High Court · 2025 on 24 Apr 2025

Judgment

1. Heard Mr. Pranjal Mehrotra for the appellant and Mr. Ram Pratap Yadav, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Arbitration Act”) is arising out of an order dated 24.3.2023 passed by the District Judge.

3. Brief facts of the case as stated in the present appeal are that the land in question was acquired for building (widening/six laning etc), maintenance, management and operation of National Highway No. 2 in Kanpur Dehat, Uttar Pradesh, under the Gazette Notification published on

16.2.2015 under Section 3 A (1) of National Highways Act, 1956 (herein after referred to as the “Act”). By means of said notification, the land of the respondents bearing Plot no. 305, situated at village and tehsil Sikandara, Distt. Kanpur Dehat was acquired declaring the same as agricultural land and subsequently under Section 3 D (1) of the Act, the Central Government issued declaration of acquisition by the Gazette Notification dated

15.2.2016. Thereafter the award dated 17.11.2016 has been passed holding the land in question as non agricultural and compensation was accordingly decided. Against the said award, the appellant preferred a petition under Section 3G (5) of the Act before the Additional Commissioner, (Administration) Kanpur Division, who, vide award dated 24.4.2018, remanded the matter to the competent authority on the ground that opportunity of hearing was not provided to the appellant. Thereafter the 2 competent authority has passed the supplementary award dated 16.3.2021 wherein part of the land in question was declared as agricultural and part of the same was declared as non agricultural. Against the said supplementary award, the appellant has again preferred petition under Section 3 G (5) of the Act but the supplementary award was affirmed in favour of the respondent and contention of the appellant was rejected vide order dated 7.12.2021. Thereafter the appellant has preferred application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the District Judge but the same was dismissed by the impugned order dated 24.3.2023. Hence the present appeal.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that Gazette notification dated 16.2.2015 was issued under Section 3 A (1) of the Act declaring the land in question as agricultural land to which the the respondents have given opportunity to file objection within 21 days but they had failed to do so, therefore, the nature of the land in question was illegally changed by the impugned award, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside on this ground alone.

5. Alternatively, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the Arbitrator did not have jurisdiction to remand the matter for re-appreciation of facts, therefore, the supplementary award is bad and liable to be set aside. Further by the supplementary award, without there being any material or evidence on record, which was placed by the respondents, part of the land in question was treated as agricultural and part of the same was treated as non agricultural, which is not justified in the eyes of law. He further submits that specific ground was raised before the authorities but none of the authorities have considered the same, therefore, the award is bad. He prays for allowing the present appeal.

6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supports the impugned order as well as the awards.

7. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, the Court has perused the records. 3

8. The argument raised by the counsel for the appellant that in pursuance of the notification under Section 3 A (1) of the Act as published on

16.2.2015, the land in question was treated as agricultural land to which the respondents have not filed objection within 21 days, appears to be very attractive but on close scrutiny of the records shows that the said objection was neither raised nor pressed by the appellant at any stage, therefore, the appellant cannot be permitted to raise this new ground in the appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

9. Another argument raised by the counsel for the appellant that Arbitrator was not competent or empower to remand the matter for passing the supplementary award, also appears to be attractive, however the same has no leg to stand as the remand order was never challenged under Section 34 or 37 of the Arbitration Act, even the appellant did not challenge the same before the competent authority, who passed the supplementary award, therefore, this new ground cannot be raised before this Court for the first time, under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act.

10. Further, learned counsel for the appellant has argued that under Section 3 G (7) of the Act, while passing the supplementary award, the market value of the land on the date of publication of notification under Section 3 A of the Act must be taken into consideration. He submits that the said ground was pressed before the authorities below but none of the authorities had considered the same. In other words, he submits that the specific plea was taken / argued / pressed before the authorities below but without taking note of the same, the impugned award was passed.

11. To the said submission, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the aforesaid ground was neither taken nor pressed before the authorities below, therefore, the said contention cannot be accepted at this stage.

12. On perusal of the records, it shows that only Sections of the Act were quoted before passing of the award but no argument was raised before the Arbitrator. The only argument was raised that the compensation cannot be allowed in two parts, which has not been accepted, against which the 4 arbitration proceedings have been initiated and thereafter application u/s 34 of the Arbitration Act was filed and further the present appeal and in all the three proceedings, the appellant has failed to show any ground that some argument was raised / pressed / taken but the same was not noted. Once the argument with regard to Section 3 G (7) of the Act was neither raised nor mentioned in the application u/s 34 of the Arbitration Act and the appellant in its wisdom does not pressed / taken the said ground, therefore, the same cannot be considered at this stage.

13. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. and another Vs. M/s Sanman Rice Mills and others, 2024 SCC Online SC 2632 has held as under :-

20. In view of the above position in law on the subject, the scope of the intervention of the court in arbitral matters is virtually prohibited, if not absolutely barred and that the interference is confined only to the extent envisaged under Section 34 of the Act. The appellate power of Section 37 of the Act is limited within the domain of Section 34 of the Act. It is exercisable only to find out if the court, exercising power under Section 34 of the Act, has acted within its limits as prescribed thereunder or has exceeded or failed to exercise the power so conferred. The Appellate Court has no authority of law to consider the matter in dispute before the arbitral tribunal on merits so as to find out as to whether the decision of the arbitral tribunal is right or wrong upon reappraisal of evidence as if it is sitting in an ordinary court of appeal. It is only where the court exercising power under Section 34 has failed to exercise its jurisdiction vested in it by Section 34 or has travelled beyond its jurisdiction that the appellate court can step in and set aside the order passed under Section 34 of the Act. Its power is more akin to that superintendence as is vested in civil courts while exercising revisionary powers. The arbitral award is not liable to be interfered unless a case for interference as set out in the earlier part of the decision, is made out. It cannot be disturbed only for the reason that instead of the view taken by the arbitral tribunal, the other view which is also a possible view is a better view according to the appellate court.

21. It must also be remembered that proceedings under Section 34 of the Act are summary in nature and are not like a full-fledged regular civil suit. Therefore, the scope of Section 37 of the Act is much more 5 summary in nature and not like an ordinary civil appeal. The award as such cannot be touched unless it is contrary to the substantive provision of law; any provision of the Act or the terms of the agreement. (Emphasis supplied by this Court)

14. In view of the facts as stated above as well as law laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court as referred herein above, no interference is called for by this Court in the impugned order.

15. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

16. Let the lower Court record be returned. Date : 24.4.2025 Rahul Dwivedi/- RAHUL DWIVEDI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad