High Court
Case Details
Court No. - 6 Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 1781 of 2004 Appellants :- U.P. State Road Transport Corporation through its Regional Manager, Rajapur, Allahabad Respondents :- Smt. Kamrun Nisha and others Counsel for Appellant :- Mr. Amit Dwivedi, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Anuj Srivastava, Advocate Counsel for Respondent :- Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha and Ms. Deepali Srivastava Sinha, Advocates Case :- FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 2276 of 2004 With Appellants :- Kamrun Nisha Respondents :- U.P. State Road Transport Corporation through Divisional Manager, Rajapur, Allahabad Counsel for Appellant :- Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha and Ms. Deepali Srivastava Sinha, Advocates holding brief of Mr. Ram Singh, Advocate Counsel for Respondent :- Mr. Amit Dwivedi, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Anuj Srivastava, Advocate Hon'ble J.J. Munir,J. 1. This judgment will dispose of First Appeal From Order No. 1781 of 2004 and First Appeal From Order No. 2276 of 2004, both of which were directed to be taken up together vide order dated 05.10.2017, though not formally connected. Both the appeals arise out of the same judgment and award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/ Additional District Judge, Court No. 19, Allahabad in MACP No. 507 of 1998. The Tribunal by the impugned award has partly allowed the claim petition, awarding compensation to the claimants in the sum of Rs. 2,40,000/-. 2. The opposite party to the claim petition is the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation (for short, 'the UPSRTC'), represented by its Divisional Manager, Rajapur, Allahabad (now Prayagraj). The claimants have appealed the award vide First Appeal From Order No. 2276 of 2004, 2 seeking enhancement, whereas the UPSRTC have preferred First Appeal From Order No. 1781 of 2004, seeking reversal of the award and dismissal of the claim petition. First Appeal From Order No. 1781 of 2004 shall be treated as the leading case and the facts noticed there, the contentions being, of course, dealt with separately. 3. According to the claimants, on 19.05.1998, the deceased Sagiruddin was travelling on board a Tata Sumo MUV, bearing registration No. UP-78M-1632 from Kanpur to Allahabad (now Prayagraj). At about 5 o'clock in the evening as the vehicle aforesaid neared Village Kokhraj, P.S. Kokhraj, District Kaushambi, a bus owned and operated by the UPSRTC, bearing registration No. UP-65F-0762, driven negligently by its driver at a high speed, hit the Tata Sumo. In consequence, Sagiruddin was grievously injured and died. At the time of accident, the deceased was 28 years old. He was gainfully employed into the business of tailoring and retail of clothes. The claimants say that in the event the deceased's life had not been prematurely snuffed out on account of the accident, he would have lived to see his 70th birthday. He would have earned a lot from business. At the time of his demise, the deceased had a shop of his own and would earn a sum of Rs. 6000/- per mensem.
Legal Reasoning
The claimants are Smt. Kamrun Nisha, the deceased's widow, aged about 25 years; his minor sons, Imtiyaz Ahmad, aged 7 years, Istiaq Ahmad, aged 4 years, Saied Ahmad, aged two and a half years; the deceased's father, Safiquddin Khan, aged 65 years and his mother, Bitti Bibi, aged 55 years. 4. It is the claimants' further case that a First Information Report about the accident was lodged with Police Station Kokhraj on 19.05.1998, where it was registered as Crime No. 208 of 1998. A total compensation in the sum of Rs. 20 lakhs was demanded under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act') along with a sum of Rs. 50,000/- under Section 140 of the Act, the petition being a composite one. The claim petition was instituted before the Tribunal on 31.07.1998. 3 5. A written statement was put in on behalf of the UPSRTC. It is the UPSRTC's case in the written statement that on the date of accident, the bus, bearing registration No. UP-65F-0762, driven by their driver, was proceeding to Kanpur. As the bus reached within the local limits of Police Station Kokhraj, according to the words employed in the written statement, translated from Hindi to English, “bus's pedal was depressed”, whereupon the UPSRTC driver slowing down the bus, carefully moved to his side of the road. At that moment, the ill-fated vehicle approached from the opposite direction, driven negligently and at a high speed by its driver. It rammed into the bus. This is how, according to the UPSRTC, the accident occurred due to the negligence of the ill-fated vehicle's driver. The UPSRTC bus driver is not at all guilty of negligence or a contributory to the accident. The UPSRTC have denied that the deceased was engaged in the trade of clothes nor did he have a monthly income of Rs. 6000/- earned from the said business. 6. This Court notices at this juncture that the owner, driver or the insurers of the ill-fated vehicle were not impleaded as parties to the claim petition. The claim petition was instituted, arraying the URSRTC alone in Column-16, from whom compensation was sought. 7. On the pleadings of parties, the following issues were framed (translated into English from Hindi): “1. Whether on 19.05.1998 at about 5 p.m. at the G.T. Road, near Police Station Kokhraj in District Kaushambi, the driver of Roadways Bus, bearing registration No. UP- 65F-0762, driving negligently and at a high speed, caused it to collide with Tata Sumo, bearing registration No. UP-78M-1632, on account of which Sagiruddin, a passenger on board the Tata Sumo, sustained grievous injury and died? If yes, its effect? 2. Whether non-impleadment of the owner of Tata Sumo, bearing registration No. UP- 78M-1632, renders the claim petition bad for non-joinder? 4 3. Whether the claimants are entitled to receive any compensation? If yes, how much and from whom?” 8. On behalf of the claimants, oral testimony was offered by the deceased's widow, Kamrun Nisha, entering the witness-box as PW-1. Another witness, Saj Mohammad was examined on behalf of the claimants as PW-2. The UPSRTC produced in oral evidence, one Sunil Kumar Bharti, the driver of the offending bus. The claimants, in their documentary evidence, have brought on record a copy of the First Information Report, charge-sheet, postmortem report, a receipt from Raj Narain Textiles, a cash credit memo from M/s. Sunil Prints, two receipts issued by Gopal Brothers and a receipt issued by the Kanpur-Farrukhabad Transport Association. No documentary evidence was led on behalf of the UPSRTC. 9. The UPSRTC say in the leading appeal that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent driving of the driver on wheel of the ill-fated vehicle. It was not at all the negligence of the UPSRTC bus driver. It is also argued that the Tribunal ought to have framed an issue, whether the driver of the ill-fated vehicle held a valid driving licence, which was never done. It is next submitted that no adverse inference could be drawn against the UPSRTC regarding negligence, because the brake pedal of the bus went down. This Court must remark at this juncture that by the rather odd description of the trouble relating to the brake pedal, what the UPRSTC wish to say is that it was a case of brake failure on the offending vehicle. It is also argued that the Tribunal has recorded an incorrect finding that the UPSRTC bus was rashly and negligently driven. The evidence of PW-2, Saj Mohammad has been castigated as that of an interested witness and his presence on the scene of accident doubted. It is also argued that the Tata Sumo was being plied as an illegal taxi. 10. It is the UPSRTC's further case that it is a case of collision between two vehicles, approaching from the opposite direction and, therefore, the 5 contributory negligence of the ill-fated vehicle's driver has to be taken into consideration and liability apportioned. It is, particularly, argued that the Tribunal has erred in holding the UPSRTC solely responsible for the accident and liable to pay compensation. Adverse inference against the UPSRTC has been incorrectly drawn from the testimony of DW-1. It is also urged by the learned Counsel for the UPSRTC that the relationship between the driver of the ill-fated Tata Sumo and the deceased was not ascertained by the Tribunal or a finding recorded why the deceased was travelling on board the Tata Sumo from Kanpur to Allahabad. It is also urged that the Tribunal has erred in holding that the owner of the Tata Sumo was not a necessary party to the claim petition. There are other issues raised about the age and income of the deceased, but those would be dealt with while considering the claimants' appeal. 11. The learned Counsel for the claimants in answer submits that there is ample evidence on record to show that the accident occurred due to the exclusive negligence of the driver of the UPSRTC bus, who drove it negligently, causing the accident. He submits that there is overwhelming evidence on record to establish the factum of exclusive negligence on the part of the UPSRTC bus driver. He has referred to the testimony of PW-2, Saj Mohammad, who was travelling on board the ill-fated Tata Sumo along with the deceased. It is argued by the learned Counsel for the claimants that it is not at all a case of contributory negligence, or for that matter, composite negligence. 12. Heard Mr. Amit Dwivedi, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Anuj Srivastava, learned Counsel for the UPSRTC, Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha and Ms. Deepali Srivastava Sinha, Advocates holding brief of Mr. Ram Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the claimants and perused the record. 13. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, this Court finds that a prompt FIR about the accident was lodged with Police Station Kokhraj within 15 minutes of the occurrence by one Bassan son of Siphte Haidar, 6 who is an unconcerned man. The accident has occurred almost in front of the Gate of Police Station Kokhraj. In the very prompt FIR, that has been lodged, a fact given due weightage by the Tribunal as well while returning its findings on Issue No. 1, the first informant has stated that the UPSRTC bus was being driven at a high speed and negligently. The UPSRTC bus collided with the Tata Sumo that came on from the direction of Kanpur at the Kokhraj tri-junction. 14. This Court is of opinion that the FIR in this case has sterling evidentiary value. It has been lodged very promptly. The prompt lodging of the FIR is well explained by the site of accident, which happened to be almost in front of the Police Station's Gate. The informant is an unconcerned man and had no stakes either way. The account of the accident in the FIR is spontaneous and exclusively blames the UPSRTC bus driver for negligent driving at a high speed as the cause for the accident. The bus driver, after investigation, has been charge-sheeted by the Police. Though, in no way decisive, the factum that the Police reached a conclusion to charge-sheet the UPSRTC bus driver, has to be given its due weight. The evidence of PW-2, who was a passenger on board the ill- fated Tata Sumo along with the deceased, is of much relevance. He had seen the accident and the events leading out to it with his own eyes. He is a survivor. This witness has said categorically in his examination-in-chief that the driver of the ill-fated vehicle was driving on the left hand side of the road. He has also categorically testified that the UPSRTC bus was driven negligently and at a high speed. It hit the ill-fated vehicle on the wrong side. In his cross-examination, the witness has acknowledged the fact that he knew the deceased for about 15-20 years past, because they are natives of the same Mohalla. The witness has not denied the fact that he was friends with the deceased. There is nothing material elicited in the cross-examination of Saj Mohammad done on behalf of the UPSRTC, which may show that he had wrongly described the accident or the events leading to it. In his cross-examination, he has described in graphic detail, 7 where each of the passenger was sitting. He has mentioned the speed of the bus as 70-80 kilometres per hour, which the driver of the Sumo first saw at a distance of about 30-40 meters. The witness has said that he had not fainted. The witness's account is absolutely is one that gives a graphic detail of the events leading to the accident. There is no reason to doubt the witness's testimony that ascribes exclusive negligence to the driver of the UPSRTC bus. 15. So far as the contention of the learned Counsel for the UPSRTC about composite negligence of drivers of both vehicles is concerned, it must be remarked that even if it were so, though not proved by evidence in this case, it is open to the injured to recover from either of the two tortfeasors. The claimants' case cannot fail, because the owner or the representative in interest of the Tata Sumo's owner or its insurer have not been impleaded. It is open to the claimants to recover from anyone of them assuming that there is a case of composite negligence. On the evidence, however, this Court does not find it to be a case of composite negligence at all. 16. In support of what has been said hereinabove, reference may be made to the decision of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Bittan Devi and others, 1986 SCC OnLine All 893, where their Lordships of the Division Bench have held: “12. From what we have said above, we find that the accident was due to the composite negligence of both the drivers, i.e., the bus and the truck. As to what is composite negligence is defined in Andhra Marine Exports etc. v. P. Radhakrishmn etc., AIR 1984 Mad 358. Pollock in his book on Torts 15th Edn. Held: “Where negligent acts of two or more independent persons have between them caused damage to a third, the suffer is not driven to apply any such analysis to find out whom he can sure. He is entitled, of course, within the limits set out by the general rules as 8 to remoteness of damage to sue all or any one of the negligent persons. It is no concern of his whether there is any duty of contribution or indemnity as between these persons though in any case he cannot recover in the whole more than his whole damage.” 13. Since this was a case of composite negligence the respondents had a right under the law to sue the Corporation for the compensation which had been suffered by them. The liability of the truck and the bus was joint and several. This being the position, the respondents could choose either of the two or prefer claim against both. In this view of the matter, although we have differed from the finding of the Claims Tribunal that the accident took place due to the sole negligence of the bus driver but that does not make out any case to reverse its judgment. The accident even if was due to the negligence of both, the liability of the Corporation would not vanish, extinguish or diminish.” 17. The principles regarding determination of liability in case of composite negligence have been authoritatively laid down by a Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Khenyei v. New India Assurance Company Limited and others, (2015) 9 SCC 273. In Khenyei (supra), it has been held by their Lordships: “22. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is as follows: 22.1. In the case of composite negligence, the plaintiff/claimant is entitled to sue both or any one of the joint tortfeasors and to recover the entire compensation as liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and several. 22.2. In the case of composite negligence, apportionment of compensation between two tortfeasors vis-à-vis the plaintiff/claimant is not permissible. He can recover at his option whole damages from any of them. 22.3. In case all the joint tortfeasors have been impleaded and evidence is sufficient, it is open to the court/Tribunal to determine inter se extent of composite 9 negligence of the drivers. However, determination of the extent of negligence between the joint tortfeasors is only for the purpose of their inter se liability so that one may recover the sum from the other after making whole of the payment to the plaintiff/claimant to the extent it has satisfied the liability of the other. In case both of them have been impleaded and the apportionment/extent of their negligence has been determined by the court/Tribunal, in the main case one joint tortfeasor can recover the amount from the other in the execution proceedings. 22.4. It would not be appropriate for the court/Tribunal to determine the extent of composite negligence of the drivers of two vehicles in the absence of impleadment of other joint tortfeasors. In such a case, impleaded joint tortfeasor should be left, in case he so desires, to sue the other joint tortfeasor in independent proceedings after passing of the decree or award.” 18. Thus, assuming for a moment that indeed there was a case of composite negligence involving the driver of the ill-fated Tata Sumo and the UPSRTC bus, it would not make the slightest difference to the claimants' case that he did not implead the owner of the Tata Sumo, his LRs or the ill-fated vehicle's insurers. Even otherwise, on facts, this Court finds that there is no evidence about a case of composite negligence being involved here at all. 19. In view of what has been said above, this Court does not find it to be a case, where the Tribunal's award, holding the UPSRTC liable to compensate the claimants, may be disturbed. FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 2276 of 2004 20. Now, the claimants' appeal may be taken up. 21. The only relevant issue in this appeal is Issue No. 3. There is much cavil about the age of the deceased and also his income. There is no documentary evidence about the deceased's age and in the postmortem report, he has been opined to be 38 years. According to the claimants, he 10 was 28. The Tribunal has placed the deceased in the age group of 35-40 years for the determination of the claimants' entitlement to compensation. The deceased's income from his business of trading in clothes has been asserted to be Rs. 6000/- per month. This Court finds that the deceased's wife, Kamrun Nisha has testified to the effect that the deceased would retail clothes, earning about Rs. 6000/- a month. In her cross-examination, the witness has said that her husband would purchase clothes from Kanpur, stitch it and retail clothes. She has reiterated that he had an income of Rs.6000/- per month. The Tribunal in its finding about the evidence of this witness has gone into unnecessary alleys through which the witness was taken by the cross-examiner, holding that the deceased had an income of Rs. 1500-2000/- per month from his business. The income has, therefore, been pegged at a figure of Rs. 1800/- per month for the purpose computation of compensation. A one-third has been deducted towards the personal expenses of the deceased, relying on the Second Schedule to the Act. The Tribunal has, therefore, proceeded to determine that the claimants had a dependency of Rs. 1200/- per month. The annual dependency has been determined at a figure of Rs.14,400/-. A multiplier of ‘16’ has been adopted by the Tribunal to arrive at an annual dependency of Rs. 2,30,400/-. 22. For the funeral expenses, loss of consortium and loss of estate, a total sum of Rs. 9500/- has been awarded, without marshalling it into different heads. A sum of Rs. 2,39,900/-, rounded-off to Rs.2,40,000/- has been awarded in compensation by the Tribunal with 8% simple interest, payable annually. 23. Heard Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha and Ms. Deepali Srivastava Sinha, learned Counsel for the claimants and Mr. Amit Dwivedi, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Anuj Srivastava, learned Counsel appearing for the UPSRTC. 11 24. The Counsel for the claimants have urged that the Tribunal has awarded a measly compensation, which is far from a just award. The deceased’s income has been grossly underestimated, ignoring evidence, even circumstances, from which a reasonable estimation about the income may be made. 25. The learned Counsel appearing for the UPSRTC, on the other hand, supported the award and said that a just and fair compensation has been awarded by the Tribunal. He submits that no exception can be taken so far as the compensation awarded to the claimants is concerned. It is emphasized that there is no dependable evidence about the deceased’s income. 26. Upon hearing learned Counsel for the parties, this Court finds that the deceased was a healthy and able-bodied man in the prime of his life. He has been estimated to be in the age bracket of 35-40 years by the Tribunal. In the opinion of this Court, the appropriate age bracket would, therefore, be 36-40 years. At that age, the deceased cannot be regarded to be earning a sum of Rs. 1800/- per month in the year 1998, when the accident happened. The deceased was supporting a family of six members. It is impossible to accept that the deceased would be managing a family of that size in the relatively humble sum of Rs.1800/- per month, which back then too, did not have enough value to support so many family members. There is no evidence on record to show that any of the claimants had an alternate or dependable source of income. All of them were dependent on the deceased. In the totality of circumstances, where there are some documents relating to the deceased’s business transactions, particularly, cash-memos about cloth purchased from Kanpur and Farrukhabad and a consignment receipt, it would be just and fair to determine the deceased’s income in the sum of Rs. 3000/- per month. It is on the said basis that the claimants’ entitlement to compensation would now be determined. 12 27. The deceased’s monthly income was Rs.3000/-. His annual income would a figure of Rs. 36,000/-. The deceased had six dependents, who are the claimants. Going by the principle in Paragraph No. 30 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121, in case where the dependents are between 4-6, a deduction of one-fourth has been made towards personal expenses of the deceased. The Tribunal has, therefore, committed an error in deducting a one-third towards personal expenses, according to the Second Schedule of the Act. 28. The deceased being in the age bracket of 36-40 years, going by the Table provided in Paragraph No. 42 of the decision in Sarla Verma (supra), multiplier of ‘15’ would be applicable. The Tribunal has erred in applying the multiplier of ‘16’. 29. The question of future prospects would be governed in accordance with Rule 220-A(3) of the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998 (for short, '1998 Rules'), going by the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Company Limited v. Urmila Shukla and others, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 822. 30. There is this further issue whether Rule 220-A (3) of the Rules of 1998, that was inserted by Notification No. 777/XXX-4-2011-4(3)-2010 dated September 26, 2011, being the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles (Eleventh Amendment) Rules, 2011, would apply retrospectively to an accident that happened much before the amendment. The accident here happened on 19.05.1998. This question was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sushil Kumar and others v. M/s. Sampark Lojastic Private Limited and others, First Appeal From Order No. 2581 of 2011, decided on 26.04.2017. In Sushil Kumar (supra) it was observed by the Division Bench : “Rule 220-A was inserted in the Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 in view of the various decisions of the law courts for providing benefit on account of future prospects 13 of the injured/deceased. It provides for addition of certain percentage of the income of the injured/deceased in his actual income depending upon the age of the injured/deceased for the purposes of determination of the compensation. The aforesaid Rule came into effect on 26.09.2011 after the decision of the claim petition but before filing of the appeal though the accident took place on 08.05.2010 much before the enforcement of the above Rule.
Decision
It is in view of the above that an argument is being raised that Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident which had taken place on 08.05.2010. In Ram Sarup Vs. Munshi AIR 1963 SC 553 it was laid down that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the rights of the parties. The view expressed above was followed by the Supreme Court in Mula Vs. Godhu AIR 1971 SC 89. In Dayawati Vs. Inderjit AIR 1966 SC 1423 the court had observed as under:- If the new law speaks in language, which expressly or by clear intendment, takes in even pending matters, the court of trial as well as the court of appeal must have regard to an intention so expressed, and the court of appeal may give effect to such a law even after the judgment of the court of first instance. In Amarjit Kaur Vs. Pritam Singh AIR 1974 SC 2068 effect was given to the change in law during the pendency of an appeal as the hearing of an appeal under the procedural law of this country is in the nature of rehearing of the suit by superior court. It was in the light of the above decisions that in Lakshmi Narayan Guin and others Vs. Niranjan Modak AIR 1985 SC 111 it was held that a change in law during the pendency of an appeal has to be taken into account and will cover the right of the parties. The aforesaid decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in U.P. State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Smt. Madhu Sharma and others, 2003 (4) AWC 2620 which was a case in relation to the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and it was observed that it is apparent that the change in law during the pendency of the original proceedings has to be taken into account so as to cover the rights of the parties. In view of above decision the view expressed by the Division Bench of this court in ICICI Lombard (Supra) is not of good law as it does not takes into account the decisions referred to above in holding that the Rule 220-A of the Rules which came into effect on 26.09.2011 would not apply to the accident that took place prior to the said date only for the reason that the Rule was not specifically stated to be retrospective in nature.” 14 31. In view of the fact that the deceased was in the age group of 36-40 years, the claimants are entitled to add 50% to his income by way of future prospects. 32. Still, one matter remains to be considered, and that is, the award of compensation under the conventional heads. In this regard, the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi is, again, the guiding beacon on the point, where it has been held : “48. This aspect needs to be clarified and appositely stated. The conventional sum has been provided in the Second Schedule to the Act. The said Schedule has been found to be defective as stated by the Court in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v. Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362] . Recently, in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy [Puttamma v.K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] it has been reiterated by stating : (SCC p. 80, para 54) “54. … we hold that the Second Schedule as was enacted in 1994 has now become redundant, irrational and unworkable due to changed scenario including the present cost of living and current rate of inflation and increased life expectancy.” 49. As far as multiplier or multiplicand is concerned, the same has been put to rest by the judgments of this Court. Para 3 of the Second Schedule also provides for general damages in case of death. It is as follows: “3. General damages (in case of death): The following general damages shall be payable in addition to compensation outlined above: Funeral expenses (i) (ii) Loss of consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse (iii) Loss of estate (iv) Medical expenses — actual expenses incurred before death by bills/vouchers but not exceeding supported Rs.2000 Rs.5000 Rs.2500 Rs.15,000 50. On a perusal of various decisions of this Court, it is manifest that the Second Schedule has not been followed starting from the decision in Trilok Chandra [UP SRTC v.Trilok Chandra, (1996) 4 SCC 362] and there has been no amendment to the same. The conventional damage amount needs to be appositely determined. As we notice, in different cases different amounts have been granted. A sum of Rs 1,00,000 was granted towards consortium inRajesh [Rajesh v. 15 Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] . The justification for grant of consortium, as we find fromRajesh [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] , is founded on the observation as we have reproduced hereinbefore. 33. So far as award of compensation for the loss of consortium is concerned, it was considered by the Supreme Court in Magma General Insurance Company Limited v. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram and others, (2018) 18 SCC 130. In Magma General Insurance Company (supra) it was observed : “21. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pranay Sethi[National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 248 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 205] dealt with the various heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a death case. One of these heads is loss of consortium. In legal parlance, “consortium” is a compendious term which encompasses “spousal consortium”, “parental consortium”, and “filial consortium”. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse : [Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 54 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ) 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 817 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 149] 21.1. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of “company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation”. [Black's Law Dictionary(5th Edn., 1979).] 21.2. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of “parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training”. 21.3. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. (emphasis by Court) 34. In view of the aforesaid conclusions, the compensation payable to the claimants in FAFO No. 2276 of 2004 would have to be revised in the following manner:- 16 (i) Monthly Income (of the deceased) = 3000/- (ii) Monthly Income+Future Prospects (monthly income x 50%) = 3000+1500 (iii) Annual Income (of the deceased) = 4500x12 (iv) Annual Dependency = Annual Income – one-fourth deduction towards personal expenses of the deceased = 54,000- 13,500 (v) Total Dependency = Annual Dependency x Applied Multiplier = 40500x15 (vi) Claimants’ entitlement towards conventional heads = Loss of Estate + Funeral Expenses + dependents’ Consortium = 15000+15000+40000x6 The total compensation would therefore, work out to a figure of Rs. 6,07,500+ Rs. 2,70,000 = = = = = = 4500/- 54,000/- 40,500/- 6,07,500/- 2,70,000/- 8,77,500/- 35. The impugned award is modified and it is ordered that the Insurance Company shall pay in compensation to the claimants a sum of Rs. 8,77,500/-. The aforesaid sum of money shall carry simple interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of institution of claim petition, until realization. 36. The sum of money already deposited with the Tribunal pursuant to the impugned award passed by the Tribunal, or the interim order passed by this Court, shall be adjusted against the award. The other directions of the Tribunal shall remain intact. 37. In the result, FAFO No. 1781 of 2004 is dismissed and FAFO No.2276 of 2004 stands partly allowed. Costs easy. Order Date :- 8.12.2022 Anoop (J.J. Munir, J.) Digitally signed by :- ANOOP KUMAR SINGH High Court of Judicature at Allahabad