High Court · 2025

1. Heard Sri Yogesh Kumar Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents.

2. Present writ petition is filed questioning the order dated

15.12.2015 and consequential directions to the respondents to pay salaries along with arrears from the date of approval and during pendency of the writ petition, the respondents have the impugned orders on 19.02.2016 restricting salaries from the date of order.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that pursuant to the notification dated 11.12.1991, the petitioner had participated along with one Pramod Kumar Singh vide order dated 18.01.1992 and the said appointment was approved by the District Inspector of Schools vide order dated 23.06.1992. Despite approval, the respondents have not released salaries to the petitioner. Hence, she approached the authorities by way of several representations and the said representations were not attended by the respondents. Left with no option, she approached this Court by way of Writ A No. 35499 of 1995. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 20.03.2002 directing the respondents to decide the representation made by the petitioner. While the respondents have not implemented the orders, the petitioner has pressed the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. Consequentially, the respondents passed an order on 15.12.2015 accepting the appointment of the petitioner. By virtue of the existence of ban orders dated 17.07.1991 and 30.07.1991, they have rejected the claim of the petitioner. Assailing the said orders, present writ petition has been filed.

4. Considering the submissions made, this Court has passed the following orders on 1.2.2016: "On 08.01.2016, learned Standing Counsel was granted time to seek instruction from the Joint Director. He has produced the instruction wherein the Joint Director has referred a letter of the District Inspector of Schools dated 15.09.2015. This Court in its order dated 03.03.2002 passed in writ petition no. 35499 of 1995 has issued direction to the Joint Director to consider the matter. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that vide judgment of this Court the Government Order dated 30.07.1991 has been struck down. It is further stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by the same approval of the District Inspector of Schools, dated 23.06.1992, the petitioner and one Promod Kumar Singh were granted approval but only petitioner's salary has not been paid. Sri Promod Kumar Singh is still being paid salary in spite of the alleged Government Order dated 30.07.1991. In the instruction, the Joint Director is completely silent on this issue. Even in the impugned order also, it has been admitted that Sri Promod Kumar Singh is getting his salary. In spite of the opportunity given to the Joint Director, he has not taken the matter seriously. Let Joint Director be present in the Court along with original record to assist the Court on 11.02.2016. Put up this case on 11.02.2016."

5. In abovesaid order, the Court has pointed out that quashing of two Government Orders which were relied by the respondents in the impugned orders and consequentially, the respondents have passed one more order on 4.6.2016 releasing payment of salaries to restrict the payment from the date of joining. By way of amendment, the said orders were assailed in the present writ petition.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stressed his submission though the petitioner was appointed after following the procedure contemplated under the Rules in a clear vacancy and the said appointment was approved by the competent authority vide order dated 23.6.1992 itself, but for the reason best known to the respondents, they have not released salaries to the petitioner despite her repeated requests. Only they have passed an order in the year 2015 relying on the ban orders dated 17.07.1991 and

30.07.1991.

7. The fact remains that the said ban orders were quashed by this Court in bunch of writ petitions. Knowing the said facts the respondents have passed the orders rejecting the claim of the petitioner. Even the order dated 15.12.2015, the respondents have accepted the appointment of the petitioner as the same was done in a procedure contemplated under the Rules, but only on the ground of ban, they have rejected the claim. When the said orders were assailed, based on the observations made by this Court on

1.2.2016, the respondents have passed the present order on

4.6.2016 restricting the payment of salaries only from the date, is bad. Once the appointment of the petitioner is approved in a existing substantive vacancy, the respondents cannot and ought not to restrict the payment only from the date of the impugned order i.e. 4.6.2016. Even when passing the said order, the respondents have not pointed out any laches on the part of the petitioner. When there is no laches on the part of the petitioner, the respondent ought not have rejected the payment as she is entitled from the date of initial appointment.

8. While considering the matter, this Court has passed an order on

21.01.2020 directing the Secretary, Secondary Education, U.P. Lucknow to file a personal affidavit. Consequent on the said order, the Secretary has filed his personal affidavit, wherein he has stated that on inquiry, the appointment letter of the petitioner was not available both with the District Inspector of Schools or Committee of Management. He has further stated that as per the alleged appointment letter, the petitioner neither joined nor worked, as per the letter of the respondent no.5-Commitee of Management dated

7.9.2015. In compliance of the orders passed by this Court, the respondents have passed an order on 4.06.2016, the petitioner joined and continued on the said post. Hence, she is not entitled to any salary from the date of initial appointment.

9. In such circumstances, though notices were received by the respondent no.5, the Committee of Management have not filed any counter affidavit with regard to working of the petitioner in the said institution consequent to the appointment. In said circumstances, this Court is not inclined to pass any orders with regard to payment of salaries from 1992 to 2016. As requested by learned counsel for the petitioner, there shall be a direction to respondent nos. 2 and 3 to conduct an inquiry after show cause to respondent no.5 and pass appropriate orders with regard to arrears of salaries.

10. When the respondents have passed the order on 4.6.2016, the petitioner's case has to be considered for regularization of service under Section 33C of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 and the District Inspector of Schools ought to have pass order for regularization under Section 33C of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order and after passing such orders, the respondents are also directed to release all consequential benefits to the petitioner.

11. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. Order Date :- 21.5.2025 Noman (Donadi Ramesh, J.) NOMAN AHMAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1. Heard Sri Yogesh Kumar Saxena, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State respondents.

2. Present writ petition is filed questioning the order dated

15.12.2015 and consequential directions to the respondents to pay salaries along with arrears from the date of approval and during pendency of the writ petition, the respondents have the impugned orders on 19.02.2016 restricting salaries from the date of order.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that pursuant to the notification dated 11.12.1991, the petitioner had participated along with one Pramod Kumar Singh vide order dated 18.01.1992 and the said appointment was approved by the District Inspector of Schools vide order dated 23.06.1992. Despite approval, the respondents have not released salaries to the petitioner. Hence, she approached the authorities by way of several representations and the said representations were not attended by the respondents. Left with no option, she approached this Court by way of Writ A No. 35499 of 1995. The said writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 20.03.2002 directing the respondents to decide the representation made by the petitioner. While the respondents have not implemented the orders, the petitioner has pressed the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. Consequentially, the respondents passed an order on 15.12.2015 accepting the appointment of the petitioner. By virtue of the existence of ban orders dated 17.07.1991 and 30.07.1991, they have rejected the claim of the petitioner. Assailing the said orders, present writ petition has been filed.

4. Considering the submissions made, this Court has passed the following orders on 1.2.2016: "On 08.01.2016, learned Standing Counsel was granted time to seek instruction from the Joint Director. He has produced the instruction wherein the Joint Director has referred a letter of the District Inspector of Schools dated 15.09.2015. This Court in its order dated 03.03.2002 passed in writ petition no. 35499 of 1995 has issued direction to the Joint Director to consider the matter. It is stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that vide judgment of this Court the Government Order dated 30.07.1991 has been struck down. It is further stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by the same approval of the District Inspector of Schools, dated 23.06.1992, the petitioner and one Promod Kumar Singh were granted approval but only petitioner's salary has not been paid. Sri Promod Kumar Singh is still being paid salary in spite of the alleged Government Order dated 30.07.1991. In the instruction, the Joint Director is completely silent on this issue. Even in the impugned order also, it has been admitted that Sri Promod Kumar Singh is getting his salary. In spite of the opportunity given to the Joint Director, he has not taken the matter seriously. Let Joint Director be present in the Court along with original record to assist the Court on 11.02.2016. Put up this case on 11.02.2016."

5. In abovesaid order, the Court has pointed out that quashing of two Government Orders which were relied by the respondents in the impugned orders and consequentially, the respondents have passed one more order on 4.6.2016 releasing payment of salaries to restrict the payment from the date of joining. By way of amendment, the said orders were assailed in the present writ petition.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stressed his submission though the petitioner was appointed after following the procedure contemplated under the Rules in a clear vacancy and the said appointment was approved by the competent authority vide order dated 23.6.1992 itself, but for the reason best known to the respondents, they have not released salaries to the petitioner despite her repeated requests. Only they have passed an order in the year 2015 relying on the ban orders dated 17.07.1991 and

30.07.1991.

7. The fact remains that the said ban orders were quashed by this Court in bunch of writ petitions. Knowing the said facts the respondents have passed the orders rejecting the claim of the petitioner. Even the order dated 15.12.2015, the respondents have accepted the appointment of the petitioner as the same was done in a procedure contemplated under the Rules, but only on the ground of ban, they have rejected the claim. When the said orders were assailed, based on the observations made by this Court on

1.2.2016, the respondents have passed the present order on

4.6.2016 restricting the payment of salaries only from the date, is bad. Once the appointment of the petitioner is approved in a existing substantive vacancy, the respondents cannot and ought not to restrict the payment only from the date of the impugned order i.e. 4.6.2016. Even when passing the said order, the respondents have not pointed out any laches on the part of the petitioner. When there is no laches on the part of the petitioner, the respondent ought not have rejected the payment as she is entitled from the date of initial appointment.

8. While considering the matter, this Court has passed an order on

21.01.2020 directing the Secretary, Secondary Education, U.P. Lucknow to file a personal affidavit. Consequent on the said order, the Secretary has filed his personal affidavit, wherein he has stated that on inquiry, the appointment letter of the petitioner was not available both with the District Inspector of Schools or Committee of Management. He has further stated that as per the alleged appointment letter, the petitioner neither joined nor worked, as per the letter of the respondent no.5-Commitee of Management dated

7.9.2015. In compliance of the orders passed by this Court, the respondents have passed an order on 4.06.2016, the petitioner joined and continued on the said post. Hence, she is not entitled to any salary from the date of initial appointment.

9. In such circumstances, though notices were received by the respondent no.5, the Committee of Management have not filed any counter affidavit with regard to working of the petitioner in the said institution consequent to the appointment. In said circumstances, this Court is not inclined to pass any orders with regard to payment of salaries from 1992 to 2016. As requested by learned counsel for the petitioner, there shall be a direction to respondent nos. 2 and 3 to conduct an inquiry after show cause to respondent no.5 and pass appropriate orders with regard to arrears of salaries.

10. When the respondents have passed the order on 4.6.2016, the petitioner's case has to be considered for regularization of service under Section 33C of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982 and the District Inspector of Schools ought to have pass order for regularization under Section 33C of U.P. Act No. 5 of 1982, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order and after passing such orders, the respondents are also directed to release all consequential benefits to the petitioner.

11. The writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of. Order Date :- 21.5.2025 Noman (Donadi Ramesh, J.) NOMAN AHMAD High Court of Judicature at Allahabad