Misc. Case No. 93 of 2014 · Ble High Court · 2025

Counsel, St at e of U.P., Ut t arakhand High Court , Nainit al.

16. That t he pairokar reached t he Nainit al and cont act ed wit h t he St anding Counsel, St at e of U.P. Ut t arakhand High Court , Nainit al on 23 rd March 2020. Since som e m ore docum ent s and a Cert ified Copy of t he I m pugned Judgm ent dat ed 18.05.2016 were required by t he St anding Counsel t o prepare t he Appeal, t he pairokar ret urned t o Roorkee.

17. That t hereaft er due t o Covid- 19 pandem ic and lockdown t he m at t er was furt her delayed as t he Court s below were not funct ioning.”

4. The above r eferred fact s depict t hat t he j udgm ent dat ed 18.05.2016 was passed in presence of counsel for t he appellant s and as such t he appellant s wer e well awar e of t he aforesaid j udgm ent . I n para- 4 of t he 5 affidavit in support of t he delay condonat ion applicat ion, it has been st at ed t hat legal opinion of t he DGC was obt ained, who subm it t ed his opinion on 23.11.2016, how ever, t here is no m ent ion as t o on w hich dat e t he said legal opinion was sought from t he DGC and when t he said opinion was received by t he Depar t m ent . Thus, it is clear t hat from 18.05.2016 t ill 23.11.2016 already six m ont hs t im e period had elapsed.

5. Furt her, in para- 5, it has been st at ed t hat t her eaft er, t he Execut ive Engineer, Nort her n Division, Ganga Canal, Roorkee wrot e a let t er t o t he Superint ending Engineer on 13.01.2017 com m unicat ing t he legal opinion of t he DGC for seeking perm ission t o file t he appeal. The affidavit in support of t he delay condonat ion applicat ion furt her reveals t hat on 17.07.2018 a rem inder was sent t o Super int ending Engineer, Ganga Canal, Meerut , t hus, it t ook m ore t han 18 m ont hs t o t he Depart m ent t o send a rem inder t o t he higher aut horit y, for filing t he appeal. During t his period alr eady a delay of 2 years and 2 m ont hs had occur red.

6. A per usal of ot her paragraphs of t he affidavit filed in support of delay condonat ion applicat ion furt her reveals t hat as per t he case of t he appellant s, again opinion was sought from learned C.S.C., High Court of Allahabad 6 and t hus it t ook t im e in t he m ovem ent of file from one t able t o anot her, which result ed in filing of appeal in t he m ont h of Novem ber, 2020 before t his Court . Thus, in t ot al 1560 day s of delay occurred in filing t he appeal.

7. Obj ect ion t o t he delay condonat ion applicat ion has been filed by t he respondent wher ein it is st at ed t hat t her e is huge delay in filing t he appeal and t he appellant s have failed t o show sufficient cause for such delay and t her efore t he delay condonat ion applicat ion is liable t o be dism issed on t he ground of delay and laches. Reliance has been placed upon t he j udgm ent passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in “ St a t e o f M a d h y a Pr a d e s h & Or s. V s. B h e r u l a l ” ( 2 0 2 0 ) 1 0 SCC 6 5 4 a n d “ St a t e o f Bi h a r v s. D e o K u m a r Si n g h ” SLP ( Ci v i l ) D i a r y N o .1 3 3 4 8 o f 2 0 1 9 .

8. Hear d subm issions of learned counsel for t he part ies and perused t he ent ire m at er ial available on file.

9. Hon’ble Apex Cour t in t he case of “ Go v e r n m e n t o f M a h a r a s h t r a v s. Bo r se Br o t h e r s En g i n e e r s” ( 2 0 2 1 ) 6 SCC 4 6 0 w hile considering t he aspect of condonat ion of delay in appeals filed u/ s 37 of Arbit rat ion and Conciliat ion Act , 1996 held t hat m erely because gover nm ent is involved, a differ ent yardst ick for condonat ion of delay cannot be laid 7 down. Paragraphs 30, 31 and 55 t o 63 of t his j udgm ent are quot ed below: - 3 0 . The j udgm ent in Kandla Export Corpn. v. OCI Corpn., ( 2018) 14 SCC 715 also observed: “ 27. The m at t er can be looked at from a slight ly different angle. Given t he obj ect s of bot h t he st at ut es, it is clear t hat arbit rat ion it self is m eant t o be a speedy resolut ion disput es bet ween part ies. Equally, enforcem ent of foreign awards should t ake place as soon as possible if I ndia is t o rem ain as an equal part ner, com m ercially speaking, in t he int ernat ional com m unit y. I n point of fact , t he raison d'êt re for t he enact m ent of t he Com m ercial Court s Act t hat com m ercial disput es involving high am ount s of m oney should be speedily decided. Given t he obj ect s of bot h t he enact m ent s, if we were t o provide an addit ional appeal, w hen Sect ion 50 does away wit h an appeal so as t o speedily enforce foreign awards, we would be t urning t he 35 Arbit rat ion Act and t he Com m ercial Court s Act on t heir heads. Adm it t edly, if t he am ount cont ained in a foreign award t o be enforced in I ndia were less t han Rs 1 crore, and a Single Judge of a High Court were t o enforce such award, no appeal would lie, in keeping wit h t he obj ect of speedy enforcem ent of foreign awards. However, if, in t he sam e fact circum st ance, a foreign award were t o be for Rs 1 crore or m ore, if t he appellant s are correct , enforcem ent of such award would be furt her delayed by providing an appeal under Sect ion 13( 1) of t he Com m ercial Court s Act . Any such int erpret at ion would lead t o absurdit y, and would be direct ly cont rary t o t he obj ect sought t o be achieved by t he Com m ercial Court s Act viz. speedy resolut ion of disput es of a com m ercial nat ure involving a sum of Rs 1 crore and over. For t his reason also, we feel t hat Sect ion 13( 1) of t he Com m ercial Court s Act m ust be const rued in accordance wit h t he obj ect sought t o be achieved by t he Act . Any const ruct ion of Sect ion 13 of t he Com m ercial Court s Act , which would lead t o furt her delay, inst ead of an expedit ious enforcem ent of a foreign award m ust , t herefore, be eschewed. Even on applying t he doct rine of harm onious const ruct ion of bot h st at ut es, it is clear t hat t hey are best harm onised by giving effect t o t he special st at ut e i.e. t he Arbit rat ion Act , vis- à- vis t he m ore general st at ut e, nam ely, t he Com m ercial Court s Act , being left t o operat e in spheres ot her t han arbit rat ion.” 8 3 1 . A recent j udgm ent of t his Court in I COMM Tele Lt d. v. Punj ab St at e Wat er Supply and Sewerage Board, ( 2019) 4 SCC 401, st at es: “ 25. Several j udgm ent s of t his Court have also reit erat ed t hat t he prim ary obj ect of arbit rat ion is t o reach a final disposal of disput es in a speedy, effect ive, inexpensive and expedit ious m anner. Thus, in Cent rot rade Minerals & Met al I nc. v. Hindust an Copper Lt d. [ Cent rot rade Minerals & Met al I nc. v. Hindust an Copper Lt d., ( 2017) 2 SCC 228 : 36 ( 2017) 1 SCC ( Civ) 593] , t his Court held: ( SCC p. 250, para 39) ‘39. I n Union of I ndia v. U.P. St at e Bridge Corpn. Lt d. [ Union of I ndia v. U.P. St at e Bridge Corpn. Lt d., ( 2015) 2 SCC 52 : ( 2015) 1 SCC ( Civ) 732] t his Court accept ed t he view [ I ndu Malhot ra, O.P. Malhot ra on t he Law and Pract ice of Arbit r at ion and Conciliat ion ( 3rd Edn., Thom son Reut ers, 2014) .] t hat t he A&C Act has four foundat ional pillars and t hen observed in para 16 of t he Report t hat : ( SCC p. 64) “ 16. First and param ount principle of t he fir st pillar is ‘fair, speedy and inexpensive t rial by an Arbit ral Tribunal’. Unnecessary delay or expense would frust rat e t he very purpose of arbit rat ion.” ’” 5 5 . Reading t he Arbit rat ion Act and t he Com m ercial Court s Act as a whole, it is clear t hat when sect ion 37 of t he Arbit rat ion Act is read wit h eit her Art icle 116 or 117 of t he Lim it at ion Act or sect ion 13( 1A) of t he Com m ercial Court s Act , t he obj ect and cont ext provided by t he aforesaid st at ut es, read as a whole, is t he speedy disposal of appeals filed under sect ion 37 of t he Arbit rat ion Act . To read sect ion 5 of t he Lim it at ion Act consist ent ly wit h t he aforesaid obj ect , it is necessary t o discover as t o what t he expression “ sufficient cause” m eans in t he cont ext of condoning delay in filing appeals under sect ion 37 of t he Arbit rat ion Act . 5 6 . The expression “ sufficient cause” cont ained in sect ion 5 of t he Lim it at ion Act is elast ic enough t o yield different result s depending upon t he obj ect and cont ext of a st at ut e. Thus, in Aj m er Kaur v. St at e of Punj ab, ( 2004) 7 SCC 381, t his Court , in t he cont ext of sect ion 11( 5) of t he Punj ab Land Reform s Act , 1972, held as follows: “ 10. Perm it t ing an applicat ion under Sect ion 11( 5) t o be 9 m oved at any t im e would have disast rous consequences. The St at e Governm ent in which t he land vest s on being declared as surplus, will not be able t o ut ilise t he sam e. The St at e Governm ent cannot be m ade t o wait indefinit ely before put t ing t he land t o use. Where t he land is ut ilised by t he St at e Governm ent , a consequence of t he order passed subsequent ly could be of divest ing it of t he land. Taking t he fact s of t he present case by way of an illust rat ion, it would m ean t hat t he land which st ood m ut at ed in t he St at e Governm ent in 1982 and which w as allot t ed by t he St at e Governm ent t o t hird part ies in 1983, would as a result of r eopening t he set t led posit ion, lead t o t hird part ies being asked t o rest ore back t he land t o t he St at e Governm ent and t he St at e Governm ent in t urn would have t o be divest ed of t he land. The land will in t urn be rest ored t o t he landowner. This will be t he result of t he land being declared by t he Collect or as not surplus wit h t he landowner. The effect of per m it t ing such a sit uat ion will be t hat t he land will rem ain in a sit uat ion of flux. There will be no finalit y. The very purpose of t he legislat ion will be defeat ed. The allot t ee will not be able t o ut ilise t he land for fear of being divest ed in t he event of deat hs and birt hs in t he fam ily of t he landowners. Deat hs and birt hs are event s which are bound t o occur. Therefore, it is reasonable t o read a t im e- lim it in sub- sect ion ( 5) of Sect ion 11. The concept of reasonable t im e t he given fact s would be m ost appropriat e. An applicat ion m ust be m oved wit hin a reasonable t im e. The fact s t he pr esent dem onst rat e t hat redet erm inat ion under sub- sect ion ( 5) of Sect ion 11 alm ost 5 years aft er t he deat h of Kart ar Kaur and m ore t han 6 years aft er t he order of t he Collect or declaring t he land as surplus had becom e final, has result ed in grave inj ust ice besides defeat ing t he obj ect of t he legislat ion which was envisaged as a socially beneficial piece of legislat ion. Thus we hold t hat t he applicat ion redet erm inat ion filed by Daya Singh under sub- sect ion ( 5) of Sect ion 11 of t he Act on 21- 6- 1985 was 58 liable t o be dism issed on t he ground of inordinat e delay and t he Collect or was wrong in reopening t he issue declaring t he land as not surplus in t he hands of Daya Singh and Kart ar Kaur.

11. The above reasoning is in consonance wit h t he provision in sub- sect ion ( 7) of Sect ion 11 of t he Act . Subsect ion ( 7) uses t he words “ where succession has 10 opened aft er t he surplus area or any part t hereof has been det erm ined by t he Collect or …” . The words “ det erm ined by t he Collect or” would m ean t hat t he order t he Collect or has at t ained finalit y. The provisions regarding appeals, et c. cont ained in Sect ions 80- 82 of t he Punj ab Tenancy Act , 1887, as m ade applicable t o proceedings under t he Punj ab Land Reform s Act , 1972, show t hat t he m axim um period of lim it at ion in case of appeal or review is ninet y days. The appeal against t he final order of t he Collect or dat ed 30- 9- 1976 whereby

3.12 hect ares of land had been declared as surplus was dism issed on 27- 3- 1979. The order was allowed t o becom e final as it was not challenged any furt her. Thus t he det erm inat ion by t he Collect or becam e final on 27- 3-

1979. The sam e could not be reopened aft er a lapse of m ore t han 6 years by order dat ed 23- 7- 1985. The subsequent proceedings before t he Revenue Aut horit ies did not lie. The order dat ed 23- 7- 1985 is non est . All t he subsequent proceedings t herefore fall t hrough. The issue could not have been reopened.” ( em phasis supplied) 5 7 . Nearer hom e, in Braham pal v. Nat ional I nsurance Com pany, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1053, t his Court specifically referred t o t he difference bet ween a delay in filing com m ercial claim s under t he Arbit rat ion Act or t he Com m ercial Court s Act and claim s under t he Mot or Vehicles Act , 1988, as follows: “ 14. This Court has first ly held t hat purpose of conferm ent of such power m ust be exam ined t he det erm inat ion of t he scope of such discret ion conferred upon t he court . [ refer t o Bhaiya Punj alal Bhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwat prasad Prabhuprasad, AI R 1963 SC 120; Shri Prakash Chand Agarwal v. Hindust an St eel Lt d., ( 1970) 2 SCC 806] . Our analysis of t he purpose of t he Act suggest s t hat such discret ionary power is conferred upon t he Court s, t o enforce t he right s of t he vict im s and t heir dependent s. The legislat ure int ended t hat Court s m ust have such power so as t o ensure t hat subst ant ive j ust ice is not t rum ped by t echnicalit ies. * * *

20. Therefore, t he aforesaid provision being a beneficial legislat ion, m ust be given liberal int erpret at ion t o serve it s obj ect . Keeping in view t he subst ant ive right s of t he part ies, undue em phasis should not be given t o t echnicalit ies. I n such cases delay in filing and refiling 11 cannot be viewed st rict ly, as com pared t o com m ercial claim s under t he Arbit rat ion and Concilliat ion Act , 1996 or t he Com m ercial Court s Act , 2015.

21. I n P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kum ar, ( 2019) 13 SCC 445, wherein t his Court while int erpr et ing Sect ion 34 of t he Arbit rat ion Act , held t hat t he r ight t o obj ect t o an award it self is subst ant ively bound wit h t he lim it at ion period prescribed t herein and t he sam e cannot m erely a procedural prescript ion. I n effect t he Court held t hat a com plet e pet it ion, has t o be filed wit hin t he t im e prescribed under Sect ion 34 of t he Arbit rat ion Act and ‘not t hereaft er’. The Court while com ing t o t he aforesaid conclusion, reasoned as under: “ 36.1 First , t he pur pose of t he Arbit rat ion Act was t o provide for a speedy disput e resolut ion process. The St at em ent of Obj ect s and Reasons reveal t hat t he legislat ive int ent of enact ing t he Arbit rat ion Act was t o provide part ies wit h an 60 efficient alt ernat ive disput e resolut ion syst em which gives lit igant s an expedit ed resolut ion of disput es while reducing t he burden on t he court s. Art icle 34( 3) reflect s t his int ent when it defines t he com m encem ent concluding period challenging award. This Court in Popular Const ruct ion [ Union I ndia v. Popular Const ruct ion Co., ( 2001) 8 SCC 470] highlight ed t he im port ance of t he fixed periods under t he Arbit rat ion Act . We m ay also add t hat t he finalit y is a fundam ent al principle enshrined under t he Arbit rat ion Act and a definit ive t im e lim it for challenging an award necessary for ensuring finalit y. I f Sect ion 17 were t o be applied, an award can be challenged even aft er 120 days. This would defeat t he Arbit rat ion Act 's obj ect ive of speedy resolut ion of disput es. The finalit y of award would also be in a lim bo as a part y can challenge an award even aft er t he 120 day period.” Com ing back t o t he Mot or Vehicles Act , t he legislat ive int ent is t o provide appropriat e com pensat ion for t he vict im s and t o prot ect t heir subst ant ive right s, in pursuit of t he sam e, t he int erpret at ion should not be as st rict as com m ercial claim s as elucidat ed above.

22. Undoubt edly, t he st at ut e has grant ed t he Court s wit h discret ionary powers t o condone t he delay, 12 however at t he sam e t im e it also places an obligat ion upon t he part y t o j ust ify t hat he w as pr event ed from abiding by t he sam e due t o t he exist ence of “ sufficient cause” . Alt hough t here exist s no st rait j acket form ula for t he Court s t o condone delay, but t he Court s m ust not only t ake int o considerat ion t he ent ire fact s and circum st ances of case but also t he conduct of t he part ies. The concept of reasonableness dict at es t hat , t he 61 Court s even while t aking a liberal approach m ust weigh in t he right s and obligat ions of bot h t he part ies. When a right has accrued in favour of one part y due t o gross negligence and lackadaisical at t it ude of t he ot her, t his Court shall refrain from exercising t he aforesaid discret ionary relief.

23. Taking int o considerat ion t he fact s and circum st ances of t he present case, we are of t he opinion t hat t he delay of 45 days has been properly explained by t he appellant s, which was on account of illness of t he wife of Appellant No. 1. I t was not appropriat e on t he part of t he High Court t o dism iss t he appeal m erely on t he ground of delay of short durat ion, part icularly in m at t ers involving deat h in m ot or accident claim s. Moreover, in t he pr esent case no m ala fide can be im put able against t he appellant s for filing t he appeal aft er t he expiry of ninet y days. Therefore, we are of t he opinion t hat t he st rict approach t aken in t he im pugned order is hyper- t echnical and cannot be sust ained in t he eyes of law.”

58. Given t he obj ect sought t o be achieved under bot h t he Arbit rat ion Act and t he Com m ercial Court s Act , t hat is, t he speedy resolut ion of disput es, t he expression “ sufficient cause” is not elast ic enough t o cover long delays beyond t he period provided by t he appeal provision it self. Besides, t he expression “ sufficient cause” is not it self a loose panacea for t he ill of pressing negligent and st ale claim s. This Court , in Basawaraj v. Land Acquisit ion Officer, ( 2013) 14 SCC 81, has held: “ 9. Sufficient cause is t he cause for which t he defendant could not be blam ed for his absence. The m eaning of t he 62 word “ sufficient ” is “ adequat e” or “ enough” , inasm uch as m ay be necessary t o answer t he purpose int ended. Therefore, t he word “ sufficient ” em braces no m ore t han t hat which provides a plat it ude, 13 which when t he act done suffices t o accom plish t he purpose int ended in t he fact s and circum st ances exist ing in a case, duly exam ined t he viewpoint of a reasonable st andard of a caut ious m an. I n t his cont ext , “ sufficient cause” m eans t hat t he part y should not have act ed in a negligent m anner or t here was a want of bona fide on it s part in view of t he fact s and cir cum st ances of a case or it cannot be alleged t hat t he part y has “ not act ed diligent ly” or “ rem ained inact ive” . However, t he fact s and circum st ances of each case m ust afford sufficient ground t o enable t he court concerned t o exercise discret ion for t he reason t hat whenever t he court exercises discret ion, it has t o be exercised j udiciously. The applicant m ust sat isfy t he court t hat he was prevent ed by any “ sufficient cause” from prosecut ing his case, and unless a sat isfact ory explanat ion is furnished, t he court should not allow t he applicat ion for condonat ion of delay. The court has t o exam ine whet her t he m ist ake is bona fide or was m erely a device t o cover an ult erior purpose. ( See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Lt d. v. Bhut nat h Banerj ee [ AI R 1964 SC 1336] , Mat a Din v. A. Narayanan [ ( 1969) 2 SCC 770 : AI R 1970 SC 1953] , Parim al v. Veena [ ( 2011) 3 SCC 545 : ( 2011) 2 SCC ( Civ) 1 : AI R 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mum bai [ ( 2012) 5 SCC 157 : ( 2012) 3 SCC ( Civ) 24 : AI R 2012 SC 1629] .

10. I n Arj un Singh v. Mohindra Kum ar [ AI R 1964 SC 993] t his Court explained t he difference bet ween a “ good cause” and a “ sufficient cause” and observed t hat every “ sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exist s it can only be t hat t he requirem ent of good cause is com plied wit h on a lesser degree of proof t han t hat of “ sufficient cause” .

11. The expression “ sufficient cause” should be given a liberal int erpret at ion t o ensure t hat subst ant ial j ust ice is done, but only so long as negligence, inact ion or lack of bona fides cannot be im put ed t o t he part y concerned, whet her or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on t he fact s of a part icular case and no st rait j acket form ula is possible. ( Vide Madanlal v. Shyam lal [ ( 2002) 1 SCC 535 : AI R 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nat h Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [ ( 2002) 3 SCC 195 : AI R 2002 SC 1201] ) 14

12. I t is a set t led legal proposit ion t hat law of lim it at ion m ay harshly affect a part icular part y but it has t o be applied wit h all it s rigour when t he st at ut e so prescribes. The court has no power t o ext end t he period of lim it at ion on equit able grounds. “ A result flowing from a st at ut ory provision is never an evil. A court has no power t o ignore t hat provision t o relieve what it considers a dist ress result ing from it s operat ion.” The st at ut ory provision m ay cause hardship or inconvenience t o a part icular par t y but t he court has no choice but t o enforce it giving full effect t o t he sam e. The legal m axim dura lex sed lex which m eans “ t he law is hard but it is t he law” , st ands at t ract ed in such a sit uat ion. I t has consist ent ly been held t hat , “ inconvenience is not ” a decisive fact or t o be considered while int erpret ing a st at ut e.

13. The st at ut e of lim it at ion is founded on public policy, it s aim being t o secure peace in t he com m unit y, t o suppress fraud and perj ury, t o quicken diligence and t o prevent oppression. I t seeks t o bury all act s of t he past which have not been agit at ed unexplainably and have from lapse of t im e becom e st ale. According t o Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266: “ 605. Policy of t he Lim it at ion Act s.—The court s have expressed at least t hree differing reasons support ing t he exist ence of st at ut es of lim it at ions 64 nam ely, ( 1) t hat long dorm ant claim s have m ore of cruelt y t han j ust ice in t hem , ( 2) t hat a defendant m ight have lost t he evidence t o disprove a st ale claim , and ( 3) t hat persons wit h good causes of act ions should pur sue t hem wit h reasonable diligence.” An unlim it ed lim it at ion would lead t o a sense of insecurit y and uncert aint y, and t herefore, lim it at ion prevent s dist urbance or deprivat ion of what m ay have been acquired in equit y and j ust ice by long enj oym ent or what m ay have been lost by a part y's own inact ion, negligence or laches. ( See Popat and Kot echa Propert y v. SBI St aff Assn. [ ( 2005) 7 SCC 510] , Raj ender Singh v. Sant a Singh [ ( 1973) 2 SCC 705 : AI R 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Pat il v. Jalgaon Medium Proj ect [ ( 2008) 17 SCC 448 : ( 2009) 5 SCC ( Civ) 907] .)

14. I n P. Ram achandra Rao v. St at e of Karnat aka 15 [ ( 2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC ( Cri) 830 : AI R 2002 SC 1856] t his Court held t hat j udicially engraft ing principles of lim it at ion am ount s t o legislat ing and would fly in t he face of law laid down by t he Const it ut ion Bench in Abdul Rehm an Ant ulay v. R.S. Nayak [ ( 1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC ( Cri) 93 : AI R 1992 SC 1701] .

15. The law on t he issue can be sum m arised t o t he effect t hat where a case has been present ed in t he court beyond lim it at ion, t he applicant has t o explain t he court as t o what w as t he “ sufficient cause” w hich m eans an adequat e and enough reason which prevent ed him t o approach t he court wit hin lim it at ion. I n case a part y is found t o be negligent , or for want of bona fide on his part in t he fact s and circum st ances of t he case, or found t o have not act ed diligent ly or rem ained inact ive, t here cannot be a j ust ified ground t o condone t he delay. No court could be j ust ified in condoning such an inordinat e delay by im posing any 65 condit ion w hat soever. The applicat ion is t o be decided only wit hin t he param et ers laid down by t his Court in regard t o t he condonat ion of delay. I n case t here was no sufficient cause t o prevent a lit igant t o approach t he court on t im e condoning t he delay wit hout j ust ificat ion, put t ing condit ion what soever, am ount s t o passing an order in violat ion of t he st at ut ory provisions and it t ant am ount s t o showing ut t er disregard t o t he legislat ure.” ( em phasis supplied) 5 9 . Likewise, m erely because t he governm ent is involved, a different yardst ick for condonat ion of delay cannot be laid down. This was felicit ously st at ed in Post m ast er General v. Living Media I ndia Lt d., ( 2012) 3 SCC 563 [ “ Post m ast er General” ] , as follows: “ 27. I t is not in disput e t hat t he person( s) concerned were well aware or conversant wit h t he issues involved including t he prescribed period of lim it at ion for t aking up t he m at t er by way of filing a special leave pet it ion in t his Court . They cannot claim t hat t hey have a separat e period of lim it at ion when t he Depart m ent was possessed wit h com pet ent persons fam iliar wit h court proceedings. I n t he absence of plausible and accept able explanat ion, we are posing a quest ion why t he delay is t o condoned m echanically m erely because t he Governm ent or a wing of t he Governm ent is a part y before us. 16

28. Though we are conscious of t he fact t hat in a m at t er of condonat ion of delay when t here was no gross negligence or deliberat e inact ion or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has t o be adopt ed t o advance subst ant ial j ust ice, we are of t he view t hat in t he fact s circum st ances, t he Depart m ent cannot t ake advant age of various earlier decisions. The claim on account im personal m achinery inherit ed bureaucrat ic 66 m et hodology of m aking several not es cannot be accept ed in view of t he m odern t echnologies being used and available. The law of lim it at ion undoubt edly binds everybody, including t he Governm ent .

29. I n our view, it is t he right t im e t o inform all t he governm ent bodies, t heir agencies and inst rum ent alit ies t hat unless t hey have reasonable and accept able explanat ion for t he delay and t here was bona fide effort , t here is no need t o accept t he usual explanat ion t hat t he file was kept pending for several m ont hs/ years due t o considerable degree of procedural red t ape in t he process. The governm ent depart m ent s are under a special obligat ion t o ensure t hat t hey perform t heir dut ies wit h diligence and com m it m ent . Condonat ion of delay is an except ion and should not be used as an ant icipat ed benefit for t he governm ent depart m ent s. The law shelt ers everyone under t he sam e light and should not be swirled for t he benefit of a few.” 6 0 . The decision in Post m ast er General ( supra) has been followed in t he following subsequent j udgm ent s of t his Court : ( i) St at e of Raj ast han v. Bal Kishan Mat hur, ( 2014) 1 SCC 592 at paragraphs 8- 8.2; ( ii) St at e of U.P. v. Am ar Nat h Yadav, ( 2014) 2 SCC 422 at paragraphs 2- 3; ( iii) St at e of T.N. v. N. Suresh Raj an, ( 2014) 11 SCC 709 at paragraphs 11- 13; and ( iv) St at e of M.P. v. Bherulal, ( 2020) 10 SCC 654 at paragraphs 3- 4. 6 1 . I n a recent j udgm ent , nam ely, St at e of M.P. v. Chait ram Maywade, ( 2020) 10 SCC 667, t his Court r eferred t o Post m ast er General ( supra) , and held as follows: “ 1. The St at e of Madhya Pradesh cont inues t o do t he sam e t hing again and again and t he conduct seem s t o be incorrigible. The special leave pet it ion has been filed 17 aft er a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion t o deal wit h such inordinat ely delayed filing of t he appeal by t he St at e of Madhya Pr adesh in St at e of M.P. v. Bherulal [ St at e of M.P. v. Bher ulal, ( 2020) 10 SCC 654] in t erm s of our order dat ed 15- 10- 2020.

2. We have penned down a det ailed order in t hat case and we see no purpose in repeat ing t he sam e reasoning again except t o record what ar e st at ed t o be t he fact s on which t he delay is sought t o be condoned. On 5- 1- 2019, it is st at ed t hat t he Governm ent Advocat e was approached in respect of t he j udgm ent delivered on 13- 11- 2018 [ Chait ram Maywade v. St at e of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine HP 1632] and t he Law Depart m ent perm it t ed filing of t he SLP against t he im pugned order on 26- 5- 2020. Thus, t he Law Depart m ent t ook alm ost about 17 m ont hs' t im e t o decide whet her t he SLP had t o be filed or not . What great er cert ificat e of incom pet ence would t here be for t he Legal Depart m ent !

3. We consider it appropriat e t o direct t he Chief Secret ary of t he St at e of Madhya Pradesh t o look int o t he aspect of revam ping t he Legal Depart m ent as it appears t hat t he Depart m ent is unable t o file appeals wit hin any reasonable period of t im e m uch less wit hin lim it at ion. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded t he aforesaid order, are no m ore adm issible in view of t he j udgm ent in Post m ast er General v. Living Media ( I ndia) Lt d. [ Post m ast er General v. Living Media ( I ndia) Lt d., ( 2012) 3 SCC 563 : ( 2012) 2 SCC 68 ( Civ) 327 : ( 2012) 2 SCC ( Cri) 580 : ( 2012) 1 SCC ( L&S) 649]

4. We have also expressed our concern t hat t hese kinds of t he cases are only “ cert ificat e cases” t o obt ain a cert ificat e of dism issal from t he Suprem e Court t o put a quiet us t o t he issue. The obj ect is t o save t he skin of officers who m ay be in default . We have also recorded t he irony of t he sit uat ion where no act ion is t aken against t he officers who sit on t hese files and do not hing.

5. Looking t o t he period of delay and t he casual m anner in which t he applicat ion has been worded, t he wast age of j udicial t im e involved, we im pose cost s on t he pet it ioner St at e of Rs 35,000 t o be deposit ed wit h t he Mediat ion and Conciliat ion Proj ect Com m it t ee. The am ount be deposit ed wit hin four weeks. The am ount be recovered from t he officer( s) responsible for t he delay in filing and sit t ing on t he files and cert ificat e of recovery of t he said am ount be also filed in t his Court wit hin t he said 18 period of t im e. We have put t o Deput y Advocat e General t o caut ion t hat for any successive m at t ers of t his kind t he cost s will keep on going up.” 6 2 . Also, it m ust be rem em bered t hat m erely because sufficient cause has been m ade out in t he fact s of a given case, t here is no right in t he appellant t o have delay condoned. This was felicit ously put in Ram lal v. Rewa Coalfields Lt d., ( 1962) 2 SCR 762 as follows: “ 12. I t is, however, necessary t o em phasise t hat even aft er sufficient cause has been shown a part y is not ent it led t o t he condonat ion of delay in quest ion as a m at t er of right . The proof of a sufficient cause is a condit ion precedent for t he exercise of t he discret ionary j urisdict ion vest ed in t he court by s. 5. I f sufficient cause is not proved not hing 69 furt her has t o be done; t he applicat ion for condoning delay has t o be dism issed on t hat ground alone. I f sufficient cause is shown t hen t he Court has t o enquire whet her in it s discr et ion it should condone t he delay. This aspect of t he m at t er nat urally int roduces t he considerat ion of all relevant fact s and it is at t his st age t hat diligence of t he part y or it s bona fides m ay fall for considerat ion; but t he scope of t he enquiry while exercising t he discret ionary power aft er sufficient cause is shown would nat urally be lim it ed only t o such fact s as t he Court m ay regard as relevant . I t cannot j ust ify an enquiry as t o why t he part y was sit t ing idle during all t he t im e available t o it . I n t his connect ion we m ay point out t hat considerat ions of bona fides or due diligence are always m at erial and relevant when t he Court is dealing wit h applicat ions m ade under s. 14 of t he Lim it at ion Act . I n dealing wit h such applicat ions t he Court is called upon t o consider t he effect of t he com bined provisions of ss. 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerat ions which have been expressly m ade m at erial and relevant by t he provisions of s. 14 cannot t o t he sam e ext ent and in t he sam e m anner be invoked in dealing wit h applicat ions which fall t o be decided only under s. 5 wit hout reference t o s. 14.” 6 3 . Given t he aforesaid and t he obj ect of speedy disposal sought t o be achieved bot h under t he Arbit rat ion Act and t he Com m ercial Court s Act , for appeals filed under sect ion 37 of t he Arbit rat ion Act t hat are governed by Art icles 116 and 117 of t he Lim it at ion Act or sect ion 13( 1A) of t he Com m ercial Court s Act , a 19 delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respect ively, is t o be condoned by way of except ion and not by way of rule. I n a fit case in which a part y has ot herwise 70 act ed bona fide and not in a negligent m anner, a short delay beyond such period can, in t he discret ion of t he court , be condoned, always bearing in m ind t hat t he ot her side of t he pict ure is t hat t he opposit e part y m ay have acquired bot h in equit y and j ust ice, w hat m ay now be lost by t he first par t y’s inact ion, negligence or laches.”

10. Honble Apex Court in t he aforesaid j udgm ent , while int er pret ing t he scope and pur pose of t he Ar bit rat ion and Conciliat ion Act em phasized t hat t he obj ect sought t o be achieved by t he Act is speedy disposal t hrough arbit rat ion proceedings. I n such circum st ances, t he Court held t hat t he period of lim it at ion is t o be followed and delay can only be condoned in cases w here sufficient cause is show n by t he part y. The Court clarified t hat ‘sufficient cause’ would m ean t hat part y seeking condonat ion of delay has not act ed in a negligent m anner or it cannot be said t hat such par t y was inact ive or was not diligent in pursuing his/ her case.

11. I n t he pr esent case, t he appellant s being t he St at e of U.P. were fully awar e of t he j udgm ent dat ed

18.05.2016 from t he very beginning, however, t hey act ed in a callous and negligent m anner, r esult ing in an inor dinat e delay of 1560 day s in filing t he appeal. The appellant s have failed t o show any sufficient cause for such huge delay in filing t he appeal u/ s 37 of t he Ar bit rat ion and Conciliat ion 20 Act . I n such cir cum st ances, t his Court is of t he consider ed opinion t hat delay of 1560 days cannot be condoned. Ther efore, t he delay condonat ion applicat ion is dism issed. Consequent ly, t he appeal also st ands dism issed. ( Su b h a sh Up a d h y a y , J.)

04.07.2025 Raj ni RAJINI GUSAIN DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=97cfa6e4cbd49c07b876db4 8448ac3701a9ae475a2547e4b7f1d9b 1f17d01342, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=8D039BC77BD1A2222 B4DF4FC80D4557562F95BEBA013F53 0616A158A0A878BD8, cn=RAJINI GUSAIN 21