State of Uttarakhand others v. Medhani Prasad

Judgment

(per Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)

1. State has filed this intra-Court appeal, challenging judgment and order dated 24.03.2021, passed by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 393 of 2021 (Medhani Prasad Vs. State of Uttarakhand & Others). By

the said judgment, writ petition filed by Mr. Medhani Prasad (respondent herein) was allowed and Competent Authority was directed to consider his case for Sailesh Matiyani State Teachers Award. Operative portion of the impugned judgment is reproduced below: “13. There is no dispute to the fact that on the date when the petitioner applied for the award, he was eligible. The Government Order dated 20.10.2009 also does not categorically stipulate the date of eligibility, but it speaks of the “preceding year”. The communication of the Director Education dated 27.05.2019 and the Chief Education Officer, Uttarkashi dated 28.05.2019 also state that applications of ineligible forwarded. The interpretation of these communications in the light of the Government Order dated 20.10.2009 makes it abundantly candidates may not be 1 clear that the eligibility is to be determined on the date when the applications are presented. Therefore, without adverting to any other issue, this Court is of the view that the candidature for the consideration of the award to the petitioner may not be rejected on the ground that the day when the Committee for selection, considered the matter, the petitioner was not eligible. This Court also restrains to direct the State Government to confer the award on the petitioner, but in this petition what the Court considers, in the interest of justice, is that while quashing the order dated 22.02.2021, respondent no. 1 should be directed to consider the candidature of the petitioner on the date when he made the application, not on the date when Selection Committee considered it.

14. The impugned order dated 22.02.2021 is quashed. The respondent no.1 is directed to consider the case of the petitioner for the award, keeping in view his eligibility on the date, when he submitted application for that purpose.”

2. It is not in dispute that the respondent, who was serving Assistant Lecturer a Sanskrit Mahavidhyalaya, applied for Sailesh Matiyani State Teachers Award, which is given to teachers serving in Government and Government aided Educational Institution for excellence in service. Respondent however was not given the award on the ground that he superannuated from service on 30.09.2020. He made a representation which was rejected by Secretary, School Education vide order dated 22.02.2021. Respondent, thereafter, filed Writ Petition (S/S) No. 393 of 2021, which has been allowed by the impugned judgment.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that eligibility and the criteria for selection for the Award is laid down in a Government Order dated 20.10.2009 and in para 3(4) of the Government Order, it is provided that teachers, including Principal, will not be eligible for the award, if they are re-employed upon superannuation, till end of academic session. 2

4. Learned counsel for the appellant/State further submits that this vital aspect could not be considered by learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition. Clause 3(4) of Government Order dated 20.10.2009 relied by State Counsel is reproduced below:- “3(4)- lsokfuo`r@iqufuZ;qDr v/;kid@iz/kkukpk;Z@iz/kkuk/;kid@izf”k{kd jkT; iqjLdkj ds fy, ;ksX; ugha gksaxaa sA”

5. He thus submits that, as writ petitioner attained age of superannuation in the month of September, 2020, he therefore became ineligible for Sailesh Matiyani State Teachers Award. He submits that in view of express provision made in para 3(4) of aforesaid government order, re-employment of a teacher post retirement, till end of academic session will not improve his case for the award and he will become ineligible for the award.

6. Learned State Counsel further submits that the analogy drawn by learned Single Judge in para 12 of the writ petition that eligibility for appointment has to be seen with reference to the date on which a candidate submits application in response to an advertisement is not correct as the principle of service jurisprudence that eligibility regarding age and academic qualification has to be seen with reference to the last date of submission of application will not apply to the present case where conditions of eligibility are prescribed in the Government Order dated

20.10.2009.

7. He submits that present is not the case where writ petitioner (respondent herein) had applied for appointment to a public post but he had applied for conferment of an award and conditions of eligibility for such award are 3 prescribed in a Government Order, therefore, eligibility of a teacher for such award is to be seen only with reference to the condition mentioned in the Government Order.

8. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner (respondent herein), per contra submits that writ petitioner had not completed age of superannuation on the date he submitted application for award, therefore his subsequent superannuation would not render him ineligible as his eligibility has to be seen on the date of making application and not on the date when result of selection is declared.

9. After hearing rival contentions for the parties, we are of the considered opinion that principle of service law that eligibility of a candidate has to be seen with reference to the last date of submission of application and not on the date when result of the selection is declared, can have no application in the present case where selection is for conferment of an award, especially when the conditions of eligibility are provided in a Government Order. One of the condition of the Government Order that upon superannuation, a Teacher/Principal/ Administrator/ Trainer, will not be eligible for the award.

10. Conferment of State Teachers Award is not regulated by any statute and it is governed only by a self contained Government Order dated 20.10.2009. In view of the express bar contained in para 3(4) of the Government Order, upon completing age of superannuation, a teacher cannot be considered for conferment of State Teachers Award. 4 11. Perusal of impugned judgment reveals that attention of learned Single Judge was drawn to para 3(4) of the aforesaid Government Order, however, there is no discussion as to how condition mentioned in para 3(4) of the Government Order would not be attracted to the case in hand.

12. In view of express provision made in para 3(4) of the Government Order, the date of submitting application, the academic year for which award is to be given or the date when meeting of selection committee is held, becomes irrelevant, and anyone who completes age of superannuation, becomes ineligible for the award.

13. It is settled principle of interpretation that full meaning should be given to every provision of a statute or in other words, every word and phrase should be considered and given its proper meaning, unless doing so leads to an absurd or unreasonable result. The object is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and apply the law as it was intended.

14. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nathi Devi Vs. Radha Devi Gupta has held as under: “13. The interpretative function of the court is to discover the true legislative intent. It is trite that in interpreting a statute the court must, if the words are clear, plain, unambiguous and reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, give to the words that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. Those words must be expounded in their natural and ordinary sense. When the language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. Courts are not concerned with the policy involved or that the results are injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. If the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. In considering whether there is ambiguity, the court must look at the statute as a whole and consider the appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context avoiding absurdity and inconsistencies or unreasonableness which may render the statute unconstitutional. 5 14. It is equally well settled that in interpreting a statute, effort should be made to give effect to each and every word used by the legislature. The courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. A construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except for compelling reasons such as obvious drafting errors. (See State of U.P. v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj [AIR 1963 SC 946 : (1963) 1 SCR 1] , Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh [AIR 1954 SC 749 : (1955) 1 SCR 671] , Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [AIR 1957 SC 907 : 1958 SCR 360] , Nyadar Singh v. Union of India [(1988) 4 SCC 170 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 934 : (1988) 8 ATC 226 : AIR 1988 SC 1979] , J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [AIR 1961 SC 1170] and Ghanshyamdas v. CST [AIR 1964 SC 766 : (1964) 4 SCR 436] .)

15. It is well settled that literal interpretation should be given to a statute if the same does not lead to an absurdity.

16. In Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal [(2003) 2 SCC 577] this Court stated the law in the following terms: (SCC p. 589, para 37) “37. The court's jurisdiction to interpret a statute can be invoked when the same is ambiguous. It is well known that in a given case the court can iron out the fabric but it cannot change the texture of the fabric. It cannot enlarge the scope of legislation or intention when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. It cannot add or subtract words to a statute or read something into it which is not there. It cannot rewrite or recast legislation. It is also necessary to determine that there exists a presumption that the legislature has not used any superfluous words. It is well settled that the real intention of the legislation must be gathered from the language used. It may be true that use of the expression ‘shall or may’ is not decisive for arriving at a finding as to whether the statute is directory or mandatory. But the intention of the legislature must be found out from the scheme of the Act. It is also equally well settled that when negative words are used the courts will presume that the intention of the legislature was that the provisions are mandatory in character.”

17. Even if there exists some ambiguity in the language or the same is capable of two interpretations, it is trite that the interpretation which serves the object and purport of the Act must be given effect to. In such a the doctrine of purposive construction should be adopted. (See Swedish Match AB v. Securities & Exchange Board of India [(2004) 11 SCC 641 : (2004) 7 Scale 158] .)

15. Although in the present case, we are not dealing with a statutory provision, however, since the eligibility conditions, criteria for selection, composition of selection committee, etc. are governed by Government Order dated

20.10.2009, therefore the law declared by constitution Bench in the aforesaid judgment become relevant while interpreting the different clauses of aforesaid Government Order.

16. Learned writ Court has although noted the argument raised by State Counsel, based on para 3(4) of the Government Order dated 20.10.2009, however the import 6 of para 3(4) is not considered and discussed in the impugned judgment and no reason is assigned for holding that it would be inapplicable to the case in hand.

17. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner (respondent herein) submitted that in similar circumstances, another teacher was conferred Sailesh Matiyani State Teachers Award after superannuation, therefore his client is also entitled to similar benefit and denial of award to him only on the ground that he has superannuated from service is not proper. This submission however is denied by State Counsel who submits that no one was given the award post retirement.

18. The submission made by counsel for the respondent is bereft of merit. Two wrongs do not make a right. Merely because someone, who was not eligible for award as per Government Order was conferred the same, will not entitle the respondent to claim award on the ground of parity. Courts are required to enforce law or Government Policy, and an illegality cannot be permitted to be perpetuated merely because of some decision taken earlier ignorance of law or Government Policy.

19. For the aforesaid reasons, Special Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment rendered by learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (S/S) No. 393 of 2021, is set aside. (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) (Subhash Upadhyay, J.) Dated: 03.06.2025 Kaushal 7