HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL v. Mr. Sahil Mullick, Advocate for the

The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner, Balmer Lawrie Van Leer Ltd., is a public limited company engaged in the manufacture of plastic containers for industrial and allied use, operating an industrial unit at Selaqui, Dehradun. The respondent, Sunil Kumar 1 Prajapati, joined the petitioner-company on 07.02.2013 as Officer-Commercial, a position which he duly accepted in writing. He was subsequently confirmed in service w.e.f.

01.03.2014. His responsibilities encompassed a range of administrative and supervisory functions, including control over H.R. functions, accounts, dispatch and store-related activities. Over time, his salary increased from ₹14,629/- to ₹27,491/- per month, and he also enjoyed various benefits and reimbursements which were not available to the workmen category. Owing to business exigencies and operational requirements at the petitioner’s Chennai plant, the respondent was transferred from the Dehradun unit to the Chennai unit with effect from 04.05.2019 by order dated 02.05.2019, a transfer in consonance with Clause 11(b) of his appointment letter, which expressly provided that his services were transferable to any department, office, establishment or unit of the company anywhere in India or abroad. While the transfer letter required him to join at Chennai by 09.05.2019, he repeatedly sought extensions of time and expressed inability to join on grounds of ill-health, paucity of time and family commitments. The petitioner, granted extensions and repeatedly advised him to join by 20.05.2019. However, despite multiple reminders dated 09.05.2019, 10.05.2019,

27.05.2019 and others, the respondent did not report at the transferred location. Even thereafter, the respondent remained absent without authorization, prompting the Chennai management to issue “Non-Reporting for Duty” notices on 24.06.2019 and 06.07.2019, reminding him of his prolonged unauthorized absence. In response, the respondent categorically communicated, vide email dated

06.07.2019, that he would not report at the Chennai unit.

3. Consequently, the petitioner initiated domestic enquiry proceedings and served a charge-sheet dated 2 09.08.2019, alleging willful disobedience of lawful orders, habitual absence without leave, and misconduct under the applicable standing orders. The respondent’s explanation dated 21.08.2019 reiterated his refusal to join and cited personal commitments. He was thereafter served with a notice of enquiry dated 15.11.2019, duly apprised of his rights, including the right to present evidence and cross- examine management witnesses, and was warned that non- participation would lead to ex parte proceedings. Despite this, the respondent refused to participate in the enquiry vide letter dated 19.11.2019. The enquiry was accordingly conducted ex parte in accordance with the principles of natural justice by an independent Enquiry Officer, who filed a report dated 23.12.2019 concluding that all charges against the respondent stood proved. The management thereafter concurred with findings. Instead of complying with the transfer or challenging it before an appropriate forum, the respondent approached the Deputy Labour Commissioner, who passed the impugned Reference Order under Section 4-K, leading to Adjudication Case No.7 of 2021 before the Labour Court, Dehradun. It is this reference that the petitioner seeks to challenge before this Court.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned reference order dated 30.03.2021 issued under Section 4-K of the Act is wholly without jurisdiction and legally unsustainable, as the respondent does not fall within the statutory definition of “workman” under Section 2(z). It is asserted that the respondent, appointed as Officer-Commercial, was entrusted with administrative and supervisory functions, including control over subordinate staff, accounts, H.R.-related work, dispatch and store management and was drawing salary and benefits incompatible with the workman category. Consequently, 3 initiation of an industrial dispute at his behest is, according to the petitioner, a legal impossibility, rendering the Deputy Labour Commissioner’s assumption of jurisdiction fundamentally flawed.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the entire cause of action arose exclusively at Chennai, Tamil Nadu, where the respondent was lawfully transferred under Clause 11(b) of the appointment letter. Despite repeated opportunities and extended joining dates, the respondent categorically refused to join the Chennai unit, as admitted in his email dated 06.07.2019. This compelled the petitioner to issue notices of unauthorized absence and, subsequently, to conduct a disciplinary enquiry. The enquiry, conducted after the respondent declined to participate, resulted in a reasoned report dated

23.12.2019 finding all charges proved, following which a show-cause notice was issued and, upon receiving no reply, a dismissal order dated 23.01.2020 was passed, all from Chennai.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that, despite these undisputed facts, the respondent fabricated a narrative before the Labour Authorities at Dehradun, alleging clerical duties, harassment, mala fide transfer, and coercion to resign, allegations contradicted by documentary evidence. The Deputy Labour Commissioner, it is alleged, mechanically referred the dispute without considering that no part of the cause of action arose within Uttarakhand and without addressing the petitioner’s objection to territorial jurisdiction. It is asserted that a delegated authority in Uttarakhand cannot refer a dispute arising wholly outside the State, rendering the reference null and void. The Labour Court’s subsequent orders dated

14.02.2024 and 06.10.2025 refusing to treat territorial 4 jurisdiction as a preliminary issue are also challenged as contrary to the decision in V.G. Jagdishan Vs. Indofos Industries Ltd., 2022 LLR 827, which emphasizes the need to decide jurisdictional objections at the threshold.

7. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Labour Court erred in rejecting Review Application No.43-C on the erroneous assumption that review is impermissible under the Act. The petitioner argues that limited review is maintainable correct patent jurisdictional or procedural errors. It is further submitted that the respondent’s dismissal after a disciplinary enquiry does not amount to retrenchment, making Section 6-E inapplicable, and that the respondent has been gainfully employed thereafter. The continuation of proceedings at Dehradun despite inherent lack of jurisdiction is described as an abuse of process, warranting quashing of the reference order and all consequential proceedings under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

8. Having heard the arguments advanced by counsel for the petitioner and after perusal of the material on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that no ground is made out for interference with the reference order dated 30.03.2021 or with the subsequent interlocutory orders of the Labour Court.

9. At the outset, it is well settled that a reference under Section 4-K of the Act is an administrative act. The appropriate Government is not required to conclusively determine disputed questions such as whether the employee is a “workman,” whether the disciplinary enquiry is valid, or whether territorial jurisdiction is ultimately established. These are mixed questions of fact and law which require the parties to lead evidence before the 5 Labour Court. The Supreme Court in Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 189, has clearly held that the correctness or propriety of a reference cannot be examined in writ jurisdiction unless the reference is patently absurd or without any factual foundation, a circumstance not present here. This Court also finds no merit in the contention that the respondent is not a “workman.” Determination of “workman” status depends upon the actual nature of duties performed, the degree of supervisory or managerial control, and the extent of discretion exercised. These factual aspects cannot be adjudicated in summary proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. The Labour Court is the proper forum to assess evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and determine whether the respondent falls within the statutory definition under Section 2(z) of the Act. Accordingly, the question is left open to be decided during adjudication, and this Court refrains from entering into that arena.

10. As regards territorial jurisdiction, this Court is not persuaded that jurisdiction lies exclusively at Chennai. The Act is silent on the issue of territorial competence; therefore, the principles underlying Section 20 C.P.C. - that proceedings may be instituted where the defendant resides, carries on business, or where the cause of action wholly or in part arise, are applicable. This Court is guided by the principle laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 711, wherein it was held that territorial jurisdiction at the threshold is examined on the basis of the averments made in the petition. If such averments disclose that even a part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial limits of the Court, the matter may be entertained, however, it remains open to the opposite party to contest those 6 averments on facts, and if ultimately the Court finds them untrue, the petition must fail for want of jurisdiction. Applying this principle, the respondent’s allegations regarding acts of harassment and mala fide transfer at Dehradun are sufficient to confer prima facie jurisdiction, though whether such facts are ultimately proved will be determined in adjudication. Likewise, in Indian Overseas Bank v. IOB Officers’ Association, reported in (2001) 9 SCC 540, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that when a transfer is challenged as mala fide, punitive, or an act of victimization, the cause of action arises not merely at the place where the employee is transferred but also at the place from which the transfer originated.

11. In the present case, the respondent alleges that he was subjected to harassment, unfair labour practices, and a mala fide and punitive transfer while he was employed at Dehradun. The employment relationship originated in Dehradun and continued there for several years, the transfer order also emanated from Dehradun. These allegations, whether ultimately proved or not, constitute a material and substantial part of the cause of action sufficient to approach the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Uttarakhand, with prima facie jurisdiction. Hence, the reference cannot be said to be without territorial competence. The petitioner’s challenge to the Labour Court’s refusal to frame preliminary issues also does not merit acceptance. Such orders are procedural in nature, and unless demonstrably perverse or patently illegal, the writ court ordinarily does not interfere. The Labour Court is already seized of the matter and will examine jurisdictional questions at the appropriate stage. Judicial propriety requires that the proceedings not be stifled at an interlocutory phase. Likewise, the rejection of petitioner’s review application furnishes no ground of 7 challenge, as the Act does not confer any statutory power of review on the Labour Court.

12. Furthermore, the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy before the Labour Court. It is well settled that writ jurisdiction is not to be invoked when disputed factual issues can be adequately adjudicated by the statutory forum. All objections, including those relating to territorial jurisdiction, workman status, and validity of enquiry, remain open to the petitioner before the Labour Court. In the absence of extraordinary circumstances involving gross illegality or patent lack of jurisdiction, interference under Articles 226/227 is unwarranted.

13. Therefore, this Court finds that no exceptional circumstance exists to justify exercise of supervisory jurisdiction. The petitioner’s objections are essentially factual, contested, and incapable of being decided without evidence. The reference order does not suffer from manifest lack of jurisdiction, the interlocutory orders do not contain any error apparent on the face of the record, and the writ petition is premature.

14. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is accordingly dismissed. SK (Pankaj Purohit, J.) 01.12.2025 8