State of Uttar Pradesh v. Veer Singh Veeru) arising out of the Crime No

1. Heard Mr. Ajay Sengar, the learned counsel for applicant, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Rupendra Kumar Mishra, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Santosh Kumar Verma, the learned counsel representing prosecutrix/first informant/opposite party-2.

2. Perused the record.

3. Applicant, Veer Singh alias Veeru, who is a charge-sheeted accused and facing trial before Court below, has approached this Court by means of present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with the following prayer:- "It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble court may graciously be pleased to- A. Set aside the Impugned Order dated 18.12.2024 passed by Learned Additional District And Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act, 2012), Jalaun at Orai in Criminal Case No. 0208 of 2024 (State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Veer Singh @ Veeru) arising out of the Crime No. 0455 of 2024, u/Ss. 376 & 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 5/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, Police Station/Kotwali- Orai, District Jalaun, Quash the Impugned Charge Sheet dated 07.09.2024 submitted by the Investigating Officer as well as the entire proceedings in respect of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 0208 of 2024 (State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Veer Singh @ Veeru) arising out of the Crime No. 0455 of 2024, u/Ss. 376 & 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 5/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, Police Station/Kotwali- Orai, District Jalaun, pending before the Learned Additional District And Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act, 2012), Jalaun at Orai. B. Stay the further proceedings of the Criminal Case No. 0208 of 2024 (State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Veer Singh @ Veeru) arising out of the Crime No. 0455 of 2024, u/Ss. 376 & 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 5/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, Police Station/Kotwali- Orai, District Jalaun, pending before the Learned Additional District And Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act, 2012), Jalaun at Orai, During the pendency of the present Criminal Misc Application, Otherwise the Applicant will suffer heavy loss and injury."

4. Learned counsel for applicant submits that though applicant is a named and charge sheeted accused and facing trial before Court below, however, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances as have now emerged on record, the criminal prosecution of applicant cannot be sustained. He, therefore, contends that in view of above the present application is liable to be allowed.

5. In furtherance of aforesaid submission it is urged by the learned counsel for applicant that the consensual relationship between the parties is alleged to have commenced from 10.3.2019. However, the first application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. in respect of the criminality alleged to have been committed by the applicant was filed by the prosecutrix/first informant/opposite party-2 on 29.2.2024 i.e. after expiry of a period of almost five years. The said application came to be rejected by the jurisdictional Magistrate, vide order dated 1.4.2024 but with liberty to the applicant i.e. the prosecutrix- opposite party-2 herein that in case, a false promise of marriage has been made by accused then it shall be open to the victim to file a fresh application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. The said order is on record at page 44 of the paper book.

6. Subsequent to the above order dated 1.4.2024 prosecutrix filed another application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. on 15.4.2024 which was allowed by the Jurisdictional Magistrate vide order dated 20.6.2024.

7. In compliance of aforesaid order dated 26.06.2024, an F.I.R. dated 3.7.2024 came to be registered against the applicant as Case Crime No. 0455 of 2024 under Sections 376, 506 IPC, Police Station Kotwali Orai, District-Jalaun. In the aforesaid F.I.R. two persons, namely, Veer Singh @ Veeru (applicant herein) and Chatrapal have been nominated as named accused.

8. Learned counsel for applicant with reference to above submits that in the day, date and time of the occurrence column of the F.I.R. it is mentioned that the occurrences giving rise to the present criminal proceedings occurred from 10.3.2019 to 8.1.2024. On the above premise it is thus urged by the learned counsel for applicant that the F.I.R. is highly belated. However, no attempt the prosecutrix/first informant/Opposite Party-2 to explain the delay/latches in lodging the F.I.R. in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. filed by her. was made by

9. It is next contended by the learned counsel for applicant that subsequent to the aforementioned F.I.R. statements of the prosecutrix/first informant/opposite party-2 were recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. Same are on record as annexures 11 and 12 to the affidavit filed in support of present application. However, even in her aforesaid statements, the prosecutrix has not made any attempt to explain the delay/laches in lodging the F.I.R. As such, the delay in lodging the F.I.R. remains unexplained upto this stage.

10. Referring to the judgments of Supreme Court in (i). P. Ramchandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578, (ii). P. Rajagopal and others Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2019 SC 2866 (paragraph 8), (iii). Hasmukhlal D. Vora and Another Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, 2022 SCC OnLine 1732 , (iv). Sekaran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2024) 2 SCC 176 and (v) Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur @ Banti Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 938, it is thus urged by the learned counsel for applicant that the Apex Court has now itself held that where there is a delayed FIR but the delay in lodging the FIR has not been sufficiently explained, then in that eventuality, the consequential prosecution of an accused cannot be sustained.

11. Much emphasis was placed upon paragraph 5 of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur (Supra), wherein the Apex Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused therein on the ground that there is an unexplained delay of 39 days in lodging the FIR.

12. Learned counsel for applicant has then submitted that admittedly the prosecutrix is major. She entered into consensual relationship with the applicant in the year-2019. No objection was ever raised by the prosecutrix to such consensual relationship. As such, no offence as alleged can be said to have been committed by applicant. To lend legal support to his submissions, he has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Prashant Vs. State of (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3375 and Mahesh Damu Khare Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471. Reliance has been placed upon paragraphs 31 and 35 of the judgment in Mahesh Damu Khare (Supra). Tthe same are, accordingly, reproduced herein below:- "31. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such prolonged physical relationship at a very belated stage, it can lead to serious consequences. It will open the scope for imputing criminality to such long term relationships after turning sour, as such an allegation can be made even at a belated stage to drag a person in the juggernaut of stringent criminal process. There is always a danger of attributing criminal intent to an otherwise disturbed civil relationship of which the Court must also be mindful.

35. In our opinion, allowing the criminal proceeding against the appellant in the facts and circumstances to continue, where no criminal liability can be attached, would amount to abuse of the process of court. Therefore, under the circumstances, we are satisfied that the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed for quashing the complaint/FIR."

13. Reference was then made on the judgment of Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, wherein the Apex Court has drawn distinction between a false promise of marriage and a breach of promise of marriage. After having undertaken an elaborate exercise, the Apex Court concluded that in the case of false promise of marriage, criminal prosecution of accused- applicant can be sustained but not on account of breach of promise of marriage. The relevant observations are contained in paragraph 16 of the report, which are, accordingly, extracted herein under:- “16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed:

21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently.

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (Emphasis supplied)"

14. On the above premise the learned counsel for applicant contends that no offence under Section 376 IPC can be said to be made out against applicant. As such, the criminal prosecution of applicant cannot be sustained and is, therefore, liable to be quashed by this Court.

15. Per contra, the learned A.G.A. representing State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Rupendra Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel representing first informant, opposite party-2 have vehemently opposed the present application. They submit that since applicant is a named and charge sheeted accused, therefore, he does not deserve any indulgence by this Court. During course of investigation, sufficient material was gathered by the investigating officer, on the basis of which, prima facie, the criminality alleged to have been committed by applicant was found to be established. Accordingly, applicant was charge sheeted. Offence complained of against applicant is not only illegal but also immoral. As such, no interference is warranted by this Court in present application.

16. Mr. Rupendra Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel representing first informant has further submitted that at the time of commencement of consensual relationship between the parties, both were unmarried. However, on account of delay in the performance of marriage by applicant with the prosecutrix, the matter was taken to the local police station, wherein the applicant entered into a compromise with the prosecutrix and agreed to solemnize marriage with her. The said fact is clearly evident from the document occurring at page 36 of the paper book. However, irrespective of above, the applicant has resiled from the same.

17. On the above conspectus, the learned counsel representing first informant submits that since applicant has committed a breach of promise by not solemnizing marriage with the applicant and there being nothing on record to show that marriage could not be solemnized by the applicant with the prosecutrix on account of a reason beyond the control of applicant, therefore, the promise made by the applicant to the prosecutrix regarding performance of marriage with her, appears to be false right from the very inception. It appears from the record that there was no intention on the part of applicant to marry with the prosecutrix. Since the applicant is guilty of dislodging the modesty of a young girl, who was a child within the meaning of the term "child", at the time of commencement of the consensual relationship, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court in present application. The prosecutrix, in her statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., has fully supported the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R. The veracity of the said statements cannot be examined at this stage.

18. On the edifice of above submissions, it is thus urged by the learned counsel representing first informant that no interference is warranted by this Court in present application.

19. When confronted with above, the learned counsel for applicant could not over come the same.

20. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A. for State-Opposite Party-1, Mr. Rupendra Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel representing first informant opposite party-2 and upon perusal of record, this Court finds that the objections raised by the learned A.G.A. and the learned counsel representing first informant in opposition to this application are clearly born out form the record and furthermore the same could not be dislodged by the learned counsel for the applicant with reference to the record at this stage. As such, no good ground exist to entertain the present application.

21. In view of above, the present application fails and is liable to be dismissed.

22. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Order Date :- 7.3.2025 Kumar Manish MANISH TRIPATHI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1. Heard Mr. Ajay Sengar, the learned counsel for applicant, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Rupendra Kumar Mishra, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Santosh Kumar Verma, the learned counsel representing prosecutrix/first informant/opposite party-2.

2. Perused the record.

3. Applicant, Veer Singh alias Veeru, who is a charge-sheeted accused and facing trial before Court below, has approached this Court by means of present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with the following prayer:- "It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble court may graciously be pleased to- A. Set aside the Impugned Order dated 18.12.2024 passed by Learned Additional District And Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act, 2012), Jalaun at Orai in Criminal Case No. 0208 of 2024 (State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Veer Singh @ Veeru) arising out of the Crime No. 0455 of 2024, u/Ss. 376 & 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 5/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, Police Station/Kotwali- Orai, District Jalaun, Quash the Impugned Charge Sheet dated 07.09.2024 submitted by the Investigating Officer as well as the entire proceedings in respect of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 0208 of 2024 (State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Veer Singh @ Veeru) arising out of the Crime No. 0455 of 2024, u/Ss. 376 & 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 5/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, Police Station/Kotwali- Orai, District Jalaun, pending before the Learned Additional District And Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act, 2012), Jalaun at Orai. B. Stay the further proceedings of the Criminal Case No. 0208 of 2024 (State of Uttar Pradesh Versus Veer Singh @ Veeru) arising out of the Crime No. 0455 of 2024, u/Ss. 376 & 506 Indian Penal Code, 1860 and 5/6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, Police Station/Kotwali- Orai, District Jalaun, pending before the Learned Additional District And Sessions Judge/Special Judge (POCSO Act, 2012), Jalaun at Orai, During the pendency of the present Criminal Misc Application, Otherwise the Applicant will suffer heavy loss and injury."

4. Learned counsel for applicant submits that though applicant is a named and charge sheeted accused and facing trial before Court below, however, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances as have now emerged on record, the criminal prosecution of applicant cannot be sustained. He, therefore, contends that in view of above the present application is liable to be allowed.

5. In furtherance of aforesaid submission it is urged by the learned counsel for applicant that the consensual relationship between the parties is alleged to have commenced from 10.3.2019. However, the first application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. in respect of the criminality alleged to have been committed by the applicant was filed by the prosecutrix/first informant/opposite party-2 on 29.2.2024 i.e. after expiry of a period of almost five years. The said application came to be rejected by the jurisdictional Magistrate, vide order dated 1.4.2024 but with liberty to the applicant i.e. the prosecutrix- opposite party-2 herein that in case, a false promise of marriage has been made by accused then it shall be open to the victim to file a fresh application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. The said order is on record at page 44 of the paper book.

6. Subsequent to the above order dated 1.4.2024 prosecutrix filed another application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. on 15.4.2024 which was allowed by the Jurisdictional Magistrate vide order dated 20.6.2024.

7. In compliance of aforesaid order dated 26.06.2024, an F.I.R. dated 3.7.2024 came to be registered against the applicant as Case Crime No. 0455 of 2024 under Sections 376, 506 IPC, Police Station Kotwali Orai, District-Jalaun. In the aforesaid F.I.R. two persons, namely, Veer Singh @ Veeru (applicant herein) and Chatrapal have been nominated as named accused.

8. Learned counsel for applicant with reference to above submits that in the day, date and time of the occurrence column of the F.I.R. it is mentioned that the occurrences giving rise to the present criminal proceedings occurred from 10.3.2019 to 8.1.2024. On the above premise it is thus urged by the learned counsel for applicant that the F.I.R. is highly belated. However, no attempt the prosecutrix/first informant/Opposite Party-2 to explain the delay/latches in lodging the F.I.R. in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. filed by her. was made by

9. It is next contended by the learned counsel for applicant that subsequent to the aforementioned F.I.R. statements of the prosecutrix/first informant/opposite party-2 were recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. Same are on record as annexures 11 and 12 to the affidavit filed in support of present application. However, even in her aforesaid statements, the prosecutrix has not made any attempt to explain the delay/laches in lodging the F.I.R. As such, the delay in lodging the F.I.R. remains unexplained upto this stage.

10. Referring to the judgments of Supreme Court in (i). P. Ramchandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4 SCC 578, (ii). P. Rajagopal and others Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2019 SC 2866 (paragraph 8), (iii). Hasmukhlal D. Vora and Another Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu, 2022 SCC OnLine 1732 , (iv). Sekaran Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2024) 2 SCC 176 and (v) Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur @ Banti Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 938, it is thus urged by the learned counsel for applicant that the Apex Court has now itself held that where there is a delayed FIR but the delay in lodging the FIR has not been sufficiently explained, then in that eventuality, the consequential prosecution of an accused cannot be sustained.

11. Much emphasis was placed upon paragraph 5 of the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Shivendra Pratap Singh Thakur (Supra), wherein the Apex Court quashed the criminal proceedings against the accused therein on the ground that there is an unexplained delay of 39 days in lodging the FIR.

12. Learned counsel for applicant has then submitted that admittedly the prosecutrix is major. She entered into consensual relationship with the applicant in the year-2019. No objection was ever raised by the prosecutrix to such consensual relationship. As such, no offence as alleged can be said to have been committed by applicant. To lend legal support to his submissions, he has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Prashant Vs. State of (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3375 and Mahesh Damu Khare Vs. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471. Reliance has been placed upon paragraphs 31 and 35 of the judgment in Mahesh Damu Khare (Supra). Tthe same are, accordingly, reproduced herein below:- "31. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such prolonged physical relationship at a very belated stage, it can lead to serious consequences. It will open the scope for imputing criminality to such long term relationships after turning sour, as such an allegation can be made even at a belated stage to drag a person in the juggernaut of stringent criminal process. There is always a danger of attributing criminal intent to an otherwise disturbed civil relationship of which the Court must also be mindful.

35. In our opinion, allowing the criminal proceeding against the appellant in the facts and circumstances to continue, where no criminal liability can be attached, would amount to abuse of the process of court. Therefore, under the circumstances, we are satisfied that the appellant is entitled to the relief claimed for quashing the complaint/FIR."

13. Reference was then made on the judgment of Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608, wherein the Apex Court has drawn distinction between a false promise of marriage and a breach of promise of marriage. After having undertaken an elaborate exercise, the Apex Court concluded that in the case of false promise of marriage, criminal prosecution of accused- applicant can be sustained but not on account of breach of promise of marriage. The relevant observations are contained in paragraph 16 of the report, which are, accordingly, extracted herein under:- “16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of upholding his word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of fact” where such misconception was the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act. In Deepak Gulati this Court observed:

21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently.

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances, when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The “failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term “misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never really intended to marry her.” (Emphasis supplied)"

14. On the above premise the learned counsel for applicant contends that no offence under Section 376 IPC can be said to be made out against applicant. As such, the criminal prosecution of applicant cannot be sustained and is, therefore, liable to be quashed by this Court.

15. Per contra, the learned A.G.A. representing State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Rupendra Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel representing first informant, opposite party-2 have vehemently opposed the present application. They submit that since applicant is a named and charge sheeted accused, therefore, he does not deserve any indulgence by this Court. During course of investigation, sufficient material was gathered by the investigating officer, on the basis of which, prima facie, the criminality alleged to have been committed by applicant was found to be established. Accordingly, applicant was charge sheeted. Offence complained of against applicant is not only illegal but also immoral. As such, no interference is warranted by this Court in present application.

16. Mr. Rupendra Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel representing first informant has further submitted that at the time of commencement of consensual relationship between the parties, both were unmarried. However, on account of delay in the performance of marriage by applicant with the prosecutrix, the matter was taken to the local police station, wherein the applicant entered into a compromise with the prosecutrix and agreed to solemnize marriage with her. The said fact is clearly evident from the document occurring at page 36 of the paper book. However, irrespective of above, the applicant has resiled from the same.

17. On the above conspectus, the learned counsel representing first informant submits that since applicant has committed a breach of promise by not solemnizing marriage with the applicant and there being nothing on record to show that marriage could not be solemnized by the applicant with the prosecutrix on account of a reason beyond the control of applicant, therefore, the promise made by the applicant to the prosecutrix regarding performance of marriage with her, appears to be false right from the very inception. It appears from the record that there was no intention on the part of applicant to marry with the prosecutrix. Since the applicant is guilty of dislodging the modesty of a young girl, who was a child within the meaning of the term "child", at the time of commencement of the consensual relationship, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court in present application. The prosecutrix, in her statements under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C., has fully supported the prosecution story as unfolded in the F.I.R. The veracity of the said statements cannot be examined at this stage.

18. On the edifice of above submissions, it is thus urged by the learned counsel representing first informant that no interference is warranted by this Court in present application.

19. When confronted with above, the learned counsel for applicant could not over come the same.

20. Having heard the learned counsel for the applicant, learned A.G.A. for State-Opposite Party-1, Mr. Rupendra Kumar Mishra, the learned counsel representing first informant opposite party-2 and upon perusal of record, this Court finds that the objections raised by the learned A.G.A. and the learned counsel representing first informant in opposition to this application are clearly born out form the record and furthermore the same could not be dislodged by the learned counsel for the applicant with reference to the record at this stage. As such, no good ground exist to entertain the present application.

21. In view of above, the present application fails and is liable to be dismissed.

22. It is, accordingly, dismissed. Order Date :- 7.3.2025 Kumar Manish MANISH TRIPATHI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad