TRF Lt d v. Energo Engg. Proj ect s Lt d

“ 18. The issue was discussed and decided by t his Court as under: ( TRF Lt d. vs. Energo Engg. Proj ect s Lt d., ( 2017) 8 SCC 377) : 50. First , we shall deal wit h Clause ( d) . There is no quarrel t hat by virt ue of Sect ion 12( 5) of t he Act , if any person who falls under any of t he cat egories specified in t he Sevent h t he Schedule shall be arbit rat or. There t he language em ployed in t he Sevent h Schedule, t he Managing ineligible by t he Corporat ion has becom e Direct or of operat ion of law. I t is t he st and of t he learned Senior Counsel for t he appellant t hat once t he Managing Direct or becom es ineligible, he also becom es ineligible t o nom inat e. Refut ing t he said st and, it is canvassed by t he learned Senior Counsel for t he respondent t hat t he ineligibilit y t he cannot ext end Corporat ion and m ore so when t here is apposit e and requisit e disclosure. We t hink it appropriat e t o m ake it clear t hat in t he case at hand we are neit her concerned wit h t he disclosure nor obj ect ivit y nor im part ialit y nor any such ot her circum st ance. We are singularly concerned wit h t he t he Managing Direct or, aft er becom ing issue, whet her ineligible by operat ion of law, is he st ill eligible t o nom inat e an arbit rat or. At t he cost of repet it ion, we m ay st at e t hat t wo part ies, one m ay nom inat e an arbit rat or and t he ot her m ay appoint anot her. That is alt oget her a different sit uat ion. I f t here is a clause requiring t he part ies t o nom inat e t heir respect ive arbit rat or, t heir aut horit y t o nom inat e cannot be quest ioned. What really in t hat circum st ance can be called t he procedural com pliance and t he eligibilit y of t heir arbit rat or depending upon t he norm s provided under t he Act and t he Schedules appended t heret o. But , here is a case where t he t o a nom inee in quest ion t here are is not if he 3 rulings 41( 1) of t he said t hat where t he one decided by t he Board delegat ed Managing Direct or is t he “ nam ed sole arbit rat or” and he has also been conferred wit h t he power t o nom inat e one who can be t he arbit rat or in his place. Thus, t here is subt le dist inct ion. I n t his regard, our at t ent ion has been drawn t o a t wo- Judge Bench decision in St at e of Orissa v. Com m r. of Land Records & Set t lem ent ( 1998) 7 SCC 162. I n t he said case, t he quest ion arose, can t he Board of Revenue revise t he order passed by it s delegat e. Dwelling upon t he said proposit ion, t he Court held: ( SCC p. 173, para 25) “ 25. We have t o not e t hat t he Com m issioner when he t o him exercises power of under Sect ion 33 of t he Set t lem ent Act , 1958, t he order passed by him is t o be t reat ed as an order of t he Board of Revenue and not as t hat of t he Com m issioner in his capacit y as Com m issioner. This posit ion is clear from t wo rulings of t his Court t o which we shall present ly refer. The first of t he Const it ut ion Bench of t his Court in Roop Chand v. St at e of Punj ab AI R 1963 SC 1503. I n t hat case, it was held by t he m aj orit y t he St at e Governm ent had, t he East Punj ab Holdings under Sect ion ( Consolidat ion and Prevent ion of Fragm ent at ion) Act , 1948, delegat ed it s appellat e powers vest ed in it under Sect ion 21( 4) t o an “ officer” , an order passed by such an officer was an order passed by t he St at e Governm ent it self and t his Act ” “ not an order passed by any officer under t he St at e wit hin Sect ion 42 and was not revisable by Governm ent . I t was point ed out t hat for t he purpose of exercise of powers of revision by t he St at e under Sect ion 42 of t hat Act , t he order sought t o be revised m ust be an order passed by an officer in his own right and not as a delegat e of t he St at e. The St at e Governm ent was, t herefore, not ent it led under Sect ion 42 t o call for t he records of t he case which was disposed of by an officer act ing as it s delegat e.” ( em phasis in original) 51. Be it not ed in t he said case, reference was m ade t o Behari Kunj Sahkari Awas Sam it i v. St at e of U.P. ( 1997) 7 SCC 37, which followed t he decision in Roop Chand v. St at e of Punj ab AI R 1963 SC 1503. I t is seem ly t o not e here t hat t he said principle has been followed in I ndore Vikas Pradhikaran vs. Pure I ndust rial Coke and Chem icals Lim it ed ( 2007) 8 SCC 705. 52. Mr Sundaram has st rongly relied on Prat apchand Nopaj i vs. Kot rike Venkat a Set t y & Sons ( 1975) 2 SCC 208. I n t he said case, t he t hree- Judge Bench applied t he m axim “ qui facit per alium facit per se” . We m ay profit ably reproduce t he passage: ( SCC p. 214, para 9) “ 9. … The principle which would apply, if t he obj ect s are st ruck by Sect ion 23 of em bodied in t he m axim : “ qui facit per alium facit per t he Cont ract Act , 4 illegal act wit hin se” ( what one does t hrough anot her is done by oneself) . To put it in anot her form , t hat which cannot be done direct ly m ay not be done indirect ly by engaging anot her out side t he prohibit ed area t o do t he im m at erial whet her, for t he doing of such an illegal act , t he agent em ployed is given t he wider powers or aut horit y of t he “ pucca adat ia” , or, as t he High Court had held, he is clot hed wit h t he powers of an ordinary com m ission agent only.” t he prohibit ed area. I t

53. The aforesaid aut horit ies have been com m ended t o us t o est ablish t he proposit ion t hat if t he nom inat ion of an arbit rat or by an ineligible arbit rat or is allowed, it would t ant am ount t o carrying on t he proceeding of arbit rat ion by him self. According t o t he learned counsel for t he appellant , ineligibilit y st rikes at t he root of his power t o arbit rat e or get it arbit rat ed upon by a nom inee. 54. I n such a cont ext , t he fulcrum of t he cont roversy would be, can an ineligible arbit rat or, like t he Managing Direct or, nom inat e an arbit rat or, who m ay be ot herwise eligible and a respect able person. As st at ed earlier, we are neit her concerned wit h individual t he obj ect ivit y nor respect abilit y. We are only concerned wit h t he aut horit y or t he power of t he Managing Direct or. By our analysis, we are obligat ed t o arrive at t he conclusion t hat once t he arbit rat or has becom e ineligible by operat ion of law, he cannot nom inat e anot her as an arbit rat or. The arbit rat or becom es ineligible as per prescript ion cont ained in Sect ion 12( 5) of t he Act . I t is inconceivable in law t hat person who is st at ut orily ineligible can nom inat e a person. Needless t o say, once t he infrast ruct ure collapses, t he superst ruct ure is bound t o collapse. One cannot have a building wit hout t he plint h. Or t o put it different ly, once t he ident it y of t he Managing Direct or as t he sole arbit rat or is lost , t he power t o nom inat e som eone else as an arbit rat or is oblit erat ed. Therefore, t he view expressed by t he High Court is not sust ainable and we say so.” t he

19. I t was t hus held t hat as t he Managing Direct or becam e ineligible by operat ion of law t o act as an arbit rat or, he could not nom inat e anot her person t o act as an arbit rat or and t hat once t he ident it y of t he Managing Direct or as t he sole arbit rat or was lost , t he power t o nom inat e som eone else as an arbit rat or was also oblit erat ed. The relevant Clause in said case had nom inat ed t he Managing Direct or him self t o be t he sole arbit rat or and also em powered said Managing Direct or t o nom inat e anot her person t o act as an arbit rat or. The Managing Direct or t hus had t wo capacit ies under said Clause, t he first as an arbit rat or and t he second as an appoint ing aut horit y. I n t he present case we are concerned wit h only one capacit y of t he Chairm an and Managing Direct or and t hat is as an appoint ing aut horit y. 5 I n t he basis t he disput e, t aken t o be

20. We t hus have t wo cat egories of cases. The first , sim ilar t o t he one dealt wit h in TRF Li m i t e d where t he Managing Direct or him self is nam ed as an arbit rat or wit h an addit ional power t o appoint any ot her person as an arbit rat or. t he second cat egory, t he Managing Direct or is not t o act as an arbit rat or him self but is em powered or aut horised t o appoint any ot her person of his choice or discret ion as an arbit rat or. I f, in t he first cat egory of cases, t he Managing Direct or was found incom pet ent , it was because of t he int erest t hat he would be said t o be having in t he out com e or result of t he disput e. The elem ent of invalidit y would t hus be direct ly relat able t o and arise from t he int erest t hat he would be having in such out com e or decision. I f t hat be t he t est , sim ilar invalidit y would always arise and spring even in t he second cat egory of cases. I f t he int erest t hat he has in t he out com e of t he possibilit y of bias, it will always be present irrespect ive of whet her t he m at t er st ands under t he first or second cat egory of cases. We are conscious t hat if such deduct ion is drawn from t he decision of t his Court in TRF Li m i t e d , all cases having clauses sim ilar t o t hat wit h which we are present ly concerned, a part y t o t he agreem ent would be disent it led t o m ake any appoint m ent of an Arbit rat or on it s own and it would always be available t o argue t hat a part y or an official or an aut horit y having int erest in t he disput e would be disent it led t o m ake appoint m ent of an Arbit rat or. 21. But , in our view t hat has t o be t he logical deduct ion from TRF Li m i t e d . Paragraph 50 of t he decision shows t hat t his Court was concerned wit h t he issue, “ whet her t he Managing Direct or, aft er becom ing ineligible by operat ion of law, is he st ill eligible t o nom inat e an Arbit rat or” The ineligibilit y referred t o t herein, was as a result of operat ion of law, in t hat a person having an int erest in t he disput e or in t he out com e or decision t hereof, m ust not only be ineligible t o act as an arbit rat or but m ust also not be eligible t o appoint anyone else as an arbit rat or and t hat such person cannot and should not have any role in chart ing out any course t o t he disput e resolut ion by having t he power t o appoint an arbit rat or. The next sent ences in t he paragraph, furt her show t hat cases where bot h t he part ies could nom inat e respect ive arbit rat ors of t heir choice were found t o be com plet ely a different sit uat ion. The reason is clear t hat what ever advant age a part y m ay derive by nom inat ing an arbit rat or of it s choice would get count er balanced by equal power wit h t he ot her part y. But , in a case where only one part y has a right t o appoint a sole arbit rat or, it s choice will always have an elem ent of exclusivit y in det erm ining or chart ing resolut ion. t he course Nat urally, t he person who has an int erest in t he out com e or decision of t he disput e m ust not have t he power t o appoint a sole arbit rat or. That has t o be t aken as t he essence of t he t he Arbit rat ion and Conciliat ion am endm ent s brought for disput e in by 6 ( Am endm ent ) Act , 2015 ( 3 of 2016) and recognised by t he decision of t his Court in TRF Lim it ed. 22. We m ust also at t his st age refer t o t he following observat ions m ade by t his Court in para 48 of it s decision in I ndian Oil Corpn. Lt d. v. Raj a Transport ( P) Lt d. ( 2009) 8 SCC 520, which were in t he cont ext t hat was obt aining before Act 3 of 2016 had com e int o force: - I n t he light of t he dat e of t he Act cont aining t he above discussion, t he scope t he schem e of “ 48. of Sect ion 11 of appoint m ent of arbit rat ors m ay be sum m arised t hus: ( i) Where t he agreem ent provides for arbit rat ion wit h t hree arbit rat ors ( each part y t o appoint one arbit rat or and t he t wo appoint ed arbit rat ors t o appoint a t hird arbit rat or) , in t he event of a part y failing t o appoint an arbit rat or wit hin 30 days from t he receipt of a request from t he ot her part y ( or t he t wo nom inat ed arbit rat ors failing t o agree on t he t hird arbit rat or wit hin 30 days t he t he Chief Just ice or his designat e will appoint m ent ) , exercise power under sub- sect ion ( 4) of Sect ion 11 of t he Act . ( ii) Where t he agreem ent provides for arbit rat ion by a sole arbit rat or and t he part ies have not agreed upon any appoint m ent procedure, t he Chief Just ice or his designat e will exercise power under sub- sect ion ( 5) of Sect ion 11, if t he part ies fail t o agree on t he arbit rat ion wit hin t hirt y days from t he receipt of a request by a part y from t he ot her part y. ( iii) Where t he appoint m ent procedure, t hen irrespect ive of whet her t he arbit rat ion is by a sole arbit rat or or by a t hree- m em ber Tribunal, t he Chief Just ice or his designat e will exercise power under sub- sect ion ( 6) of Sect ion 11, if a part y fails t o act as required under t he agreed procedure ( or t he part ies or t he t wo appoint ed arbit rat ors fail t o reach an agreem ent expect ed of t hem under t he agreed procedure or any person/ inst it ut ion fails t o perform any funct ion ent rust ed t o him / it under t hat procedure) . ( iv) While failure of t he ot her part y t o act wit hin 30 days t he part y seeking arbit rat ion t o approach t he Chief Just ice or his designat e in cases falling under sub- sect ions ( 4) and ( 5) , such a t im e- ( 6) requirem ent t he agreed of Sect ion 11. The procedure wit hin t he arbit rat ion agreem ent , or in t he absence of any prescribed t he t im e- lim it , wit hin a aggrieved part y t o file a pet it ion under Sect ion 11( 6) of t he Act . ( v) Where t he appoint m ent procedure has been agreed bet ween t he part ies, but t he cause of act ion for invoking t he arbit rat ion agreem ent specifies furnish a cause of act ion t im e- lim it prescribed by t im e, will enable is not failure t o act as per in sub- sect ion reasonable t he t o 7 t he j urisdict ion of t he Chief Just ice or his designat e under clauses ( a) , ( b) or ( c) of sub- sect ion ( 6) has not arisen, t hen t he quest ion of t he Chief Just ice or his designat e exercising power under sub- sect ion ( 6) does not arise. The condit ion precedent for approaching t he Chief Just ice or his designat e for t aking necessary m easures under sub- sect ion ( 6) is t hat ( i) a part y failing t o act as required under t he agreed appoint m ent procedure; or ( ii) t he part ies ( or t he t wo appoint ed arbit rat ors) failing t o reach an agreem ent expect ed of t hem under t he agreed appoint m ent procedure; or ( iii) a person/ inst it ut ion who has been ent rust ed wit h appoint m ent t he procedure, failing t o perform such funct ion. funct ion agreed ( vi) The Chief Just ice or his designat e while exercising power under sub- sect ion ( 6) of Sect ion 11 shall endeavour t o give effect t o t he appoint m ent procedure prescribed in t he arbit rat ion clause. ( vii) I f circum st ances exist , giving rise t o j ust ifiable doubt s as t o t he independence and im part ialit y of t he person nom inat ed, or if ot her circum st ances warrant appoint m ent of an independent arbit rat or by ignoring t he procedure prescribed, t he Chief Just ice or his designat e m ay, for reasons t o be recorded ignore t he designat ed arbit rat or and appoint som eone else.” t o t he j ust ifiable doubt s as ( em phasis in original) 23. Sub para ( vii) of aforesaid paragraph 48 lays down t hat if t here are independence and im part ialit y of t he person nom inat ed, and if ot her circum st ances warrant appoint m ent of an independent arbit rat or by ignoring t he procedure prescribed, such appoint m ent can be m ade by t he Court . I t m ay also be not ed t hat on t he issue of necessit y and desirabilit y of im part ial and independent arbit rat ors t he m at t er was considered by t he Law Com m ission in it s report No.246. Paragraphs 53 t o 60 under t he heading “ Neut ralit y of Arbit rat ors” are quot ed in t he Judgm ent of t his Court in Voest apline Schienen Gm bh v. Delhi Met ro Rail Corpn. Lt d. ( 2017) 4 SCC 665, while paras 59 and 60 of t he report st and ext ract ed in t he decision of t his Court in Bharat Broadband Net work Lim it ed vs. Unit ed Telecom s Lim it ed ( 2019) 5 SCC 755. For t he present purposes, we m ay rely on paragraph 57, which is t o t he following effect : - t he lat t er by “ 57. …The balance bet ween procedural fairness and binding nat ure of t hese cont ract s, appears t o have been t ilt ed in favour of t he Com m ission believes t he present posit ion of law is far from sat isfact ory. Since im part ialit y and independence cannot be discarded at any st age of t he proceedings, specifically at t he st age of const it ut ion of t he Arbit ral Tribunal, it would be incongruous t o say t hat part y t he Suprem e Court , and t he principles of 8 t he ex officio m em ber of aut onom y can be exercised in com plet e disregard of t hese principles—even if t he sam e has been agreed prior t o t he disput es having arisen bet ween t he part ies. There are cert ain m inim um levels of independence and im part ialit y t hat should be required of t he arbit ral process regardless of t he part ies’ apparent agreem ent . A sensible law cannot , for inst ance, perm it appoint m ent of an arbit rat or who him self a part y t o t he disput e, or who is em ployed by ( or sim ilarly dependent on) one part y, even if t his is what t he part ies agreed. The Com m ission hast ens t o add t hat Mr t he Law P.K. Malhot ra, Com m ission suggest ed having an except ion for t he St at e, and allow St at e part ies t o appoint em ployee arbit rat ors. The Com m ission is of t he opinion t hat , on t his issue, t here cannot be any dist inct ion bet ween St at e and non- St at e part ies. The concept of part y aut onom y cannot be st ret ched t o a point where it negat es t he very basis of having im part ial and independent adj udicat ors for resolut ion of disput es. I n fact , when t he part y appoint ing an adj udicat or im part ial and independent adj udicat or is t hat m uch m ore onerous — and t he right t o nat ural j ust ice cannot be said t o have been waived only on t he basis of a “ prior” agreem ent bet ween t he part ies at t he t im e of t he cont ract and before arising of t he disput es.” t o appoint an t he St at e, t he dut y ( em phasis in original) 24. I n Vo e st a l p i n e , t his Court dealt wit h independence and im part ialit y of t he arbit rat or as under: t he t his int o reason ent ered t hat not wit hst anding “ 20. I ndependence and im part ialit y of t he arbit rat or are t he hallm arks of any arbit rat ion proceedings. Rule against bias is one of t he fundam ent al principles of nat ural j ust ice which applied t o all j udicial and quasi- j udicial proceedings. I t is t hat relat ionship bet ween t he part ies t o t he arbit rat ion and t he arbit rat ors t hem selves are cont ract ual in nat ure and t he source of an arbit rat or’s appoint m ent is deduced from t he part ies, agreem ent not wit hst anding t he sam e non- independence and non- im part ialit y of such arbit rat or ( t hough cont ract ually agreed t he upon) would arbit rat ion. The genesis behind t his rat ional is t hat even when an arbit rat or is appoint ed in t erm s of cont ract and by t he part ies t o t he cont ract , he is independent of t he part ies. Funct ions and dut ies require him t o rise above t he part isan int erest of t he part ies and not t o act in, or so as t o furt her, t he t he part icular arbit rat or has adj udicat ory role t o perform and, t herefore, he m ust be independent of part ies as well as im part ial. The Unit ed Kingdom Suprem e Court has beaut ifully highlight ed int erest of eit her part ies. Aft er all, render him t o conduct ineligible bet ween t he 9 t his aspect in Hashwani v. Jivraj ( 2011) 1 WLR 1872 in t he following words: ( WLR p. 1889, para 45) “ 45. … t he dom inant purpose of appoint ing an arbit rat or or arbit rat ors is t he im part ial resolut ion of t he disput e bet ween t he part ies in accordance wit h t he t he t erm s of cont ract bet ween t he arbit rat ors would be a cont ract for t he provision of personal services, t hey were not personal services under t he direct ion of t he part ies.” t he agreem ent and, alt hough t he part ies and

21. Sim ilarly, Cour de Cassat ion, France, in a j udgm ent delivered in 1972 in Consort s Ury vs. SA des Galeries Lafayet t e, Cass. 2e civ., 13- 4- 1972, JCP, Pt . I I , No. 17189 ( 1972) ( France) , underlined t hat : im part ialit y are “ an independent m ind is indispensable in t he exercise of j udicial power, what ever t he source of t hat power m ay be, and it is one of t he essent ial qualit ies of an arbit rat or.” I ndependence and

22. t wo different concept s. An arbit rat or m ay be independent and yet , lack im part ialit y, or vice versa. I m part ialit y, as is well accept ed, is a m ore subj ect ive concept as com pared t o independence. I ndependence, which is m ore an obj ect ive concept , m ay, t hus, be m ore st raight forwardly ascert ained by t he part ies at t he out set of t he arbit rat ion proceedings in light of t he circum st ances disclosed by t he arbit rat or, while part ialit y will m ore likely surface during t he arbit rat ion proceedings. * * * t o in order t o send posit ive signals t he 30. Tim e has com e t o creat e int ernat ional business com m unit y, healt hy arbit rat ion environm ent and conducive arbit rat ion cult ure in t his count ry. Furt her, as highlight ed by t he Law Com m ission also in it s report , dut y becom es m ore onerous in governm ent cont ract s, where one of t he part ies t o t he disput e is t he Governm ent or public sect or undert aking it self and t he aut horit y t o appoint t he arbit rat or rest s wit h it . I n t he inst ant case also, t hough choice is given by DMRC t o t o choose an arbit rat or from t he panel prepared by DMRC. I t , t herefore, becom es im perat ive t o have a m uch broadbased panel, so t hat t hat principle of im part ialit y and independence would be discarded at any t he st age of st age of const it ut ion of t he Arbit ral Tribunal. We, t herefore, direct t hat DMRC shall prepare a broadbased panel on t he aforesaid lines, wit hin a period of t wo m ont hs from t oday.” t he proceedings, specially at is no m isapprehension t he opposit e part y but lim it ed t here

27. I t m ay be not ed here t hat t he aforesaid view of t he Designat ed Judge in Walt er Bau AG vs. Municipal Corporat ion of Great er Mum bai ( 2015) 3 SCC 800 was pressed int o service on t he opinion behalf of in TRF Li m i t e d and t he appellant 10 expressed by consonance wit h t he binding aut horit ies of t his Court . I t was observed: - t he Designat ed Judge was t o be “ 32. Mr Sundaram , learned Senior Counsel for t he appellant has also drawn inspirat ion from t he j udgm ent passed by t he Designat ed Judge of t his Court in W a l t e r Ba u A G, where t he learned Judge, aft er referring t o Ant rix Corpn. Lt d vs. Devas Mult im edia ( P) Lt d. ( 2014) 11 SCC 560, dist inguished t he sam e and also dist inguished t he aut horit y in Pricol Lt d. v. Johnson Cont rols Ent erprise Lt d. ( 2015) 4 SCC 177 and cam e t o hold t hat : ( Walt er Bau AG case3, SCC p. 806, para 10) j urisdict ion under Sect ion 11( 6) of “ 10. Unless t he appoint m ent of t he arbit rat or is ex facie valid and such appoint m ent sat isfies t he Court exercising t he Arbit rat ion Act , accept ance of such appoint m ent as a fait accom pli t o debar t he j urisdict ion under Sect ion 11( 6) cannot be count enanced in law. …” 33. We m ay t he opinion t hat expressed in t he aforesaid case is in consonance wit h t o t he binding aut horit ies we have hereinbefore.” I n TRF Li m i t e d , t he Managing Direct or of im m ediat ely st at e referred

28. t he respondent had nom inat ed a form er Judge of t his Court as sole arbit rat or in t erm s of aforesaid Clause 33( d) , aft er t he appellant had preferred an applicat ion under Sect ion 11( 5) read wit h Sect ion 11( 6) of t he Act . The plea was rej ect ed by t he appeal t herefrom on t he issue whet her t he Managing Direct or could nom inat e an arbit rat or was decided in favour of t he appellant as st at ed hereinabove. As regards t he issue about fresh appoint m ent , t his Court rem anded t he m at t er t o t he High Court for fresh considerat ion as is discernible from para 55 of t he Judgm ent . I n t he light of t hese aut horit ies t here is no hindrance in ent ert aining t he inst ant applicat ion preferred by t he Applicant s.” t he High Court and

6. Per cont ra, learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 t o 4 would place reliance on t he ruling of t he Hon’ble Apex Court rendered in S.P. Si n g l a Co n st r u ct i o n s Pr i v a t e Li m i t e d v s. St a t e o f H i m a ch a l Pr a d e sh a n d a n o t h e r report ed in ( 2 0 1 9 ) 2 SCC 4 8 8 . 11

7. The law declared by t he Hon’ble Apex Court in Pe r k i n s Ea st m a n A r ch i t e ct s D PC ( supra) is subsequent t o t he pronouncem ent in S.P. Si n g l a Co n st r u ct i o n s Pr i v a t e Li m i t e d ( supra) . That apart , t he law, as declared by t he Coordinat e Bench of t he Hon’ble Apex Court , cont inues t o hold t he field.

8. I n t hat view of t he m at t er, t his Court sees no m erit in t he cont ent ion canvassed by learned counsel for respondent Nos. 2 t o 4.

9. I n t hat view of t he m at t er, t he Applicat ion is allowed.

10. On query, bot h t he learned counsel would suggest t hat t he disput e m ay be referred for arbit rat ion by appoint ing Sri B.S. Verm a, a ret ired Judge of t his High Court as t he sole arbit rat or.

12. The subm issions are placed on record. Mr. Just ice B.S. Verm a ( Ret ired) is, hereby, appoint ed t o act as an Arbit rat or t o adj udicat e t he disput e t hat have arisen bet ween t he part ies.

13. Let a copy of t his order be com m unicat ed t o Mr. B.S. Verm a ( Ret ired Judge) , High Court of Ut t arakhand, House No. 1386 ( New) , 432/ 38 ( Old) , Civil Lines, Roorkee, Dist rict Haridw ar. 12

16. The Applicat ion st ands disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order as t o cost s. I n sequel t heret o, all pending Applicat ions st and disposed of. Dt : 7 t h January, 2025 Rat hour PRAVINDRA S RATHOUR DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=23699ccc2fd40ad81b6fd13323779 d9e3aeb1097d17dbb53d481cabd25946eed , postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=1F65499E931DF71CDAF92A 40CC6179B8E010331BA695239171F906FD5 C45C4E8, cn=PRAVINDRA S RATHOUR _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ G. N A REN D A R, C.J. 13