High Court · 2025

1. Heard Sri Anand Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Ghanshyam Kumar, learned A.G.A.-I for the State.

2. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants challenging the judgment and order dated 27.03.1984 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Banda in Session Trial No. 355 of 1982 convicting the appellant no. 1 Anil to undergo life imprisonment under section 302 I.P.C. and appellant no. 2 Satish alias Pappu to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment under section 307 I.P.C.

3. The prosecution story in brief is that on 11.06.1982, at about 5:30 P.M. near boda confectionery at Katra market the complainant Munna, his brother Babbu and Suraj were standing and talking to each other. There were some other people also. At that time, Anil S/o Sahdev Nuniya, Satish alias Babbu Srivastava son of Narsingh Bahadur and Pawan S/o Deen Dayal Niniya came there and one Anil fired at the brother of the complainant and in the meantime Satish has exploded the fire cracker on the land and ran away. Satish fell on the ground due to fire arm injury.

4. As per office report dated 20.03.2025 based on the report of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda, dated 24.02.2025, the appellant no. 2 Satish @ Pappu S/o Nar Singh Bahadur Srivastava died on 18.04.2024. The photo copy of the death certificate issued by the Nagar Palika Parishad Banda has been annexed with the report.

5. Accordingly, the appeal in respect of appellant no. 2 (Satish @ Pappu S/o Nar Singh Bahadur Srivastava) stands abated. 1

6. At the very outset, learned counsel for appellant submitted that an application was filed to decide the appeal of the appellant as a juvenile in conflict with law. The said application was supported by an affidavit in which High School certificate of the year 1987 has been attached in support of his claim showing his date of birth as 05.04.1967 and date of occurrence on 11.06.1982. It was contended that from the above material it is ascertainable that on the date of commission of the crime, that is 11.06.1982, the appellant was below 18 years in age and therefore was entitled for the benefit of the provisions of Juvenile.

7. By an order dated 08.02.2017, the learned AGA was granted two weeks time to get the genuineness of the certificate verified and to file counter affidavit in response to the application filed by the appellant.

8. Pursuant to the above order, a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State. Thereafter, by order dated 23.03.2017, the Juvenile Justice Board, Banda was directed to consider and decide the application of the appellant no. 1 Anil Son of Sahadeo claiming juvenility, in accordance with law after giving opportunity to the parties concerned including the complainant and submit the report/order before this Court within two months.

9. In view of the report of Juvenile Justice Board, Banda, dated 13.04.2018 by which the appellant no. 1 Anil was declared juvenile on 14.03.2022, the following order was passed by this Court accepting the said report which reads thus: “The office has put up this appeal for hearing along with the report dated 13.04.2018 submitted by the Juvenile Justice Board, Banda declaring appellant no.1 (Anil S/o Sahdev) juvenile being aged 15 years 2 months and 6 days old on 11.06.1982 i.e. the date of occurrence. We have perused the report submitted by the Juvenile Justice Board, Banda. Perusal whereof would reveal that the date of birth of the appellant no.1 Anil was ascertained to be 05.04.1967 on the basis of the school records suggesting that he has passed class V in the year 1977. The necessary school records were produced and the witnesses, who proved the same, were examined. It appears that Anil had also appeared in the High School Examination of the year 1987 with the same date of birth 05.04.1967. Notice was also served by the Board upon the family of the victim. Pursuant thereto, Purushottam Das appeared from the victim side and stated that informant of the case is no more alive and that he has no information with regard to the age of the accused-appellant no.1. 2 The Juvenile Justice Board after examining the record and considering the statements of the witnesses, examined during the course of inquiry, ascertained the date of birth of the appellant no.1 as 05.04.1967 and, thus, found the appellant aged 15 years 2 months 6 days (a juvenile) on the date of occurrence i.e. 11.06.1982. No objection to this report has been taken either by the State or the victim party. Learned AGA has pointed out that even in the trial court judgment while considering the question of sentence to be imposed upon appellant no.1 it was found that the accused is a young man aged about 17 years on the date of judgment i.e. 27.03.1984. In this view of the matter, we deem it appropriate to accept the report of Juvenile Justice Board, Banda in respect of the juvenility claim/set up by appellant no.1 and declare appellant no.1 a juvenile. We have heard Sri Anand Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Pankaj Saxena, learned AGA for the State. Judgment reserved.”

10. The above quoted order further reflects that after hearing of learned counsel for the appellants and learned A.G.A. the judgment was reserved. However, subsequently vide order dated 16.09.2022 the appeal was released and that is how this appeal is before us.

11. Now, since the appellant no. 1 was a Juvenile in conflict with law, on the date of incident, and presently he has crossed 58 years age, and further no other ground of appeal having been raised before us, therefore, at this stage the Court has to take into consideration provisions of Section 18 and 21 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and to pass appropriate orders.

12. For ready reference section 18 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is extracted below. "18. Orders regarding child found to be in conflict with law.- (1). Where a Board is satisfied on inquiry that a child irrespective of age has committed a petty offence, or a serious offence, or a child below the age of sixteen years has committed a heinous offence, then, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, and based on the nature of offence, specific need for supervision or intervention, circumstances as brought out in the social investigation report and past conduct of the child, the Board may, if it so thinks fit,- a. allow the child to go home after advice or admonition by following appropriate inquiry and counselling to such child and to his parents or the guardian; 3 b. direct the child to participate in group counselling and similar activities; c. order the child to perform community service under the supervision of an organisation or institution, or a specified person, persons or group of persons identified by the Board; d. order the child or parents or the guardian of the child to pay fine: Provided that, in case the child is working, it may be ensured that the provisions of any labour law for the time being in force are not violated; e. direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care of any parent, guardian or fit person, on such parent, guardian or fit person executing a bond, with or without surety, as the Board may require, for the good behaviour and child's well-being for any period not exceeding three years; f. direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care and supervision of any fit facility for ensuring the good behaviour and child's well-being for any period not exceeding three years; g. direct the child to be sent to a special home, for such period, not exceeding three years, as it thinks fit, for providing reformative services including education, skill development, counselling, behaviour modification therapy, and psychiatric support during the period of stay in the special home: Provided that if the conduct and behaviour of the child has been such that, it would not be in the child's interest, or in the interest of other children housed in a special home, the Board may send such child to the place of safety.

2. If an order is passed under clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1), the Board may, in addition pass orders to- i. attend school; or ii. attend a vocational training centre; or iii. attend a therapeutic centre; or iv. prohibit the child from visiting, frequenting or appearing at a specified place; or v. undergo a de-addiction programme.

3. Where the Board after preliminary assessment under section 15 pass an order that there is a need for trial of the said child as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences."

13. It is also relevant to quote section 21 of the Act. "21. Order that may be passed against a child in conflict with law: No child in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or for life imprisonment without the possibility of release, for any offence, 4 either under the provisions of this Act or under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force."

14. From the perusal of the aforesaid provisions it is noticed that a juvenile in conflict with law cannot be sentenced to undergo life imprisonment, and further the maximum period for which a juvenile may be sent to a special home is only three years.

15. Further, the accused appellant no. 1 because of his age, as on today cannot be sent to special home. However, as is evident from record that the appellant has already undergone about 6 months of imprisonment.

16. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to look into the ratio laid down by Apex Court while dealing with the similar situation like in the case in hand.

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahesh and others vs. State of Rajasthan and others, reported in 2019(3) Crimes 60 (SC) has held as follows: "5. The position in law in this regard is somewhat unsettled as has been noticed and dealt with by this Court in Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh and another versus State of Uttar Pradesh1 wherein in paragraphs 24 to 27 four categories of cases have been culled out where apparently different approaches had been adopted by this Court. The net result is summed up in paragraph 28 of the aforesaid report which explains the details of the categorization made in the earlier paragraphs of the said report. Paragraph 28 of the said report, therefore, would require a specific notice and is reproduced below: "28. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that in one set of cases this Court has found the juvenile guilty of the crime alleged to have been committed by him but he has gone virtually unpunished since this Court quashed the sentence awarded to him. In another set of cases, this Court has taken the view, on the facts of the case that the juvenile is adequately punished for the offence committed by him by serving out some period in detention. In the third set of cases, this Court has remitted the entire case for consideration by the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board, both on the innocence or guilt of the juvenile as well as the sentence to be awarded if the juvenile is found guilty. In the fourth set of cases, this Court has examined the case on merits and after having found the juvenile guilty of the offence, remitted the matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board on the award of sentence."

6. The validity of the conviction in respect of the incident which 5 occurred almost two decades back, in our considered view, ought to be decided in these appeals and the entire of the proceedings including the punishment/sentence awarded should not be interfered with on the mere ground that the accused appellants were juveniles on the date of commission of the alleged crime. Judicial approaches must always be realistic and have some relation to the ground realities. We, therefore, adopt one of the possible approaches that has been earlier adopted by this Court in the four categories of cases mentioned above to examine the correctness of the conviction of the accused appellants under the provisions of the IPC, as noticed above.

7. In this regard, having perused the materials on record we find no ground whatsoever to take a view different from what has been recorded by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. The conviction of the accused appellants under Sections 323, 324, 325, 427, 455 read with Section 149 IPC accordingly shall stand affirmed.

8. This will bring us to a consideration of the sentence to be awarded. Here again,in the four categories of cases that have been noticed in Jitendra Singh (supra) and in several subsequent decisions of this Court in Abdul Razzaq vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Mohd. Feroz Khan alias Feroz vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, Mumtaz alias Muntyaz vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Mahendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan different approaches have been adopted. In some cases, the question of punishment has been left to be determined by the Juvenile Justice Board in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act of 2000. In other cases, the issue of punishment has been dealt with by the Court having regard to the fact that on the date when the Court had considered the issue the juvenile(s) have advanced in age.

9. The present is a case where the accused appellants though juveniles on the date of commission of the alleged crime are, as on today, middle aged persons. The accused appellant - Mahesh in Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.2934 of 2015 had undergone the custody for a period of nearly one year whereas the accused appellant - Arjun in Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.5370 of 2015 had suffered custody for about eight (08) months. The maximum sentence, as already noted, is three years. Having regard to the long efflux of time we are of the view that it will not be necessary, in the facts of the present cases, to cause a remand of the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for a decision on the quantum of sentence for the reason even if such a remand is made and the Juvenile Justice Board comes to a decision that in addition to the period of custody suffered by the accused appellants they need to suffer a further period of custody, such custody can only be in a remand home or a protection home to which places the accused appellants, because of their age as on today, cannot be sent.

10. On the contrary, having regard to the period of custody suffered; the age of the accused appellants as on date; the efflux of time since 6 the date of occurrence and all other relevant facts and circumstances we are of the view that while maintaining the conviction of the accused appellants the sentence imposed should be modified to one of the period undergone. We order accordingly."

18. In light of the above legal position and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, period of imprisonment, the age of the accused appellant no. 1 as on date, the efflux of time since the date of occurrence, we are of the view that the while maintaining the conviction of the accused appellant no. 1 Anil the sentence imposed is modified to the period already undergone.

19. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. The accused appellant no. 1 is availing the benefit of bail by furnishing adequate sureties and bonds, the same stands discharged.

20. Lower Court record along with a copy of this judgement be sent back immediately to District Court concerned for compliance and further necessary action. Order Date :- 21.3.2025 K.K. Maurya 7 KAMLESH KUMAR MAURYA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

1. Heard Sri Anand Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Ghanshyam Kumar, learned A.G.A.-I for the State.

2. The present appeal has been filed by the appellants challenging the judgment and order dated 27.03.1984 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Banda in Session Trial No. 355 of 1982 convicting the appellant no. 1 Anil to undergo life imprisonment under section 302 I.P.C. and appellant no. 2 Satish alias Pappu to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment under section 307 I.P.C.

3. The prosecution story in brief is that on 11.06.1982, at about 5:30 P.M. near boda confectionery at Katra market the complainant Munna, his brother Babbu and Suraj were standing and talking to each other. There were some other people also. At that time, Anil S/o Sahdev Nuniya, Satish alias Babbu Srivastava son of Narsingh Bahadur and Pawan S/o Deen Dayal Niniya came there and one Anil fired at the brother of the complainant and in the meantime Satish has exploded the fire cracker on the land and ran away. Satish fell on the ground due to fire arm injury.

4. As per office report dated 20.03.2025 based on the report of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Banda, dated 24.02.2025, the appellant no. 2 Satish @ Pappu S/o Nar Singh Bahadur Srivastava died on 18.04.2024. The photo copy of the death certificate issued by the Nagar Palika Parishad Banda has been annexed with the report.

5. Accordingly, the appeal in respect of appellant no. 2 (Satish @ Pappu S/o Nar Singh Bahadur Srivastava) stands abated. 1

6. At the very outset, learned counsel for appellant submitted that an application was filed to decide the appeal of the appellant as a juvenile in conflict with law. The said application was supported by an affidavit in which High School certificate of the year 1987 has been attached in support of his claim showing his date of birth as 05.04.1967 and date of occurrence on 11.06.1982. It was contended that from the above material it is ascertainable that on the date of commission of the crime, that is 11.06.1982, the appellant was below 18 years in age and therefore was entitled for the benefit of the provisions of Juvenile.

7. By an order dated 08.02.2017, the learned AGA was granted two weeks time to get the genuineness of the certificate verified and to file counter affidavit in response to the application filed by the appellant.

8. Pursuant to the above order, a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State. Thereafter, by order dated 23.03.2017, the Juvenile Justice Board, Banda was directed to consider and decide the application of the appellant no. 1 Anil Son of Sahadeo claiming juvenility, in accordance with law after giving opportunity to the parties concerned including the complainant and submit the report/order before this Court within two months.

9. In view of the report of Juvenile Justice Board, Banda, dated 13.04.2018 by which the appellant no. 1 Anil was declared juvenile on 14.03.2022, the following order was passed by this Court accepting the said report which reads thus: “The office has put up this appeal for hearing along with the report dated 13.04.2018 submitted by the Juvenile Justice Board, Banda declaring appellant no.1 (Anil S/o Sahdev) juvenile being aged 15 years 2 months and 6 days old on 11.06.1982 i.e. the date of occurrence. We have perused the report submitted by the Juvenile Justice Board, Banda. Perusal whereof would reveal that the date of birth of the appellant no.1 Anil was ascertained to be 05.04.1967 on the basis of the school records suggesting that he has passed class V in the year 1977. The necessary school records were produced and the witnesses, who proved the same, were examined. It appears that Anil had also appeared in the High School Examination of the year 1987 with the same date of birth 05.04.1967. Notice was also served by the Board upon the family of the victim. Pursuant thereto, Purushottam Das appeared from the victim side and stated that informant of the case is no more alive and that he has no information with regard to the age of the accused-appellant no.1. 2 The Juvenile Justice Board after examining the record and considering the statements of the witnesses, examined during the course of inquiry, ascertained the date of birth of the appellant no.1 as 05.04.1967 and, thus, found the appellant aged 15 years 2 months 6 days (a juvenile) on the date of occurrence i.e. 11.06.1982. No objection to this report has been taken either by the State or the victim party. Learned AGA has pointed out that even in the trial court judgment while considering the question of sentence to be imposed upon appellant no.1 it was found that the accused is a young man aged about 17 years on the date of judgment i.e. 27.03.1984. In this view of the matter, we deem it appropriate to accept the report of Juvenile Justice Board, Banda in respect of the juvenility claim/set up by appellant no.1 and declare appellant no.1 a juvenile. We have heard Sri Anand Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri Pankaj Saxena, learned AGA for the State. Judgment reserved.”

10. The above quoted order further reflects that after hearing of learned counsel for the appellants and learned A.G.A. the judgment was reserved. However, subsequently vide order dated 16.09.2022 the appeal was released and that is how this appeal is before us.

11. Now, since the appellant no. 1 was a Juvenile in conflict with law, on the date of incident, and presently he has crossed 58 years age, and further no other ground of appeal having been raised before us, therefore, at this stage the Court has to take into consideration provisions of Section 18 and 21 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and to pass appropriate orders.

12. For ready reference section 18 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is extracted below. "18. Orders regarding child found to be in conflict with law.- (1). Where a Board is satisfied on inquiry that a child irrespective of age has committed a petty offence, or a serious offence, or a child below the age of sixteen years has committed a heinous offence, then, notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, and based on the nature of offence, specific need for supervision or intervention, circumstances as brought out in the social investigation report and past conduct of the child, the Board may, if it so thinks fit,- a. allow the child to go home after advice or admonition by following appropriate inquiry and counselling to such child and to his parents or the guardian; 3 b. direct the child to participate in group counselling and similar activities; c. order the child to perform community service under the supervision of an organisation or institution, or a specified person, persons or group of persons identified by the Board; d. order the child or parents or the guardian of the child to pay fine: Provided that, in case the child is working, it may be ensured that the provisions of any labour law for the time being in force are not violated; e. direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care of any parent, guardian or fit person, on such parent, guardian or fit person executing a bond, with or without surety, as the Board may require, for the good behaviour and child's well-being for any period not exceeding three years; f. direct the child to be released on probation of good conduct and placed under the care and supervision of any fit facility for ensuring the good behaviour and child's well-being for any period not exceeding three years; g. direct the child to be sent to a special home, for such period, not exceeding three years, as it thinks fit, for providing reformative services including education, skill development, counselling, behaviour modification therapy, and psychiatric support during the period of stay in the special home: Provided that if the conduct and behaviour of the child has been such that, it would not be in the child's interest, or in the interest of other children housed in a special home, the Board may send such child to the place of safety.

2. If an order is passed under clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1), the Board may, in addition pass orders to- i. attend school; or ii. attend a vocational training centre; or iii. attend a therapeutic centre; or iv. prohibit the child from visiting, frequenting or appearing at a specified place; or v. undergo a de-addiction programme.

3. Where the Board after preliminary assessment under section 15 pass an order that there is a need for trial of the said child as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences."

13. It is also relevant to quote section 21 of the Act. "21. Order that may be passed against a child in conflict with law: No child in conflict with law shall be sentenced to death or for life imprisonment without the possibility of release, for any offence, 4 either under the provisions of this Act or under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force."

14. From the perusal of the aforesaid provisions it is noticed that a juvenile in conflict with law cannot be sentenced to undergo life imprisonment, and further the maximum period for which a juvenile may be sent to a special home is only three years.

15. Further, the accused appellant no. 1 because of his age, as on today cannot be sent to special home. However, as is evident from record that the appellant has already undergone about 6 months of imprisonment.

16. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to look into the ratio laid down by Apex Court while dealing with the similar situation like in the case in hand.

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahesh and others vs. State of Rajasthan and others, reported in 2019(3) Crimes 60 (SC) has held as follows: "5. The position in law in this regard is somewhat unsettled as has been noticed and dealt with by this Court in Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh and another versus State of Uttar Pradesh1 wherein in paragraphs 24 to 27 four categories of cases have been culled out where apparently different approaches had been adopted by this Court. The net result is summed up in paragraph 28 of the aforesaid report which explains the details of the categorization made in the earlier paragraphs of the said report. Paragraph 28 of the said report, therefore, would require a specific notice and is reproduced below: "28. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that in one set of cases this Court has found the juvenile guilty of the crime alleged to have been committed by him but he has gone virtually unpunished since this Court quashed the sentence awarded to him. In another set of cases, this Court has taken the view, on the facts of the case that the juvenile is adequately punished for the offence committed by him by serving out some period in detention. In the third set of cases, this Court has remitted the entire case for consideration by the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board, both on the innocence or guilt of the juvenile as well as the sentence to be awarded if the juvenile is found guilty. In the fourth set of cases, this Court has examined the case on merits and after having found the juvenile guilty of the offence, remitted the matter to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board on the award of sentence."

6. The validity of the conviction in respect of the incident which 5 occurred almost two decades back, in our considered view, ought to be decided in these appeals and the entire of the proceedings including the punishment/sentence awarded should not be interfered with on the mere ground that the accused appellants were juveniles on the date of commission of the alleged crime. Judicial approaches must always be realistic and have some relation to the ground realities. We, therefore, adopt one of the possible approaches that has been earlier adopted by this Court in the four categories of cases mentioned above to examine the correctness of the conviction of the accused appellants under the provisions of the IPC, as noticed above.

7. In this regard, having perused the materials on record we find no ground whatsoever to take a view different from what has been recorded by the learned trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. The conviction of the accused appellants under Sections 323, 324, 325, 427, 455 read with Section 149 IPC accordingly shall stand affirmed.

8. This will bring us to a consideration of the sentence to be awarded. Here again,in the four categories of cases that have been noticed in Jitendra Singh (supra) and in several subsequent decisions of this Court in Abdul Razzaq vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Mohd. Feroz Khan alias Feroz vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, Mumtaz alias Muntyaz vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Mahendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan different approaches have been adopted. In some cases, the question of punishment has been left to be determined by the Juvenile Justice Board in view of the provisions of Section 20 of the Act of 2000. In other cases, the issue of punishment has been dealt with by the Court having regard to the fact that on the date when the Court had considered the issue the juvenile(s) have advanced in age.

9. The present is a case where the accused appellants though juveniles on the date of commission of the alleged crime are, as on today, middle aged persons. The accused appellant - Mahesh in Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.2934 of 2015 had undergone the custody for a period of nearly one year whereas the accused appellant - Arjun in Criminal Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.5370 of 2015 had suffered custody for about eight (08) months. The maximum sentence, as already noted, is three years. Having regard to the long efflux of time we are of the view that it will not be necessary, in the facts of the present cases, to cause a remand of the matter to the Juvenile Justice Board for a decision on the quantum of sentence for the reason even if such a remand is made and the Juvenile Justice Board comes to a decision that in addition to the period of custody suffered by the accused appellants they need to suffer a further period of custody, such custody can only be in a remand home or a protection home to which places the accused appellants, because of their age as on today, cannot be sent.

10. On the contrary, having regard to the period of custody suffered; the age of the accused appellants as on date; the efflux of time since 6 the date of occurrence and all other relevant facts and circumstances we are of the view that while maintaining the conviction of the accused appellants the sentence imposed should be modified to one of the period undergone. We order accordingly."

18. In light of the above legal position and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, period of imprisonment, the age of the accused appellant no. 1 as on date, the efflux of time since the date of occurrence, we are of the view that the while maintaining the conviction of the accused appellant no. 1 Anil the sentence imposed is modified to the period already undergone.

19. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part. The accused appellant no. 1 is availing the benefit of bail by furnishing adequate sureties and bonds, the same stands discharged.

20. Lower Court record along with a copy of this judgement be sent back immediately to District Court concerned for compliance and further necessary action. Order Date :- 21.3.2025 K.K. Maurya 7 KAMLESH KUMAR MAURYA High Court of Judicature at Allahabad