Headmaster and School Register. The Apex Court also in the case of P. Yuvaprakash v. State Rep. By Inspector Of Police, has observed that the mere school leaving cert

1. Heard Mr. Jai Prakash Singh, learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Awdhesh Singh, learned counsel for opposite party nos. 2 and 3 and Mr. Ramesh Kumar, learned AGA for the State.

2. The present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed on behalf of the applicant for quashing of the entire proceeding of Case No. 361 of 2020 (State Vs. Rinku) in Charge Sheet No. 427 of 2018, dated 28.10.2018 submitted by the Investigating Officer against the applicant in Case Crime No. 0132 of 2017 under Sections 363, 366 and 376 I.P.C., and Section 4 POCSO Act, Police Station- Faridpur, District- Bareilly, pending in the Court of Special Court POCSO Act/Additional Sessions Judge III, Bareilly, as well as the summoning order 03.10.2020.

3. Facts giving rise to the present controversy is that opposite party no. 2 has lodged an FIR against the applicant in Case Crime No. 132 of 2017, dated 25.03.2017 under Sections 363 and 366 I.P.C. making allegation that the applicant has enticed away the minor daughter of the first informant.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that during investigation police has recorded the statement of victim- Seema under Section 164 Cr.P.C. wherein she has clearly stated that she is twenty years old and her father has produced forged mark-sheet before the police to obtain benefit of the POCSO Act. It is further stated by the victim girl in her statement that she willingly left her house and reached to the house of the applicant and thereafter they got married being major. The victim has also stated in her statement that her elder sister is twenty five years old and her elder brother is twenty three years old and she herself is two years younger to her elder brother, therefore, she is about twenty one years of age. But the police relied upon the leaving certificate issued on 31.03.2017 by Headmaster of Primary School which is not countersigned by the BSA showing the date of birth of victim as 05.06.2004 and on the basis of leaving certificate police has submitted the charge sheet against the applicant under Sections 363, 366 and 376 I.P.C. and under Section 4 of POCSO Act.

5. It is further submitted that during the pendency of impugned proceedings parties have settled their dispute and the first informant who is the mother of the victim has accepted the marriage of the applicant and opposite party no. 3 and a compromise has also been annexed at page 52 of the paper book which was signed by the mother of the victim being the first informant. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the aforesaid compromise may be verified by issuing a direction so that the impugned proceedings may be quashed on the basis of verified compromise.

6. From the perusal of the school leaving certificate, which is the basis of the filing of the charge sheet, it is clear that leaving certificate will not come within the definition date of birth certificate from school as required by Section 94 (2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. Even otherwise the same is not countersigned by the BSA and it does not has any authenticity in absence of any statement of Headmaster and School Register. The Apex Court also in the case of P. Yuvaprakash vs State Rep. By Inspector Of Police, has observed that the mere school leaving certificate/transfer certificate cannot be treated as equal to date of birth certificate, unless same is duly authenticated by concerned authority, and in such cases in absence of other documents ossification test could determine the age of the juvenile/victim.

7. Paragraph No. 14 of P. Yuvaprakash (Supra) is being quoted as under:- "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence."

8. The Apex Court in the case of Vinod Katara vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh, Writ Petition(Crl.) 121/22 has also observed that the mode of determining the age should be as per the prescribed Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

9. Paragraph no. 20 of the Vinod Katara (Supra) is quoted as under:- "20. Section 94(2) of the JJ Act provides for the mode of determination of age. In the order of priorities, the date of birth certificate from the school stands at the highest pedestal whereas ossification test has been kept at the last rung to be considered, only in the absence of the criteria Nos. 1 and 2, i.e. in absence of both certificate from school and birth certificate issued by a Corporation/Municipal Authority/Panchayat."

10. From the perusal of Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, it is clear that in absence of date of birth certificate or matrimonial certificate as well as birth certificate issued by Corporation or Panchayat age shall be determined as by the ossification test.

11. Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is quoted as under:- "(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining— (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order."

12. Therefore, in the present case this Court is of the view that the school leaving certificate which is the basis of impugned chargesheet is not the authentic document to consider it as date of birth certificate as mentioned in the Section 94(2) of the J.J. Act, therefore, same cannot be relied upon to determine the age of opposite party no. 3. In absence of other relevant documents the only process is ossification test to determine the age of the victim. In the present case ossification test was conducted on 30.07.2017 showing victim as twenty years old, therefore, on the date of incident, when the victim had left her house and joined the applicant, she was major. As the victim herself stated in her statement, under Section 164 Cr.P.C., that she herself left her house and willingly got married to the applicant, therefore, no case under Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act is made out against the applicant.

13. From the perusal of the record it is also clear that at present victim and applicant have been residing together as husband and wife and they are also blessed with two children as well as keeping in mind the law laid down by the Apex Court in cases of State of Haryana and Others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others 1992 (SUPP) 1 SCC 335, R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra and others 2021 19 SCC 401, quashing the impugned proceedings would be in the interest of justice.

14. Accordingly, the present application is allowed and the impugned proceedings, as mentioned above, are quashed. Order Date :- 13.5.2025 Saurabh SAURABH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1. Heard Mr. Jai Prakash Singh, learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Awdhesh Singh, learned counsel for opposite party nos. 2 and 3 and Mr. Ramesh Kumar, learned AGA for the State.

2. The present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed on behalf of the applicant for quashing of the entire proceeding of Case No. 361 of 2020 (State Vs. Rinku) in Charge Sheet No. 427 of 2018, dated 28.10.2018 submitted by the Investigating Officer against the applicant in Case Crime No. 0132 of 2017 under Sections 363, 366 and 376 I.P.C., and Section 4 POCSO Act, Police Station- Faridpur, District- Bareilly, pending in the Court of Special Court POCSO Act/Additional Sessions Judge III, Bareilly, as well as the summoning order 03.10.2020.

3. Facts giving rise to the present controversy is that opposite party no. 2 has lodged an FIR against the applicant in Case Crime No. 132 of 2017, dated 25.03.2017 under Sections 363 and 366 I.P.C. making allegation that the applicant has enticed away the minor daughter of the first informant.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that during investigation police has recorded the statement of victim- Seema under Section 164 Cr.P.C. wherein she has clearly stated that she is twenty years old and her father has produced forged mark-sheet before the police to obtain benefit of the POCSO Act. It is further stated by the victim girl in her statement that she willingly left her house and reached to the house of the applicant and thereafter they got married being major. The victim has also stated in her statement that her elder sister is twenty five years old and her elder brother is twenty three years old and she herself is two years younger to her elder brother, therefore, she is about twenty one years of age. But the police relied upon the leaving certificate issued on 31.03.2017 by Headmaster of Primary School which is not countersigned by the BSA showing the date of birth of victim as 05.06.2004 and on the basis of leaving certificate police has submitted the charge sheet against the applicant under Sections 363, 366 and 376 I.P.C. and under Section 4 of POCSO Act.

5. It is further submitted that during the pendency of impugned proceedings parties have settled their dispute and the first informant who is the mother of the victim has accepted the marriage of the applicant and opposite party no. 3 and a compromise has also been annexed at page 52 of the paper book which was signed by the mother of the victim being the first informant. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the aforesaid compromise may be verified by issuing a direction so that the impugned proceedings may be quashed on the basis of verified compromise.

6. From the perusal of the school leaving certificate, which is the basis of the filing of the charge sheet, it is clear that leaving certificate will not come within the definition date of birth certificate from school as required by Section 94 (2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. Even otherwise the same is not countersigned by the BSA and it does not has any authenticity in absence of any statement of Headmaster and School Register. The Apex Court also in the case of P. Yuvaprakash vs State Rep. By Inspector Of Police, has observed that the mere school leaving certificate/transfer certificate cannot be treated as equal to date of birth certificate, unless same is duly authenticated by concerned authority, and in such cases in absence of other documents ossification test could determine the age of the juvenile/victim.

7. Paragraph No. 14 of P. Yuvaprakash (Supra) is being quoted as under:- "14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence."

8. The Apex Court in the case of Vinod Katara vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh, Writ Petition(Crl.) 121/22 has also observed that the mode of determining the age should be as per the prescribed Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.

9. Paragraph no. 20 of the Vinod Katara (Supra) is quoted as under:- "20. Section 94(2) of the JJ Act provides for the mode of determination of age. In the order of priorities, the date of birth certificate from the school stands at the highest pedestal whereas ossification test has been kept at the last rung to be considered, only in the absence of the criteria Nos. 1 and 2, i.e. in absence of both certificate from school and birth certificate issued by a Corporation/Municipal Authority/Panchayat."

10. From the perusal of Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, it is clear that in absence of date of birth certificate or matrimonial certificate as well as birth certificate issued by Corporation or Panchayat age shall be determined as by the ossification test.

11. Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is quoted as under:- "(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining— (i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination Board, if available; and in the absence thereof; (ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (iii) and only in the absence of (i) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board: Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order."

12. Therefore, in the present case this Court is of the view that the school leaving certificate which is the basis of impugned chargesheet is not the authentic document to consider it as date of birth certificate as mentioned in the Section 94(2) of the J.J. Act, therefore, same cannot be relied upon to determine the age of opposite party no. 3. In absence of other relevant documents the only process is ossification test to determine the age of the victim. In the present case ossification test was conducted on 30.07.2017 showing victim as twenty years old, therefore, on the date of incident, when the victim had left her house and joined the applicant, she was major. As the victim herself stated in her statement, under Section 164 Cr.P.C., that she herself left her house and willingly got married to the applicant, therefore, no case under Sections 363, 366, 376 IPC and Section 4 of POCSO Act is made out against the applicant.

13. From the perusal of the record it is also clear that at present victim and applicant have been residing together as husband and wife and they are also blessed with two children as well as keeping in mind the law laid down by the Apex Court in cases of State of Haryana and Others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others 1992 (SUPP) 1 SCC 335, R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra and others 2021 19 SCC 401, quashing the impugned proceedings would be in the interest of justice.

14. Accordingly, the present application is allowed and the impugned proceedings, as mentioned above, are quashed. Order Date :- 13.5.2025 Saurabh SAURABH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad