Smt. Basanti Devi vs Heard Mr. Jagdish Singh Bisht, Advocate

learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that the lower appellate court has only considered the hardship of the landlord, but has nowhere considered the hardship of the tenant nor has 4 evaluated the hardship of the landlord vis-(cid:224)-vis the tenant, and submitted that, since the hardship of the tenant was not considered, the order of the lower appellate court was liable to be set aside in view of the proviso to Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at some length, the Court finds that the submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not tenable. A perusal of the impugned order as well as the application of the landlord under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act, clearly reveals that the landlord had originally occupied a room after having it vacated from the tenant Sumer Chandra, and since the same could not be utilized for residential purpose, the landlord had sold it to the same tenant Sumer Chandra, who converted the said room into a workshop, and consequently, the said room was no longer available with the landlord for the growing need of his sons. Further, the Court finds that these facts had been stated by the landlord in his release application and that, the room was sold to the said tenant much prior to the filing of the release application. Consequently, the tenant cannot raise a ground that the said room could be utilized by the landlord, when it is a clear case that the room was no longer available with the landlord. The Court finds that the appellate court has categorically given a finding that the landlord had two rooms for his use; one room for himself, and one room for his parents, and required an additional room for the growing sons. The Court finds that the lower appellate court was justified in 5 holding that there existed a bonafide need for the growing need of the sons of the landlord. This finding, in my opinion, is based on appreciation of facts, which is not perverse, and consequently, cannot be interfered with in a writ jurisdiction. On the question of comparative hardship, the Court finds that no steps had been taken by the tenant in all these years to make available an alternate accommodation. The only ground urged was that she does not have sufficient funds to take another accommodation on rent. The Court finds that the petitioner has nowhere denied the fact that the son of the petitioner had acquired a residential accommodation. In view of the aforesaid, the Court is of the opinion that the comparative hardship was more in favour of the landlord than in favour of the tenant. In view of the aforesaid, the Court does not find any error in the impugned order. The writ petition fails and is dismissed. 30-08-2010 Salim/ (Tarun Agarwala, J.)