ large on the face of records for no justification. If the same cadre of employees whose selection and appointment are done in the same manner and are also required to possess the same eligibility criterion, inasmuch as they are discharging the same duties as Stenographers whether in the office of Collectorate or in the office of Divisional Commissioner doing the work of shorthand and typing only, they must be awarded pay parity and denial of which is bound to be held an act and conduct absolutely discriminatory and arbitrary.

17. Interestingly the State Government committed another illegality and a serious one by passing another Government Order dated 12.03.2007 ignoring the pay-scale of the Stenographers of the same cadre working in 9 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 the office of the Commissioner as the pay-scale of the Stenographers working in the Collectorate was further enhanced to Rs. 4500-125-7000 whereas petitioners were made to satisfy with enhancement of Rs. 4100- 6000 as their pay-scale was at that point of time was only 1200-2040. Again discriminatory action on the part of the State Government. What is very disheartening and disappointing to the Court is that even though the recommendation came to be made by the Commissioner, Allahabad Division Allahabad on 17.01.2008 to remove this disparity, the State Government even after a lapse of 27 years has not been able to take decision. In the counter affidavit a plea has been taken vide paragraph 11 that the matter is engaging attention of the State Government but this counter affidavit was also sworn on 10.12.2012. It is therefore, rendered meaningless to wait a decision on the parity of pay by State government. If a popularly elected Government in a democratic set up cannot meet the aspiration of its populace moreso when they are employees of its own, then it can be only said very very unfortunate. It, therefore, appears that even the reasonable time of six months in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Surjeet Singh Sahni v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2022) 15 Supreme Court Cases 356 has expired and, therefore, it would be deemed that respondents have denied this claim to the petitioners. 18 In matters of pay parity Courts have repeatedly held that if identically placed employees are discharging same duties under the same employer then they are entitled to the same benefit in terms of pay/ remuneration and the identical benefits provided they are able to prove it. In the case of State of M.P. v. Pramod Bhartiya (1993) 1 SCC 539 Vide paragraph- 13 Supreme Court has held thus: 10 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 " It would be evident from this definition that the stress is upon the similarity of skill, effort and responsibility when performed under similar conditions. Further as pointed out by Mukharji, J. (as he then was ) in Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers v. Union of India, the quality of work may vary from post to post. It may vary from institution to institution. We cannot ignore or overlook this reality. It is not a matter of assumption but one of proof. The respondents (original petitioners) have failed to establish that their duties responsibilities and functions are similar to those of the non-technical lecturers in Technical Colleges. They have also failed to establish that the distinction between their scale of pay and that of non-technical lecturers working in Technical Schools is either irrational and that it has no basis, or that it is vitiated by mala fides, either in law or in fact (see the approach adopted in Federation case). It must be remembered that since the plea of equal pay for equal work has to be examined with reference to Article 14, the burden is upon the petitioners to establish their rights to equal pay, or the plea of discrimination, as the case may be. This burden the original petitioners (respondents herein) have failed to discharge."

19. I am conscious of legal position and limitations of Courts of law while considering claims of pay parity. It is true that burden lies upon the petitioners to prove disparity. Vide judgment in the matter of State of West Bengal and another v. West Bengal Minimum Wages Inspector Association and others, 2010 (5) SCC 225 the Court has held thus: “20. The burden to prove disparity is on the employees claiming parity vide State of U.P. v. Ministerial Karamchari Sangh, 1997(4) S.C.T. 769 (1998) 1 SCC 422; Associate Banks Officers' Association v. SBI, 1997(4) S.C.T 790 (1998) 1 SCC 428; State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, 2002(3) S.C.T. 674: (2002) 6 SCC 72; State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, 2003(4) S.C.T. 485: (2003) 6 SCC 123; S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, 2007(4) S.C.T. 76: (2007) 8 SCC 279 and U.P. SEB v. Aziz Ahmad, 2009(1) S.C.T. 670: (2009) 2 SCC 606.

21. What is significant in this case is that parity is claimed by Inspectors, AMW, by seeking extension of the pay scale applicable to Inspector (Cooperative Societies), Extension Officers (Panchayat) and KGO-JLRO (Revenue Officers) not on the basis that the holders of those posts were performing similar duties or functions as Inspectors, AMW. On the other hand, the relief was claimed on the ground that prior to ROPA Rules 1981, the posts in the said three reference categories, and Inspectors, AMW were all in the same pay scale (Pay Scale 9), and that under ROPA Rules 1981, those other three categories have been given a higher Pay Scale of No.11, while they - Inspectors, AMW- were discriminated by continuing them in the Pay Scale 9.

22. The claim in the writ petition was not based on the ground that subject post and reference category posts carried similar or identical duties and responsibilities but on the contention that as the subject post holders and the holders of reference category posts who were enjoying equal pay at an earlier point of time, should be continued to be given equal pay even after pay revision. In other words, the parity claimed was not on the basis of equal pay for equal work, 11 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 but on the basis of previous equal pay.

23. It is now well-settled that parity cannot be claimed merely on the basis that earlier the subject post and the reference category posts were carrying the same scale of pay. In fact, one of the functions of the Pay Commission is to identify the posts which deserve a higher scale of pay than what was earlier being enjoyed with reference to their duties and responsibilities, and extend such higher scale to those categories of posts.

24. The Pay Commission has two functions; to revise the existing pay scale, by recommending revised pay scales corresponding to the prerevised pay scales and, secondly, make recommendations for upgrading or downgrading posts resulting in higher pay scales or lower pay scales, depending upon the nature of duties and functions attached to those posts. Therefore, the mere fact that at an earlier point of time, two posts were carrying the same pay scale does not mean that after the implementation of revision in pay scales, they should necessarily have the same revised pay scale.

25. As noticed above, one post which is considered as having a lesser pay scale may be assigned a higher pay scale and another post which is considered to have a proper pay scale may merely be assigned the corresponding revised pay scale but not any higher pay scale. Therefore, the benefit of higher pay scale can only be claimed by establishing that holders of the subject post and holders of reference category posts, discharge duties and functions identical with, or similar to, each other and that the continuation of disparity is irrational and unjust."

20. In Steel Authority of India Limited and others v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya, (2011) 11 SCC 122 "30. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that parity of pay can be claimed by invoking the provisions of Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India by establishing that the eligibility, mode of selection/recruitment, nature and quality of work and duties and effort, reliability, confidentiality, dexterity, functional need and responsibilities and status of both the posts are identical. The functions may be the same but the skills and responsibilities may be really and substantially different. The other post may not require any higher qualification, seniority or other like factors. Granting parity in pay scales depends upon the comparative evaluation of job and equation of posts. The person claiming parity, must plead necessary averments and prove that all things are equal between the posts concerned. Such a complex issue cannot be adjudicated by evaluating the affidavits filed by the parties.

31. The onus to establish the discrimination by the employer lies on the person claiming the parity of pay. The Expert Committee has to decide such issues, as the fixation of pay scales etc. falls within the exclusive domain of the executive. So long as the value judgment of those who are responsible for administration Le. service conditions, etc., is found to be bona fide, reasonable, and on intelligible criteria which has a rational nexus of objective of differentiation, such differentiation will not amount to discrimination. It is not prohibited in law to have two grades of posts in the same cadre. Thus, the nomenclature of a post may not 12 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 be the sole determinative factor. The courts in exercise of their limited power of judicial review can only examine whether the decision of the State authorities is rational and just or prejudicial to a particular set of employees. The court has to keep in mind that a mere difference in service conditions does not amount to discrimination. Unless there is complete and wholesale/wholesome identity between the two posts they should not be treated as equivalent and the Court should avoid applying the principle of equal pay for equal work."

21. I am equally conscious of the parameters delineated by Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association (2002) 6 SCC 72 as under: "10. It is to be kept in mind that the claim of equal pay for equal work is not a fundamental right vested in any employee though it is a constitutional goal to be achieved by the Government. Fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties and responsibilities is a complex matter which is for the executive to discharge. While taking a decision in the matter several relevant factors, some of which have been noted by this Court in the decided case, are to be considered keeping in view the prevailing financial position and capacity of the State Government to bear the additional liability of a revised scale of pay. It is also to be kept in mind that the priority given to different types of posts under the prevailing policies of the State Government is also a relevant factor for consideration by the State Government. In the context of complex nature of issues involved, the far reaching consequences of a decision in the matter and its impact on the administration of the State Government courts have taken the view that ordinarily courts should not try to delve deep into administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixation and pay parity. That is not to say that the matter is not justiciable or that the courts cannot entertain any proceeding against such administrative decision taken by the Government. The courts should approach such matters with restraint and interfere only when they are satisfied that the decision of the Government is patently irrational, unjust and prejudicial to a section of employees and the Government while taking the decision has ignored factors which are material and relevant for a decision in the matter. Even in a case where the court holds the order passed by the Government to be unsustainable then ordinarily a direction should be given to the State Government or the authority taking the decision to reconsider the matter and pass a proper order. The court should avoid giving a declaration granting a particular scale of pay and compelling the Government to implement the same. As noted earlier, in the present case the High Court has not even made any attempt to compare the nature of duties and responsibilities of the two sections of the employees, in the State Secretariat and the other in the Central Secretariat. It has also ignored the basic principle that there are certain rules, regulations and executive instructions issued by the employers which govern the administration of the cadre."

22. Testing the facts of the present case upon the above principles, I find there to be no dispute regarding nature of work/ performance of duties of stenographers working with the office of Divisional Commissioner it being same as of Stenographers working in the District Offices. I have 13 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 already discussed it above and have also gone above through the relevant service rules that provide for a unified cadre. It has been held in the case of Randhir Singh v. Union of India (1982) 1 SCC 618 vide paragraphs 8 and 9 thus: “8. It is true that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not expressly declared by our Constitution to be a fundamental right. But it certainly is a constitutional goal. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims "equal pay for equal work for both men and women" as a Directive Principle of State Policy. 'Equal pay for equal work for both men and women' means equal pay for equal work for everyone and as between the sexes. Directive Principles, as has been pointed out in some of the judgments of this Court have to be read into the fundamental rights as a matter of interpretation. Article 14 of the Constitution enjoins the State not to deny any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws and Article 16 declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. These equality clauses of the Constitution must mean something to everyone. To the vast majority of the people the equality clauses of the Constitution would mean nothing if they are unconcerned with the work they do and the pay they get. To them the equality clauses will have some substance if equal work means equal pay. Whether the special procedure prescribed by a statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with statute for trying alleged robber-barons and smuggler kings or for dealing with tax evaders is discriminatory, whether a particular governmental policy in the matter of grant of licences or permits confers unfettered discretion on the Executive, whether the take-over of the empires of industrial tycoons is arbitrary and unconstitutional and other questions of like nature, leave the millions of people of this country untouched. Questions concerning wages and the like, mundane the may be, are yet matters of vital concern to them and it is there, if at all that the equality clauses of the Constitution have any significance to them. The Preamble to the Constitution declares the solemn resolution of the people of India to constitute India into a Sovereign Socialist Democratic Republic. Again the word 'Socialist' must mean some-thing. Even if it does not mean 'to each according to his need', it must at least mean 'equal pay for equal work'. "The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is expressly recognized by all socialist systems of law, e.g., Section 59 of the Hungarian Labour Code, para 2 of Section 111 of the Czechoslovak Code, Section 67 of the Bulgarian Code, Section 40 of the Code of the German Democratic Republic, para 2 of Section 35 of the Rumanian Code. Indeed this principle has been incorporated in several western Labour Codes too. Under provisions in Section 31 (g. No. 2d) of Book I of the French Code du Travail, and according to, Argentinian law, this principle must be applied to female workers in all collective bargaining agreements. Ir accordance with Section 3 of the Grundgesetz of the German Federa Republic, and Clause 7, Section 123 of the Mexican Constitution, the principle is given universal significance (vide International Labour Law by Istvan Szaszy, p. 265). The Preamble to the Constitution of the Inter national Labour Organisation recognises the principle of 'equal remuneration for work of equal value' as constituting one of the means of achieving th improvement of conditions "involving such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to produce unrest so great that the peace an harmony of the world are imperilled". Construing Articles 14 and 16 i the light of the Preamble and Article 39(d), we are of the view that the principle 'equal pay for equal work' is deducible from those Articles an may be properly applied to cases of unequal scales of pay based on no class fication or irrational classification though those drawing the different scale of pay do identical work under the same employer. 14 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012

9. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the drivers in the Dell Police Force perform the same functions and duties as other drivers service of the Delhi Administration and the Central Government. If an thing, by reason of their investiture with the 'powers, functions and privileg of a police officer', their duties and responsibilities are more arduous. In answer to the allegation in the petition that the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force perform no less arduous duties than drivers in other departments, it was admitted by the respondents in their counter that the duties of the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force were onerous. What then is the reason for giving them a lower scale of pay than others? There is none. The only answer of the respondents is that the drivers of the Delhi Police Force and the other drivers belong to different departments and that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not a principle which the courts may recognise and act upon. We have shown that the answer is unsound. The clarification is irrational. We, therefore, allow the writ petition and direct the respondents to fix the scale of pay of the petitioner and the driver-constables of the Delhi Police Force at least on a par with that of the drivers of the Railway Protection Force. The scale of pay shall be effective from January 1, 1973, the date from which the recommendations of the Pay Commission were given effect.” (emphasis added)

23. Again in the case of State of Punjab v. Jagjit Singh and others 2017 (1) SCC 148 vide paragraph 60 the Court has held thus: “60. Having traversed the legal parameters with reference to the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work, in relation to temporary employees (daily wage employees, ad hoc a ppointees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determination is, whether the concerned employees (before this Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibilities, as were being discharged by regular employees, holding the same/corresponding posts. This exercise would require the application of the parameters of the principle of equal pay for equal work summarised by us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was fairly acknowledged by the learned counsel representing the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in the present bunch of appeals, were appointed against posts which were also available in the regular cadre establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of their employment, the concerned temporary employees were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and responsibilities, which at some point in time, were assigned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holding substantive posts, were also posted to discharge the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees, from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles summarised by us in paragraph 42 herein above. There can be no doubt, that the principle of equal pay for equal work' would be applicable to all the concerned temporary employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at par with the minimum of the pay-scale of 15 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 regularly engaged Government employees, holding the same post.”. (emphasis added)

24. The state respondents in their counter affidavit having not denied that cadre of stenographers working in the office of Divisional Commissioner and those working in the district offices under the Collectorates in the State, form a unified cadre. I do not see there to be any justification to remand the matter to the state government. There would have been a factual issue to be resolved by the State, had these employees belonged to two different cadres and the qualifications had been different. In such exceptional circumstances there could have been an occasion to asses and appreciate work of employees belonging to different cadres upon well laid parameters and, therefore, in such condition it will have to be left for the employer to take a decision and it would also incur a financial burden. Under these exceptional circumstances this would not have convenient and feasible for the state to bring two cadres at part in terms of pay. But here is the case where discrimination is being meted out to the two identically placed employees falling in in the same cadre with two different set of pay structure prescribed and hence the above judgment is distinguishable on facts. It is well settled principles of law that judgments are not theorems of law. The legal principles are to be applied but in setting of facts of a case. It has been held in the case of Chintels India Limited v. Bhayana Builders Private Limited (2021) 4 Supreme Court Cases 602 vide paragraphs 31 and 32 thus: "31. It is well settled that judgments are not to be construed like Euclid's theorems (see Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab), but all observations made therein must relate to the context in which they were made. In that case, the Court put it thus(SCC pp.362-63, paras 10- 11)

10. There is one other significant sentence in Sreenivasa General Traaders v. State of A.P. with which we must express our agreement, it was said: (SCCp. 377 paras 26-27) '26-27.... with utmost respect, these observations of the learned Jude are not to be read as 16 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012 Euclid's theorems, nor as provisions of a statute. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear.' We consider it proper to say, as we have already said in other cases, that judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrase and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be intercepted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Co. Ltd v. Horton, Lord MacDermott observed (AC. 761) '...The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J., as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge; ..." In Home Office v. Doret Yacht Co. Ltd Lord Reid said: (AC p. 1027) '... Lord Atkin's speech [Donoghue v. Stevenson, AC at p. 580 All ER p. 11] ... is not to be treated as if it were a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances' Megarry, J. in Shepherd Homes Ltd. v. Sandham (No. 2) observed (WLR p. 1069) '.... One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell, L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And, in Herrington v. British Railways Board Lord Morris said ( AC p. 902) 'There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or an judgment as though they were words in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.'

11. There are a few other observations in Kewal Krishan Puri case to which apply with the same force all that we have said above. It is needless to repeat the oft quoted truism of Lord Halsbury that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not for what may seem to follow logically from it." (emphasis added)

25. Nowhere in the entire counter affidavit it has been stated that petitioners are not discharging duties identical to those Stenographers who are employed in the the District Offices of the Revenue Department and hence, the respondents now cannot take the plea that this disparity in the pay is justified on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution.

26. In view of the above, writ petitioners therefore, deserve to be awarded with the same pay-scale as is admissible to their counterparts working in District Offices, more especially in the circumstances when the 1998 rules are the common rules creating a unified cadre.

27. Accordingly the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 17 WRIA No. 12122 of 2012

28. A writ of mandamus is issued to the respondent No. 1 to immediately remove this pay disparity amongst the Stenographers working in the office of the Divisional Commissioner and their counter parts in the district offices being members of a unified cadre.

29. Petitioners who are working in the office of the Divisional Commissioner are held entitled to the same benefit of pay-scale w.e.f from the date their counter parts in the district offices were awarded with the pay-scale i.e. 1991.

30. Since the pay-scale of the Stenographers of the District Office was restored under the judgment of this Court at Lucknow dated 06.02.2009 w.e.f. 17.01.1992 the arrears will be calculated accordingly and shall be paid. The State Government shall be passing necessary orders in the light of the observations and directions made above within a maximum period of two months of production of certified copy of this order. August 13, 2025 Nadeem (Ajit Kumar,J.) NADEEM AHMAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad