M/S Poddar Ispat Private Ltd v. Office of the Deputy Commissioner

Judgment

(per Mr. SUBHASH UPADHYAY, J.) Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition with the following prayers: (i) Issue a writ of certiorari, or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature thereof, quashing the impugned order dated 08.05.2025 along with DRC-07

08.05.2025 bearing reference no. ZD0505250005133Z (Annexure-1) and also quashing of show cause notice dated 15.01.2025 along with Form DRC-01 dated 04.02.2025 bearing reference no. ZI050225002301B (Annexure-2) issued by respondent no. 1 and also quash the notice for intimation of amount recoverable issued vide from DRC-01D dated 08.05.2025, issued on 04.08.2025 (Annexure-3). 1 Pass an appropriate writ, order or direction staying (ii) the operation, implementation, and execution of the recovery proceedings initiated under Section 79 of the CGST/UPGST Act pursuant to the notice for intimation of amount recoverable issued in FOR DRC-01D dated

08.05.2025, served on 04.08.2025, during pendency of the present writ petition.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the entire proceedings culminating in the impugned order dated 08.05.2025 are vitiated by gross procedural irregularities and there is non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the CGST Act and Rules. The denial of opportunity for personal hearing, and the passing of a non-speaking and mechanical adjudication order, all cumulatively render the impugned demand legally unsustainable.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that the issue involved in the present case is covered by the order passed by the Hon’ble Court in Writ

Petition (M/B) 316 of 2025, M/S Sri Sai Vishwas Polymers vs. Deputy Commissioner and another, decided on 05.06.2025.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent Ms. Puja Banga also submits that the present Writ Petition can be disposed of in terms of the order passed in the aforesaid Writ Petition. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Writ 2 Petition (WPMB No. 316 of 2025) has held as hereunder: “2. The short point, that is canvassed before this Court is that the Assessing Officer has passed the order of assessment in violation of the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 75 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (for short “CGST Act”). Section 75 of the CGST Act deals with the general provisions relating to determination of tax, and the procedure that is required to be adopted by the Assessing Authority, while completing the process of assessment. One such pre- requisite is that the Assessing Authority is required to afford an opportunity of personal hearing, where it is requested by the Assessee in writing, or where any adverse decision is contemplated against such person, meaning thereby that the Assessing Authority is required to comply with the mandate of sub-section (4) of Section 75 in either of the two circumstances, i.e. where a request for personal hearing is made and specifically sought for in writing, or where an adverse decision is contemplated against such person.

3. In the instant case, the Assessing Officer has drawn conclusions adverse to the interest of the petitioner, and that being the undisputed fact, the Assessing Authority was required to afford an opportunity of personal hearing, even in the absence of a written request. It is needless to say that, when the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, the said act shall be performed in the said manner alone, or not at all. Law in this regard is no more res integra, and is well-settled by catena of judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court. A similar view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 6071 of 2023 dated 29.01.2025. Paragraph nos. 54 & 83 of the said judgment reads as follows: 3 “54. In the present interpretive exercise, one also needs to be mindful of the legal principle which says that where a statute requires one to do a certain thing in a certain manner, it must be done in that particular manner or not done at all. For this proposition, it would be relevant to extract the following from the judgment in A. R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500: “22…….. It is unnecessary to refer to the long line of decisions commencing from Taylor v. Taylor [(1876) 1 Ch D 426]; Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 253 (2): 63 IA 372: (1936) 37 Cri LJ 897] and ending with Chettiam Veettil Ammadv. Taluk Land