High Court · 2025 on 16 Jul 2025

Judgment

1. Heard Sri Mohd Shamim Khan, learned counsel for the appellants, Sri Vikas Goswami learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the lower Court record.

2. The present appeal arises from the judgement and order dated

03.03.1984 passed by Muhi Ul Islam, VII Additional Sessions Judge/ Bareilly, in Sessions Trial No.148 of 1982 (State Vs. Kallu Shah, Zakir Shah and Saman Shah), arising out of Case Crime No. 294 of 1980 Police Station- Izzatnagar, District- Bareilly, whereby the learned court below has convicted the surviving appellant-Zakir Shah for offence under Section 302/34 I.P.C and sentenced him to undergo rigorous life imprisonment. The appellants were on bail.

3. During pendency of the appeal, the appellants-Kallu Shah and Saman Shah died. Accordingly their appeal abated. The present appellant Zakir Shah was aged about 18 years on the date of incident. Today he is more than 65 years old.

4. The prosecution story emerged, on the strength of the Written Report dated 02.09.1980 submitted by Ganga Ram (P.W.-1 at the trial) to the Station House Officer Izzat Nagar, Bareilly which is Ex. Ka-1 at the trial.

5. On that Written Report, FIR was registered on 02.09.1980 at about 3:30 p.m. reporting that about 12 noon, the cattle of the appellants tress-passed on the agricultural field of the informant. Such occurrence had been witnessed by the deceased Hetram who was engaged in cutting weed for cattle fodder/‘Chari’. The deceased objected. On that the appellants reacted and a quarrel erupted between the parties.

6. In that all the appellants armed with wooden sticks(Lathies) assaulted Hetram (deceased). The occurrence was witnessed by the

first informant Ganga Ram (P.W.-1) as also Har Dayal (P.W.-2) alongwith Angan Lal and Mewa Ram (both not examined at the trial). As to his own presence, the first informant Ganga Ram (P.W.-1) narrated that he was harvesting Arum/Ghuinya on his field. Upon the witnesses objecting the appellants fled towards their house. The deceased received injuries on his head, ears, hand, feet and legs. He was placed on a bullock cart and was by taken to the Police Station. He died on way. The FIR is Ex. Ka-6 at the trial.

7. Upon such occurrence being reported, Sub- Inspector, Munna Lal, Investigation Officer (P.W.-4) recovered plain and blood stained earth from the place of occurrence, on 02.09.1980. That Recovery Memo is Ex. Ka-11 at the trial. Also, on 02.09.1980 at about 4:00 p.m. Inquest Report was prepared, which is Ex. Ka-2 at the trial. Thereafter, also on 3.9.1980 Dr. J.N. Bhargawa (P.W.6 at the trial) prepared the Autopsy Report of Hetram (deceased) which is Ex. Ka- 13 at the trial. In that the following injuries were noted: 2 “1- फटा हुआ घाव 1cm X 1cm सि(cid:11)र के ऊपर सि(cid:17)(cid:11)का direction anterior Posteriorly. 2- नीलगू निनशान 4cm X 3cm सि(cid:11)र के बाई ं तरफ बायें कान 6cm ऊपर। 3- फटा हुआ घाव 2cm X 1cm मां(cid:11) तक गहरा दाहनी छोटी उंगली के (cid:11)ामने दू(cid:11)रे पोर पर। 4- नीलगू खराश 2cm X 1cm बायें हाथ के बांह की तरफ कन्धे (cid:11)े 8cm नीचे। 5- खराश ½cm X 1/2cmcm X 1/2cm दाहने टांग पर घुटने (cid:11)े 6cm नीचे।" He further opined that the death of the deceased had been caused due to coma caused by head injury.

8. On completion of the investigation, Sub- Inspector Munna Lal, Investigation Officer (P.W.-4) submitted a charge-sheet. Cognizance was taken and the case committed for trial to the Court of Session. The following charge came to be framed against the appellants: “ That you all on 2.9.80 at about 12 noon in village Kalari within P.O. Cantt. Distt. Bareilly, in furtherance of your common intention did commit murder of Hetram, while intentionally or knowingly causing his death and you thereby committed an offence punishable U/s 302 IPC read with sec. 34 of the I.P.C. and within my cognizance.”

9. At the trial, besides the above described documentary evidence, the prosecution relied on oral evidence of six witnesses. The first informant Ganga Ram was examined as P.W.-1. He proved the lodging of the FIR. In that he stated that prior to the occurrence the cattle of Kallu Shah had damaged his crops. The deceased complained to Kallu Shah and his sons Zakir Shah and Saman Shah. On that hot talk arose between the parties. As to the occurrence, he proved that on the date of occurrence also, the cattle of the appellants had tresspassed 3 on the agricultural field of the first informant, while the deceased was working on his agricultural field. On objection being raised by the deceased, Kallu Shah, Zakir Shah and Saman Shah who were standing on the boundary/‘Medh’ of that agricultural field, entered into a verbal quarrel with the deceased. Thereafter, they assaulted the deceased with wooden sticks/ ‘lathies’.

10. As to his presence and being witness to the occurrence, he further narrated that he was present on his agricultural field a little to the south from the place of occurrence. He was harvesting Arum/‘Ghuinyan’. Also, he narrated upon Hetram raising an alarm, other villagers namely Har Dayal (P.W.-2), Angan Lal and Mewa Ram (both not examined at the trial), present on their agricultural fields, ran to his help. When those persons (including) Ganga Ram (P.W.-1) scolded the appellants, they stopped the assault and ran towards their house. Since Hetram (the deceased) had received numerous injuries, the witness Ganga Ram (P.W.-1) arranged a bullock cart. While he was taking the injured to the Police Station Izzat Nagar, he died on the way.

11. Next, Hardayal was examined as P.W.-2. First, he narrated that at 12 noon on the date of occurrence, he heard hot talk between the deceased Hetram and the present appellants wherein they were abusing each other. Hearing that he reached the place of occurrence along with Angan Lal, Mewa Lal and Ramji. He witnessed that the present appellants armed with wooden sticks/‘Lathies’ were assaulting Hetram ( the deceased). When the said witness and others raised an alarm, assailants/present appellants fled. Thereafter, the witness Hardayal alongwith others reached where Hetram (deceased) had been injured. They carried him to his house from the agricultural field. Later, he came to know that Hetram died on way to the police station. At no place, during his examination-in-chief the said witness tried to 4 establish the presence of Ganga Ram (P.W.-1) at the time and place of occurrence.

12. Thereafter, K.K. Sharma, S.I. was examined as P.W.-3. He proved the Inquest Report. Next S.I. Munna Lal, Investigating Officer was examined as P.W.-4. He proved the Recovery Memo and the investigation. Next, Constable Inder Singh was examined as P.W.-5. He proved the facts pertaining to transportation of the dead body to mortuary etc. Dr. J.N. Bhargawa who conducted the autopsy was examined as P.W.-6. He proved the injuries suffered by the deceased.

13. Thereafter statements of all the accused persons were recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. In that the present appellant suggested that the occurrence had been caused at another place near a culvert.

14. Thereafter, defence evidence was led. In that four witnesses were examined. First Sabir Shah another son of accused Kallu Shah and brother of the surviving appellants Zakir Shah was examined as D.W.-1. He tried to prove that the occurrence had been caused otherwise, for reason of obstruction caused to the flow of water in an irrigation drain, by the informant side. Also, he tried to prove that the occurrence was caused at another place near a culvert.

15. Ram Autar -Postman was examined as D.W.-2. He could not led any evidence to the benefit of the defence. Thereafter, Jhan Khan was examined as D.W.-3. He tried to prove that recovery of blood stained and plain earth was made from his agricultural field located to the south of a culvert. However, he did not make any statement as to the case/occurrence with respect to which such recovery may have been made. He also did not specify the name of police inspector/ personnel who may have made such recovery. Last, Nanhe Shah was examined 5 as D.W.-4. He tried to establish that the occurrence was caused otherwise.

16. On the basis of such evidence, the learned court below has convicted the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

17. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that no one has seen the occurrence. The presence of PW-1 has been doubted on the evidence of PW-2 who did not place Ganga Ram (PW-1) at the place of occurrence. On the contrary, he proved that he alongwith two other villagers intervened and stopped the assault. Further, he proved that those persons carried, the injured Hetram to his house. Thus, the prosecution itself putforth two versions with respect to what transpired immediately after the occurrence. On both counts there is absence of PW-1 in carrying the injured to his residence, after the occurrence, Therefore the Ganga Ram (PW-1) is unreliable.

18. Further, it has been stated that it is wholly unlikely that in a simple assault not involving lethal weapons, a young son would have remained a spectator to his father being assaulted with wooden sticks/ ‘Lathies’ i.e. non-lethal weapons. If Ganga Ram (PW-1) had been present at the place of occurrence, it would have been wholly natural to expect that he would have intervened first and strangers / other villagers would have arrived to intervene later.

19. Insofar as Har Dayal (PW-2) is concerned, his evidence has been doubted on the strength of his statement that he alongwith Aganlal and Mewa Ram carried the injured to his house. If such three able bodied persons had been present at the time of occurrence involving two parties both belonging to the same village, these four persons would have intervened to stop the assault or tried to save the 6 injured. On the contrary, during his cross examination the said witness admitted bad relations between him and the appellants inasmuch as he proved that the appellant Kallu Shah had supported his real brother of Kishni in an earlier dispute. It has been vehemently urged that Har Dayal (PW-2) is a wholly interested witness. He has deposed before the learned Court below only to take revenge on Kallu Shah for having supported his brother Kishni with whom the said witness had bad relations. In that regard, reference has also been made to the defence witness to contend that the occurrence was caused wholly otherwise near a culvert and not in the agricultural field of the deceased. Therefore, he is also an unreliable witness.

20. Alternatively, it has been submitted that in any case the occurrence may not travel beyond the ingredients of offence under Section 304 Part II. In fact the FIR was registered for that offence only. There is no allegation of assault caused with lethal weapons. There is no evidence of any particular injury caused by any particular accused. Relying on certain injury reports existing on the Case Diary, it has been contended that the appellant side had also received injuries which remained unexplained by the prosecution.

21. Therefore, in the context of lack of premeditation a sudden quarrel had erupted between the parties where no unfair advantage had been taken by the appellant side and there is no cruel behavior of the appellant. Therefore, the ingredient of offence under Section 300 read with Section 302 IPC are not made out.

22. On the issue of sentence, it has been further submitted that the appellant was very young on the date of occurrence. Though, he may not have remained confined for any substantial time, today, he is more than sixty five years of age with ill health. In that regard, learned counsel has also reminded the Court that the said appellant had 7 appeared on the last date pursuant to notices issued. He was unable to move freely, of his own. Therefore, in case he is found guilty, his physical condition of the appellant-Zakir Shah may be considered sympathetically.

23. On the other hand, learned AGA would submit that in the first place there is reason to doubt the presence of Ganga Ram (PW-1). He and the deceased being members of the same family being farmers. His presence in the agricultural field during day hours was wholly natural with his father. The defence did not lead effective cross- examination to doubt his presence.

24. In any case there is nothing to doubt the presence of Har Dayal (PW-2). He clearly proved that the occurrence had been caused by the appellants who were the aggressors. They assaulted the deceased in response to a simple oral objection raised with respect to cattle grazing over the agricultural field of the deceased.

25. Referring to the medical opinion, it has been contended that injury no.1 (noted above) was sufficient to cause death. Though the injuries claimed by the appellants side were never proved, in view of that defence set up, it can never be simultaneously contended by defence that the occurrence was not caused by the accused persons or was caused to the place of occurrence disclosed. Once the accused set up a defence that they came to be injured in the same occurrence, their presence and involvement is duly established.

26. Referring to the injury report relied by the defence, it has been submitted that those are wholly manufactured inasmuch as injury reports are of the date 03.09.1980 at about 07:15 PM and 07:30 PM 8 whereas the injuries were opined to have been caused half day earlier. Clearly those are manufactured injuries of which no benefit may be given to the defence. In absence of any injury suffered by the accused and further in view of such false defence set up which was not proven, undoubtedly the appellants are the aggressors.

27. Having heard counsel for the parties and having perused the records, the present is a case of direct evidence. Also in the context of time of occurrence 12:00 PM narrated in the FIR and close to the same time as set up by the defence, the FIR lodged at 03:30 PM the same day, is prompt especially considering the fact that occurrence took place in the year 1980 wherein parties may not have had access to quick modes of transport. By way of fact, it has been proven that the injured was being carried by bullock cart when he died on way to the police station. Therefore, the FIR is wholly prompt.

28. As to the recoveries of blood stained and plain soil made on

02.09.1980. No doubt has been raised. Though the defence sought to establish that the place of occurrence was different and in that regard tried to rely on recovery of blood stained earth from the field of Jhan Khan (DW-2), we reject that defence version in entirety inasmuch as the said witness did not prove that recovery as relevant to the present case-either with respect to the description of the occurrence or with reference to date and time of the recovery or with reference to the case number or the police personnel who have made that recovery. The said witness did not prove any material fact.

29. Therefore, the occurrence wherein the deceased sustained injuries has to be accepted as narrated by the prosecution i.e. on the agricultural field of the deceased at about 12:00 noon on 02.09.1980. 9

30. Coming to the substantive evidence about the manner of the occurrence, we have doubt in accepting the evidence of son of the deceased Ganga Ram (PW-1), inasmuch as though during his examination-in-chief, he offered an eye witness account of the occurrence but he did not make any effort to prove that he tried to intervene in the occurrence involving non-lethal weapons. Then during his cross-examination, he narrated that he reached the place of occurrence after he heard people shouting and quarreling. He further stated that he reached the place of occurrence after the assault was over. That part of his statement is contrary to his earlier statement that he was standing and he saw the assault from a short distance. Yet later, he again stated that he saw the occurrence from about 40 to 60 foot. However, it is the own case that he did not intervene in the occurrence. That is wholly unnatural.

31. Clearly, it appears, he reached the place of occurrence, after it got over. We may have examined his deposition a little more carefully but at present we find Hardayal (PW-2) made a different narration, that corroborates- Ganga Ram (P.W.-1) reached later and that the deceased (then injured) was carried to his house by others. In that, he completely denied the presence of Ganga Ram (PW-1) at the time and place of occurrence. Yet, he offered an eye witness account of the occurrence wherein he narrated that he got to know of the occurrence at the time when the deceased and the appellants were engaged in a verbal quarrel and they were hurling abuses at each other. At that point he along-with Aganlal, Mewalal and Ramji reached the place of occurrence. At that time he saw the present appellants assaulting the deceased with lathis. He also claimed that he along-with others raised an alarm. At that the assailants fled. Thereafter they carried the injured Hetram to his house. During his cross examination no doubt emerged to disbelieve his testimony or his presence. The defence was unable to contradict or doubt any part of the statement made by the witness to 10 any fact proven by the witness during his examination-in-chief, as to his presence at the place of occurrence while it has been caused or that he carried the injured Hetram to his house.

32. The fact that the prosecution did not examine three other persons, who were present, may not be relevant to doubt that the said witness was present and saw the assault and thereafter he ran up to help the injured Hetram. It leads us to accept the prosecution story as to the presence of the appellant at the time and place of occurrence. In absence of any other fact proven with respect to the nature of the claim of Kishni or falsity of that complaint etc., that fact does not doubt the credibility or the truthfulness of the said witnesses. He did not make any effort to make a false statement. Rather, he candidly admitted the fact.

33. Then, it was proven by the said witness that before the assault began, the parties were involved in a verbal quarrel wherein they were hurling abuses at each other. The context in which that quarrel has arisen was not proven. Though the prosecution witness narrated that all the appellants were involved in the assault and were causing injuries to the deceased with wooden sticks/'Lathies', he did not assign any specific role to any of the accused with respect to any particular injury. He did not specify which injury was caused by which accused. Yet, the defence also did not cross-examine the witness in that regard. Therefore, we find, the said witness had not only proven the occurrence but also the common intent of the assailants including the present appellant. We have no reason to take another view, in absence of any such cross-examination on that point.

34. What then survives for our consideration is, if the prosecution had been able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that the occurrence was a premeditated murder. Here, we find, doubts exist 11 inasmuch as on the strength of the evidence led by P.W.-2, it cannot be said that there was any strong motive pre-existing before the occurrence was caused. Second, what led to the oral quarrel wherein both parties started hurling abuses at each other, perhaps for reason of objection raised by the deceased to cattle of the assailants damaging the crops of the deceased. Though Ganga Ram (P.W.-1), the son of the deceased may not have been present at the time of the exact occurrence, he did suggest that fact occurrence preceded the verbal quarrel. Therefore, it has to be accepted that immediately before the occurrence was caused, a sudden quarrel had erupted between the parties at the spur of the moment for reason of cattle of the appellant having damaged the crops of the deceased. In that, sudden quarrel, the deceased came to be assaulted with wooden sticks/'Lathies' wherein he received one fatal injury on his head measuring 1 cm x 1 cm (on surface). That led to Coma and eventually the death of the deceased.

35. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Anbazhagan Vs. The State, Represented by the Inspector of Police, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 857, the Supreme Court has again made analysis and the difference between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Supreme Court summarized the principle as below: "66. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:- (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate:'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury 12 was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is 'guilty knowledge'. 13 (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five 14 exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of 15 the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC."

36. In view of the foregoing discussion, we find, the occurrence does not travel beyond the ingredients of offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. Therefore, the appellant Zakir Shah is found guilty of that offence, only. Neither premeditation nor cruel behaviour nor undue advantage taken by the appellant was proven at the trial. At the same time in the context of single fatal injury suffered by the deceased, (by unspecified accused), as sudden quarrel that led to heat of passion resultantly in the occurrence, was proven.

37. On the issue of sentence, as noted above, the occurrence was caused in the heat of the moment when the appellant may have been very young. Many years have passed since then. Today, the appellant is about 63 years of age. Though no positive finding is recorded in that regard but it did to us that he was facing partial difficulty in moving freely, on his own. However, he was in a position to stand and move on his own.

38. Considering the peculiarities of the appeal being brought up for hearing after 45 years as also considering the general health condition of the appellant-Zakir Shah, as observed by us, on the issue of sentence, we are of the considered view that he deserves to be sentenced commensurate to the occurrence that took place decades 16 ago and also considering his current age and health. Accordingly, he is awarded two years simple imprisonment with fine Rs. 20,000/-. In default, he shall undergo six months additional imprisonment.

39. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant-Zakir Shah is hereby modified from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 part II IPC and his sentence is modified from imprisonment for life to two years simple imprisonment with fine of Rs. 20,000/-. In default, he shall undergo six months additional imprisonment. The appellant- Zakir Shah is on bail. He is directed to surrender by 31.08.2025 and serve the remaining sentence as he may have undergone incarceration only for one and half month.

40. Let a copy of this order along with trial court record be transmitted to the court concerned. Compliance report shall be submitted by the court concerned within a period of two months from today. The same shall be kept on record. Order Date :- 16.7.2025 Akbar ( Madan Pal Singh,J.) (Saumitra Dayal Singh,J.) 17