State of U.P v. Tinku), arising out of Case Crime No

stating therein that the daughter of the applicant/plaintiff (age about 15 years) had gone out of the village to the fields to defecate at about 6.00 P.M. in the evening as usual. Raj Kumar alias Raju son of Ramsevak, Jitendra son Lalaram, Tinku son Ravindra Kumar, Usha Devi wife of Ravindra Kumar and Ravindra Kumar son Shriram of the same village kidnapped the complainant’s daughter in a planned manner. After a lot of investigation, it was found out confidentially that now the complainant suspects that the daughter has been murdered. On the basis of above, First Information Report of the present crime was registered, investigation of the above crime was started by the investigating officer, during the investigation the investigating officer inspected the scene of incident, prepared the map, recorded statements of witnesses and on the basis of evidence collected during the investigation, when sufficient evidence was available, a charge sheet against the accused was sent to the court.

4. In support of prosecution case, PW-1 Victim, PW2 Upendra Kumar, PW3 Mahila Constable Sarika Gupta, PW4 Dr. Priyanka Pandey, PW5 S.I. Ramjeet Singh and PW6 Constable Viresh Kumar.

5. The prosecution has proved Written Report as Ext. Ka1, Statement of victim recorded U/s 161 Cr.P.C. as Ext. Ka2, Medical Report as Ext. Ka3, Supplementary medical report as Ext. Ka4, Site Plan as Ext. K5, Charge sheet as Ext. K6, G.D. Report as Ext. Ka7, F.I.R. as Ext. Ka8, Recovery memo as Ext. Ka9, as documentary evidence.

6. The judgement of acquittal has been passed by the learned trial Court on the ground that as per the educational certificate Paper No.9Ka, her date of birth in the register of High School Examination of 2024 was 10.10.1998 and therefore, she was just short of 18 years of age on the date of incident. As the High School Certificate itself was not produced and her medical examination was conducted according to which, she was aged about 15 years. The Court found that the victim was studying in Class 11 and the educational document 2 of 9 issued by the School was based on the S.R. Register as well as High School Gazette, according to which, her date of birth was

10.10.1998. It was therefore, found that she was aged about 18 years. Coupled with this, it was found that in her statement recorded under Sections 161 Cr.P.C. and 164 Cr.P.C. she had not supported the prosecution version. The Court also found that the alleged incident of taking her away is stated to be dated 27.06.2016, whereas the first information report was lodged by his father on 27.07.2016 and therefore, there was a considerable delay in lodging the first information report. She had returned after about a month. The medical certificate does not reflect that she was sexually assaulted and there was no evidence of rape.

7. The judgement of acquittal was passed on the ground that the Court below found that the prosecution could not prove his case beyond doubt and the accused persons were given benefit of doubt and judgement of acquittal was passed.

8. Challenging the impugned judgment, Shri Ghanshyam Kumar, learned AGA submits that as per medical examination report, she was aged about 15 years and this was the age mentioned in the first information report itself and therefore, the judgement is against the weight and evidence on record.

9. We have considered the submissions and have perused the record.

10. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of law on the appeal against acquittal.

11. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790, in paragraph 10, the 3 of 9 Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that “the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, especially when the prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and infirmities”

12. In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words: "The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the view formed by the trial court was a ''possible view'. The judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete misreading of the material evidence which has led to miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with. This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High Court of its powers to re- appreciate the evidence, including in an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding of fact."

13. In a recent judgement of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, the law on the issue involved has been considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as under: 4 of 9 “10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:- "12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more, the probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).

13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under: "...the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses...." 5 of 9

14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).

15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re- appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour 6 of 9 of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that an "order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused."

18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances includes: i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401.

19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference."

11. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it is 7 of 9 wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal.

stating therein that the daughter of the applicant/plaintiff (age about 15 years) had gone out of the village to the fields to defecate at about 6.00 P.M. in the evening as usual. Raj Kumar alias Raju son of Ramsevak, Jitendra son Lalaram, Tinku son Ravindra Kumar, Usha Devi wife of Ravindra Kumar and Ravindra Kumar son Shriram of the same village kidnapped the complainant’s daughter in a planned manner. After a lot of investigation, it was found out confidentially that now the complainant suspects that the daughter has been murdered. On the basis of above, First Information Report of the present crime was registered, investigation of the above crime was started by the investigating officer, during the investigation the investigating officer inspected the scene of incident, prepared the map, recorded statements of witnesses and on the basis of evidence collected during the investigation, when sufficient evidence was available, a charge sheet against the accused was sent to the court.

4. In support of prosecution case, PW-1 Victim, PW2 Upendra Kumar, PW3 Mahila Constable Sarika Gupta, PW4 Dr. Priyanka Pandey, PW5 S.I. Ramjeet Singh and PW6 Constable Viresh Kumar.

5. The prosecution has proved Written Report as Ext. Ka1, Statement of victim recorded U/s 161 Cr.P.C. as Ext. Ka2, Medical Report as Ext. Ka3, Supplementary medical report as Ext. Ka4, Site Plan as Ext. K5, Charge sheet as Ext. K6, G.D. Report as Ext. Ka7, F.I.R. as Ext. Ka8, Recovery memo as Ext. Ka9, as documentary evidence.

6. The judgement of acquittal has been passed by the learned trial Court on the ground that as per the educational certificate Paper No.9Ka, her date of birth in the register of High School Examination of 2024 was 10.10.1998 and therefore, she was just short of 18 years of age on the date of incident. As the High School Certificate itself was not produced and her medical examination was conducted according to which, she was aged about 15 years. The Court found that the victim was studying in Class 11 and the educational document 2 of 9 issued by the School was based on the S.R. Register as well as High School Gazette, according to which, her date of birth was

10.10.1998. It was therefore, found that she was aged about 18 years. Coupled with this, it was found that in her statement recorded under Sections 161 Cr.P.C. and 164 Cr.P.C. she had not supported the prosecution version. The Court also found that the alleged incident of taking her away is stated to be dated 27.06.2016, whereas the first information report was lodged by his father on 27.07.2016 and therefore, there was a considerable delay in lodging the first information report. She had returned after about a month. The medical certificate does not reflect that she was sexually assaulted and there was no evidence of rape.

7. The judgement of acquittal was passed on the ground that the Court below found that the prosecution could not prove his case beyond doubt and the accused persons were given benefit of doubt and judgement of acquittal was passed.

8. Challenging the impugned judgment, Shri Ghanshyam Kumar, learned AGA submits that as per medical examination report, she was aged about 15 years and this was the age mentioned in the first information report itself and therefore, the judgement is against the weight and evidence on record.

9. We have considered the submissions and have perused the record.

10. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to take note of law on the appeal against acquittal.

11. In the case of Bannareddy and others vs. State of Karnataka and others, (2018) 5 SCC 790, in paragraph 10, the 3 of 9 Hon'ble Apex Court has considered the power and jurisdiction of the High Court while interfering in an appeal against acquittal and in paragraph 26 it has been held that “the High Court should not have reappreciated the evidence in its entirety, especially when there existed no grave infirmity in the findings of the trial Court. There exists no justification behind setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, especially when the prosecution case suffers from several contradictions and infirmities”

12. In Jayamma vs. State of Karnataka, 2021 (6) SCC 213, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been pleased to explain the limitations of exercise of power of scrutiny by the High Court in an appeal against against an order of acquittal passed by a Trial Court in the following words: "The power of scrutiny exercisable by the High Court under Section 378, CrPC should not be routinely invoked where the view formed by the trial court was a ''possible view'. The judgment of the trial court cannot be set aside merely because the High Court finds its own view more probable, save where the judgment of the trial court suffers from perversity or the conclusions drawn by it were impossible if there was a correct reading and analysis of the evidence on record. To say it differently, unless the High Court finds that there is complete misreading of the material evidence which has led to miscarriage of justice, the view taken by the trial court which can also possibly be a correct view, need not be interfered with. This self-restraint doctrine, of course, does not denude the High Court of its powers to re- appreciate the evidence, including in an appeal against acquittal and arrive at a different firm finding of fact."

13. In a recent judgement of this Court in Virendra Singh vs. State of UP and others, 2022 (3) ADJ 354 DB, the law on the issue involved has been considered. For ready reference, paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 are quoted as under: 4 of 9 “10. In the case of Babu vs. State of Kerala (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Paragraphs 12 to 19 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted as under:- "12. This court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more, the probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial Court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial Court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165; Shambhoo Missir & Anr. v. State of Bihar AIR 1991 SC 315; Shailendra Pratap & Anr. v. State of U.P. AIR 2003 SC 1104; Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699; Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. AIR 2006 SC 2500; State of U.P. v. Ramveer Singh AIR 2007 SC 3075; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2066; Arulvelu & Anr. Vs. State (2009) 10 SCC 206; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P. (2009) 16 SCC 98; and Ram Singh alias Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 445).

13. In Sheo Swarup and Ors. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under: "...the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses...." 5 of 9

14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See: Tulsiram Kanu v. The State AIR 1954 SC 1; Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200; Khedu Mohton & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1970 SC 66; Sambasivan and Ors. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412; Bhagwan Singh and Ors. v. State of M.P. (2002) 4 SCC 85; and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran and Anr. (2007) 3 SCC 755).

15. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re- appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court re-iterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour 6 of 9 of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh @ Ram Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that an "order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused."

18. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne alias Baijnath & Ors. (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances includes: i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State by Public Prosecutor, Madras (2009) 10 SCC 401.

19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference."

11. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi vs. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972 has observed that while deciding appeal against acquittal, the High Court has to first record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusion arrived by it is 7 of 9 wholly untenable which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal.