Supreme Court · 2025 on 12 Aug 2025

Judgment

1. In present case, few facts are not under dispute that petitioner was appointed at respondent-bank on 19.07.1984 on a post of Officer Grade-I. An FIR dated 06.09.1993 was lodged against him along with other co-accused under Section 394/302 IPC. During investigation, he was arrested and remained behind bars from 02.11.1993 to 05.09.1994, when he was released on bail. When the petitioner was behind bars, he was put under suspension by an order dated 21.02.1994 (w.e.f. 02.11.1993) that he will be entitled for subsistence allowance.

2. The petitioner was reinstated in service vide order dated 1/5 March, 2001 on a ground that trial was pending and it would take long time. The order was passed without prejudice to right to the respondent – Bank to conduct departmental inquiry considering the progress of Court proceedings or otherwise as per Rules.

3. The petitioner has applied from time to time for payment of arrears for the period from 02.11.1993 to 05.03.2001 during which he was kept under suspension as well as annual increments also. Aforesaid grievance remained pending with respondents and meanwhile was granted acquittal by Trial Court vide judgment and order dated 01.05.2003, that charges levelled against him were false.

4. In aforesaid circumstances, the petitioner moved further application that he be granted salary for aforesaid period as well as increment and his salary be refixed, however, by an order dated 07.10.2004, his claim for payment of arrears and sanction of increment for suspension period was rejected relying upon a judgment passed by Supreme Court in Management of Reserve

Bank of India vs. Mr. Bhopal Singh Panchal, (1994) 1 SCC 541. For reference, relevant paragraph 15 of said judgment is quoted below :- “15. We have already pointed out the effect of the relevant provisions of Regulations 39, 46 and 47. The said regulations read together, leave no manner of doubt that in case of an employee who is arrested for an offence, as in the present case, his period of absence from duty is to be treated as not being beyond circumstances under his control. In such circumstances, when he is treated as being under suspension during the said period, he is entitled to subsistence allowance. However, the subsistence allowance paid to him is liable to be adjusted against his pay and allowances if at all he is held to be entitled to them by the competent authority. The competent authority while deciding whether an employee who is suspended in such circumstances is entitled to his pay and allowances or not and to what extent, if any, and whether the period is to be treated as on duty or on leave, has to take into consideration the circumstances of each case. It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the 2 employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. As it is, even during such period, the employee earns subsistence allowance by virtue of the Regulations. In the circumstances, the Bank's power in that behalf is unassailable.”

5. Sri Siddharth Khare, learned counsel for petitioner has submitted that it was not a default of the petitioner since he was always ready to work with respondents and it was respondents who were failed to take his services. No departmental proceedings were initiated after suspension was withdrawn. The petitioner remained under suspension for a very long period i.e. about 7 years and in support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon a judgment of Supreme Court in Shobha Ram Raturi vs. Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Ltd. and others, (2016) 16 SCC 663 and for reference, paragraph 3 of said judgment is quoted below :- “3. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the controversy, we are satisfied, that after the impugned order of retirement dated 31-12-2002 was set aside, the appellant was entitled to all consequential benefits. The fault lies with the respondents in not having utilised the services of the appellant for the period from 1-1-2003 to 31-12-2005. Had the appellant been allowed to continue in service, he would have readily discharged his duties. Having restrained him from rendering his services with effect from 1-1-2003 to 31-12- 2005, the respondent cannot be allowed to press the self-serving plea of denying him wages for the period in question, on the plea of the principle of “no work no pay”.” 3

6. Per contra, Sri Ambrish Sahai, learned counsel for respondent – Bank has supported the impugned order that petitioner remained in jail for his own conduct. He was facing trial for a serious offence of murder and has never …….

8. Heard learned counsel for parties and perused the records. This writ petition was filed in the year 2004 when petitioner has declared his age about 46 years and since this writ petition is now finally decided after about 21 years, therefore, it appears that petitioner is now aged about 67 years.

9. As referred above, facts are not disputed that petitioner was remained under suspension w.e.f. 02.11.1993. Later on, his suspension order was revoked by an order dated 1/5 March, 2001 with an observation that “decision regarding suspension period and/or increments falling during suspension period shall also be taken after conclusion of Court case/departmental enquiry”. Admittedly, no departmental proceedings was initiated against petitioner as well as that he was granted acquittal by trial Court and it is not on record whether State has filed any appeal against judgment of acquittal dated 01.05.2003. Relevant part of said judgment is quoted below :- न明胔 विवोधा(cid:14)ा୆셿 “ इ୆ ्ቚका वाद셿 एव렪쫉 अभि(cid:14)यु्ሹ鍵鳵 दोन鍵鳵 क明胔 ्ቛाा ्ቚस्तुत ୆ाቌኚय तथा विवव明胔चना क明胔 विवव明胔चक鍵鳵 क明胔 आ셨뢚୆셿 विवश明胔쫊쬁 रू셨뢚 ୆明胔 दोन鍵鳵 सि୆ꗤ꿹 नह錾钄 होत셿 है湷潠 अभि(cid:14)यु्ሹ दो쫊쬁셿 नह錾钄 है湷潠 वै୆明胔 अऩु୆ा ह셿 यह घटना विवव明胔चना ह셿 कायद明胔 ୆明胔 नह錾钄 हुॅ᭪ तथा तो ୆व, ्ቚथꙗꘈ ୆ह셿 दो쫊쬁셿 क破胯 दू୆셿 बा जब ୆셿.व셿.୆셿.आॅ᭪.ड셿. विवव明胔चना क破胯 तो घटना को अ୆त्य 셨뢚ात明胔 हुए अभि(cid:14)यु्ሹ鍵鳵 को दो쫊쬁셿 नह錾钄 셨뢚ाया湷潠 इ୆ ्ቚका कोॅ᭪ एक विवव明胔चक ्ቦ셿 श明胔쫊쬁ꙗꘈभि9 वि:셨뢚ाठ셿 विवव明胔चक तो अ୆त्य है湷潠 यहा鱯鴞 셨뢚 ꙗꘈ觱諓 셨뢚हल明胔 जो जब ड셿.वाॅ᭪.ए୆.셨뢚셿. विव明胔चना विक उन्ह鍵鳵न明胔 विवव明胔चना कायद明胔 ୆明胔 क破胯 होत셿 औ कायद明胔 ୆明胔 नह錾钄 क破胯湷潠 अग उन्ह鍵鳵न明胔 ୆(cid:14)셿 गवाहन क明胔 बयान लिलय明胔 होत明胔, ୆ुध셿 का 셨뢚ता लगाया होता, त明胔ज िሺ୆ह क破胯 बन्दूक क破胯 बाꙗꘈदग셿 क破胯 होत셿 या इ୆ वाद ꙗꘈ睗矴 कु ⸗⸸ (cid:14)셿 ्ቚ(cid:14)ाव셿 बाद विवव明胔चना का काय,वाह셿 क破胯 होत셿 औ ୆ब कु ⸗⸸ जानका셿 क明胔 ቝኌस्थ瞩漟त कु ⸗⸸ औ ह셿 होत셿湷潠 वै୆明胔 अभि(cid:14)योजन 셨뢚रि9ाꙗꘈ विनकाला होता तो 셨뢚셌쫫 अ셨뢚न셿 ୆ह셿 लिHलाफ काय,वाह셿 कवा ୆कता था湷潠 ल明胔विकन 셨뢚ुलिल୆ विवव明胔चक ्ቦ셿 श明胔쫊쬁ꙗꘈभि9 वि:셨뢚ाठ셿 ቝኌस्थ瞩漟त क破胯 जानका셿 कक明胔 है क明胔 बा明胔 ꙗꘈ睗矴 ह셿 कहू दोवि쫊쬁य鍵鳵 क明胔 렪쫉गा 4 को आनन फानन ꙗꘈ睗矴 आो셨뢚 셨뢚: दालिHल कना ह셿 इ୆ ꙗꘈुकदꙗꘈ睗矴 ꙗꘈ睗矴 घातक सि୆ꗤ꿹 हुआ है湷潠 जो दो गवाह वाद셿 셨뢚셌쫫 ्ቛाा 셨뢚明胔श हुए ह觱諓 वह 셨뢚ू9, रू셨뢚 ୆明胔 अविव्ቫ୆न셿य ह觱諓湷潠 ୆फाॅ᭪ ୆ा셌쫫셿ग9 दोन鍵鳵 ह셿 셨뢚ू9, रू셨뢚 ୆明胔 विव्ቫ୆न셿य ह觱諓 एव렪쫉 इ୆ अभि(cid:14)योग को अ୆त्य सि୆ꗤ꿹 कत明胔 ह觱諓湷潠 394 आॅ᭪.셨뢚셿.୆셿. का क明胔 ୆ .. … (cid:14)셿 ୆ाቌኚय नह錾钄 है湷潠 इ୆ ्ቚका यह न्यायालय इ୆ विनष्क쫊쬁, 셨뢚 셨뢚हु विक अभि(cid:14)यु्ሹग9 दो쫊쬁셿 नह錾钄 ह觱諓 औ दो쫊쬁 ꙗꘈु्ሹ होन明胔 योग्य ह觱諓湷潠 अभि(cid:14)योजन 셨뢚셌쫫 셨뢚ू9, रू셨뢚 ୆明胔 अ୆फल हा है湷潠 ” 렪쫉चता है

10. Aforesaid nature of acquittal may be considered as an Honourable Acquittal, however, a fact remains that petitioner has not worked from 02.11.1993 to 1/5.03.2001. The petitioner has not substantially pressed his claim for salary during aforesaid period. The petitioner was in jail due to his own alleged act and has faced a criminal trial for a very serious offence.

11. Aforesaid circumstance was only due to an alleged act of petitioner. The respondent-bank was not liable for such act, therefore, Shobha Ram Raturi (supra) is distinguishable on facts wherein appellant therein was terminated which was later on set aside i.e. employee was out of job due to act of an employer.

12. In this regard, Court takes note of judgment of Management of RBI (supra) that in given circumstances, principles of ‘no work no pay’ would be applicable.

13. In aforesaid circumstances, Court is of the view that petitioner was suspended due to his alleged act committed by himself. Respondent-bank was not liable for such act. The petitioner has not challenged his suspension order even after he came out on bail, therefore, principles of no work no pay is applicable.

14. So far as acquittal is concerned, it would also not be helpful of the petitioner that since petitioner was already reinstated with continuity in service except on principle of no 5 work no pay, salary was not paid when the petitioner remained under suspension.

15. The petitioner has already been retired and his retiral dues have already been paid, therefore, Court is of the view claim for payment of arrears and sanction of increments for suspension period was rightly rejected after applying principles of ‘no work no pay’.

16. In view of above, Court does not find any merit in present case. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed. Order Date :- August 12, 2025 N. Sinha [Saurabh Shyam Shamshery, J.] NIRMAL SINHA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad 6