(Under Section 482 Cr.P.C.) Vaibhav Kumar and Others ……… v. State of Uttarakhand and Another

confirming through UK police records that there was no case or charge pending against him; that, the respondent no. 2 visited India from 24.11.2013 to

01.01.2014 for her sister’s marriage and in August 2014 for her father’s last rites; that, other than these visits, since 2013 she has been living and working independently in the UK; that, the trial court wrongly allowed respondent no. 2 to file a false and malicious the D.V. Act complaint through her mother using a General Power of Attorney on

03.03.2014; that, this effectively removed the need 8 for the aggrieved person to be present in court, which is against the spirit of the Act; that, Section 27(1)(a) of the DV Act states that the court having jurisdiction is where the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides, carries on business, or is employed. This means the aggrieved person must actually be living at the place where the case is filed. The word “resides” is in the present tense, showing that the legislature intended the person to be residing there during the trial; that, the Act also expects the aggrieved person’s presence because only she can accurately explain the alleged incidents of domestic violence; that, her physical presence is primary; territorial jurisdiction is secondary.

10. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that in this case, respondent no. 2’s presence was completely bypassed by using a Power of Attorney; that, the 2nd Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun, did not question why the complaint and the Domestic Incident Report were filed by her mother instead of respondent no. 2 herself, when 9 the trial court raised the question of jurisdiction, respondent no. 2, her mother, and their counsel falsely stated that respondent no. 2 was residing at Prem Nagar, Dehradun, however, reality, respondent no.2 was in the U.K. and exemptions from her court appearance were regularly granted without inquiry, violating the Act.

11. She would further submit that the learned trial court wrongly interpreted the phrase “any other person may present the application” in Section 12(1) of the DV Act. This provision is meant only for exceptional situations where the aggrieved person is confined, incapacitated, or in a critical condition and cannot come to court, despite residing within the court’s territorial limits. In such cases, the Magistrate or an appointed official can record her statement. Using this clause to let a Power of Attorney handle the case entirely, without the aggrieved person’s presence, is against the D.V. Act. She would further submit that having no other option, applicant no. 1 withdrew the case from the Faridabad Family Court and filed for divorce before 10 the Croydon Court, UK, on grounds of cruelty and abandonment, among other reasons. Respondent no. 2 contested the case fully, but her appeal was rejected. The Croydon Family Court granted a final divorce decree on 23.05.2016.

12. Learned senior counsel would further submit that the applicant nos. 2, 3, and 4 are elderly parents and relatives of applicant no. 1, and cannot be held guilty of domestic violence. Applicant no. 2 lives in his native village, and applicant no. 4 has been living in Indonesia with her husband

23.07.2013

10.11.2023. Respondent no. 2 herself admitted this in paragraph 5 of the complaint; that, they have never lived with respondent no. 2 in a shared household. The address of Noida mentioned as C-53, Sector 47 was a rented house of applicant no. 4’s husband. Under Section 2(f) of the DV Act, a “domestic relationship” exists only when two persons live or have lived together in a shared household and are related by marriage or otherwise as specified. The word used is “are related” (present tense), not “were related.” 11 Here, respondent no. 2 voluntarily left the shared household in London on 17.11.2013 and never lived with applicant no. 2 thereafter; that, the divorce decree by the Croydon Family Court is final. The trial court should have considered whether any domestic relationship existed at the time of filing the complaint. Moreover, the complaint does not mention a single incident of domestic violence in India. All alleged incidents occurred in London, where the police found no evidence and refused to file charges, therefore, the Magistrate in Dehradun had no territorial jurisdiction.

13. Learned senior counsel for the applicant would submit that the applicant no.1 had raised the jurisdiction issue before the trial court, but it was dismissed without proper application of mind on

09.09.2016. The trial court also ignored the requirement under Section 12(1) of the DV Act to consider a Domestic Incident Report from the Protection Officer before passing any order. In this case, neither the complaint nor the Domestic Incident Report was signed by respondent no. 2, 12 and no affidavit was filed by her or her attorney.

14. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 wuld submit that the trial court rightly passed the impugned order after considering all material on record; that, the court correctly held that the Court at Dehradun has jurisdiction to hear the complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act, even when filed through a power of attorney holder. The objections raised by the applicants regarding maintainability and jurisdiction were without merit, and there was no jurisdictional error in rejecting those objections.

15. To this, learned Senior Counsel for the applicants would submit that the applicants have filed this application to quash the entire proceedings of Case No. 267 of 2010 Smt. Ritu Raj vs. Vaibhav Kumar and Others under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, pending before the IV Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun. The Magistrate rejected the applicants’ jurisdictional objection and entertained the complaint filed by opposite party no.3 under Section 12 of the DV Act. 13

16. Learned senior counsel for the applicants would submit that the Magistrate acted under a misconception of law by issuing notices despite lacking territorial jurisdiction. They argue that the alleged incidents took place entirely in Croydon, United Kingdom, and the complaint itself contains no allegation of any incident in Dehradun. On the date of filing the application (03.03.2014), respondent no.2 was employed in Croydon, London. From paragraph 25 of her application, it is clear that she only made casual visits to Dehradun to attend her sister’s marriage before returning to London. Since she neither resided nor worked in Dehradun filing date, the application was not maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction; that in paragraph 12 of her own application, where she states that on 17.11.2013 in London, she was allegedly assaulted and called the police, who registered a domestic violence case. She also admits that she came to India on 23.11.2013 for her sister’s marriage and then returned to London.

17. Learned senior counsel for the applicants 14 emphasized that on the filing date, respondent no.2 was not present in Dehradun, therefore, the Magistrate have no jurisdiction to entertain her complaint. In support of her arguments, she relied upon the judgment in the case of Sharad Kumar Pandey v. Mamta Pandey 2010 SCC Online Del 2977, where the Delhi High Court discussed “temporary residence” under Section 27 of the DV Act. The Court held that temporary residence means a dwelling where a person stays for a meaningful period, not just for a casual or fleeting visit. It does not include places visited only to file a case or attend proceedings. Temporary residence must be continuous from the date it is acquired until disposal of the case. She also relied on the Bombay High Court’s judgment in Afia Rasheed Khan v. Mazharuddin Ali Khan (2021) SCC Bom 4605 passed in W.P. No. 4148 of 2021, which clarified that “temporary residence” requires an intention to stay on a continuing basis for a specific reason, and not just a short or casual visit.

18. Learned Senior Counsel would further 15 submit that the marriage between applicant no.1 and respondent no.2 had already been dissolved by a decree of divorce passed by the competent court at Croydon, UK, which remains unchallenged. The complaint under the D.V. Act is, therefore, an abuse of process of law; that, the alleged domestic violence took place in London, where police investigated and found no evidence, refusing to press charges. Moreover, the Section 12 D.V. Act application was not even filed by respondent no.2 herself but by her mother as attorney holder, without any supporting affidavit, rendering it not maintainable, therefore, the impugned order dated

09.09.2016 rejecting the applicants’ jurisdictional objection is illegal and liable to be quashed.

19. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent no. 2 would submit that respondent no.2 is living at her parents’ house in Premnagar, Dehradun. He referred to the order of a Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 25.03.2022, where the Court had asked Respondent No. 2 to clarify the following : 16 “(i) when she came to Dehradun before filing her application under Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act. (ii) Where she was staying at the time the application was filed. (iii) Whether she was living in London, and if so, to give details and the duration of her stay. (iv) To provide her travel details for the year 2014, along with a copy of her passport and immigration records.”

20. He would further submit that in compliance same, respondent no. 2 filed a supplementary affidavit stating that she came to India on 24.11.2013 and stayed at her residence in Dehradun till 01.01.2014. At the time of filing her application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, she was living in London at 89 Seyssel Street. Her stays in London were: 11.09.2013 to 23.11.2013,

01.01.2014

18.07.2014,

26.09.2014

28.10.2014, 09.12.2015 to 28.10.2018, and from

07.12.2018 till date. Her travel to India in 2014 was: 24.11.2013 to 01.01.2014 and 19.07.2014 to

25.09.2014. She stated this was not just a casual visit. 17

21. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 would further submit that the temporary resident of respondent no.2 is at Dehradun, therefore, the Magistrate has rightly entertain the complaint of respondent no.2 under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. In support of his submission, learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Vikram vs. Vaishali & Others, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1091, wherein, relying on the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it was held that mere temporary residence in a place does not confer jurisdiction on the courts of that place unless such residence satisfies the statutory requirement of permanency or continuity under Section 27 of the D.V. Act. Reliance was also placed the judgment of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of K.C. Vijayakumar & Another vs. State of Karnataka, wherein it was clarified that under Section 27 of the D.V. Act, the Magistrate having jurisdiction is one within whose local limits the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides, but such temporary residence must not be a fleeting or casual visit; it must have some degree of continuity 18 or intention to stay. Further reliance was placed upon the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Google India Private Limited vs. Visakha Industries & Ors., AIR 2020 SC 350, wherein the Court reiterated the guidelines in paragraph 102 of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, illustrating categories of cases wherein the High Court may exercise inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process of the court and to secure the ends of justice, particularly where the allegations do not disclose the commission of any offence or where proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides.

22. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record.

23. It is admitted that the marriage between the applicant and respondent no. 2 took place on

09.04.2013. After the marriage, respondent no. 2 went to London, United Kingdom, with her husband (applicant no. 1). It is also undisputed that the alleged incident of domestic violence took place in 19 London, where she lodged a complaint with the local police. After inquiry, the UK police found the allegations unsubstantiated. It is further not in dispute that, in her application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“D.V. Act”), respondent no. 2 gave her address as 62, Topmast Point, The Quarter Deck, POP, London E14 8SN, which is different from the address of applicant no. 1 mentioned in the complaint.

24. Section 27(1)(a) of the D.V. Act clearly states as under: (1) The Court of Judicial Magistrate of the first class or the Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, within the local limits of which (a)the person aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed; or (b)the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed; or (c)the cause of action has arisen, shall be the competent Court to grant a protection order and other orders under this Act and to try offences under this Act. (2) Any order made under this Act shall be 20 enforceable throughout India.

25. The judgment in Vikram v. Vaishali (Supra) cited by learned counsel for respondent no.2 clarifies that “temporary residence” must be actual, substantial, and existing at the time of filing the complaint. A past stay or short visit before filing is not enough to give jurisdiction.

26. In this case, by her own admission, respondent no. 2 was living in London when she filed the case. Her short visits to India, months earlier, cannot be treated as “temporary residence” for the purpose of jurisdiction. Even in her affidavit, she stated that her stays in Dehradun were only for limited periods between long stays in London. The Supreme Court in Rupali Devi v. State of U.P., (2019) 5 SCC 384, held that jurisdiction can also arise where the effects of domestic violence continue at a certain place. However, there must be a clear pleading and evidence to show such continuing effects. In this case, there is no such factual basis. Merely visiting Dehradun for personal or family reasons is not the same as residing there 21 with the intention to stay for a reasonable time.

27. The Karnataka High Court decision relied upon by the respondent does not help her case because, in K.C. Vijayakumara (Supra), the aggrieved person was actually living within the Magistrate’s jurisdiction when the case was filed — which is not the situation here.

28. The words “temporarily resides” mean that the stay must show some continuity and intention to live there, not just a casual short visit. The Supreme Court in Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414, explained that a “shared household” can include a place where the woman lived in a domestic relationship, even if owned by in-laws. But if the in-laws live separately and there is no evidence of their involvement in cruelty, they cannot be made parties.

29. The record shows that respondent no. 2 came to Dehradun only to attend her sister’s wedding and then returned to London, meaning thereby, that the respondent no.2 had no intention to reside, even temporarily, at her parental home in 22 Dehradun. The respondent no.2 was not residing in Dehradun permanently or even temporarily at the time of filing the complaint. Therefore, Dehradun does not qualify as her “temporary residence” under Section 27 of the D.V. Act. It is also admitted that applicant no. 1 and respondent no. 2 lived together for only a short time, and the other applicants never lived with them. Under the D.V. Act, the law applies to people who have lived together in a shared household. Simply naming relatives in a complaint, without giving clear details of incidents, dates, or acts, is not enough to proceed against them.

30. Considering these facts and the settled legal principles, the complaint filed before the court at Dehradun is without territorial jurisdiction. The proceedings, therefore, are liable to be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., which empowers the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of the court and secure the ends of justice.

31. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds that it is a fit case to exercise inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, 23 application is allowed. The impugned order dated

09.09.2016 passed in Misc. Case No. 267 of 2014 (Smt. Ritu Raj v. Vaibhav Kumar and Others) under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, pending in the Court of 4th Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun, is hereby quashed.

33. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of. Mamta (ALOK MAHRA, J.) 05.08.2025 24