High Court
Case Details
1 Court No. - 6 Reserved A.F.R. Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 1140 of 2014 Appellant :- The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Respondent :- Smt. Lajjawati And 6 Ors. Counsel for Appellant :- Rahul Sahai Counsel for Respondent :- Kamini Pandey,Anand Pandey Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J. This is an appeal by the Insurance Company, challenging an award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ the Additional District Judge, Court No.9, Mathura dated 09.01.2014, awarding compensation to the claimant-respondents, on account of a fatal motor accident, where one Heera Singh Chaudhary lost his life. 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are thus: According to the claimant-respondents, who are respondent nos.1 to 5 to this appeal and shall hereinafter be called 'the claimants’, Heera Singh Chaudhary was a Junior Engineer with the Department of Irrigation, Government of U.P. posted at Etah. On 04.09.2011 for the purpose of tail-feed work, he was supervising the removal of shrubs, garbage etc., blocking water passage under the culvert, situate at the Khitauli Turn on the Amapur-Sahwar Road, Etah. At about 2:30 p.m., a truck bearing Registration No. UP-80F-9381, driven negligently and at a high speed, approached from the Etah side. It hit Heera Singh Chaudhary and ran him over. In consequence, Heera Singh Chaudhary sustained grievous injuries and was conveyed for medical aid to the Sahwar Hospital, but declared dead by the doctors there. His dead body was subjected to 2 autopsy at Etah. Since the accident had occurred within the local limits of Police Station Sahwar, District Kashiram Nagar, Case Crime No. 323 of 2011, under Sections 279, 337, 338, 304A IPC, was registered there. 3. It is the claimants’ further case that the deceased Heera Singh Chaudhary was an able bodied and healthy man. He was employed with the Department of Irrigation as a Junior Engineer. He was drawing a monthly salary of 52,041/-, which ₹ was the source of livelihood for the family. The entire family, that is to say, the claimants, who are dependents of Heera Singh Chaudhary, have plunged into a financial crisis and their future turned bleak. Accordingly, the claimants have preferred the present claim. 4. It is further pleaded that the accident occurred on account of the offending vehicle being driven at a high speed and negligently by its driver, Kaptan Singh, opposite party no.1 to the claim petition and respondent no.7 here. He shall hereinafter be called 'the driver'. Smt. Mithilesh Kumari, opposite party no.2 to the claim petition, was the registered owner of the offending vehicle at the time of the accident. She is respondent no.6 to this appeal. She will hereinafter be called 'the owner'. 5. The offending truck was insured with the New India Assurance Company Limited, Saukh Adda, Mathura through its Branch Manager (hereinafter referred to as ‘the insurers’) under a policy valid from 22.01.2011 to 21.01.2012. It is the claimants’ case that they are entitled to a total compensation of 65 lakhs, ₹ together with interest @ 12% per annum on account of the fatal 3 motor accident, payable by the opposite parties to the claim petition, that is to say, the owner, the insurers and the driver, jointly and severally. 6. The claimants, accordingly, instituted the claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act') before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ District Judge, Mathura as they are residents of Mathura, a fact on account of which the Tribunal at Mathura had territorial jurisdiction. 7. The Insurers put in a written statement, denying the allegations in the claim petition and by way of additional pleas, came up with a case that they are not the insurers of the offending vehicle bearing Registration No. UP-80F-9381, unless the original policy was produced. It was further pleaded that in
Legal Reasoning
case the existence of the policy were confirmed, the insurers reserve their rights to file an additional written statement. It was also pleaded that the claim petition was bad on account of copies of the FIR, the Postmortem Report, the Site-plan, the charge-sheet, the technical report etc. not being presented along with the claim petition. The insurers further denied the fact that the offending vehicle was involved in the accident and put the claimants to strict proof of the fact. It was also pleaded that it was expected of the owner and the driver that they would produce the route-permit, the Driving Licence, the Fitness Certificate, Registration Certificate etc. and prove these, and that in the absence of these documents being produced and proved, the claimants had no right to recover from the insurers. It is the insurers’ further case that the owner and the driver have violated the terms of the policy. There is a further plea that the 4 driver of the offending vehicle did not hit the deceased Heera Singh Chaudhary and that the said vehicle has been involved in the accident without basis. The further plea is that the FIR lodged by the deceased's wife is wrong and the insurers deny the accident. It was also the insurers’ case that the entire fault/ negligence was that of the deceased, Heera Singh Chaudhary and the insurers are not liable to compensate on that account. Moreover, the compensation demanded was inflated and exaggerated. 8. The owner filed a separate written statement and did a wholesome denial of the claimants' case. In the additional
Legal Reasoning
pleas, it was urged that neither the offending vehicle operated by the driver was involved in the accident, that happened on 04.09.2011 at 2:30 p.m. at Khitauli Canal Bridge, P.S. Shahwar, District Kashiram Nagar, nor the deceased Heera Singh Chaudhary sustained injury in consequence of the accident, caused by the offending vehicle. It was pleaded that without prejudice to the owner's case that the accident never happened involving the offending vehicle, there was no rash or negligent operation by the driver. The owner further pleaded that the claimants' case that the deceased was aged 54 years or that he was a Junior Engineer with the Department of Irrigation, earning a sum of 52,041/- per month was wrong, false and ₹ concocted. The compensation claimed was not at all due and burden lay entirely upon the claimants to establish the facts. The owner further pleaded that the claimants were not dependents of the deceased nor his legal representatives. The owner was not liable to pay any compensation, as claimed. The petition was not properly drawn up, verified or presented. It was 5 not maintainable. The claimants had not filed the necessary papers, that were mandatory under the Motor Vehicle Rules, entitling them to maintain the claim petition. The further plea was that the owner had, for the offending vehicle on the date of accident, a Registration Certificate, a valid insurance, Fitness Certificate, route-permit, a paid up tax etc. The driver had a valid driving licence to operate the offending vehicle bearing Licence No. RT4396/ Aligarh/ 85, valid from 01.12.2008 to 30.11.2011 and 31.03.2012 to 30.03.2015. The licence was further endorsed as LMV (P.E.) + HGV (P.E.) and that it was in force on the date of accident. The offending vehicle on the date of accident, was insured by the insurers vide Policy No. 3213231100200006364, valid from 22.01.2011 to 21.01.2012, offering a comprehensive cover. In substance, therefore, the liability, if any, lay on the shoulders of the insurers. 9. The driver did not appear to contest the claim petition nor did he file a written statement. 10. Upon the pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed (translated into English from Hindi): (1) Whether on 04.09.2011 at 2:30 p.m. when Heera Singh Chaudhary for the purpose of tail-feed work, was supervising clearance of shrubs and garbage under the culvert, located at the Khitauli Turn on the Amapur- Shahwar Road, a truck bearing (Registration) No. UP- 80F-9381 approaching from the side of Etah, driven negligently at a high speed, hit Heera Singh Chaudhary, the front wheel running him over and causing his death? (2) Whether on the date of accident, the driver of the truck bearing (Registration) No. UP-80F-9381, held a valid and effective driving licence? 6 (3) Whether on the date of accident, truck bearing (Registration) No. UP-80F-9381, was insured with opposite party no.1, the New India Insurance Company (sic) Assurance Company Limited? (4) Whether the petitioners were entitled to any relief from the opposite parties? If yes, how much and from which opposite party? 11. The documentary evidence led on behalf of the claimants has been listed in the judgment of the Tribunal and no useful purpose would be served by a repetition thereof. However, the relevant documents would be referred to wherever appropriate during course of this judgment. The claimants examined Smt. Lajjawati, the deceased's widow as PW-1, one Mausam Ali (an eye-witness) as PW-2 and Pratap Singh Chauhan, a Senior Clerk in the Department of Irrigation, Etah as PW-3. 12. The opposite parties put in, by way of documentary evidence, a photostat copy of the insurance policy, the driver's driving licence, a photostat copy of the registration certificate, a photostat copy of the goods permit, a copy of the fitness certificate, Paper No. 17 ग/5. No oral evidence was produced on behalf of any of the opposite parties before the Tribunal. 13. Heard Mr. Rahul Sahai, learned Counsel for the insurers, Ms. Kamini Pandey, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of claimants and perused the record. No one appears on behalf of the owner. 14. Mr. Rahul Sahai, learned Counsel for the insurers has urged that the Tribunal has gone wrong in holding that negligence of the driver was proved. He submits that the Tribunal's finding is primarily based on the testimony of one 7 Mausam Ali, PW-2, who claims to be an eye-witness of the accident. It is urged that the eye-witness was also employed in the same department as the deceased and, therefore, the Tribunal ought not to have accepted his testimony without due caution. It is also urged that at the time of the accident, PW-2 was looking in the opposite direction and, therefore, his testimony is of no significance about the involvement or the negligence of the offending vehicle. It is also said in criticism of the Tribunal's judgment by Mr. Sahai that it is a settled proposition of the law that the factum of negligence is a sine qua non for a claim under Section 166 of the Act to succeed. In a very candid stance on behalf of the insurer, the learned Counsel says that the testimony of PW-2 may have some relevance, so far as the factum of accident and involvement of the offending vehicle is concerned, but his testimony would not be relevant insofar as the issue of negligence goes. It is emphasized that PW-2 was facing the other side and the accident took place with his back to the mishap. As such, negligence cannot be said to be duly proved. 15. It is next submitted that apart from these factors, extrinsic to the testimony of the witness that have bearing upon it, the testimony of PW-2 does not inspire confidence. It is emphasized that the witness has stated that he was standing under the culvert, whereas the deceased was standing over it. The evidence of PW-2, therefore, cannot be relied upon, insofar as the offending vehicle's negligence is concerned. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Meena 8 Variyal and others, (2007) 5 SCC 428. In Meena Variyal (supra), it has been held: 27. We think that the law laid down in Minu B. Mehta v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayan [(1977) 2 SCC 441 : (1977) 2 SCR 886] was accepted by the legislature while enacting the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by introducing Section 163-A of the Act providing for payment of compensation notwithstanding anything contained in the Act or in any other law for the time being in force that the owner of a motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be, and in a claim made under sub- section (1) of Section 163-A of the Act, the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle concerned. Therefore, the victim of an accident or his dependants have an option either to proceed under Section 166 of the Act or under Section 163-A of the Act. Once they approach the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Act, they have necessarily to take upon themselves the burden of establishing the negligence of the driver or owner of the vehicle concerned. But if they proceed under Section 163- A of the Act, the compensation will be awarded in terms of the Schedule without calling upon the victim or his dependants to establish any negligence or default on the part of the owner of the vehicle or the driver of the vehicle. 16. Reliance has further been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Premlata Shukla and others, (2007) 13 SCC 476 and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Gaura Devi and others vs. Shahzad Khan and others, 2013 (1) AWC 914. 17. Ms. Kamini Pandey, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the claimants, on the other hand, submitted that the 9 testimony of PW-2 is a clear, accurate and dependable account by an eye-witness, who was doubtlessly there at the time of the accident. The evidence of PW-2, read as a whole, clearly establishes not only the factum of accident, but the solitary negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle. 18. We have considered the submissions of the learned Counsel for parties on the issue in hand. So far as the testimony of PW-1 is concerned, it is not of any relevance, insofar as the factum of accident or the negligence of the offending vehicle goes. She is not an eye-witness. In the opinion of this Court, the proof of negligence hinges on the testimony of PW-2, Mausam Ali. It must be said at once that the submission on behalf of the insurers that the testimony of PW-2 ought to be approached with caution, almost suggesting it to be unreliable for the reason that he is an employee of the same department as the deceased, is utterly unacceptable. There is no principle of law or one of prudence by which in a case of tort, like a motor accident, a fellow employee of the victim, serving the same department, is to be doubted for his word, about the circumstances attending the accident. 19. So far as PW-2 is concerned, he is a very natural witness since he was a part of the team of employees of the Irrigation Department, detailed to the work of tail-feed being undertaken on the fateful day under the stewardship of the deceased. The said witness was part of his workforce. The witness in his cross- examination has introduced himself as a Seenchpal and has apparently denied a suggestion that he was a Mate. No doubt, he has said that his face and that of Heera Singh was not towards the road and that he did not see the offending vehicle 10 approach, but the evidence is clear on the point that he was working at the site of accident, commanding the labour-force, at a distance of 5 feet from the spot where the deceased was standing at the time when he fell victim to the accident. The witness has clearly specified the registration number of the vehicle. He has consistently remained unwavering in his stand that it was the offending vehicle that caused the accident. In the opinion of this Court, the evidence of the witness has to be read as a whole. Contrary to what the insurers say that the witness could utter falsehood, because of some kind of an ‘imagined bias’ for a colleague, the witness's account has the assurance of his presence on the date, time and place of accident. He was assuredly detailed to the same duty as the deceased, albeit in a different and subordinate role. His presence on the spot has the credit of Government records from the Irrigation Department. About the witness looking in another direction when the accident happened, is too slender a circumstance to believe that he would not have seen what he has said in his testimony relating to the accident and the tort committed by the offending vehicle. A man standing 5 feet away from the site of a fatal motor accident, even if he were looking the other way, would naturally become cognizant in the split of a second to look in the right direction when the mishap occurred. Quick shift of attention at a distance, as small as 5 feet, about a happening this big, is good enough to credit the witness with being a truthful witness of whatever he has said in his testimony, relating to the accident. The witness has decidedly reported the offending vehicle to be involved in the accident and said that it was the vehicle's negligence that caused the mishap that day. 11 There is not the slightest reason to take a different view from the Tribunal on this score. In the opinion of this Court by the sound standard of preponderant probability, the negligence of the offending vehicle is well established. The authorities relied upon by Mr. Sahai, all binding for the principle that they lay down, are not attracted to the facts of this case at all for the reasons that we have indicated. It is held, accordingly. 20. The other issue is about the quantum of compensation on which learned Counsel for both parties have vied to sway this Court in favour of their stand. Mr. Sahai has argued that the age of the deceased has been wrongly determined by the Tribunal at 54 years, going by the entry in his service record. He submits that the deceased was aged 57 years at the time of accident. To the above end, learned Counsel for the insurers has drawn this Court's attention to the testimony of PW-1, where it is said that she got married in the year 1974 and at that time, her husband was aged about 20 years. It is argued that the accident happened in the year 2011 and, therefore, the arithmetical calculation would safely place the deceased's age at 57 years. It is urged that in view of the aforesaid testimony of PW-1, the deceased's wife and one of the claimants, the Tribunal ought to have ignored the deceased's date of birth recorded in the service-book. It is also argued by the learned Counsel for the insurers that in no event can this Court enhance the compensation awarded by the Tribunal in the absence of a cross-objection or an appeal preferred by the claimants. In aid of the aforesaid submission, Mr. Sahai has placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Ranjana Prakash 12 and others v. Divisional Manager and another, (2011) 14 SCC 639. In Ranjana Prakash (supra), it has been held: 7. This principle also flows from Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables an appellate court to pass any order which ought to have been passed by the trial court and to make such further or other order as the case may require, even if the respondent had not filed any appeal or cross-objections. This power is entrusted to the appellate court to enable it to do complete justice between the parties. Order 41 Rule 33 of the Code can however be pressed into service to make the award more effective or maintain the award on other grounds or to make the other parties to litigation to share the benefits or the liability, but cannot be invoked to get a larger or higher relief. For example, where the claimants seek compensation against the owner and the insurer of the vehicle and the Tribunal makes the award only against the owner, on an appeal by the owner challenging the quantum, the appellate court can make the insurer jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation, along with the owner, even though the claimants had not challenged the non-grant of relief against the insurer. Be that as it may. 8. Where an appeal is filed challenging the quantum of compensation, irrespective of who files the appeal, the appropriate course for the High Court is to examine the facts and by applying the relevant principles, determine the just compensation. If the compensation determined by it is higher than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will allow the appeal, if it is by the claimants and dismiss the appeal, if it is by the owner/insurer. Similarly, if the compensation determined by the High Court is lesser than the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court will dismiss any appeal by the claimants for enhancement, but allow any appeal by the owner/insurer for reduction. The High Court cannot obviously increase the compensation in an appeal by the owner/insurer for reducing the compensation, nor can it reduce the compensation in an appeal by the claimants seeking enhancement of compensation. 21. On the other hand, Ms. Kamini Pandey, learned Counsel for the claimants has argued that the compensation has been rightly assessed, taking the deceased's age as 54 years. The 13 deceased, according to her, was 54 years 2 months and 3 days on the date of accident. It is urged that the best evidence about the deceased's age is the entry in his service-book and there is no reason to doubt the same. It is also the claimants' contention that in the postmortem report, the age of the deceased has been estimated to be 55 years, approximately. This assessment of age for the deceased supports the record of it in his service- book. It is particularly argued that the deceased is entitled to future prospects as he was a permanent employee in government service. Reliance in support of the grant of future prospects has been placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680. It is further argued that the claimants have been under-compensated under the conventional heads by the Tribunal. Learned Counsel for the claimants, in this regard, has placed reliance upon the guidance of the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Limited v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130. It is submitted by Ms. Kamini Pandey that each of the claimants is entitled to compensation for loss of consortium in the sum of 40,000/- and the claimants are also entitled to ₹ compensation towards loss of estate and funeral expenses in the sum of 15,000/-, respectively. ₹ 22. As regards the compensation to be awarded, there is no difficulty in considering the plea for reduction thereof, since the appeal is one by the insurers. There is no dearth of jurisdiction with this Court to reduce the awarded compensation, provided a case is made out by the insurers. It, however, requires some consideration whether in the absence of an appeal or a cross- 14 objection by the claimants, it is open to this Court to enhance the compensation awarded, should this Court reach a conclusion in favour of enhancing it. 23. So far as the question of reducing the compensation is concerned, this Court may say at once that the submission of the learned Counsel for the insurers that the age of the deceased is not 54 years, leading to application of a higher multiplier, is not at all acceptable. The deceased was a government servant, who had an authoritative record of his age, maintained by his employers in his service records. There is no reason to disbelieve the record of the deceased's age in his service-book. A copy of his service-book is available on record as Paper No. 29 ग/3. The original of the service-book was produced before the Tribunal and the copy thereof filed was proved by PW-3, Vishnu Pratap Singh Chauhan, Senior Clerk in the office of the Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department. The service-book clearly shows the deceased's recorded date of birth as 01.07.1957. This clearly works out to the deceased being aged 54 years 2 months and 3 days on the date he died as a result of the accident. The postmortem report also estimates the deceased's age at about 55 years. This evidence is indeed enough to hold the deceased's age to be 54 years. The fact that PW-1 in her cross-examination has said that the deceased was aged 20 years at the time the witness and the deceased were married in the year 1974, cannot be relied upon to draw a different conclusion about the deceased's age. The reason is that PW-1 in her cross-examination also says that she does not know her husband's date of birth. She has also said that she also does not know her own date of birth. 15 It is also said that her father-in-law had read up to Class-V and was not gainfully employed. Though she has said that she has read up to Class-VIII, the overall educational and socio- economic background of parties would not lead this Court to expect a very accurate account from the witness about the deceased's age on the date of the parties' marriage or even the year when the parties were married. On the basis of the estimated dates given out by PW-1, the deceased's recorded date of birth in his service record, much corroborated by the medico-legal evidence, cannot be disbelieved. The contention of the learned Counsel for the insurers on this score is, therefore, not worthy of acceptance. 24. There is no other serious contention apart from the age related variation in the applicable multiplier, urged on behalf of the insurers to reduce the awarded compensation. It is, thus, evident that no case for reducing the awarded compensation is made out. This poses the question before the Court, which Mr. Sahai has argued very vociferously, whether on an appeal by the insurer, compensation to be awarded, can be enhanced unless there be a cross-appeal or objection preferred by the claimant? This Court has already noticed the authority which the learned Counsel for the insurers has pressed in aid of the aforesaid submission with much vehemence. It is the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Ranjana Prakash. No doubt, the law laid down in Ranjana Prakash specifically holds what the learned Counsel for the insurers canvasses, but the principle there does not appear to be the ruling precedent any longer. The aforesaid change in judicial opinion is evident from the pronouncement of the three Judge Bench of their Lordships 16 of the Supreme Court in Surekha and Others v. Santosh and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1312. In Surekha (supra), it has been held: 2. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and order dated 04.01.2019 passed by the High Court of judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in First Appeal No. 2564 of 2016, whereby the High Court, even though agreed with the stand of the appellants that just compensation amount ought to be Rs. 49,85,376/- (Forty-Nine Lakh Eighty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Six Only), however, declined to grant enhancement merely on the ground that the appellants had failed to file cross-appeal. 3. By now, it is well-settled that in the matter of insurance claim compensation in reference to the motor accident, the court should not take hyper technical approach and ensure that just compensation is awarded to the affected person or the claimants. 25. In working out the compensation, what is essential to be reckoned is the monthly income of the deceased. There is a well proven salary certificate from the deceased's employers, who are a department of the State. The certificate is on record ग / 9. It shows the gross monthly income of as Paper No. 29 - ₹ the deceased to be a figure of 52,041/-. The net income has been shown as 44,941/- per ₹ mensem. The total deductions include GPF, GIS and GVR, all of which are in the nature of made to funds/ Group Insurance etc. The deduction to be discounted from the income is one towards income tax, which is a figure of 3000/- per month. There is also on record a copy of ₹ the deceased’s Form-16 submitted by the employer to the Income Tax Authorities for the Assessment Year 2011-12 (corresponding to the Financial Year 2010-11). A perusal of Form-16 relating to the deceased shows that the total income tax deposited is a sum of 45,500/- only. The said form shows ₹ 17 ₹ that for 11 months, a sum of 3000/- has been deducted at source and in the 12th month, for the Assessment Year 2011-12, a sum of 12,900/- has been deducted. Thus, the Tribunal has ₹ determined the income tax deduction from the deceased's ₹ annual income at a figure of 45,500/-. The said deduction towards income tax is unexceptionable. 26. The Tribunal has worked out the compensation on the basis of a gross month salary of 52,041/-. This figure has ₹ been made the foundation to determine the annual income of the deceased at a figure of 6,55,065/-. From the said sum of ₹ money, income tax has been deducted. 27. Now, from the said annual income of the deceased, the Tribunal has deducted a sum of 45,500/- towards income tax, ₹ which meets our approval, as already said. But, in addition to the deduction from the annual income on account of income tax, the Tribunal has further deducted a sum of 550/- per ₹ month, that is to say, a sum of 6,600/- for the year. This ₹ deduction has been made on the basis that the deceased was receiving a sum of 200/- per month towards City ₹ Compensatory Allowance (CCA) and a sum of 350/- per ₹ month towards MCA. The monthly sum of CCA and MCA works out to 550/- and adds up to an annual figure of 6,600/-. The ₹ ₹ Tribunal has been of opinion that these allowances are payments personally received by the deceased, that he would be utilizing during service. Since these sums would have been utilized by the deceased, the Tribunal has thought it proper to deduct whatever the deceased received towards CCA and MCA, during the year, from his annual income. This deduction ordered by the Tribunal, in our opinion, is not at all justified. 18 Every allowance, that the deceased receives towards his remuneration, would count as his income. All that can be deducted is whatever goes out of the deceased's hands as levies of the State, like income tax or any sum of money, that would not enure to his benefit, if he were alive. For the said reason, deductions made as contributions to funds etc. are not liable to be deducted from the deceased's income and the Tribunal has not done that. 28. The question whether allowances and perquisites received by an employee during service ought to be deducted from his annual income while working out the claimants' dependency, fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Sunil Sharma and others v. Bachitar Singh and others, (2011) 11 SCC 425. In Sunil Sharma (supra), it was observed: (a) Computation of income