High Court · 2025

1. Heard Sri Umesh Vats, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.C. Mishra, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. Rejoinder affidavit filed today, is taken on record.

3. By means of instant writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 05.07.2022 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Stamp), Meerut Mandal, Ghaziabad and the order dated 15.05.2023 passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Meerut Mandal, Ghaziabad.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the land in question was purchased by the petitioner on the strength of registered sale deed dated 05.10.2015 executed by Smt. Bijendri W/o Gajendra Singh after paying the requisite stamp duty thereof. Subsequently, the entire plot was sold by the petitioner to Mr. Ramish Akeel vide sale deed dated 23.02.2017 and thereafter, out of the plot purchased by Mr. Ramish Akeel, 100 Sq. Yard was sold to Mohd. Nabeel Ansari vide sale deed dated 17.11.2017. Thereafter, the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act were initiated against Mohd. Nabeel Ansari and deficiency of stamp duty amounting to Rs. 1,55,510/- and penalty of Rs. 10,000/- along with interest @ 1.5% per month was imposed against him vide order dated 17.07.2018. The said amount was deposited through challan by Mohd. Nabeel Ansari on 17.11.2018.

5. He further submits that after the expiry of limitation prescribed under the Stamp Act, the notice was issued for deficiency of stamp duty, which was neither served upon the petitioner nor the petitioner has knowledge about the said proceedings, however, an ex-parte order dated 05.07.2022 was passed holding the deficiency of stamp duty amounting to Rs. 26,98,010/- and penalty amounting to Rs. 5,40,000/- along with interest @ 1.5% per month from the date of execution of sale deed till the actual realization of the payment. Against the said order, an appeal was filed wherein a specific ground was taken that the proceedings have been initiated after the expiry of period prescribed and no permission from the State Government has been taken for initiating the proceedings after the expiry of prescribed period, but the same was not considered.

6. He further submits that before the appellate authority, it was also brought to the notice that after purchase of the plot in question, two subsequent sale deeds were executed and regarding last sale deed, deficiency of stamp duty was assessed, which was paid by subsequent purchased, however, only on the basis of an ex-parte report dated 27.06.2020, the order has been passed confirming the deficiency of stamp duty.

7. He further submits that a specific pleading has been made that the proceedings initiated after the expiry of the prescribed period i.e. four years and without any approval by the State Government, the proceedings cannot be initiated. In para nos. 12 & 26 of the present writ petition, which has been replied in para no. 8 of the counter affidavit, wherein no specific denial has been made.

8. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of Full Bench of this Court passed in the case of Girjesh Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. [Reference No. 1 of 1996], dated 08.12.1997 and submits that the proceedings cannot be sustained.

9. Per contra, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel supports the impugned orders and submits that the proceedings were rightly been initiated as the stamp duty was found to be deficient. He further submits that after due approval by the State Government, proceedings were initiated to which he refers page no.1 of the impugned order annexed as Annexure No.6 to this writ petition. He prays for dismissal of the writ petition.

10. After hearing the parties, the Court has perused the record.

11. It is not in dispute that after purchase of the land in question by the petitioner, the entire plot was sold by the petitioner to Mr. Ramish Akeel vide sale deed dated 23.02.2017 and thereafter, out of the plot purchased by Mr. Ramish Akeel, 100 Sq. Yard was sold to Mohd. Nabeel Ansari vide sale deed dated 17.11.2017. Thereafter, the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act were initiated against Mohd. Nabeel Ansari and deficiency of stamp duty amounting to Rs. 1,55,510/- and penalty of Rs. 10,000/- along with interest @ 1.5% per month was imposed against him vide order dated 17.07.2018. The said amount was deposited through challan by Mohd. Nabeel Ansari on 17.11.2018.

12. Further, the proceedings against the petitioner were initiated pursuant to the notice dated 07.08.2020; whereas admittedly, the sale deed was executed on 05.10.2015, which is beyond the period of four years, as prescribed under the Stamp Act.

13. The record shows that no permission was sought by the State Government to initiate the proceedings after four years as prescribed under the Stamp Act, rather a reference of a Government Order has been made in the impugned order at page No. 120 of the writ petition as well as in para no.8 of the counter affidavit, bearing No. G.O. No. 12/2021/1302/94 St. Ni. 2/20210700 (01) 2015 dated 24.12.21 has been mentioned.

14. Further, pursuant to the said government order, a notice was issued to the petitioner for compounding of the pending cases. The said G.O. shows a scheme was pronounced by the State Government vide order dated 24.12.2021 for compounding of the pending cases, but neither in the counter affidavit nor any of the impugned orders, it has been mentioned that the permission, extending the limitation as prescribed under the Stamp Act has been taken by the State Government. In absence of such permission, the proceedings cannot be said to be legal and is liable to be set aside.

15. This Court in the case of Girjesh Kumar Srivastava (supra) in para nos. 10 to 14 held as under:- "10. There is no dispute from either side that the starting point of limitation is the date of registration of the instrument and the period of limitation is four years. According to learned Chief Standing Counsel, if a reference from any Court or Commissioner of Stamps or Additional Commissioner of Stamps or a Deputy Commissioner of Stamps or any officer authorised by the Board, of Revenue in that behalf is made within four years from the date of registration of the Instrument, whether any action is taken by the Collector or not, the proceedings would be within limitation. Shri Rajiv Joshi, learned counsel for the applicants has, on the other hand, contended that the limitation of four years is for the Collector to initiate action and the date on which a reference is made by a Court or authorities enumerated in the opening part of sub-section (4) of Section 47A is irrelevant. The question which arises for consideration is whether the period of four years qualifies the action of the Collector or the making of reference. Under sub-section (1) of Section 47A the registering officer is required to make a reference to the Collector before registering the instrument,, while under subsection (2) a discretion has been given to him to register the Instrument and then make a reference to the Collector for determination of market value. In normal course of events this reference would be made immediately after registering the Instrument and, therefore, the enquiry under sub- section (3) is likely to commence soon as the person in whose favour the instrument has been executed would forthwith come to know about the reference and would be interested to get the matter concluded. In the first case the Instrument would remain unregistered and in the second case he will not get back the instrument after registration on account of it having been referred to the Collector. Therefore, in cases covered by sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) at least the factum of reference would be immediately known to the person in whose favour instrument has been executed and he is bound to take all proceedings expedttlously in order to secure his title or get the benefits of the instrument. Under sub-section (4) power has been conferred on the Collector to call for and examine the instrument after it has been registered for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the market value of the property which is subject of such instrument and the duty payable thereon. This action can be taken either suo motu or on a reference from any Court or any one of the authorities enumerated in the sub-section. In our opinion, the language of the sub-section shows that the period of four years qualifies the action which may be taken by the Collector. If the Interpretation suggested by learned Chief Standing Counsel was correct, the sub-section would have read like this : "The Collector may, suo motu or on a reference from any Court or from the Commissioner of Stamps or a Deputy Commissioner of Stamps or an Assistant Commissioner of Stamps or any officer authorised by the Board of Revenue in that behalf made within four years from the date of registration of any instrument." From the language in which the sub-section has been couched, it is not possible to hold that the period of four years qualifies the reference.

11. It may be noticed that the language used in the opening part of subsection (4) of Section 33 is exactly similar to the language used in the opening part of sub-section (4) of Section 47A. The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 33 says that no action under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) shall be taken after a period of four years from the date of execution of the Instrument. Here the bar of limitation applies to the action which may be taken by the Collector and not to a reference. There is no reason why similar interpretation should not be given to sub-section (4) of Section 47A specially when both the sections namely Section 33 and Section 47A find place in same Chapter IV of the Stamp Act which deals with Instrument Not Duly Stamped.

12. It has been held by a Full Bench of Seven Judges of our Court in Mata Badal Pandey and others v. Board of Revenue, 1974 U. P. Tax Cases 570 that where there is some dgubt or ambiguity in any provision in the authoritative English text, it is permissible to look Into the Hindi text to remove the doubt or ambiguity. Sub-section (4) of Section 47A as given in the Hindi version of the Act reads as follows : यय उप- धयरय (1) धयरय (2) लजस पर शयलक समपलत कल बयजयरस ममलय पर, कललकटरर सवयमलव यय ककसस नयययलय, यय सहययक सटयमप आययक, यय सटयमप आययक यय अपर सटयमप आययक, यय रयजसव पररषदद दयरय इसकल "(4) यय सटयमप उप आययक, ललयल अलधकक त ककसस अलधकयरस कल ससदरर पर ककसस कवललन कल , परयरणसय हह, जज उप- रलजसटटसकरण कक तयरसख सल चयर वषर कल अनदर उस समपलत कय जज ऐखल कवललस कय कवषय हज, बयजयरस ममलय और उस पर दलय शयलक कल बयरल मम अपनस ससतयकष करनल कल पयजजन सल कवतलसत कज तलब कर, उसकय परसकण कर सकतय हह, और यकद ऐसल परसकण कल बयद उसल कवशयस करनल कज कयरण हज कक उस समपलत कय बयजयरस ममलय कवललस मम सतयतयपमणर वयक नहह ककयय गयय हह, मम कनधयररण पककयय कल अनयसयर समपलत कय बयजयरस ममलय और उस पर दलय शयलक कनकशत कर सकतय हह। शयलक कक रयकश मम अनतर यकद हज) ( उस वयकक दयरय दलय हजगय लजस पर शयलक अदय करनल कय दयकयतव हज।" कल अधसन पहलल उसकज ससदकररत न हहआ हज, तज वह उप- धयरय 3

13. There is another reason for not accepting the submission made by the learned Chief Standing Counsel. If the period of limitation is held to be applicable only to the making of a reference, a very anomalous situation may arise. There will be no limitation where the Collector chooses to take suo motu action and he may do so at any time at his sweet will. Even where a reference is made within limitation i.e., within four years either by a Court or any of the authorities enumerated in the sub- section, the Collector may not proceed forthwith and the matter may be kept pending for years. He may commence proceedings after a long period, may be after decades. The property may change hands several times during this period which may create complications for the present owner who may not even be aware of the circumstances attending the execution of the instrument which is alleged to be undervalued and may not be in a position to lead evidence. The value of immovable property changes fast. There has been a meteoric rise in the value of Immovable property in the recent past, if the proceedings are taken after a long period it may become very difficult to give evidence regarding the market value of the property at the time the instrument was executed. Therefore, the Legislature in Its wisdom thought it proper to fix a period of limitation within which the Collector must Initiate action so that the enquiry may not be unnecessarily delayed. In this connection, it may be pointed out that after the decision of Himalaya House Co. Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (supra) many States inserted Section 47A by amendment in the Stamp Act and the Collector was conferred power to suo motu call for and examine the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself is to the correctness of the market value of the property. In Andhra Pradesh, Bihar. Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Goa Daman and Diu and West Bengal the period of limitation for the Collector to suo motu call for and examine the Instrument is two years while in Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh it is three years. This shows that the intention of the Legislature is that the entire exercise should be concluded within a reasonable period and may not be kept pending for long.

14. Learned Chief Standing Counsel vehemently urged that Rule 346 of the U. P. Stamp Rules showed that the period of limitation of four years is provided for making a reference to the Collector. Rule 346, no doubt, provides that the Inspector of Stamps and Registration shall make a reference to the Collector within four years from the date of registration of the instrument. But this rule cannot be read in isolation and has to be read along with Rule 352, Rule 352 shows that the period of limitation applies to the action which may be taken by the Collector and not to a reference. As observed earlier, the Rules are always subservient to the Act under which they have been made and they cannot override or amend the provisions of the Act itself. Rule 346 cannot change the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 47A. Learned Chief Standing Counsel also referred to a Supreme Court decision rendered in Trfdeshwar Dayal v. Maheshwar Dayal 1990 (1) SCC 377 and urged on its basis that the period of limitation does not apply to the action of the Collector. We do not think that in the aforesaid case the Supreme Court has held as a proposition of law that the period of limitation does not apply to the action which may be initiated by the Collector but applies only to a reference by a Court or other authority enumerated in the sub- section. In this case, order for Impounding the award of the arbitrator had been passed by the civil court itself and subsequent order of the Collector was held to have been passed merely as a follow-up step in pursuance of the civil court's order."

16. Record shows that no permission has been granted by the State Government for taking action against the petitioner after expiry of the limitation and therefore, proceedings against the petitioner is vitiated and liable to be set aside.

17. In view of the above facts as stated as well as law laid down in the aforesaid judgment, the impugned orders cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and the same are hereby quashed.

18. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.

19. Any amount deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the impugned orders, shall be refunded to him along with interest @ 4% per annum, within two months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. Order Date :- 14.5.2025 Pravesh Mishra PRAVESH KUMAR MISHRA PRAVESH KUMAR MISHRA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1. Heard Sri Umesh Vats, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A.C. Mishra, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.

2. Rejoinder affidavit filed today, is taken on record.

3. By means of instant writ petition, the petitioner has assailed the order dated 05.07.2022 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Stamp), Meerut Mandal, Ghaziabad and the order dated 15.05.2023 passed by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Meerut Mandal, Ghaziabad.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the land in question was purchased by the petitioner on the strength of registered sale deed dated 05.10.2015 executed by Smt. Bijendri W/o Gajendra Singh after paying the requisite stamp duty thereof. Subsequently, the entire plot was sold by the petitioner to Mr. Ramish Akeel vide sale deed dated 23.02.2017 and thereafter, out of the plot purchased by Mr. Ramish Akeel, 100 Sq. Yard was sold to Mohd. Nabeel Ansari vide sale deed dated 17.11.2017. Thereafter, the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act were initiated against Mohd. Nabeel Ansari and deficiency of stamp duty amounting to Rs. 1,55,510/- and penalty of Rs. 10,000/- along with interest @ 1.5% per month was imposed against him vide order dated 17.07.2018. The said amount was deposited through challan by Mohd. Nabeel Ansari on 17.11.2018.

5. He further submits that after the expiry of limitation prescribed under the Stamp Act, the notice was issued for deficiency of stamp duty, which was neither served upon the petitioner nor the petitioner has knowledge about the said proceedings, however, an ex-parte order dated 05.07.2022 was passed holding the deficiency of stamp duty amounting to Rs. 26,98,010/- and penalty amounting to Rs. 5,40,000/- along with interest @ 1.5% per month from the date of execution of sale deed till the actual realization of the payment. Against the said order, an appeal was filed wherein a specific ground was taken that the proceedings have been initiated after the expiry of period prescribed and no permission from the State Government has been taken for initiating the proceedings after the expiry of prescribed period, but the same was not considered.

6. He further submits that before the appellate authority, it was also brought to the notice that after purchase of the plot in question, two subsequent sale deeds were executed and regarding last sale deed, deficiency of stamp duty was assessed, which was paid by subsequent purchased, however, only on the basis of an ex-parte report dated 27.06.2020, the order has been passed confirming the deficiency of stamp duty.

7. He further submits that a specific pleading has been made that the proceedings initiated after the expiry of the prescribed period i.e. four years and without any approval by the State Government, the proceedings cannot be initiated. In para nos. 12 & 26 of the present writ petition, which has been replied in para no. 8 of the counter affidavit, wherein no specific denial has been made.

8. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the judgment of Full Bench of this Court passed in the case of Girjesh Kumar Srivastava Vs. State of U.P. [Reference No. 1 of 1996], dated 08.12.1997 and submits that the proceedings cannot be sustained.

9. Per contra, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel supports the impugned orders and submits that the proceedings were rightly been initiated as the stamp duty was found to be deficient. He further submits that after due approval by the State Government, proceedings were initiated to which he refers page no.1 of the impugned order annexed as Annexure No.6 to this writ petition. He prays for dismissal of the writ petition.

10. After hearing the parties, the Court has perused the record.

11. It is not in dispute that after purchase of the land in question by the petitioner, the entire plot was sold by the petitioner to Mr. Ramish Akeel vide sale deed dated 23.02.2017 and thereafter, out of the plot purchased by Mr. Ramish Akeel, 100 Sq. Yard was sold to Mohd. Nabeel Ansari vide sale deed dated 17.11.2017. Thereafter, the proceedings under Section 47-A of the Indian Stamp Act were initiated against Mohd. Nabeel Ansari and deficiency of stamp duty amounting to Rs. 1,55,510/- and penalty of Rs. 10,000/- along with interest @ 1.5% per month was imposed against him vide order dated 17.07.2018. The said amount was deposited through challan by Mohd. Nabeel Ansari on 17.11.2018.

12. Further, the proceedings against the petitioner were initiated pursuant to the notice dated 07.08.2020; whereas admittedly, the sale deed was executed on 05.10.2015, which is beyond the period of four years, as prescribed under the Stamp Act.

13. The record shows that no permission was sought by the State Government to initiate the proceedings after four years as prescribed under the Stamp Act, rather a reference of a Government Order has been made in the impugned order at page No. 120 of the writ petition as well as in para no.8 of the counter affidavit, bearing No. G.O. No. 12/2021/1302/94 St. Ni. 2/20210700 (01) 2015 dated 24.12.21 has been mentioned.

14. Further, pursuant to the said government order, a notice was issued to the petitioner for compounding of the pending cases. The said G.O. shows a scheme was pronounced by the State Government vide order dated 24.12.2021 for compounding of the pending cases, but neither in the counter affidavit nor any of the impugned orders, it has been mentioned that the permission, extending the limitation as prescribed under the Stamp Act has been taken by the State Government. In absence of such permission, the proceedings cannot be said to be legal and is liable to be set aside.

15. This Court in the case of Girjesh Kumar Srivastava (supra) in para nos. 10 to 14 held as under:- "10. There is no dispute from either side that the starting point of limitation is the date of registration of the instrument and the period of limitation is four years. According to learned Chief Standing Counsel, if a reference from any Court or Commissioner of Stamps or Additional Commissioner of Stamps or a Deputy Commissioner of Stamps or any officer authorised by the Board, of Revenue in that behalf is made within four years from the date of registration of the Instrument, whether any action is taken by the Collector or not, the proceedings would be within limitation. Shri Rajiv Joshi, learned counsel for the applicants has, on the other hand, contended that the limitation of four years is for the Collector to initiate action and the date on which a reference is made by a Court or authorities enumerated in the opening part of sub-section (4) of Section 47A is irrelevant. The question which arises for consideration is whether the period of four years qualifies the action of the Collector or the making of reference. Under sub-section (1) of Section 47A the registering officer is required to make a reference to the Collector before registering the instrument,, while under subsection (2) a discretion has been given to him to register the Instrument and then make a reference to the Collector for determination of market value. In normal course of events this reference would be made immediately after registering the Instrument and, therefore, the enquiry under sub- section (3) is likely to commence soon as the person in whose favour the instrument has been executed would forthwith come to know about the reference and would be interested to get the matter concluded. In the first case the Instrument would remain unregistered and in the second case he will not get back the instrument after registration on account of it having been referred to the Collector. Therefore, in cases covered by sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) at least the factum of reference would be immediately known to the person in whose favour instrument has been executed and he is bound to take all proceedings expedttlously in order to secure his title or get the benefits of the instrument. Under sub-section (4) power has been conferred on the Collector to call for and examine the instrument after it has been registered for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the correctness of the market value of the property which is subject of such instrument and the duty payable thereon. This action can be taken either suo motu or on a reference from any Court or any one of the authorities enumerated in the sub-section. In our opinion, the language of the sub-section shows that the period of four years qualifies the action which may be taken by the Collector. If the Interpretation suggested by learned Chief Standing Counsel was correct, the sub-section would have read like this : "The Collector may, suo motu or on a reference from any Court or from the Commissioner of Stamps or a Deputy Commissioner of Stamps or an Assistant Commissioner of Stamps or any officer authorised by the Board of Revenue in that behalf made within four years from the date of registration of any instrument." From the language in which the sub-section has been couched, it is not possible to hold that the period of four years qualifies the reference.

11. It may be noticed that the language used in the opening part of subsection (4) of Section 33 is exactly similar to the language used in the opening part of sub-section (4) of Section 47A. The proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 33 says that no action under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) shall be taken after a period of four years from the date of execution of the Instrument. Here the bar of limitation applies to the action which may be taken by the Collector and not to a reference. There is no reason why similar interpretation should not be given to sub-section (4) of Section 47A specially when both the sections namely Section 33 and Section 47A find place in same Chapter IV of the Stamp Act which deals with Instrument Not Duly Stamped.

12. It has been held by a Full Bench of Seven Judges of our Court in Mata Badal Pandey and others v. Board of Revenue, 1974 U. P. Tax Cases 570 that where there is some dgubt or ambiguity in any provision in the authoritative English text, it is permissible to look Into the Hindi text to remove the doubt or ambiguity. Sub-section (4) of Section 47A as given in the Hindi version of the Act reads as follows : यय उप- धयरय (1) धयरय (2) लजस पर शयलक समपलत कल बयजयरस ममलय पर, कललकटरर सवयमलव यय ककसस नयययलय, यय सहययक सटयमप आययक, यय सटयमप आययक यय अपर सटयमप आययक, यय रयजसव पररषदद दयरय इसकल "(4) यय सटयमप उप आययक, ललयल अलधकक त ककसस अलधकयरस कल ससदरर पर ककसस कवललन कल , परयरणसय हह, जज उप- रलजसटटसकरण कक तयरसख सल चयर वषर कल अनदर उस समपलत कय जज ऐखल कवललस कय कवषय हज, बयजयरस ममलय और उस पर दलय शयलक कल बयरल मम अपनस ससतयकष करनल कल पयजजन सल कवतलसत कज तलब कर, उसकय परसकण कर सकतय हह, और यकद ऐसल परसकण कल बयद उसल कवशयस करनल कज कयरण हज कक उस समपलत कय बयजयरस ममलय कवललस मम सतयतयपमणर वयक नहह ककयय गयय हह, मम कनधयररण पककयय कल अनयसयर समपलत कय बयजयरस ममलय और उस पर दलय शयलक कनकशत कर सकतय हह। शयलक कक रयकश मम अनतर यकद हज) ( उस वयकक दयरय दलय हजगय लजस पर शयलक अदय करनल कय दयकयतव हज।" कल अधसन पहलल उसकज ससदकररत न हहआ हज, तज वह उप- धयरय 3

13. There is another reason for not accepting the submission made by the learned Chief Standing Counsel. If the period of limitation is held to be applicable only to the making of a reference, a very anomalous situation may arise. There will be no limitation where the Collector chooses to take suo motu action and he may do so at any time at his sweet will. Even where a reference is made within limitation i.e., within four years either by a Court or any of the authorities enumerated in the sub- section, the Collector may not proceed forthwith and the matter may be kept pending for years. He may commence proceedings after a long period, may be after decades. The property may change hands several times during this period which may create complications for the present owner who may not even be aware of the circumstances attending the execution of the instrument which is alleged to be undervalued and may not be in a position to lead evidence. The value of immovable property changes fast. There has been a meteoric rise in the value of Immovable property in the recent past, if the proceedings are taken after a long period it may become very difficult to give evidence regarding the market value of the property at the time the instrument was executed. Therefore, the Legislature in Its wisdom thought it proper to fix a period of limitation within which the Collector must Initiate action so that the enquiry may not be unnecessarily delayed. In this connection, it may be pointed out that after the decision of Himalaya House Co. Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (supra) many States inserted Section 47A by amendment in the Stamp Act and the Collector was conferred power to suo motu call for and examine the instrument for the purpose of satisfying himself is to the correctness of the market value of the property. In Andhra Pradesh, Bihar. Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Goa Daman and Diu and West Bengal the period of limitation for the Collector to suo motu call for and examine the Instrument is two years while in Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh it is three years. This shows that the intention of the Legislature is that the entire exercise should be concluded within a reasonable period and may not be kept pending for long.

14. Learned Chief Standing Counsel vehemently urged that Rule 346 of the U. P. Stamp Rules showed that the period of limitation of four years is provided for making a reference to the Collector. Rule 346, no doubt, provides that the Inspector of Stamps and Registration shall make a reference to the Collector within four years from the date of registration of the instrument. But this rule cannot be read in isolation and has to be read along with Rule 352, Rule 352 shows that the period of limitation applies to the action which may be taken by the Collector and not to a reference. As observed earlier, the Rules are always subservient to the Act under which they have been made and they cannot override or amend the provisions of the Act itself. Rule 346 cannot change the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 47A. Learned Chief Standing Counsel also referred to a Supreme Court decision rendered in Trfdeshwar Dayal v. Maheshwar Dayal 1990 (1) SCC 377 and urged on its basis that the period of limitation does not apply to the action of the Collector. We do not think that in the aforesaid case the Supreme Court has held as a proposition of law that the period of limitation does not apply to the action which may be initiated by the Collector but applies only to a reference by a Court or other authority enumerated in the sub- section. In this case, order for Impounding the award of the arbitrator had been passed by the civil court itself and subsequent order of the Collector was held to have been passed merely as a follow-up step in pursuance of the civil court's order."

16. Record shows that no permission has been granted by the State Government for taking action against the petitioner after expiry of the limitation and therefore, proceedings against the petitioner is vitiated and liable to be set aside.

17. In view of the above facts as stated as well as law laid down in the aforesaid judgment, the impugned orders cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and the same are hereby quashed.

18. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed.

19. Any amount deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the impugned orders, shall be refunded to him along with interest @ 4% per annum, within two months from the date of production of certified copy of this order. Order Date :- 14.5.2025 Pravesh Mishra PRAVESH KUMAR MISHRA PRAVESH KUMAR MISHRA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad High Court of Judicature at Allahabad