High Court · 2025

Petitioner :- Aslam And 4 Others Respondent :- Javed Alam And 11 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Himanshu Singh,Sr. Advocate,Triloki Nath Counsel for Respondent :- Arvind Srivastava,Mohammad Waseem Hon'ble Ajit Kumar,J.

1. Heard Sri P.K. Jain, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Himanshu Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Arvind Srivastava and Sri Mohammad Waseem, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. Petitioner before this Court is aggrieved by the judgment passed in revision by the court below dated 18.12.2024 reversing the findings returned by the Judge, Small Causes and decreeing the suit for arrears of rent and damages and eviction.

3. This is a case where the small causes suit was originally filed by the the landlord respondent was dismissed holding that Act No.13 of 1972 was applicable to the building in question and hence tenancy could not have been terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1872.

4. Two fold submissions have been advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner: firstly, there was no material placed before the court that building in question was constructed after 1985 and hence, in the absence of relevant material to prove factum of construction after 1985, the building in question fell within the scope and ambit of Act No.13 of 1972 and hence findings to the contrary are perverse; and secondly, if the court below had properly appreciated the document issued by Varanasi Nagar Nigam, Varanasi, it would have appreciated that it was not a new assessment but was a continued assessment of the old building and thus document deserved appreciation in the light of the Nakal Chittha of 1976 Fasli wherein the petitioner was shown as tenant for Rs.20/- of the shop in question.

5. Per contra, it is submitted by Sri Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents that the court below rightly appreciated Paper No.8-C which had got absolutely ignored by the Judge, Small Causes. According to him, had the Judge, Small Causes appreciated the paper no.8-C which was the first assessment, it would have realized that constructions had been made without sanction of the map. He submitted that the 7-C document also was not appreciated by the trial judge which sufficiently demonstrated that it was the first assessment may be in the year 1997, given effect to from the year 1996.

6. It is submitted by Sri Srivastava that the court below has considered every aspect of the matter and truly appreciated the evidence brought on record to arrive at a finding that the construction of the building in question were made after the year 1985.

7. Having heard learned Advocates for the respective parties, their arguments raised across the bar and having perused the records that include the orders impugned I find that the trial court proceeded to hold the building to be old one only by citing the statement of landlord in which he stated that Abdul Salam was tenant of the premises for 20- 30 years and therefore, the tenant would be taken to be in the premises in question since prior to 1991. He then proceeded to consider Nakal Chittha 1976 to refer to the statement of PW-1, Jahangir that he purchased the property in 1996 and the description of the property in the sale deed matches to the description of the property given in Nakal Chittha of Nagar Nigam, Varanasi. Thus it was held that there was no sufficient proof that the construction of the building was a new one or atleast after 26.04.1985.

8. The nakal chittha is available on record of the petition as Annexure-13 but I find therein that property number shown is of 42/9 in which the petitioner is shown to be tenant for Rs.20/-. The next property is item no.19 which is 42/11 but there is nothing on record to establish that it showed to be the same property as 42/9. The two properties are different and nakal chittha cannot be said to be a sufficient proof that property no.42/9 was the same property as 42/11 to hold that petitioner continued in tenancy since prior to 30 years and the description given in the sale deed of Haji by Bilkis Begum in the year 1981 matched with the structure under the tenancy of the petitioner. Thus the findings based upon this nakal chittha cannot be sustained.

9. Still further, I find that certain part of the statement of PW- 1 to acknowledge tenancy of the tenant-petitioner to be 20- 30 was taken as sufficient admission of a fact that the tenant was there since prior to 30 years. One or two statement of facts given in a statement cannot be taken to obliterate the entire other facts stated in the statement. It is settled that doctrine Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not attracted in India. Hence the court was not justified in picking out a particular statement of PW-1 to hold that the sitting tenant was there since prior to 30 years. When the statement is given 20-30 years, it could be 20 years, it could be 30 years but this conclusion has to be arrived at by considering other statements made.

10. The argument that was advanced by Sri Srivastava, is to the effect that the paper no.7-C has been completely ignored by the trial court while holding that Act No.13 of 1972 is applicable. I have seen this document which is the municipal record qua assessment and tax and I find that the assessment in question is made effective with effect from 11.11.1996. Thus an entry has been made on 06.03.1997 pursuant to some order passed on 09.07.1997. Besides this, I find there to be a notice issued to Bilkis Begum on 05.12.1991 which acknowledged this factum of raising construction though unauthorisely in that relevant year of the show cause notice. This is also a document of acknowledgement of the constructions being raised first time in the year 1991. I find that the court below has also considered the final order passed in the proceedings drawn by the development authority being confirmed in appeal bearing no.153 of 1992 in which vide paragraph 4, the court referred to the statement of the development authority admitting that the construction had been raised without seeking permission. Thus it is rightly submitted that it was sufficient to draw inference that the building was a new construction. The Court recorded that the copy of the assessment register of the fasli year 1996-2008 clearly establish that there was no assessment made prior to year 1992, nor in the column of possession there is any reference to any tenant otherwise if the assessment had been made prior to the same, there would have been reference of a sitting tenant. In the year 1992 atleast there was no sitting tenant and so the respondents entered tenancy after the new constructions came into existence.

11. Having so discussed above, I do not find any good ground to hold that findings in the impugned order to be perverse, nor do I find any cogent material placed before me by learned counsel for the petitioner which may indicate that findings got recorded ignoring such material. The judgment that was cited before me of the Supreme Court in the case of Trilok Singh Chauhan v. Ram Lal (Dead) Thr. Lrs. and Ors.:2017(12) JT 202 is dealing with the cases and what circumstances when the findings can be held to be perverse. If findings are not based upon any evidence or any material which is inadmissible, court may hold the findings to be perverse. I do not see paper no.7-C or 8-C to be held inadmissible for any reason. It was all a question of appreciation and interpretation and in the event trial court has failed to appreciate the document available on record by ignoring it the court of revision cannot be said to have exceeded the authority in arriving at a conclusion that the suit deserved to be decreed on the basis of said document. Thus the judgment in the case of Trilok Singh Chauhan (Supra) as cited above is of no help to the petitioner. In so far as the case of Shyam Lal v. Rasool Ahmed:(2002) 9 SCC 499 is concerned, in my view the revisional court has not exceeded its authority in appreciating document which was all together overlooked by the trial court and which was a weighty material available on record. I find support in the judgment of Shyam Lal (Supra) wherein vide paragraph 4 the Court has held thus: "4. Lastly, it was submitted that the district court exercising revisional jurisdiction did not have jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court. This submission is also liable to be rejected. Firstly, it was a revision preferred under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, the jurisdiction whereunder is not so limited as it may be under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, as we have already pointed out the learned district judge had assigned convincing reasons for arriving at a finding different from the one arrived at by the trial court and on the material available on record the district judge though exercising revisional jurisdiction was fully justified in interfering with findings of fact arrived at by the trial court which overlooked the weighty relevant material available on record and clinching the issue."

10. In view of the above, I do not find any flaw in the findings returned by the court of revision in decreeing the suit. Petition lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed. Order Date :- 10.2.2025 Deepika DEEPIKA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

Petitioner :- Aslam And 4 Others Respondent :- Javed Alam And 11 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Himanshu Singh,Sr. Advocate,Triloki Nath Counsel for Respondent :- Arvind Srivastava,Mohammad Waseem Hon'ble Ajit Kumar,J.

1. Heard Sri P.K. Jain, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Himanshu Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Arvind Srivastava and Sri Mohammad Waseem, learned counsel for the respondents.

2. Petitioner before this Court is aggrieved by the judgment passed in revision by the court below dated 18.12.2024 reversing the findings returned by the Judge, Small Causes and decreeing the suit for arrears of rent and damages and eviction.

3. This is a case where the small causes suit was originally filed by the the landlord respondent was dismissed holding that Act No.13 of 1972 was applicable to the building in question and hence tenancy could not have been terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1872.

4. Two fold submissions have been advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner: firstly, there was no material placed before the court that building in question was constructed after 1985 and hence, in the absence of relevant material to prove factum of construction after 1985, the building in question fell within the scope and ambit of Act No.13 of 1972 and hence findings to the contrary are perverse; and secondly, if the court below had properly appreciated the document issued by Varanasi Nagar Nigam, Varanasi, it would have appreciated that it was not a new assessment but was a continued assessment of the old building and thus document deserved appreciation in the light of the Nakal Chittha of 1976 Fasli wherein the petitioner was shown as tenant for Rs.20/- of the shop in question.

5. Per contra, it is submitted by Sri Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents that the court below rightly appreciated Paper No.8-C which had got absolutely ignored by the Judge, Small Causes. According to him, had the Judge, Small Causes appreciated the paper no.8-C which was the first assessment, it would have realized that constructions had been made without sanction of the map. He submitted that the 7-C document also was not appreciated by the trial judge which sufficiently demonstrated that it was the first assessment may be in the year 1997, given effect to from the year 1996.

6. It is submitted by Sri Srivastava that the court below has considered every aspect of the matter and truly appreciated the evidence brought on record to arrive at a finding that the construction of the building in question were made after the year 1985.

7. Having heard learned Advocates for the respective parties, their arguments raised across the bar and having perused the records that include the orders impugned I find that the trial court proceeded to hold the building to be old one only by citing the statement of landlord in which he stated that Abdul Salam was tenant of the premises for 20- 30 years and therefore, the tenant would be taken to be in the premises in question since prior to 1991. He then proceeded to consider Nakal Chittha 1976 to refer to the statement of PW-1, Jahangir that he purchased the property in 1996 and the description of the property in the sale deed matches to the description of the property given in Nakal Chittha of Nagar Nigam, Varanasi. Thus it was held that there was no sufficient proof that the construction of the building was a new one or atleast after 26.04.1985.

8. The nakal chittha is available on record of the petition as Annexure-13 but I find therein that property number shown is of 42/9 in which the petitioner is shown to be tenant for Rs.20/-. The next property is item no.19 which is 42/11 but there is nothing on record to establish that it showed to be the same property as 42/9. The two properties are different and nakal chittha cannot be said to be a sufficient proof that property no.42/9 was the same property as 42/11 to hold that petitioner continued in tenancy since prior to 30 years and the description given in the sale deed of Haji by Bilkis Begum in the year 1981 matched with the structure under the tenancy of the petitioner. Thus the findings based upon this nakal chittha cannot be sustained.

9. Still further, I find that certain part of the statement of PW- 1 to acknowledge tenancy of the tenant-petitioner to be 20- 30 was taken as sufficient admission of a fact that the tenant was there since prior to 30 years. One or two statement of facts given in a statement cannot be taken to obliterate the entire other facts stated in the statement. It is settled that doctrine Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not attracted in India. Hence the court was not justified in picking out a particular statement of PW-1 to hold that the sitting tenant was there since prior to 30 years. When the statement is given 20-30 years, it could be 20 years, it could be 30 years but this conclusion has to be arrived at by considering other statements made.

10. The argument that was advanced by Sri Srivastava, is to the effect that the paper no.7-C has been completely ignored by the trial court while holding that Act No.13 of 1972 is applicable. I have seen this document which is the municipal record qua assessment and tax and I find that the assessment in question is made effective with effect from 11.11.1996. Thus an entry has been made on 06.03.1997 pursuant to some order passed on 09.07.1997. Besides this, I find there to be a notice issued to Bilkis Begum on 05.12.1991 which acknowledged this factum of raising construction though unauthorisely in that relevant year of the show cause notice. This is also a document of acknowledgement of the constructions being raised first time in the year 1991. I find that the court below has also considered the final order passed in the proceedings drawn by the development authority being confirmed in appeal bearing no.153 of 1992 in which vide paragraph 4, the court referred to the statement of the development authority admitting that the construction had been raised without seeking permission. Thus it is rightly submitted that it was sufficient to draw inference that the building was a new construction. The Court recorded that the copy of the assessment register of the fasli year 1996-2008 clearly establish that there was no assessment made prior to year 1992, nor in the column of possession there is any reference to any tenant otherwise if the assessment had been made prior to the same, there would have been reference of a sitting tenant. In the year 1992 atleast there was no sitting tenant and so the respondents entered tenancy after the new constructions came into existence.

11. Having so discussed above, I do not find any good ground to hold that findings in the impugned order to be perverse, nor do I find any cogent material placed before me by learned counsel for the petitioner which may indicate that findings got recorded ignoring such material. The judgment that was cited before me of the Supreme Court in the case of Trilok Singh Chauhan v. Ram Lal (Dead) Thr. Lrs. and Ors.:2017(12) JT 202 is dealing with the cases and what circumstances when the findings can be held to be perverse. If findings are not based upon any evidence or any material which is inadmissible, court may hold the findings to be perverse. I do not see paper no.7-C or 8-C to be held inadmissible for any reason. It was all a question of appreciation and interpretation and in the event trial court has failed to appreciate the document available on record by ignoring it the court of revision cannot be said to have exceeded the authority in arriving at a conclusion that the suit deserved to be decreed on the basis of said document. Thus the judgment in the case of Trilok Singh Chauhan (Supra) as cited above is of no help to the petitioner. In so far as the case of Shyam Lal v. Rasool Ahmed:(2002) 9 SCC 499 is concerned, in my view the revisional court has not exceeded its authority in appreciating document which was all together overlooked by the trial court and which was a weighty material available on record. I find support in the judgment of Shyam Lal (Supra) wherein vide paragraph 4 the Court has held thus: "4. Lastly, it was submitted that the district court exercising revisional jurisdiction did not have jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the trial court. This submission is also liable to be rejected. Firstly, it was a revision preferred under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act, the jurisdiction whereunder is not so limited as it may be under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Secondly, as we have already pointed out the learned district judge had assigned convincing reasons for arriving at a finding different from the one arrived at by the trial court and on the material available on record the district judge though exercising revisional jurisdiction was fully justified in interfering with findings of fact arrived at by the trial court which overlooked the weighty relevant material available on record and clinching the issue."

10. In view of the above, I do not find any flaw in the findings returned by the court of revision in decreeing the suit. Petition lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed. Order Date :- 10.2.2025 Deepika DEEPIKA SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad